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ABSTRACT 
The subject of this thesis is the transition from de facto 
military rule to constitutional civilian government in Guatemala 
between 1963 and 1970. The focus is upon the limits to 
democratisation inherent in this process at a time of intense 
political polarisation and increasing militarisation. The work 
opens with a consideration of the debates that emerged in the 
context of the political transitions in Latin America during the 
1980s. The second chapter charts the central characteristics of 
a foundat i ona 1 per i od i n Guatema 1 an po 1 it i cs between 1944 and 
1954 and argues that later political developments can only be 
fully understood with reference to this earlier period. Chapter 
Th ree addresses the mi 1 i tary coup of 1963 and the per i od of 
military government which followed. The emphasis is on the 
effort to defi ne the parameters of the Guatema 1 an po 1 it i ca 1 
process and the mi 1 i tary response to the guerri 11 a chall enge 
which emerged after 1962. Chapter Four examines in detail the 
elections of March 1966 and the political campaign which preceded 
them. Particular consideration is given to the origins and 
character of the pact si gned wi th the mi 1 i tary establ i shment 
before the new government was permi tted to take offi ce. The 
following two chapters present a case study of the civilian 
government between 1966 and 1970. Chapter Five addresses the 
rhetoric and reality of the government programme with respect to 
three key pol icy areas and suggests that the fai 1 ure to make 
progress in each was indicative of the true limits to this 
democratic experiment. The thematic focus of Chapter Six is 
insurgency and counterinsurgency and the extensive political 
violence which became the overarching feature of this period. 
The thesis concludes with a brief examination of the 1970 
elections and goes on to argue that the failure of 
democratisation between 1963 and 1970 derived from the historic 
absence of ali bera 1 democrat i c consensus and the predomi nant 
role of the military in the political process. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
APPROACHES TO TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA 
Introduction 
Beginning with the political transition in Ecuador in 1979, 
Latin America experienced transitions from military to 
civilian rule throughout the following decade. Part of a 
wider democratising trend internationally, this phenomenon 
in Latin America has provoked extensive debate about the 
nature of these changes and the longer-term prospects for 
democracy in the region. 1 Before 1980, the lack of stable 
democracy in Latin America had been explained largely in 
terms of regional 
democratisation. 
underdevelopment and obstacles to 
Modernisation theorists' 'optimistic 
equation' argued that when certain levels of socio-economic 
development had been reached, specifically in terms of per 
capita income, literacy and urbanisation, democracy would 
Key reference points include the five-volume work 
edited by Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and 
Laurence Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: 
Prospects for Democracy (Baltimore and London, 1986) and in 
particular, O'Donnell et al (eds.), Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule: Latin America (Baltimore and London, 
1986); O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain 
Democracies (Baltimore and London, 1986); see also, Larry 
Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds.), 
Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America (London, 
1989); Robert A. Pastor, Democracy in the A~~ricas: 
Stoppi ng the Pendu 1 urn (New York, 1989); Scott Ma i nwar i ng, 
Guillermo O'Donnell, J Samuel Valenzuela, Issues in 
Democratic Consolidation: The New South American 
Democracies in Comparative Perspective (Notre Dame, 1992); 
John Hi gl ey and Ri chard Gunther (eds. ) , El i ~~_~_r'1~ 
Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern 
Euro~ (Cambridge, 1992); James M. Malloy, and Mitchell A. 
Seligson (eds.), Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime 
Tran~itiQn in Latin America (Pittsburgh, 1987). 
f 011 ow. 2 A central 
mi ddl e sector wi th a 
political democracy.3 
2 
suppos it i on was the emergence of a 
pre-programmed inc 1 i nat i on towards 
With similar underlying assumptions, 
political culture theorists argued that a 'civic culture' 
characterised by mutual trust, tolerance and compromise was 
an important prerequisite for a democratic polity. Latin 
America's cultural heritage of Iberian colonialism was a 
central factor in the absence of democratic values in the 
region. 4 Again in the developmentalist mode, Samuel 
Huntington pointed to inadequate institutional development 
in the context of increased political participation as the 
source of democratic instability in developing countries.5 
The emergence in the 1960s and 1970s of institutionalised 
military regimes in some of Latin America's most developed 
nat ions countered moderni sat ion i st assumpt ions about the 
unilateral and evolutionary nature of political change and 
exposed thei r fai 1 ure to take account of i nternat i onal 
factors and historical and regional specificities. While 
culturalist explanations persisted, an alternative approach 
argued that the region's particular insertion into the 
2 Terry Lynn Karl, 'Dilemmas of Democratisation in 
Latin America', Comparative Politics, 23 (October 1990). 
p.3 citing Seymour Martin Lipset. 'Some Social Requisites 
of Democracy: Economic Development and Political 
Legitimacy'. American Political Science Review (March 
1959) . 
3 John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin America: 
The Emergence of the Middle Sectors (Stanford. 1958). 
4 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba. The Civic 
Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations 
(Princeton, 1963); Howard J. Wiarda (ed), Politics and 
social Change in Latin America: The Distinct Tradition 
(Amherst. 1974); Seymour Martin Lipset. 'Values. Education 
and Ent repreneu rsh i p', in Seymou r Mart in L i pset and A 1 do 
Solari (eds.). Elites in Latin America. (New York, 1967), 
all cited in Karen L. Remmer. 'New Wine or Old Bottlenecks? 
The Study of Latin American Democracy', in Comparative 
Politics.,23 (July. 19~'). 
5 Samuel P. Hunt i ngton. Pol iti~C! 1 Order i n Changill9 
Societies (New Haven, 1968). 
3 
international capitalist economy was the determining factor 
distorting Latin American development. The problems of 
dependent development - and particularly those associated 
wi th the end of the 'easy' phase of i mport-subst i tut i ng 
industrialisation were argued to have given rise to 
'bureaucratic authoritarian' regimes in Brazil, Argentina, 
Uruguay and in Chile after 1973. 6 Structuralists and 
dependency theorists emphasised external factors as another 
set of preconditions ultimately affecting the possibilities 
for Latin American democratisation. 7 The experience of 
Latin America in the 1980s appeared to challenge these 
earlier paradigms of authoritarianism and democratisation 
in the region. Of particular salience in the current 
debate has been the shift in emphasis away from 
structurally-led analyses to an assessement of the 
political processes and institutional forms involved in 
moving from one regime to another and the focus on elite 
actors and contingent choice. 
Definitions of Democracy 
Integral to the debate on democratic transition and 
consolidation in Latin America is the fundamental question 
of how liberal democracy is itself defined. If the 
Schumpeterian formulation of a polity permitting the choice 
between eli tes by cit i zens vot i ng in regu 1 ar and 
competitive elections largely describes Western democracy 
6 Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic 
Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics 
(Berkeley, 1973); see also, David Collier (ed.,), The New 
Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton, 1979). 
7 Cristobal Kay, Latin American Theories of 
Deve 1 opment and Underdeve 1 opment (London and New York, 
1989); Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, 
Dependency and Deve 1 opment i n La tin Amgr i ca ( Be r ke 1 ey , 
1978) . 
4 
in practice, it is often considered to be too narrow a 
model on which to judge the existence or otherwise of 
political democracy in Latin America. S In Central America, 
where periodic elections have historically been used to 
reinforce dictatorial rule and where more recent 
transitions to civilian government have taken place under 
militarised conditions, to equate non-fraudulent elections 
with democracy - as did US policy-makers in the early to 
mid-1980s - is particularly unsatisfactory.9 In Guatemala 
and El Salvador, these elections failed to establish a 
significant rupture with the past and predated the regional 
move towards peace after 1987. Part of the cont i nui ng 
'reality gap' in many Central American polities between a 
constitutionally-established institutional framework which 
incorporates liberal democratic processes and safeguards in 
theory and their violation in practice, elections on this 
basis reinforced what Mario So16rzano has described as 
democraci as de fachada. 10 
8 Paul Cammack, 'Democratisation: A Review of the 
Issues', Bulletin of Latin American Research, 4 (2, 1985), 
p.45; Karl, 'Dilemmas', p.1 citing J. A. Schumpeter, 
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London, 1943); see 
also, Peter Smith's contention that 'Latin culture' is 
still widely predisposed to regard elections as 'the 
institutionalized celebration of mediocrity': Peter Smith, 
'On Democracy and Democratization', in Howard J. Wiarda 
(ed.), Politics and Social Change in Latin America: Still 
a Distinct Tradition? (Boulder, 1992), p.303. 
9 See, for example, Edelberto Torres Rivas, 
'Authoritarian Transition to Democracy in Central America', 
in Jan Flora and Edelberto Torres Rivas (eds.), Sociology 
of 'Developing Societies': Central America, (London, 1989); 
John A. Booth, 'Elections and Democracy in Central America. 
A Framework for Analysis' in Booth and Seligson, Elections 
and Democracy in Central America. 
10 Mario So16rzano Martinez, Guatemala: Autoritarismo 
y Democracia (San Jose, 1987), pp.277-336. Herman and 
Brodhead, Demonstration Elections: US-Staged Elections in 
the Dominican Republic, Vietnam and El Salvador (Boston, 
1984), argued that such elections in the 1980s were 
externally manipulated 'demonstration elections'; see also, 
Susanne Jonas' qualification of this view: Susanne Jonas, 
The Bat t 1 e For Guatema 1 a. Rebe 1 s, Death Squads, and US 
5 
An election may be 'democratising', but does not in 
itself constitute democracy. Conversely, an election may 
liberalise without democratising in order for a regime to 
legitimise itself or to improve its image, either in terms 
of its own population or in response to international 
pressures for democratisation. O'Donnell and Schmitter'S 
fundamental distinction between liberalisation and 
democratisation is central to their analysis. 11 While the 
former implies the easing of repression and the extension 
of civil liberties within an authoritarian regime, the 
1 atter refers to a change of regi me and a move towards 
democracy. In a situation where authoritarian rulers feel 
the need to relieve pressure on the system, liberalisation 
may exi st wi thout democrat i sat ion. 12 
While there can be no doubt that free and fair elections 
are an essential part of any liberal democracy, a more 
demanding set of conditions is required. The mainstream 
literature on democratic transition broadly follows Robert 
Dahl's classic model structured around the dimensions of 
contestation and participation. 13 In such a system, all 
sectors of the population have a regular opportunity to 
compete for political power and all have the possibility of 
participation in partisan and other forms of collective 
action. Rulers are accountable to the ruled for their 
actions and policies, while citizens are required to accept 
the legitimate outcome of competition and permit winners to 
govern with authority. Within this 'relatively stable mix 
Power (Boulder, 1991), p.159, n.1. 
11 
pp. 7 -11 . 
12 
O'Donnell 
I b iJ;!., p. 7 . 
and Schmitter, Tentative Conclusions, 
13 Robert A. Dah 1, Po 1 yarchy: Part i ~ti on and 
Opposition (New Haven, 1971), cited in Diamond et al, 
Democracy in Developing Countries, p.xvi; Higley and 
Gunther, Elites and Democra_~ic_Consolidation, p. 1; 
O'Donnell and Schmitter, Tentative CqncLusjpns, p.e. 
6 
of liberalisation and democratisation', O'Donnell and 
Schmitter identify citizenship to be the guiding principle 
of democracy.14 A further crucial dimension in the Latin 
American context, and one generally lacking in democratic 
theory, is that of civilian control over the military.15 
Broader issues of social justice and widespread popular 
participation outside elections are usually excluded from 
this procedural minimum. 16 While what are termed 
'maximalist' approaches may be ethically desirable, it is 
argued that they are unrealistic and make analytical 
precision difficult. Political democracy and economic 
equality are distinct concepts and should be treated as 
such. An alternative position argues that in Latin 
America, where extreme inequalities of income and resource 
distribution often coexist with unresponsive governments 
and political elites, political equality is meaningless 
without profound social and structural change. 17 There is 
14 O'Donnell and Schmitter, Tentative Conclusions, 
p.8. 
15 Karl, 'Dilemmas', p.2; see also, Carlos M. Vilas, 
'Prospects for Democratisation in a Post-Revolutionary 
Setting: Central America', Journal of Latin American 
Studies, 28 (May 1996), pp.495-498. 
16 See for example Karl, Dilemmas, p.2; Michael 
Burton, Richard Gunther and John Higley, 'Elite 
Transformations and Democratic Regimes' in Higley and 
Gunther, Elites and Democratic Consolidation, p.2; 
O'Donnell and Schmitter, Tentative Conclusions, p.12. 
17 Susanne Jonas, 'Elections and Transitions: The 
Guatemalan and Nicaraguan Cases', in Booth and Seligson, 
Elections and Democracy in Central AmericQ, pp.126-157; 
idem., Battle for Guatemala, p.175, n.1.; Jenny Pearce, 
'Liberal Democracy or Socialist Democracy? - Dilemmas for 
the Left in Central America', unpublished discussion paper 
presented to i nternat i ona 1 semi nar on 'Change in Lat in 
America -Solidarity in Europe', (Brussels, 9-10 May 1991); 
Barry Gills, Joel Rocamora and Richard Wilson, 'Low 
Intensity Democracy', in Barry Gills, Joel Rocamora and 
Richard Wi 1son (eds.), Low Intensity Democracy: Pol i~ical 
Power in the New World Order (London and Boulder, Colorado, 
1993), pp.3-34. 
7 
a strong case for the inclusion of substantive issues in a 
procedural definition of liberal democracy. As Carlos 
Vilas points out, extreme poverty challenges the very 
notion of citizenship in the way it excludes people from 
access to education, jobs and healthcare. 18 Similarly, 
Christian Anglade has argued that the failure of 
governments to attend to basic social needs, reflects and 
confirms the lack of political representation of those who 
are socially marginalised. 19 In Central America, Vilas has 
argued that these different interpretations of democracy 
were at the centre of the revolutionary struggles 
socioeconomic transformation to recast power relations and 
establish participatory democracy, against an elite 
perception of liberal democracy in its narrowest procedural 
sense. 20 Yet historically, elites have not been prepared 
even to countenance the outcome of elections they 
consi dered unfavourabl e to thei r own interests and have 
been unable to agree on the most basic 'rules of the game'; 
with military intervention and electoral fraud as a 
frequent result. In this sense then, a transition which 
had as its outcome a political democracy according to the 
procedural minimum established above, might be argued to be 
a considerable achievement. 
18 Vilas, 'Democratisation in Central America', p.468. 
19 Christian Anglade, 'Democracy and the New Rule of 
Law in Latin America', in Ian Budge and David McKay (eds.~. 
Developing Democracy (~ondon. Thou~and Oaks and Ne~ De~h~. 
1994). p.238, cited ln Rachel Sleder, 'Conclusl0ns .. 1n 
idem. (ed.). Central America: Fragi le Tr:-an~_tlon 
(Houndmills. Basingstoke and London, 1996), p.277. 
20 Vi 1 as. 'Prospects for Democrat i sat ion' I p. 463. 
8 
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule 
At this point, the distinction between Central American 
authoritarianism and transition in comparison with the 
South American cases should be made explicit. Indeed, the 
Central American cases are notably absent from O'Donnell ~t 
al 's mUlti-volume collection. 21 As Rachel Sieder and James 
Dunkerley have observed, the institutionalised military 
di ctatorshi ps whi ch characteri sed the Southern Cone and 
Brazil before the recent transitions were less common in 
Cent ra 1 Amer i ca. 22 The preva 1 ent pattern in the isthmus 
was rather one of 'mixed regimes', in which armies either 
established their own front parties or participated in 
civilian alliances. While it is generally agreed that the 
transition process in the Southern Cone had its origins in 
schisms within the authoritarian coalition, in Central 
America democratisation emerged in a context of civil war 
and mass opposition. 23 Involving a parallel process from 
war to peace, the transition in Central America has been 
character i sed by greater i nternat i ona 1 i nvo 1 vement than 
elsewhere in the region. 24 
If there is a general consensus that the liberalisation 
in South America was prompted by divisions in the ruling 
coalition, there is considerably less agreement on the 
factors leading to authoritarian breakdown in each country. 
Several discrete strands of explanation can be discerned 
21 O'Donnell et al, Transitions from __ Authoritarian 
22 Rachel Sieder and James Dunkerley, The Military in 
Central America: The Challenge of Transition (London, 
1994), p.1. 
23 Sieder, Fragile Transition, p.4. 
24 I bid. ; see a 1 so, Lau rence Wh i tehead, , The 
Consolidation of Fragile Democracies: A Discussion with 
Illustrations', in Pastor, Democracy in the Americas, 
pp.90-4. 
9 
and centre around questions of declining legitimacy and the 
political economy, the relative strength of civil society, 
opposition alliance and negotiating strategies, and 
corporate interests. 25 Karen Remmer has remarked on the 
multiple and heterogeneous character of the propositions on 
offer and the fact that each case is open to a variety of 
interpret ions. 26 Both Remmer and Gillespie note the 
resulting absence of a single theory to explain democratic 
transi t ion. 27 
O'Donnell differentiates between transitions that occur 
by collapse and those that occur by transaction. 28 In the 
former, the sudden emergence of massive and active 
opposition, or defeat in an external war, precipitates the 
military's retreat to the barracks. In Argentina, military 
defeat in the South Atlantic was central to the collapse of 
the authoritarian regime. However, the regime was already 
in crisis, with economic policy failures as a key source of 
conflict within the 
struggles 
1 n the 
ruling 
between 
context 
succession 
'softliners' 
all ian c e . 29 Initiated from 
coalition, together with 
military 'hardliners' and 
of an all-party opposition 
above and emergi ng from a 
25 Charles G. Gillespie, 'From Authoritarian Crises to 
Democratic Transitions', Latin American Research Review, 22 
(3, 1987), pp.167-8. 
26 Karen L. Remmer, 'New Wine or Old Bottlenecks? The 
Study of Latin American Democracy', Comparative Politics, 
23 (July 1991) p.486. 
27 Gillespie, 'From Authoritarian Crises to Democratic 
Transi t ions' J pp. 165-84; Remmer, 'Lat in Ameri can 
Democracy', pp.479-495; see also, Smith, 'On Democracy', 
pp.301-2. 
28 Ibid., pp.62-75. Several other typologies of 
transtion have been suggested. For a synoptic discussion 
see Scott Mainwaring's 'Transitions to Democracy', pp.317-
26; and Karl, Dilemmas, pp.9-10. 
29 David Pion-Berlin, 'The Fall of Military Rule in 
Argentina: 1976-1983', Journal of Interamerican Studies aod 
World Affairs, 27 (Summer 1985). 
10 
crisis in the 'internal economy' of the regime, Brazil's 
transition was marked by a decade-long process in which the 
regime proved able to retain the initiative to a 
considerable degree. 30 While the Brazilian case most 
closely approximates the model of transition through 
transaction - at least until the early 1980s - Mainwaring 
has argued that a two-fold typology of transaction or 
rupture fails adequately to capture the reality of most 
contemporary transitions in Latin America. 31 He points to 
the Peruvian and Uruguayan cases, in which weakened regimes 
remained in a position to dictate important terms of the 
transition. The Chilean case provides a further example of 
this kind. Mainwaring posits an intermediary category 
between transaction and of transition by extrication 
collapse. It is the nuances involved in the negotiations, 
dialogue and power plays that characterise the two former 
categories to which most of the transitions literature has 
been addressed. 
The move to liberalise a regime occurs either because the 
costs of staying in power increase, or because the risks in 
liberalising decrease. Declining legitimacy often derives 
from the failure to resolve the structural and economic 
problems which originally brought the authoritarian regime 
to power. 32 A fu rther cons i derat i on for the mi 1 i tary are 
the institutional risks associated with growing 
politicisation at the same time as popular pressures 
increase. Most important 1 y perhaps, is the contradi ct ion 
30 Luciano Martins, 'The "Liberalisation" of 
Authoritarian Rule in Brazil I, in O'Donnell et al, 
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Latin America. 
31 Mainwaring, 'Transitions to Democracy and 
Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical and Comparative 
Issues', in Mainwaring, O'Donnell and Valenzuela, Issues in 
Democratic Consoldiation, pp.322-4. 
32 James M. Malloy. 'The Politics of Transition in 
Latin America'. in Malloy and Seligson, Authoritarians and 
Democrats, p.247. 
1 1 
between the continuing position of the military in 
government and its stated 
democracy.33 Defeat of the 
demobilisation or greater 
objective to restore liberal 
'subversive threat' J political 
socio-economic stability may 
encourage 'depressurisation' as a first step towards 
limited democratisation. 34 More often than not. this 
process is a means to resolve elite differences rather than 
encourage greater popular participation. while readiness to 
engage in popular consultation or political competition is 
influenced by the belief that the desired outcome will be 
obtained. Whether or not democracy is the intended outcome 
however. the process that is set in motion by the 
superficial observance of liberal democratic precepts may 
have democ racy as its end resu 1 t . 35 
The focus on splits in the authoritarian coalition as the 
impetus to liberalisation has led to an emphasis on the 
role of elites in the transition process and follows the 
established tendency to view elite dispositions as a 
central factor in stable democracies. 36 A contemporary 
contribution to this mode of analysis is the collection of 
33 See Alan Angell. 'The Soldier as Politician'. in 
Eduardo P. Archetti. Paul Cammack and Bryan Roberts (eds')J 
Sociology of 'Developing Societies'. Latin America (London. 
1987). pp.282-3; see also. Smith's discussion. 'On 
Democracy'. pp.302-3; and in contrast. Adam Przeworski's 
reservations on the value of legitmacy in explaining 
authoritarian breakdown: Adam Przeworski. 'Some Problems in 
the Study of Transition to Democracy'. in O'Donnell et al, 
Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Comparative 
Perspectives. pp.50-3. 
34 Scott Mainwaring. 'Transitions to Democracy and 
Democrat i c Conso 1 i dat ion: Theoret i ca 1 and Comparat i ve 
Issues' in Mainwaring ~e-=t,----,a~l. Issues in Democratic 
Consolidation. p.323. 
35 O'Donnell and Schmitter. Tentative Conclusions. 
p.10; Laurence Whitehead. 'The Alternatives to "Liberal 
Democracy": A Latin American Perspective'. Political 
Studies (Special Issue. 1992). pp.146-159. p.150. 
36 Dankwart Rustow. 'Trans it ions to Democracy: Towards 
a Dynami c Model'. Comparat i ve Pol it i cs. (Apri 1 1970). 
12 
studi es edi ted by Hi gl ey and Gunther. 37 Drawing on the 
paradigmatic Latin American cases of Costa Rica, Venezuela 
and Colombia, the introduction to this work argues that 
elite agreements - which take the form of either 'elite 
settlements' or 'elite convergences' - and the subsequent 
arrival at elite consensual unity, are essential components 
in a stable, consolidated democracy.38 
There is an inherent tension between the idea that 
democratic consolidation largely depends on the commitment 
of key political actors, and the notion of contingency so 
prevalent in the earlier transitions literature. 
Mainwaring has argued that the emphasis on democracy as the 
unintended consequence of elite instrumentalism neglects 
the importance of a normative commitment in the initial 
transition. 39 While this is not a sufficient condition for 
stable democracy, such a commitment facilitates the 
construction of effective democratic institutions and helps 
in the process of building regime legitimacy. Again with 
reference to the cases of Costa Rica, Venezuela and 
Colombia, Mainwaring affirms that democracy as a system 
worked only because political elites saw it as the most 
desirable solution. Although much of the stuff of 
political democracy requires compromise from all sides and 
in many cases represents a second-best choice, this does 
not imply that democracy itself is regarded in the same 
manner. 40 
37 Higley 
Consolidation. 
and Gunther, Elites and 
38 Burton et aI, 'Introduction', in ibid., pp.1-37. 
Included in the authors' definition of elites are the 
holders of key positions in powerful dissident 
organisations and movements. jbid., p.S. 
39 
Mainwaring 
pp.294-335. 
Mainwaring, 'Transitions to Democracy', in 
et al, Issues in Democratic Consolidation, 
40 Ibid., p.309-10. 
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The emphasis on elite processes has 1 ed to a 
corresponding neglect of popular contributions to 
democratisation. Yet different layers in civil society 
have often played a fundamental role in pushing forward the 
political opening, whether through professional 
organisations or popular movements, or both. 41 Middle 
class organisations led the push for expanded political 
space in Brazil, Uruguay and Ecuador, while the role of 
working class organisations has been judged central to 
accelerating the process in Brazil, Chile and Peru. 42 At 
the same time, the intensity of this popular mobilisation 
is shaped by a number of variables, including past patterns 
and networks of contestat ion, as we 11 as the type of 
transition in process. Burton et al have further argued 
that unl ess popul ar protest is di rected by acknowl edged 
leaders and is organised, it usually dissipates or is 
quickly repressed. 43 Thus, the extent to which social 
groups are organised and led by elites and the ability of 
such elites to reach agreement on divisive issues, are 
considered essential to eventual democratic consolidation 
and stabi 1 i ty. 44 
41 Evelyne Huber Stevens, 'Democracy in Latin America: 
Recent Developments in Comparative Historical Perspective', 
Latin American Research Review (25, 1990), pp.161-162; 
O'Donnell and Schmitter, Tentative Conclusions, pp.48-56; 
Scott Mainwaring, 'Transitions to Democracy and Democratic 
Consolidation: Theoretical and Comparative Issues', pp.317-
26. 
42 
p.161. 
43 
Huber Stephens, 'Democracy in Latin America', 
Burton et al, 'Introduction', p.9. 
44 Laura Hastings' review, Journal of Latin American 
Studies, 25 (February 1993) questions the authors' 
insistence on stability in politics as evidence of 
democrat i c conso 1 i dat ion, and J. Samue 1 Va 1 enzue 1 a has 
similarly warned of the tendency to equate consolidation 
with regime stability and hence to assume that durability 
is a basic criterion for democratic consolidation: Samuel 
J. Valenzuela, 'Consolidation in Post-Transitional 
Settings'. in Mainwaring et al, Issues in_Qemo~rati_c 
Consolt~tC!!jon: The New South American De_mocracies __ in 
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Characteri si ng the transi t i on process in terms of a 
multi-layered chess game which takes place in a series of 
overlapping stages, O'Donnell and Schmitter acknowledge the 
role of civil society and the possibility of a 'popular 
upsurge' once the initial liberalisation has begun. 45 It 
is these pressures, they argue, which often bring political 
parties to the centre of the transition. 46 As part of the 
ongoing process of negotiations involving regime hardliners 
and softliners and their opposition counterparts 
similarly divided amongst an opportunistic opposition, a 
moderate opposition and 'maximalists' who reject any deal 
with regime incumbents47 - a series of interim arrangements 
are often reached on the new rules of the political game. 48 
In this sense, Adam Przeworski's notion of 
institutional ising uncertainty has strategic limitations. 49 
The pacts which drive the transition process towards 
'founding elections' implicitly or explicitly map out 'no-
go areas' in which the property rights of the bourgeoisie 
remain 'inviolable' as do the assets and institutional 
privileges of the military.50 Moreover, as Karl has 
Comparative Perspective, p.59. 
45 O'Donnell and Schmitter, Tentative Conclusions. 
pp.48-56. 
46 Ibid., pp.40-5, 57-8. 
47 O'Donnell, 'Transitions to Democracy: Some 
Navigation Instruments' in Robert A. Pastor (ed.), 
Democracy in the Americas: Stopping the Pendulum (New York 
and London, 1989), pp.64-5. 
48 O'Donnell and Schmitter, Tentative Conclusions, 
pp.38-48. 
49 Adam Przeworski, 'Some Probl ems in the Study of the 
Transition to Democracy'. in O'Donnell et al, Transitions 
from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, pp.58-
63; see also, Mainwaring's reservations on this subjec~: 
Mainwaring, 'Transitions to Democracy and Democratlc 
Consolidation', pp. 
50 O'Donnell and Schmitter, 'Tentative Conclusions', 
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argued, such elite pacts are also undemocratic mechanisms 
which can freeze a conservative bias into the polity and 
block further progress towards political, social and 
economi c democracy. 51 Whether or not such rest r i cted 
democracies are able to endure and develop in a more 
participatory direction depends to a large extent on the 
strength of civil society and the effectiveness of 
political parties in channelling popular demands. 52 
The heavy emphasis in the literature on the contingent 
nature of the transi t i on process and the autonomy of 
political factors, distinguishes it from earlier 
structurally-led analyses which focused on preconditions 
for democracy. However, this approach might be argued to 
run the risk of excessive voluntarism in its wider neglect 
of structural factors. 53 In an effort to locate elite 
behaviour in a wider structural-historical framework, Karl 
has argued that the emergence of democracy is made more or 
less possible by existing socio-economic structures. While 
labour-intensive agrarian structures in El Salvador, 
Nicaragua and Guatemala have traditionally linked politics 
and economics in ways inimical to democratisation, she 
suggests that petroleum revenues in Venezuela contributed 
to the absence of a large landowning elite - a crucial 
element in permitting the strategic choices which 
culminated in the 1958 Pact of Punto Fijo.54 In contrast, 
p.69. 
51 Karl, Dilemmas, pp.9-13; Terry Lynn Karl, 
'Petroleum and Political Pacts': The Transition to 
Democracy in Venezuela', in O'Donnell et al, Transitions 
From Authoritarian Rule: Latin America, p.198. 
52 Terry Lynn Karl, 'The Hybrid Regimes of Central 
America', Journal of Democr~, 6 (July 1995), p.82. 
53 Karl, 'Di lemmas', p.6; Remmer, 'The Study of Latin 
American Democracy', pp.483-5, Smith, 'On Democracy', 
pp.304-5. 
54 Karl, 'Hybrid Regimes', p.82; Karl, 'Dilemmas', 
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Mainwaring's emphasis on the importance of elite commitment 
to democracy in normative terms, reintroduces the 
problematic concept of political culture. 55 In the case of 
Venezuela he argues that it was this normative commitment, 
rather than oil which was decisive in explaining the 
construction of democracy in that country.56 
There is a tendency in the transitions literature to 
minimise the impact of external factors on democratisation 
in Latin America, in marked contrast to the emphasis given 
these quest ions independency ana 1 ysi s. 57 Remmer has 
stressed the need for greater attenti on to the changi ng 
international context in which these transitions took 
place. 58 The importance of international involvement in 
the Central American transition has already been signalled, 
with the role of the United States seen as particularly 
problematic. In the rest of Latin America, Washington 
apparently did little to influence or control the 
democratisation process. A possible answer lies in the 
location of these countries outside the immediate sphere of 
US influence - although this had been not prevented various 
p.? 
55 See John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, 'Paths 
to Democracy and the Political Culture of Costa Rica, 
Mexico and Nicaragua', in Larry Diamond (ed.), Political 
Cu_lture and Democracy in Developing Countries, (Boulder, 
Colorado, 1994); and Vilas, 'Democratisation in Central 
America', pp.498-501 for current assessments on the 
relationship between political culture and democratisation. 
56 Mai nwari ng, 
Mainwaring's more 
ibid., pp.308-12. 
'Transitions to Democracy', p.32? 
general arguments on thi s poi nt 
For 
see, 
57 
p. 18. 
O'Donnell and Schmitter, Tentative __ CQnclu~jonsJ 
58 Remmer, 'The Study of Latin American Democracy'. 
p.486. 
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kinds of intervention in the past. 59 Peter Smith further 
suggests that no serious threat was perceived to US 
interests by these transitions and in particular, that 
there was 
power. 60 
no 
A 
risk of a party of the radical 
more critical vi ew contends 
left taking 
that the 
democrat i sat i on process is a de 1 i berate US st rategy to 
dissolve political barriers as part of a transnationalising 
neo-liberal agenda which is itself inherently 
undemocrat i c. 61 
Issues in Democratic Consolidation 
The process which begins with the inauguration of a 
democratic government and ends in a consolidated democratic 
regime has been referred to as a second transition. 62 An 
ongoi ng process 1 eadi ng to the increased permanence and 
stability of a democratic system, its progress is measured 
by - amongst other factors - the new regime's ability to 
undertake far-reaching institutional reforms. The volume 
edi ted by Mai nwari ng et al focuses on some of the key 
issues and constraints in the South American transition 
towards consolidation, while the particularities of this 
transition in the Central American context are treated by 
Sieder et al. 63 Both focus on the enduring question of 
effective military subordination to civilian rule in the 
59 Smi th, 'On Democracy', p. 306-7 . 
60 Ibid. 
61 See 
Gills et al, 
Gills et al, 'Low Intensity Democracy'. 
'Low Intensity Democracy, pp.3-34. 
i n 
62 Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell and J. Samuel 
Valuenzuela, 'Introduction'. in Mainwaring et al, Issues in 
Q~mQ~~1t~Gonsol i dat ion. p. 2. 
63 Mainwaring, O'Donnell and Valenzuela, Issues in 
Democratic Consolidation; Sieder, Fragile Transition. 
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post-authori tari an sett i ng, the need for reform of key 
political actors, and the problems involved 1 n 
reconstructing political parties and party systems to 
provide effective channels of 
representation and accountability.64 
Substantive issues are increasingly seen to be linked to 
the longer-term consolidation of political democracy.65 
O'Donnell and Schmitter address this question in 
hypothesising a possible second transition, consisting of 
two independent but rel ated processes - soci al democracy 
and economi c democracy. While this 'socialization' is 
envisaged as a 'remote' goal - better not attempted before 
political democracy has been achieved - Vilas has warned 
against a sequential approach to democratisation in Central 
America. 66 Failure to combine the formal and substantive 
dimensions of democratisation can lead to delays in both. 
In this sense Vilas argues, the integrated character of the 
current Guatemalan peace negotiations with their 
incorporation of socio-economic and ethno-cultural issues, 
offer a possi bl e way forward for democrat i c advance and 
consol i dat ion. 67 
The abi 1 i ty of the mi 1 i tary to i nfl uence to varyi ng 
64 For the latter see in particular, Rodolfo Cerdas 
Cruz, 'Political Parties and Party Systems', in Sieder, 
Fragile Transition, pp.15-54; and Frances Hagopian, 'The 
Compromised Consolidation: The Political Class in the 
Brazilian Transition', in Mainwaring et al, Issues in 
Democratic Consolidation, pp.243-283; see also, Scott 
Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully (eds.), Building 
Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America 
(Stanford, 1995). 
65 Mainwaring. O'Donnell 
Democratic Consolidation. p.5. 
and Valenzuela, Issues in 
66 O'Donnell and Schmitter, TentativE;!~ncl~sions, 
pp.11-14; Vilas. 'Democratisation in Central America', 
p.502; see also. Karl. 'Hybrid Regimes', pp.78-9. 
67 Vilas, 'Democratisation in Central America'. p.502. 
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degrees all the Latin American transitions, is seen 
principal problem for eventual consolidation. 68 
as a 
In 
Argentina, the collapse of the regime in the wake of the 
South Atlantic conflict was accompanied by 'a state of 
political passivity and social confusion' which left the 
military able to influence the transition despite its 
external defeat. 69 Brazil's 'liberalisation from above' 
initially gave the regime wider scope to control the 
transition process, although opposition strategies and 
popular mobilisation proved increasingly important in the 
unstoppable momentum towards democratisation. 70 In Central 
America, military tutelage of the democratisation process 
has been greater st ill, wi th the Guatemal an mi 1 i tary in 
particular as a major force in the transition. 71 
Using the Chilean case as an example, J. Samuel 
Valenzuela identifies the various 'perverse institutions' 
68 Fe 1 i pe Aguero, 'The Mi 1 i tary and the L i mi ts to 
Democratisation in South America', in Mainwaring et al, 
Issues in Democratic Consolidation, pp.153-98, argues that 
this military predominance was a critical difference 
between the Spanish and South American cases. 
69 Scott Mainwaring and Eduardo Viola, 'Transitions to 
Democracy: Brazil and Argentina in the 1980s', Journal of 
International Affairs, (Winter 1985), cited in Charles 
Gillespie, 'From Authoritarian Crises to Democratic 
Transitions', Latin American Research Review, 22 (1987), 
p. 171 . 
70 I bid . , p p . 1 74- 7 . See a 1 so, P au 1 C a mm a c k , 
'Resurgent Democracy: Threat and Promise', New Left Review. 
(May/June 1986), p.121-8; Cammack, 'Brazil: The Long March 
to the New Repub 1 i c', New Left Revi ew, (November /December 
1991), pp.21-58. 
71 Cerdas Cruz, 'Political Parties and Party 
Systems', p.19; James Dunkerley. Power in the Isthmus. A 
Political History of Modern Central America (London and New 
York. 1988), p.498. For an account of this process from a 
key military insider, see Hector Alejandro Gramajo Morales, 
De La Guerra ... A La Guerra: La Dificil Transici6n Politic~ 
en Guatemala (Guatemala 1995). pp.227-446. 
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which can be carried over from the authoritarian regime. ~ 
Military-enacted constitutions and legal frameworks provide 
the military establishment with tutelary powers and permit 
discriminatory practices to occur in the electoral process. 
Similarly, 'reserved domains' guaranteeing military 
autonomy over such matters as income, expenditure and 
promotions and appointments, may be embedded in the 
inherited legal apparatus. Often the subject of tacit or 
explicit agreements between the military and the new 
authorities i n the initial transition process, the 
cha 11 enge becomes one of how to rega inc i vi 1 ian cont ro 1 
over these areas. 
More than a decade after the wave of Lat in Ameri can 
democratisation began, the perception of the fragility of 
these newly-democratic regimes persists. Yet, early 
predi ct ions that thi s was merel y the 1 atest stage ina 
cyclical pattern of regional authoritarianism and democracy 
have proved precipitate. 73 The debt crisis of the 1980s 
did not occasion a reversion to military government and 
civilian regimes have survived the implementation of harsh 
austerity programmes. The experience of reactionary 
authoritarianism or in the case of Cent ra 1 Amer i ca 
civil war was central to this, altering perceptions and 
convincing maximalists on both sides to reduce their 
demands. 
What might be termed the 'politics of exhaustion' also 
implies a lowering of popular expectations of what can be 
achieved through political action and the consequent 
72 J. Samuel Valenzuela, 'Democratic Consolidation in 
Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and 
Facilitating Conditions', in Mainwaring ~al, Issues in 
Democratic Consolidation, pp.58-70. 
73 Malloy, 'The Politics of Transition', p.256; Edward 
S. Herman and James Pet ras, , "Resurgent Democracy" : 
Rhetoric and Reality, New Left Review, No.154, 
(November/December 1985), pp.83-98. 
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demobilisation of civil society. The return to democracy 
has been accompanied by considerable disenchantment with 
the political process and with politicians in particular, 
who are plausibly perceived as corrupt and self-interested. 
One outcome of this disillusion has been the emergence of 
populist presidents who govern without the constraints of 
political parties or the parliamentary process. While a 
return to the institutionalised military dictatorships of 
the 1970s appears increasingly unlikely in Latin America, 
the tendency towards civilian authoritarianism represents 
a new challenge for democracy in the region. 
Introduction 
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CHAPTER TWO 
REVOLUTION AND COUNTERREVOLUTION 
The subject of this thesis is the transition from de facto 
military rule to constitutional civilian government in 
Guatemala between 1963 and 1970 which will be examined with 
reference to the debates that emerged in the context of the 
political transitions in Latin America during the 1980s. 
However, the degree of political polarisation in the 1960s 
and the consequent constraints on democratic government can 
onl y be understood wi th reference to an earl i er 
foundational period in twentieth century Guatemalan 
political history. It is argued here that there are 
important points of similarity and comparison between the 
experlence of 1944-1954 on the one hand, and 1963-1970 on 
the other, which bear consideration in any analysis of the 
second period. 
The 'revolution' of 20 October 1944 ushered in a singular 
decade in which the governments of Juan Jose Arevalo (1945-
1951) and Jacobo Arbenz (1951-1954) presided over an 
unprecedented expansion in political democracy accompanied 
by efforts at soci o-economi c and structural reform. Ten 
years after its overthrow in June 1954 it remained an 
emblematic era for both the left and the right. In the 
context of severe restrictions on political and popular 
organisation after 1954 and the explicit proscription of 
communism, the reformist decade continued to be perceived 
as something of a 'golden age' for the Guatemalan left. 
Converse1 y, it was presented by the ri ght as a narrow1 y-
averted path to communi sm to whi ch any return must be 
prevented at all costs. Still vivid in the popular memory 
and political culture of the 1960s, the weight of this 
particular history was crucial in shaping not only the 
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forces which brought Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro to 
office in 1966, but also in defining the acute limits to 
democratic government in the period which followed. 
The later chapters in this work have been arranged with 
a view to the themes arising from this earlier period in 
Guatemalan political history. However, the intention is 
not one of direct comparison, but rather to signal points 
of continuity as well as rupture in the political process. 
Indeed, while it might tentatively be argued that with the 
'Third Government of the Revolution' (1966-1970), the 
revolution experienced its final defeat, the political 
context and content of the latter period was very distinct 
to that of the 1940s. In particular, the emergence of a 
guerrilla insurgency in the 1960s significantly altered the 
political focus and led to renewed efforts on the part of 
the Uni ted States to counter the communi st threat in 
Guatemala. 
While the internal language of reaction had shifted from 
'arbenzcomunismo' to 'castrocomunismo', the anti-reformist 
precepts of anticomunismo in relation to the 1944-1954 
period remained firmly in place. It is also worth 
stressing that several of the main political actors in the 
1960s had been participants in one way or another in this 
earlier process. Similarly, the seeds of what was to 
become an enduring military influence in Guatemalan 
politics can also be found in the reformist decade. 
Finally, the popular impact of the key socio-economic 
reforms undertaken between 1944 and 1954 was such that, 
while of limited practical substance, they remained in some 
form on the statute books and continued to form part of the 
po 1 it i ca 1 rhetor i c in the fo 11 owi ng two decades. The 
purpose of this chapter therefore, is to give an account of 
this earlier period with particular reference to the 
factors which remain central to any interpretation of 
Guatemala in the 1960s. 
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Patterns of Historical Development 
The popular insurrection which overthrew the remnants of 
the 13-year regime of General Jorge Ubico signalled a new 
era in Guatemalan political history. Ubico was heir to an 
entrenched system of personalistic and authoritarian rule. 
Th is began wi th the conservat i ve i ntervent ions of Jose 
Rafael Carrera between 1835 and 1868, and extended into the 
period of liberal free trade with Justo Rufino Barrios 
(1873-1885) and Manuel Estrada Cabrera (1898-1920). 
The advent of coffee as Guatemala's main cash crop after 
1870, brought with it the emphatic revival of liberalism. 
In response to growing demands 
importantly - for seasonal labour, 
government gained particular force. 
for 1 and and most 
the logic of coercive 
The nationalisation of 
the extensi ve property hol di ngs of the Church and the 
commoditisation of communal lands facilitated the 
exceptionally large landed estates which came to 
characterise Guatemala's system of land tenure. For the 
Indians who made up the bulk of the rural population, these 
reforms had profound implications. 1 While the full 
repercussions of the alienation of communal lands only 
became apparent as the rural population increased into the 
twentieth century, the demand for a readily available 
seasonal workforce was of immediate impact. The colonial 
system of coerced labour was revived and codified through 
the traditional system of mandamientos (corvee) and the 
enforcement of debt peonage contracts. The latter, while 
1 Of the total population of 1,224,602 in 1880, 
844,384 were classified as Indian: David McCreery, Rural 
Guatemala, 1760-1940 (Stanford, 1994), p.346, Table A.3. 
For a discussion of rural labour relations during this 
period and the effects of the liberal reforms on the Indian 
communities see esp. ibid .• pp.161-337; see also. J. C. 
Cambranes, Coffee and Peasants. The Origins of the Modern 
Plantation Economy in Guatemala, 18~3-1857 (Stockholm. 
1985); Dunkerley, Power in the Ist~mus. pp.25-30; Jim 
Handy. Gift of tt:le Devil. A Hist_or"'Y __ .Qf Guatemala (Boston. 
1984) pp.57-75. 
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that it not forced labour as such, amounted to as much ln 
tied peasants into a comp 1 ex system of debt 
generally required to be paid off through 
which was 
plantation 
labour. 
Underpinning state control and repression in the 
countryside lay the newly professionalised army - Barrios 
established the elite military training school, the Escuela 
Politecnica in 1873 - and the militias, reorganised as an 
army reserve and acting as a rural police force. While the 
land-owning class gained directly from these arrangements, 
they were also beholden to a state mediating labour 
relations on their behalf and in particular to the powerful 
jefes politicos in each department. 2 Largely as a 
consequence, in Guatemala there was an absence of even the 
feeble systems of oligarchic competitive politics being 
essayed elsewhere in the region in the early decades of the 
twentieth century.3 Long before the military became a part 
of the ruling coalition in the rest of Central America, the 
Guatemalan ruling class had traded control of political 
administration for social and economic power. 
By 1890, the coffee trade was estab 1 i shed as a maj or 
source of foreign exchange revenue throughout the isthmus 
with the exception of Honduras. The rapid expansion of US-
controlled banana cultivation after the turn of the century 
consolidated the export-led model and completed Central 
2 McCreery, Rural Guatemala, p.221, 271; 
Dunkerley, 'Guatemala Since 1930', in Leslie Bethell 
Central America Since Independence (Cambridge, 
p. 122. 
James 
(ed. ) , 
1 991 ) , 
3 James Dunkerley, 'Guatemala, 1944-1954', in idem., 
Political Suicide in Latin America (London, 1992) p.84; 
idem., Power in the Isthmus, pp.29-30. As McCreery, Rural 
Guatemala, p.335, points out, it is indicative of the lack 
of organisation among the elites and the tensions between 
the caudillos and the coffee planters that large landowners 
were unable to form a national organisation until after the 
1920s. 
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America's integration into the world market. 4 While the 
banana enclave became a feature throughout the region, in 
Guatema 1 a it was represented by 
United Fruit Company (UFCo). 
a single 
Estrada 
company - the 
Cabrera proved 
particularly supine in his dealings with the UFCo, his 
generous concessi ons to the banana industry and to its 
subsidiary International Rai lways of Central America 
(IRCA) contributing to his longevity as well as his 
eventual overthrow in 1920. In so far as banana land did 
not impinge on coffee land, UFCo presented no threat to the 
plantation elites. However, resentment obtained from the 
heavier taxes applied to coffee under Estrada Cabrera and 
in particular, the discriminatory rates charged by IRCA to 
transport the grain. 5 Again, in 1931, Ubico's backing for 
UFCo and its subsidiaries against increasing elite 
opposition helped him gain support from the United States. 
These questions were to remain central to the unravelling 
of elite support for him in 1944. 
In 1920, they provided the 
to muster 
opportunity for 
fi nquero back i ng 
Estrada 
for his Cabrera's opponents 
removal from office. His overthrow inaugurated a decade 
without precedent in Guatemala a precursor to 1 ater 
transitions - with a series of relatively free and honest 
elections accompanied by greater press freedom. While the 
proto-nationalist government of Carlos Herrera was removed 
by a coup some eighteen months later, the subsequent 
governments of Generals Jose Maria Orellana (1921-1925) and 
Lazaro Chacon (1926-1930) were forced to accede to limited 
competition and continued to face opposition on the 
question of UFCo concessions. 6 
----------
4 Vi ctor Bu 1 mer-Thomas, The Po 1 it i ca 1 Economy of 
Central America since 1920 (Cambridge, 1987) pp.1-24. 
5 Export taxes 
compared to 8.7% for 
Isthmu~J p.62. 
6 I~i~., p. 63 . 
for bananas in 1928 
coffee: Dunkerley, 
were 
Power 
1 .9% as 
in the 
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Dominated by the so-called 'Generation of 1920' - a group 
of students advocat i ng a number of mi 1 d reforms the 
period was notable for its flourishing associationa1 life. 
This mobilisation was largely limited to the urban sphere 
and was periodically repressed, but there were also 
frequent bursts of unrest in the countryside as the rural 
population responded to the weakening of state control 
fo11owi ng Estrada Cabrera's fall. 7 In the context of the 
'rural bolshevism' sweeping Mexico, and no longer certain 
of the authority of the state or its capacity for 
repressi on, the p1 anter el i te regarded such di sorder and 
the threat of indigenous protest with great alarm. 
With the onset of the Depression in Guatemala the scope 
for oligarchic politics ceased. The corporate interests of 
the landowning class as a whole overcame those of certain 
competitive groups within it. a It is notable that this 
early attempt at democratic transition ended in elections 
rather than a coup, a situation which also pertained in 
1970 with the election of Colonel Arana Osorio. 
The Fall of Ubico and the October Revolution 
General Jorge Ubico's uncontested election in 1931 at the 
head of the Partido Liberal Progresista reflected the 
regi ona 1 t rend towards caudi 11 i smo in the wake of the 
Depress ion. However, in Guatema 1 a it represented 1 ess a 
rupture with the liberal oligarchic model than a revival an 
established tradition of personalist and autocratic 
politics. Despite the appearance of liberal democratic 
procedure - thereby fac i 1 i tat i ng cont i nued US support 
7 McCreery. Rural Guatemala. pp.297-300. 
8 Ibig .• pp.312-316; Dunkerley, Po~e~~_ the Isthmus. 
p.63. 
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Ubico's government was particularly monolithic and brooked 
no oPposition. 9 Dissenters were labelled 'communists' and 
dealt with accordingly.l0 In his zealous attempts to 
centralise the state all independent associations 
including the Chamber of Commerce and the Guatemalan 
Agricultural Association (AGA) - were suppressed. 11 
Responding to the economic crisis, the government slashed 
public expenditure by 30 per cent and pursued an anti-
corruption campaign in the public sector. Austerity 
programmes maintained a reduced and servile bureaucracy, 
largely staffed by military officers who were themselves 
invigilated by a formidable police force and spy network. 
Wi th 80 general s and some 700 offi cers, the bul k of the 
6,OOO-strong military remained poorly-trained and poorly-
equipped. Resentment regarding this state of affairs was 
an important source of junior officer support for the 1944 
Revolution. 12 
In the countryside, Ubico's moves to strengthen state 
power were especially notable. Fundamental to these were 
the replacement of the expensive debt peonage system with 
a vagrancy law in 1934 and the imposition of centrally 
9 For an overview of the Ubico era see Kenneth Grieb, 
Guatemalan Caudillo: The Regime of Jorge Ubico (Athens, 
Oh i 0, 1979). 
10 Jose M. Aybar de Soto, Dependency and I ntervent ion: 
The Case of Guatemala in 1954 (Boulder, 1954), p.90; Piero 
Gleijeses, Shattered Hope. The Guatemalan Revolution and 
the United States, 1944-1954 (Princeton, 1991), pp.8-9; 
Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus, pp.99-100. 
11 Dunkerley, 'Guatemala Since 1930', p.123. 
12 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, pp.15-16; Kalman 
Silvert, A Study in Government: Guatemala (New Orleans, 
1954), p.5; Jose Luis Cruz Salazar, 'El Ejercito como una 
Fuerza Political in ASIES, Democracia, Gobernabilidad y 
Sociedad Politica (Guatemala, 1993), pp.132-3; 'Un militar 
honesto de la revoluci6n: Carlos Paz Tejada', in Carlos 
Caceres (ed.), Aproximaci6n a Guatemala (Culiacan, Mexico, 
1980), p.42. 
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appoi nted i ntendentes in pl ace of 1 ocall y el ected 
indigenous mayors, who had hitherto governed in conjunction 
with local ladino authority. Decree 1996 defined as a 
vagrant any man without sufficient property to provide an 
'adequate' income, or who had not complied with a contract 
to work on a finca, or who did not have a contract to work 
on a finca and who did not cultivate specified areas of 
coffee, sugar, tobacco or vari ous subsi stence crops. 13 
Since few Indians had access such amounts of land in the 
1930s, almost all became legally bound to be available for 
both plantation labour and unpaid road-building. 14 A 
further amendment in 1935 effectively required all 
agricultural labourers to work for wages for either 100 or 
150 days a year depending on their access to land. 
Presented as a democratic advance, the transition from debt 
peonage to 'trabajo libre' corresponded rather to the 
insufficiencies of debt servitude to control the increasing 
rural population in a context of growing land shortages and 
represented another mechanism with which to 
institutionalise the coersion of labour whilst reducing its 
cost s to P 1 antat i on owners. 15 
These measures, together with his government's success in 
balancing the budget and presiding over a slow but steady 
economic recovery after the crisis of 1930-32, won Ubico 
oligarchic acceptance if not outright support. In exchange 
for order in the countryside, the landowning class was 
13 McCreery, Rural Guatemala, p.317. 
14 For Ubico's public works programme 
Guatemalan Caudillo, pp.126-40, 163-76. 
see Grieb, 
15 McCreery, Rural Guatemala" pp.312-22; see also, 
Richard Newbold Adams, Crucifixion by __ Power. Essays9n 
Guatemalan National Social Structure. 1~4~-196Q (Austin and 
London;-1970)-pp.-174-184; Dunkerley, flower in th~_Istl1muSJ 
pp.99-101; Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, pp.8-17; Handy, Gift 
of the Devil J pp.94-101; Marco Antonio Flores, Fortuny: Un 
comuni sta __ 9!@t~m~J t~tCO (Guatema 1 a, 1994), p. 41 . 
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evidently prepared to forego political control. Yet, 
Ubico's relations with this group were never close. and 
this partially explains oligarchic indifference to his 
eventual departure. 16 
The unravelling of Ubico's political control can be 
attributed to a number of factors which were symptomatic of 
the exhaustion of caudillismo throught the region. 
Demographic changes in the two decades leading up to the 
Second World War had increased the urban sector with an 
accompanying transformation in the composition of 
emp1oyment. 1? In Guatemala City. the regional expansion of 
the middle class was reflected in the five-fold increase in 
teachers during this period. 1B The decline in real living 
standards as a result of wartime restrictions. exacerbated 
frust rat i on wi th the 1 ack of representat ion ina system 
where liberal democratic form bore little resemblance to 
political reality. An important additional factor was the 
anti-dictatorial ethos of the war itself. Unadulterated by 
the censorsh i p usua 11 y app 1 i ed to forei gn news reports. 
All i ed propaganda spoke of the At 1 ant i c Charter. 
Roosevelt's 'Four Freedoms' and the need to defend liberty 
and democracy. Against this background. authorised 
demonstrations in support of the Allies began to acquire a 
new and more subversive meaning. 19 
16 As Jefe Politico in Alta Verapaz between 1907 and 
1909 Ubi co had at times come into confl i ct wi th 1 oca 1 
German coffee planters: Dunkerley. Power in the Isthmus. 
p.111. n.44; see also. Adams. Crucifixion by Power. p.183; 
Gleijeses. Shattered Hope. p.19. 
1? Bulmer-Thomas. Political Economy. pp.100-101. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Flores. Fortuny: un comun i sta ~uatema 1 teco, pp. 51-
73; Ernesto Capuano. 'Guatemala 1944-1954' in Caceres. 
8!:>roximacion a Guatemala. p.35. It is also significant 
that the United States adopted a position of strict 
neutrality towards the popular mobilisations which forced 
Ubico from power. While Ubico followed the US lead in 
declaring war on the Axis powers and deporting German 
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Inspired by the civil unrest in neighbouring El Salvador 
which had brought down his contemporary General 
Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez - in May 1944, Guatemalan 
university students and teachers began to organise in open 
defiance of Ubico in June. Initial demands for university 
autonomy resul ted in i mmedi ate repressi on and the 
subsequent delivery to the presidential palace of a 
petition signed by 311 Guatemalan notables calling for the 
restorat i on of const i tut i ona 1 guarantees. The protests 
rapidly gained popular backing and escalated over several 
days into a full-scale demonstrations demanding the 
dictator's resignation and finally a week-long general 
strike in the capital. 20 On 1 July Ubico resigned and 
turned over power to a lacklustre trimvirate of generals. 21 
After much behind-the-scenes negotiation and a considerable 
amount of military pressure - namely, the occupation of the 
Congress by troops on 3 July the National Assembly 
elected General Ponce Vaides provisional President and 
convoked presidential elections for December 1944. 22 
nationals in common with his Central American 
counterparts - and 'i ntervened' thei r extensi ve property 
holdings in 1941, he had continued to resist State 
Department pressure for outright nationalisation until a 
few days before his fall in June 1944: Dunkerley, 
'Guatemala, 1944-1954', p.91. 
20 Flores, Fortuny: 
Shattered Hope, pp.23-5; 
un comunista, pp.75-84; Gleijeses, 
Jorge Lujan Munoz, 'Hace medio 
1944-1944. Una Recordacion 
edition (October 1994) pp.6-
siglo', in 'Revolucion 
Historica', Cronica, special 
10. 
21 Generals Buenaventura Pineda, Eduardo Villagran 
Ariza and Federico Ponce Vaides: see Jose Luis Cruz 
Salazar, 'El Ejercito como una Fuerza Politica', pp.132-3; 
Flores, Eortuny: un comunista, p.86. 
22 It was at this point that Arbenz resigned his 
military post and began to conspire to overthrow the 
government: Gleijeses Shattered Hope, pp.25-7; Flores, 
Fortuny: un comunista, pp.81-4; see also, Francisco 
Villagran Kramer, Biografia Politica de Guatemala - los 
pactos politicos de 1944 a 1970 (Guatemala, 1993), pp.3-5; 
Kalman Silvert, A Stu~in Government, p.?; Lujan Munoz, 
'Hace medio siglo', p.10-11. 
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In the period of liberalisation which followed, 
restrictions on the formation of political parties and 
unions were lifted and political exiles began to return. 
By the end of August some eight political parties had been 
established, of which the most significant were the 
student-dominated Frente Popular Libertador (FPL) and 
Renovaci6n Nacional (RN), led by schoolteachers. Both 
supported the nomination of Dr Juan Jose Arevalo as their 
presidential candidate. 23 Little was known about Arevalo 
apart from his reputation in academic circles as an 
intellectual and teacher who specialised in the philosophy 
of educat i on and who had 1 i ved in sel f-i mposed exi 1 e in 
Argentina for several years. 24 While he had no record of 
active opposition to Ubico, he was sufficiently distant 
from the regime to enjoy considerable prestige and 
anonymous enough to appear to be all things to all people. 
As one of the founders of the RN put it, Arevalo was 'a 
b 1 an k page'. 25 
With Arevalo's return to a tumultuous reception on 3 
September, repression began to increase. 26 Notwithstanding 
hi s statements to the contrary, it was cl ear that Ponce 
intended to run for the presidency in December. Supported 
23 Others inc 1 uded the Part i do Soc i a 1 Democrat i co 
backing the candidacy of Colonel Guillermo Flores Avendano; 
the Frente Nacional Democratico campaigning on behalf of 
Ubico's erstwhile ambassador to Washington, Adrian Recinos; 
and Concordia Nacional proposing Clemente Marroquin Rojas -
who declined in favour of Arevalo: Villagran Kramer, 
Biografia _ Politica, pp.5-7; Lujan Munoz, 'Hace medio 
siglo', p.11; Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, p.27. 
24 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, pp.32-5; Mario Efrain 
Najera Farfan, Los Estafadores de la Democrac;a. Hombres y 
Hechos en Guatemala (Buenos Aires, 1956) pp.70-1. 
25 Najera 
Shattered Hope, 
p.8. 
Farfan, Los Estafadores, p. 70; Gl ei j eses, 
pp.34-5; Silvert, A Study in Government, 
26 N a j era Far fan , ~L~o~s~-"E=s~t=a~f..:::a,-"d=....!o,,-,r,--e=s , p.42; Flores, 
Fortuny: un comunist~, pp.103, 107-8. 
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by the government bureaucracy and Ubico's Partido Liberal 
Progresista, Ponce sought to bolster his candidacy with the 
promise to distribute recently-nationalised German lands to 
campesinos who were brought into the capital to march in 
his favour. 27 The most spectacular of these stage-managed 
demonstrations took place on Independence Day, when 
thousands of Indians wearing medallions bearing Ponce's 
portrait, paraded through Guatemala City waving machetes 
and st i cks, shout i ng 'Vi va Ponce'. 28 
The repression peaked with the assassination of the 
editor of the leading opposition daily El Imparcial on 1 
October and opposition leaders 
foreign embassies. Others were 
of the 13 October elections to 
began to take refuge in 
deported. 29 The resul ts 
fi 11 vacant seats in the 
Congress confirmed Ponce's intention to take power with the 
government-supported slate winning by 'a handsome, not to 
say fantastic margin, garnering 48,530 votes out of a total 
of 44,571' ballots cast. 30 Orders were issued for the 
27 Adams, 'Ethnic Images and Strategies in 1944', in 
Carol A. Smith (ed.), Guatemalan Indians and the State 
1540-1988 (Austin, 1990), pp.154-5. The Patzicia revolt of 
22 October was one unhappy consequence of such 
manipulation. In response to an Indian uprising demanding 
land and the restoration of Ponce which had left around 20 
1 adi nos dead, up to 900 men, women and chi 1 dren were 
massacred by soldiers: see Adams, 'Ethnic Images', pp.144-
47; Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, p.31. 
28 Najera Farfan, Los Estafadores, p.45; Lujan Munoz, 
'Hace medio siglo', p.11; Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, pp.27-
8. On the fearful ladino images of Indians '[l]ike 
cattle ... waiting to pounce' and more generally on the 
question of ethnic conflict during the reformist decade, 
see Jim Handy, Revolution in the Countryside: Rural 
Co"flict and Agrarian Reform in Guatemala 1944-1954 (Chapel 
Hill and London, 1994), pp.48-76. 
29 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, p.28; Lujan Munoz, 'Hace 
medio siglo', p.11; Silvert, A Study, p.8. 
30 US Charge d'affaires quoted in Kenneth Grieb, 'The 
Guatemalan Military and the Revolution of 1944' J in Brian 
Loveman and Thomas M. Davi es Jr. (eds.), Ttl~_poJ i_t i~of 
A~tipolitics (Lincoln. Nebraska, 1989). p.157; compare with 
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arrest and deportation of Arevalo. 
The resort to electoral fraud and repression appeared to 
signal the closure of the political apertura. 
Liberalisation had been pursued by the regime primarily to 
garner legitimacy, but Arevalo's evident popular appeal 
required the reversion to a more familiar pattern of 
control. While the opposition appeared to be losing 
momentum in the face of mount i ng i nt i mi dat ion, severa 1 
conspiracies to overthrow the regime were being planned. 31 
A plot by FPL students had failed shortly before the events 
of 19 and 20 October. 32 The action of junior officers was 
to make the vital difference to the efforts to unseat the 
last vestiges of ubiquismo. 
On the night of the 19 October the Guardia de Honor, led 
by tank commander Major Francisco Arana, rose in revolt. 
The rebel s were joi ned by fourteen students and Jacobo 
Arbenz Guzman, the young infantry captai n who had 
masterminded the plot after resigning his post in July.33 
After taking the Guardia de Honor, the rebel soldiers and 
some two to three thousand civilian volunteers, fought 
through the night to obtain the surrender of the other army 
units in the capital. A 'direct hit' scored against the 
central ammunition store of the Castillo de San Jose 
----- --- -------
Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus, p.160, n.68. 
31 Flores, Fortuny: un comunista, pp.92-124. 
32 Ibid., p.98; see also, testimony of Colonel Carlos 
Paz Tejada in Caceres, 'Un militar honesto en la 
revolucion' J p.38. 
33 The students included future president Julio Cesar 
Mendez Montenegro (1966-1970); Ricardo Asturias Valenzuela 
who became Director of the Social Security Institute and 
later Health Minister in the Mendez Montenegro government; 
Oscar de Leon Aragon and Marco Antonio Villamar Contreras: 
Flores, Fortuny: un comunista, pp.91-124; Gleijeses, 
Spat teE_~_~LJio~~, p. 28-9. 
35 
barracks effectively ended the battle. 34 At midday on 20 
October 1944, representat i ves of the Ponce regi me 
officially surrendered to the 'revolutionary forces and the 
armed people who accompany them' before the entire 
diplomatic corps assembled in the US Embassy.35 
Clearly a 'transition by collapse', it is important to 
stress that it was secured only with military intervention. 
This situation had several implications. In the short-
term, the mi 1 i tary was abl e 
concessions for the armed 
to negotiate 
institution, 
considerable 
as we 11 as 
establishing a legal basis for military intromission in the 
act of government. More generally, this state of affairs 
set a new precedent for military intervention in the 
future, and confirmed a tradition in which the armed forces 
had been central in defining the social order. 
34 0 eta i 1 s 0 f the rev 01 tar e g i ve n i n Flo res, For t u n~ 
un comunista, pp.91-124; Marco Antonio Vi11amar Contreras, 
, Nuest ras horas de 1 a verdad', in Cron i ca, , Revo 1 uc ion 
1944-1994. Una Recordacion Historica' J special edition 
(Guatemala, 1994), pp.16-22; Villagran Kramer. Biografia 
Po1itica, pp.9-12; Grieb. 'The Guatemalan Military'. 
pp.151-60. 
35 Villagran Kramer, Biografia Po1itica, pp.12-15. It 
is interesting to note that General Ydigoras Fuentes was 
present as a 'guarantor' of this treaty and equally, that 
both he and Colonel Peralta Azurdia had been considered by 
Arbenz to 1 ead the revo 1 t: Flores, FQrtulJ'y_: un comun; sta. 
pp.94-5. 
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The Reformist Decade 
Lo que ha ocurrido en Guatemala no es un Golpe de 
Estado; es algo mas profundo y algo mas benefico: 
es una Revoluci6n. No se trata simplemente de 
echar a unos hombres para sustituirlos por otros. 
Se trata de transformar las bases sobre las que 
descansaba el corrumpido orden politico del 
ubiquismo. Es una Revoluci6n que ira a las raices 
del sistema politico y no se quedara en la 
superficie de los escritorios. En una palabra, 
es una Revoluci6n llamada a lavar, a purificar 
nuestro sistema de vida publica, para 
tranquilidThd de todos y para honor de 
Guatemala. 
The October Revolution opened an exceptional period in 
Guatemalan political history and one which set it apart 
from the general pattern of post-World War II politics in 
the region. In this sense, as James Dunkerley has pointed 
out, the reformist decade represented an historical anomaly 
in the context of the 'Cold War resolution' which had been 
imposed almost everywhere else in the region between 1945 
and 1948. 37 
The initial strength of the anti-dictatorial movement 
which led to this experiment and sustained it beyond the 
ostensibly similar coalition which overthrew Martinez in El 
Sa 1 vador in May 1944, can be interpreted ina number of 
ways. In historical terms, conditions associated with a 
deep-rooted tradi t i on of autocrat i c government based on 
force of arms together with the particularities of the 
enclave economy in Guatemala had 
politically weak oligarchy which 
disinclined to come to Ubico's defence. 
contributed to a 
was i n any case 
However, a central 
feature of the revolution was its ability to secure 
36 Juan Jose Arevalo, El Candidato Blanco y _el_HJJ_racan 
(Guatemala, 1984), pp.335-6, quoted in Villagran Kramer, 
Biografi~ Politica, p.16. 
37 Dunkerley, 'Guatemala, 1944-54'. p.84. 
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military support for the new regime. 
In contrast to the popular mobilisations in June from 
which the military had been 
insurrection had been instigated by 
armed civilian volunteers. While 
absent, the October 
junior officers who had 
it was thi s cruci al 
military role which proved decisive in determining the 
composition of the revolutionary Junta in which interim 
power was vested, it was also a factor in winning the armed 
forces considerable autonomy from the executive. At the 
same time, the mi 1 i tary domi nat i on of the Junta - Maj or 
Fransisco Arana, Captain Jacobo Arbenz and a civilian, 
Jorge Toriello - and the nature of the October Revolution 
itself, contributed to an initial measure of complacency on 
the part of the 01 i garchy. 38 
On 28 November 1944, the revolutionary Junta issued 
Decree 17, Article 1 of which declared what were deemed to 
be the fundamental principles of the October Revolution. 39 
Codified in the subsequent constitution of 11 March 1945 -
four days before Arevalo took office having won the 
presidency by a margin of 255,000 out of 295,000 votes cast 
in a poll still restricted to li~.erate males these 
principles incorporated the basic elements of a liberal 
38 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, p.32. 
39 The ten revolutionary principles were: 
decentralisation of Executive powers; effective separation 
of State powers; replacement of presidential designates by 
vice-President; alternation in power; reorganisation of the 
military; municipal autonomy; effective judicial autonomy; 
university autonomy; constitutional recognition of 
political parties; compulsory secret voting for literates, 
compulsory public voting for illiterate men in municipal 
elections; recognition of citizenship for the 'mujer 
preparada'; administrative transparency: Mario Garcia 
Laguardia and Edmundo Vasquez Martinez, Constituci6n y 
Orden Democratico (Guatemala, 1984), p.88; see also, 
Villagran Kramer, Biografia Politica, pp.19-21. 
38 
democrat i c state. 40 At the same time however, they a 1 so 
entailed significant limitations on full participation and 
political competition and constraints on civilian authority 
over the military institution. While suffrage was extended 
to 1 iterate women as we 11 as men, i 11 iterate rna 1 es were 
were required to cast their ballot in public. 41 Illiterate 
women a substantial proportion of the population 
remained excluded from the franchise altogether and did not 
receive the vote until 1965. 42 Whether or not illiterates 
shou 1 d be a 11 owed to vote at a 11 had been an issue of 
considerable debate in the Constituent Assembly, a debate 
which turned on the question of whether or not illiterates 
were capable of reasoned and informed deliberation in the 
voting process and their susceptibility to demagogic 
manipulation by official parties. 43 
A striking feature in these discussions was the tendency 
to elide the terms 'Indian' and 'illiterate' and was 
characteristic of the proclivity of the 1adino elites to 
ignore the distinction between rural Indians and rural 
40 The hastily-drafted Constitution of 1945 contained 
guarantees of assembly, press, speech, political 
organisation and religious affiliation, to which were added 
the concepts of social security and welfare and the 
recognition of the social function of property. Employment 
was both a right and an obligation and, while the coersive 
features of the 1934 vagrancy law were abolished, vagrancy 
itself now defined simply in terms of those without 
sufficient work, property or income to sustain themselves -
remained theoretically punishable. 
41 In these three cases the vote was compulsory. 
42 In 1950, 76.1 per cent of women and 95.2 per cent 
of Indian women were illiterate: Susanne Jonas, The Battle 
for Guatemala. Rebels. Death Squads and US Power (Boulder, 
SanFra-ncisco and Oxford, 1991), p.23; see also, Silvert, 
~~tl!Q~ i n Government, p. 55-61; Garci a Laguardi a and 
Vasquez Martinez, Constituci6n y Orden Democratico p.93. 
43 Garcia Laguardia and Vasquez Martinez, ibid .• p.93, 
note that the socialist minority opposed the 
enfranchisement of literate women; see also Silvert. 8 
Stu~y_ in Government, pp.55-61. 
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ladinos. 44 More importantly, the reluctance to extend the 
vote to (Indian) illiterates reflected an ingrained and 
complex racism which continued to view Indianness as an 
obstacle to national development. The indigenous 
population itself remained notably absent from these early 
processes of institutional reorganisation. 45 Neither the 
Arevalo nor the more progressive Arbenz government made a 
policy distinction between Indians and the campesino 
population at large. 46 
At the same time however, the restoration of municipal 
autonomy in the 1945 Constitution and the direct election 
of local mayors allowed the possibility of greater Indian 
representation and a consequent shift in local power 
relations in some areas. 47 This pattern was varied, 
dependent on local circumstances and often corresponded to 
a new set of clientelist relations pursued by urban 
po 1 it i ca 1 part i es seek i ng rura 1 support. Equa 11 y, Handy 
has suggested that local revolutionary parties were prone 
to cooptation by still dominant elites and sometimes worked 
against the reforms being undertaken at national level. 48 
Overa 11 though, the tenor of the per i od and the earl y 
44 Ibid.; 
Countryside, p.24. 
see also Handy, 
45 Adams, 'Ethnic Images and Strategies', p.156; 
Fortuny in Flores, Fortuny: un comunista, p.133, comments 
that David Vela's intromissions on behalf of the Indian 
majority were conditioned by 'folkloric' rather than proper 
considerations of culture. 
46 Jim Handy, 'Corporate 
Organisations, and Agrarian Reform, 
Indians, p.166. 
Community, 
in Smith, 
Campesino 
Guatemalan 
47 Of 45 predominantly Indian municipalities studied 
by the ~nstituto Indigena in 1948, 27 had indigenous 
mayors: Si lvert, A Study in Government, p.66; see. also, 
Handy, Revo 1 ut ion in the Count rys ide, pp. 138, 166; 1 dem. , 
Gift of the Devil, pp.125-6; Ricardo Falla, Quiche_R~ebelQ~. 
1948-t~70 (Guatemala, 1978), p.431. 
48 Handy, Gift of the Devil, pp.125-6. 
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abol it i on of the coersi ve aspects of the vag racy 1 aw 
contributed to an important extension of civil liberty for 
the Indian population, even before rural organisation was 
officially sanctioned in 1948. 49 
During most of the Arevalo administration, communist 
organisation was effectively illegal. While Article 32 of 
the 1945 Constitution recognised the rights of 'democratic' 
political parties to organise, the 'formation and 
functioning of political organisations of an international 
or foreign character' were prohibited. 50 Approved without 
debate by the Constituent Assembly, the ostensible reason 
for this exclusion was to preempt the formation of fascist 
parties. 51 Clearly, however, it was open to wider 
i nterpretat ion. The measu re was used on a number of 
occasions to obstruct communist organisation before 1951 
and provided the basis for the closure of two evening 
schools for workers in 1946 and 1950. 52 When the Communist 
Party was finally legalised in December 1952, the 
increasingly vocal opposition to the Arbenz government 
continued to insist on the anti-communist interpretation of 
Article 32. 53 More generally, Ubico's propensity to label 
as a communi st anyone who had opposed the status quo 
continued into the reformist decade, with the opposition 
proclaiming communist inspiration behind any threatening 
49 Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus, p.139. 
50 Silvert, A Study in Government, p.58; 
Laguardia and Vasquez Martinez, Constitucion 
Democratico, p.93. 
51 
y 
Garcia 
Orden 
52 Fortuny in Flores, Fortuny: una comun i sta. p. 180, 
argues that Arevalo was under considerable US pressure on 
the question of communism; see also, ibid., pp.147-9. 179-
82. On the US perception of the Communist threat during 
the Arevalo government see Gleijeses, Shattered Ho~. 
pp.81, 98-102, 119-124. 
53 Garcia Laguardia and Vasquez Martinez, Constitucion 
y_QrQ~[I_DemQcra'tico. p.93. 
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reform. After 1954 anticomunismo became an article of 
faith and communist organisation was explicitly proscribed 
in the constitutions of 1956 and 1965. 
The provisions relating to the armed forces were a 
particularly controversial aspect of the 1945 Constitution. 
Establishing the Superior Council of National Defence and 
the Chief of Armed Forces, a new Army Statute had been one 
of the fundamental revolutionary principles laid down by 
Decree 17. Yet the authority invested in both institutions 
remained highly problematic vis a vis the 'essentially 
apolitical and non-deliberative' constitutional role 
assigned to the armed forces and effectively 
institutionalised military intromission in the act of 
government. 54 Such tutelary powers and reserve domains set 
a pattern for future civil-military relations in post-
revolutionary Guatemala and particularly after 1963. 
Moreover, the manner in which they were secured is 
significant in terms of the transfer of government in 1966. 
In 1945, it appears that a significant fraction of the 
military were reluctant to hand over power to civilians 
who, Arana argued 'would reap the benefits of what we, the 
mi 1 i tary had accomp 1 i shed. 55 At the heart of the issue 1 ay 
the question of military autonomy and concern that an anti-
military president - supposedly Arevalo - would set about 
dissolving the military institution. 56 While Arbenz and 
Toriello apparently insisted that Arevalo be permitted to 
take office, it seems that the President-elect came under 
considerable pressure to ensure that the Constituent 
54 1945 Constitution, Article 149. 
55 Letter from Arana to Jorge Toriello, 26.4.47, 
I mp arc i al , 29 . 4 . 47, cit e din G 1 e i j e s e s , 5 h a it ere d 
p.52. 
in E 1 
Hope, 
56 Villagrjn Kramer, Biografia Politica, pp.25-44. 
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Assembly approve the Army Statute. 57 
As an i ndi cat i on of how ci vi 1 i an sectors vi ewed the 
situation at the time, it is worth quoting at length the 
statement by constituyente Alberto Paz y Paz: 
El ejercito, aun sin una plena conciencia de ello 
de parte de sus integrantes, ha sido una 
superestructura con frequencia todopoderosa. Era 
preferi ble encauzar esa fuerza, acotarla, para 
que de alguna manera se pusiera al servicio 
efectivo del pais. Se pretendio reducirlo a 
normas, digificarlo como institucion nacional y 
ponerle fin al predominio de la fuerza bruta ... si 
hubo presiones, muy explicables, de parte de los 
sectores civiles mas avanzados intelectualmente. 
Se tenia plena conciencia del peligro de una 
fuerza armada prepotente a la que sacaba de su 
ambito habitual para ponerla al servicio del 
poder civil ... el mismo Presidente 
electo ... ejercio indirectamente cierta presion, 
temeroso como es~aba de no ser obedecido por la 
fuerza armada ... 5 
In exchange for the establishment of the Superior National 
Defence Council and a new post of Chief of Armed Forces, 
the military would accept the rest of the constitution in 
total. The clear implication was that without these 
concessions, Arevalo would not have been able to take 
offi ce. 59 
The debate on these questions revolves about the 
politicised character of the Superior Council and the 
57 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, p.53; Cruz Salazar, 'El 
Ejercito como Fuerza Politica', pp.132-48; Villagran 
Kramer, ~iQQrafia Politica, pp.20-44; Cardoza y Aragon, 
pp.48-49. 
58 'Don Alberto Paz y Paz habla de la revolucion y la 
contrarrevolucion en Guatemala. Entrevista de Jorge Mario 
Garcia Laguardia', El Grafico, 22.10.68, cited in Garcia 
Laguardi a and Vasquez Mart inez, Const i tuc i on.~ Orden 
Democratico, p.94, n.138. 
59 Cardoza y Aragon, La Revo 1 uc ion Guatema_Lteca I p. 48; 
Villagran Kramer, Biografia Politica, p.40. 
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parallel power represented in the Chief of Armed Forces. SO 
Charged with resolving questions relating to the operation 
of the military - whose ascribed role included defence of 
the constitution and to ensure the principle of alternation 
in power - the Superior Council was automatically imbued 
with a political function. 61 It was further required to 
give real content to the annual oath sworn to the Congress 
by the Chief of Armed Forces which itself included 
obl i gat ions to defend the 'ri ghts and freedoms of the 
people' and to guarantee democracy.62 It was therefore 
inevitable that the Superior Council would find itself in 
the position of debating the constitutionality or otherwise 
of execut i ve act ions and that it wou 1 d intercede 
accordi ngl y. 63 
The offi ce of Chi ef of Armed Forces was all the more 
problematic since its creation related directly to Arana's 
own pursuit of power. It also placed him in direct 
competition with Arbenz as Minister of Defence, and both 
60 See Cruz Salazar, 'El Ejercito como Fuerza 
Politica', pp.132-48; Villagran Kramer, Biografia Politica, 
pp.20-44; Luis Cardoza y Aragon, La Revoluci¢n 
Guatemalteca, new ed. (Guatemala, 1994) pp.48-49; Garcia 
Laguardia and Vasquez Martinez, Constitucion y Orden 
Democratico, pp.94-5. 
61 Cruz Salazar, 'El Ejercito como Fuerza Politica', 
p. 137 . 
62 Garcia Laguardia and Vasquez Martinez, Constitucion 
y Orden Democratico, p.95; Cruz Salazar, 'El Ejercito como 
Fuerza Political J pp.137-8; Caceres, 'Un Militar Honesto', 
p.40-1. According to Villagran Kramer, Biografia Politica, 
pp.24-5, the initial swearing of this oath by the Arbenz 
and Arana together with the entire military high command, 
officers and troops duly assembled on 22 December 1944, 
went along way to quelling civilian fears about military 
intentions. 
63 Cruz Salazar, 'El Ejercito como Fuerza Politica', 
pp.137-8, argues that the number of political prisoners and 
exiles in Guatemala was evidence of this constitutionally-
sanctioned military intromission, but gives no further 
details. 
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proceeded to carve out separate spheres of influence with 
an eye to the 1950 elections. 64 Responsible for all 
military appointments through the Minister of Defence, as 
Chief of Armed Forces Arana had immense personal influence 
about which Arevalo frequently complained. 65 This 
situation has particular resonance with the Mendez 
Montenegro government (1966-1970), and it is worth noting 
that the statement attributed to Arevalo to the effect that 
two presidents ruled Guatemala and one with a machine gun 
with which he is always threatening the other, has been 
similarly attributed to Mendez Montenegro in respect of his 
Defence Minister, Colonel Arriaga Bosque. 
In contrast to the more negative assessments of this 
constitutional situation, Jose Manuel Fortuny has posited 
a more sanguine and indeed positively insouciant view. 66 
In effect, he argues, the risks inherent in this parallel 
power were more hypothetical than real since Arana's 
manoeuvrings remain~4 quite marginal in terms of the 
military as a whole. When it came to the point where 
civilian power was seriously challenged, the split in the 
64 It iss i gn i fi cant that Arana was ali ne offi cer who 
had been promoted through the ranks whi 1 e Arbenz was a 
politecnica graduate, this being a traditional cleavage 
within the Guatemalan Armed forces: see Richard N. Adams, 
'The Development of the Guatemalan Military', Studies in 
Comparative International Development (4, 1968-1969), p.96. 
65 Villagran Kramer Biografia Politica, p.52 and 
Handy, Revo 1 ut ion in the Count rys ide, p. 182, both quote 
Arevalo's apocryphal statement that in Guatemala 'there are 
two presidents and one of them has a machine gun with which 
he is always threatening the other. 
66 Flores, Fortuny: un comunista, p.140. Fortuny's 
role during the reformist decade should be noted here. A 
founding member of the FPL and later the Partido de Accion 
Revolucionaria (PAR), he was a member of the Constituent 
Assembly and later a deputy in the legislatures under both 
Areva 10 and Arbenz. He was a 1 so a foundi ng member and 
Secretary General of the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) 
and played a crucial role as close friend and advisor to 
President Arbenz. 
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high command was such 'that it decided the future destiny 
of the revol ut ion' .67 Fortuny is here referri ng to Jul y 
1949 Arana was assassinated, it having become evident that 
he had abandoned hi s attempts to seek power by 
constitutional means. This cleared the way for Arbenz's 
presidency and the more concerted reforms which accompanied 
it. However, Arana's death also crystallised the anti-
revolutionary coalition and became a central focus for 
right-wing opposition against Arbenz. 
Promulgated on 15 March - the same day that Arevalo took 
office - the 1945 Constitution provided the basis for a 
series of socio-economic and structural reforms essayed by 
the Arevalo and Arbenz governments over the following nine 
years. The internal conditions for such a 'bourgeois 
democratic' project in Guatemala after the Second World War 
were hardly propicious. The overwhelming majority of the 
population remained rural and tied into a system of labour 
in which extra-market forces predominated, while the 
pattern of land tenure was particularly regressive. In 
1950, 76 per cent of all agricultural units controlled less 
than 10 per cent of cultivable land while 2.2 per cent of 
farms contoll ed over 70 per cent. 68 Outside Guatemala 
City, urban growth was still in its incipient stages with 
only 12 per cent of the population living in conurbations 
of more than 10,000 peop1e. 69 Illiteracy stood at more 
than 70 per cent. Industry was virtually inexistent. In 
1946, there were 776 'industrial' enterprises employing a 
total labour force of 23,914 which included artisanal 
67 Ibid. 
68 Cardoza y Aragon, La Revo 1 uc i on Guatem_~ 1 teca, p. 98; 
see a 1 so, Handy, c;liJ t of the Devil, p. 1 2 7 . 
69 Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus, p.140. 
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production as well as light industry.7Q As few as 1.7 per 
cent could be classed as an industrial proletariat.?1 A 
further 15,000 rural workers were engaged in waged labour 
on the UFCo plantations in the departments of Escuintla and 
Izabal, while its subsidiary IRCA employed some 5,500 on 
the railroads and at port facilities. 72 
Arevalo's administration is generally noted for its 
moderation in relation to Arbenz's more resolutely 
reformist project. Yet, despite his reluctance to address 
the question of land tenure - latifundia were prohibited in 
the constitution which authorised expropriation under 
certain conditions - and his lack of a coherent economic 
project, Arevalo made some important advances in the socio-
economic sphere, including the establishment of the 
Instituto Guatemalteco de Seguridad Social 
1946. 73 
(IGSS) in 
Of particular impact however, was the controversial 
Labour Code of 1947. The first legislation of its kind in 
Guatemala, it can be seen as a political watershed in terms 
of the definition it gave to what had hitherto been a 
rather amorphous opposition to the revolutionary regime. 
Equally, the reaction to the Labour Code reinforced 
70 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, p.37. The total 
population in 1950 was 2,790,868,11.5 per cent of whom 
were employed in manufacturing including artisanl 
production: Nathan L. Whetten, Guatemala: The Land and the 
People (New Haven and London, 1961), pp.28, 90. 
71 Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, p.24, citing 
Alfredo Guerra Borges, 'El pensamiento econ6mico-social de 
la revoluci6n de Octubre', Economia, 21 (July-September, 
1969) . 
72 I bjJj. 
73 A 1951 report for the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development/World Bank was critical of 
the haphazard nature of Arevalo's developmental 
initiatives: Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, p.377; see also, 
Handy. G; ft oL toe Dev; 1. pp.115-6. 
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labour's commitment to the revolution in the conviction 
that the movement could not survive without it. Indeed, 
the intensely political character of the labour movement 
between 1944 and 1954 was determined in large part by an 
intransigent opposition which 
former's right to exist. 74 It 
continued to deny the 
is significant that while 
the Labour Code remained on the statute books after 1954 -
with important modifications - by 1964 the total number of 
unionised workers had been reduced to 24,000 - 2 per cent 
of the economically-active population - from the 100,000-
strong membership claimed by the Confederacion General de 
Trabajadores de Guatemala (CGTG) in 1954. 75 The contrast 
in the rural sector was even more stark, with just 9,386 or 
0.2% of campesinos unionised in 1964 as opposed to 256,000 
organi sed under the aegi s of the Confederaci on Naci onal 
Campesina de Guatemala (CNCG).76 In 1966, the prospect of 
a party in government whi ch cl ai med its roots in the 
reformist decade had a particular resonance with a union 
movement which remained in the early stages of 
recomposition in the aftermath of 1954. 
The 1947 Labour Code confirmed the right to unionise and 
to strike after due arbitration, provided for collective 
barga in i ng and estab 1 i shed 1 ega 1 norms to regu 1 ate 
employment. This was radical in Guatemalan terms, but the 
code remained profoundly conservative with regard to rural 
organisation. Whereas urban unions with a minimum of 20 
workers were permitted to organise, unions on farms with 
less than 500 workers required a minimum of 50 members of 
74 Ronald Schneider. Communism in Guatemala: JJ3AA:-5~ 
(New York, 1959). p.49. 
75 Mario Lopez Larrave. Breve Historia del Movimiento 
Sindical Guatemalteco (Guatemala, 1979). p.56; Dunkerley, 
Power in the Isthmus. p.143. 
76 Lopez Larrave. Breve Historia. p.56; Dunkerley, 
pow~L_jn the I_sthmus, p. 142. 
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whom 60 percent had to be 1 iterate. 77 By January 1948, 
only 11 campesino unions had legal status, of which two 
were on the UFCo plantations on the Atlantic and Pacific 
coasts. 78 While many arevalistas did not believe the 
measures went far enough, the right argued that Labour Code 
was unconstitutional and communist-inspired. 79 Opponents 
took to the streets each Sunday in aggressive anti-
government demonstrations and appealed to both the Chief of 
Armed Forces and the US State Department to intervene. 80 
In the event, it did so, but on behalf of UFCo, the company 
having interpreted the restrictions as a direct attack on 
1 arge commerci al concerns. Largely as a result of this 
pressure, the government amended the code in June 1948. 
The somewhat iron i c consequence of US i ntervent i on was 
therefore the extensi on of 1 abour organi sat ion in the 
countryside, although it remained atomised until the 
formation of the CNCG in 1950 and only gained force with 
the land reform of 1952. 
Arevalistas had themselves been divided over the scope of 
the labour legislation and this was one aspect of a wider 
tendency towards shifting alliances and personalistic 
intrigue which was to characterise the revolutionary bloc 
throughout the reformi st decade. 8t Symptomat i c of the 
political inexperience and lack of ideological definition 
amongst many revolutionaries, these conflicts were also 
part of a struggle for presidential patronage which Arevalo 
77 Brian Murphy, 'The Stunted Growth of Campesino 
Organisations' in Adams, Crucifixion by Power, p.444. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Manuel Galich, Por Que Lucha Guatemala: Arevalo y 
Arbenz: Dos Hombres Contra el Imperio (Buenos Aires, 1956), 
p.133; Villagran Kramer, Biografia Politica, pp.56-8. 
80 Ibid. p.61; Gal ich, Por Que Lucha Guate_mala, p.134. 
8t Mario Monteforte Toledo, Guatemala- Monografia 
Socio16gica (Mexico, 1959), p.311; Gleijeses, Shattered 
Hope, p.39; Handy, Revol~tion in the Countryside, pp.30-2. 
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himself encou raged. 82 Between 1944 and 1954 the 
revolutionary parties splintered and recomposed into some 
20 different political configurations and were often united 
only in relation to the right-wing opposition. 83 It is 
significant that many of these earlier revolutionaries were 
also integrants of the Partido Revolucionario (PR) at its 
foundation in 1957, which continued to be viewed with 
suspicion by the right and the US State Department, 
notwithstanding a series of purges to eliminate more 
radical elements. 
Dominating the legislature - in which two-thirds of the 
representatives were under 35 years old - the three main 
parties in the revolutionary bloc were the Partido de 
Accion Democratico (PAR), the RN and the FPL. 84 Organised 
by schoolteachers and university students in the wake of 
Ubico's resignation, the latter two had merged to form the 
PAR in November 1945 wh i ch subsequent 1 y fragmented into 
three separate parties in 1947. Notwithstanding further 
spl its, the PAR, the RN and the rump of the FPL backed 
Arbenz's presidential candidacy in 1950, together with the 
union movement and the Communists, and the tiny Partido de 
Integridad Nacional (PIN) which remained the signal 
exception to the generalised elite opposition to Arbenz. 85 
In addition to the revolutionaries' propensity for 
i nfi ght i ng, it is worth not i ng here the tendency for 
corruption amongst officials in the Arevalo administration, 
82 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, p.39; Monteforte Toledo, 
Guatemala, p.311. 
83 Handy, Gift of the Devil, p.119. 
84 Handy, Revolution in the Countryside, p.45. 
85 Based on a handful of finqueros and industrialists 
from Quezaltenango, the PIN's support for Arbenz derived 
from friendship and regional loyalty: Arbenz was a paysano: 
see Gl ei j eses, Shattered Hope, p. 73; Flores, Fortuny: un 
comunista, p.185. 
prompting Arbenz later 
dedicated union leaders 
programme of reforms. 86 
Guatemalteco de Trabajo 
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to rely on a small group of 
and Communists to administer his 
The Com m un i s t Par t y P ar_"ti do 
(PGT) finally legalised in 
December 1952 - itself emerged as a marxist enclave within 
the PAR in 1948 and later withdrew to found the clandestine 
Partido Comunista Guatemalteco (PCG) in 1949. Tactical 
differences between the latter and labour militant Victor 
Manuel Gut i errez 1 ed to the establ i shment of a separate 
workers' party the Partido Revolucionario de Obreros 
Guatemaltecos (PROG) which disbanded in February 1952 
with the reincorporation of Gutierrez into the mainstream 
communist bloc. 87 The labour movement was itself sundered 
for a time between the sindicalist Frente Sindical de 
Guatemala (FSG) led by the powerful railway workers' union, 
SAMF, and the more ideologically-driven Confederaci6n de 
Trabajadores de Guatemala (CTG) under the leadership of 
Gutierrez. 88 In practice these separate wings often acted 
together to push for their demands, and their rapprochement 
following the establishment of the CGTG in October 1951 
responded both to a recognition of what such cooperation 
had been able to achieve, as well as the overall 
radicalisation of the movement in the face of the growing 
reactionary opposition to the regime. 
It is a signficant reflection of the historical absence 
of oligarchic competition in the political sphere that the 
---- --~--~~-------
86 Handy, Gi ft of the Devi 1, p.119; idem., Revolution 
i n t h e Co un try s_ ide, p. 45; G 1 e i j e s e s, S hat t ere d Hop e, p p . 40 , 
193; Ronald Schneider, Communism in Guatemala, p.40. 
87 See Flores, Fortuny: un comunista, pp.168-176; 
Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, pp.78, n.26, 76-81; Dunkerley, 
Power in the Isthmus, pp.145-6. 
88 With some 4,000 members, the SAMF reemerged after 
1954 as a dominant if at times compromised force in labour 
politics until its demise in the 1970's following the 
nationalisation of IRCA in 1969. 
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elite opposition remained a minor participant in electoral 
politics. B9 Centred in the newly-reinstated Asociaci6n 
General de Agricultores (AGA) and interpreting all social 
reform as communist in inspiration, the oppos; t; on 
disseminated anti-communism through the media and the 
Church and continued to look to the military to protect its 
interests. 90 This 'other way of doing politics' was to 
rema in the predomi nant pattern into the 1960s, wi th the 
extreme right-wing Movimiento de Liberaci6n Nacional (MLN) 
in particular employing a dual strategy of party political 
competition whilst simultaneously conspiring with 
recalcitrant military officers to undermine the government. 
As a founding member of the FPL, the role of Mario Mendez 
Montenegro bears consideration in the light of political 
developments after 1954. Indeed, it was on the basis of 
his earlier association with the FPL that the leader of the 
Partido Revolucionario claimed that party's roots in the 
reformist decade on its foundation in 1957. A central 
protagonist in the political struggles for presidential 
patronage which characterised Arevalo's administration, as 
Mayor of Guatema 1 a Ci ty between 1946 and 1948, Mendez 
Montenegro's all eged corrupt i on was symptomat i c of the 
graft which was rife during this period. 91 More important 
however, was his support for the political ambitions of the 
Chief of Armed Forces and his subsequent coordination of 
the military revolt which exploded in response to Arana's 
death in July 1949. 
The origins of this relationship can be found in a deal 
forged between members of the FPL and RN on the one hand, 
and Arana on the other, in the wake of a seri ous car 
accident suffered by Arevalo in December 1945. At t his 
89 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, p.49. 
90 
91 Ibid., p.40. 
52 
stage intended to forestall a coup, the pacto de barranco 
pledged revolutionary support for Arana in the 1950 
presidential elections in exchange for the latter's 
continuing defence of the revolution. 92 This pact largely 
explains Arana's role in fending off some 30 conspiracies 
aga i nst the Areva 10 government for wh i ch support the 
former a 1 so requ ired 
government pol icy. 93 
the suppression of a good deal of 
By mid-1949, many in the PAR and the 
RN, as well as in the labour movement, had decided to back 
Arbenz in the 1950 elections. Arana's commitment to the 
revolution had become increasingly suspect, and his anti-
labour activities had alienated the bulk of the 
revolutionaries. 94 His final hope the notably 
conservative FPL - threw out the motion to nominate him at 
its party convention in April 1949. 95 While this rejection 
was due more to the party's civilista inclinations than to 
any significant radicalisation, it prompted the exit of the 
arani sta facti on from its ranks into the spl inter FPL 
Ortodoxo, led by Mario Mendez Montenegro. 96 
Increasingly seen as the candidate of the right, Arana's 
manoeuvres to secure the presidency had begun to irritate 
1 1 " 1 . t 97 It' 1 a h . s military as we as C1Vl lan sec ors. n par lCU r, 1 
efforts to influence the choice of his successor through 
the Superior Council of National Defence gave rise to 
growing concern about military politicisation and threats 
92 Galich Por Que Lucha Guatemala, pp.201-2; Najera 
Farfan, Los Est~fadores, p.106; Villagran Kramer, Biografia 
Politica, pp.49-52; Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, pp.54-5, 57. 
93 Handy, Revolution in the Countryside, p.181; see 
also, idem., Gift of the Devil, p.111; Cardoza y Aragon, La 
Revolucion Guatemalteca, p.54. 
94 Flores, Fortuny: un comunista, pp.155-7. 
95 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, pp.40, 58. 
96 I bid., p. 58. 
97 Villagran Kramer, BiQgr~fia Politica, pp.66-7. 
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t a ins tit uti a n a 1 u nit y . 98 Equally, dissidents within the 
armed forces and the aranista opposition began to pressure 
for a coup. Apparently unwilling to take power by 
unconstitutional means, but wanting to preempt any action 
by his subordinates, Arana presented Arevalo with an 
ultimatum: to replace the cabinet with the men of his 
choice, including - according to Arevalo - Mario Mendez 
Montenegro. 99 Two days later, on 18 July 1949, Arana was 
killed during an abortive attempt to arrest him. 
The precise details of Arana's death need not concern us 
here. 100 Its importance 1 i es in how the event was 
perceived in Guatemala and its political consequences for 
the revolution and in the longer term. In the immediate 
aftermath, the Guardia de Honor rose in revolt under the 
civilian leadership of Mario Mendez Montenegro. 101 The 
most serious challenge yet to Arevalo's government. the 
uprising was crushed by Arbenz and loyal officers who 
distributed weapons to civilian volunteers. 102 The failure 
of the coup signalled a change in the balance of forces, 
with the right losing the initiative to a reinvigorated 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid, pp.74-80; Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, pp.62-5. 
100 Vari ous versi ons of the events 1 eadi ng up to hi s 
death and the circumstances of the assassination itself are 
given in Flores, Fortuny: un comunista, pp.160-8; Galich, 
Por Que Lucha Guatemala, pp.200-207; Gleijeses, Shattered 
Hope, pp.59-71; Najera Farfan, Los Estafado:es. pr:>.44-~; 
Sierra Roldan, Dia90los con el Coronel Monzon - Hlstorla 
viva de la Revoluci6n Guatemalteca 1944-1954 (Guatemala, 
1958); Villagran Kramer, Bi09rafia Politic~, pp.66-78. 
101 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, p.68. 
102 Ibi~.; Cruz Salazar, 'El Ejercito', p.142; Galich. 
Por Que Lucha Guatemala, p.205; Najera Farfan. Los 
Estafadores, p.111. The military quickly put pressure on 
the government to retri eve the weapons whi ch had been 
distributed to some two thousand civilian volunteers during 
the uprising, and labour unions conducted their own 
neighbourhood searches to assist in the collection: 
Gleijeses, Shattere~ Hope, p.73. 
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left, while union action against the commemorative minutos 
de si1encio for Arana on the anniversary of his death led 
to bloody battles with regime opponents and Arevalo's 
temporary handover of control to the armed forces. 103 
At the same time, however, Arana became the first martyr 
of the right and a powerful focus for the opposition who 
continued to view his death as a premeditated 
assassination. Such speculation was fed by Arevalo's 
refusal to state the true circumstances of the case and his 
implausible explanation that reactionaries frustrated by 
Arana's loyalty to the government were responsible for the 
crime. 104 His comments about Arbenz confused issues 
further by suggesting that military factionalism had led to 
Arana's death. These questions were revived some ten years 
later with the prospect of Arevalo's candidacy in the 1963 
presidential elections, when, directly accused of ordering 
in Arana's murder the ex-Presi dent responded that 
'everybody in Guatemala knows who killed Arana, why he was 
kill ed, and who benefi ted from it'. 105 
The events surrounding Arana's death marked a watershed 
103 Caceres, 'Un Mi 1 i tar Honesto', 
'The Guatemalan Revolution and Civil 
Schneider, Communism in Guatemala, p.32; 
in the Isthmus, pp.143-4. 
pp. 49-51; Handy, 
Rights', pp.8-9; 
Dunkerley, Power 
104 A close associ ate of Arbenz had been present at the 
scene: Gliejeses, Shattered Hope, p.69-71; Villagran 
Kramer, Biografia Politica, p.70; Galich, Por Que Lucha 
Guatemala, p.204; see also, Thomas Melville and Marjorie 
Melville, Guatemala -Another Vietnam? (Harmondsworth, 
1971), p.59; Susanne Jonas and David Tobis (eds.), 
Guatemala (Berkeley, 1974), p.156, n.8; Richard Immerman, 
The CIA in Guatemala. The Foreign Policy of Intervention 
(Austin, 1982), pp.59-60, who contend that Arana was killed 
by his 'friends' to remove him as an obstacle to a coup and 
to discredit Arbenz. 
105 Juan Jose Arevalo, Carta Pol itica al Pueblo de 
Guatema 1 a Con Mot i vo de Haber Aceptado 1 a_Cao~i dat!-Lr_~ 
Presidencial (Mexico, 1963). p.14. cited in Gleijeses. 
Sha-t ter~d Hope, p. 393. 
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in the direction of the revolution and confirmed Arbenz's 
rise to power based firmly on the left of the political 
spectrum and within the union movement. Moreover, the 
subsequent purge of almost a quarter of the officer corps 
ensured significant support from the military and permitted 
him a greater autonomy of action as President than Arevalo 
had enjoyed. 
Yet, even at thi s stage many bel i eved that Arbenz was 
simply an opportunist who, once in office, would move to 
curb the 'radicalism' of the Arevalo years. 106 Winning 
258,987 of the 404,739 votes cast in the November 1950 
elections against 72,796 for his closest rival the 
ubiguista General Ydigoras Fuentes -Arbenz's victory 
sparked opposition denunciations of official fraud and 
cl ai ms of government harassment. 107 The suspensi on of 
constitutional guarantees for thirty days following the 
disturbances of July 1950 were argued to have limited the 
freedom of the election campaign. l0a While the extent of 
Arbenz's popular support is hardly in doubt and few of 
these claims can be substantiated,109 it is worth noting a 
pattern which was to become increasingly familiar in 
election campaigns after 1954, when restricted competition 
enhanced the scope and possibility of fraudulent practices 
for government candidates. Indeed, it was largely on the 
basis of Ydigoras Fuentes' claims of official fraud in 1957 
that the military moved to annul those elections. 
106 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, pp.73, 125-6; Schneider, 
Communism in Guatemala, p.35. 
107 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, p.84; Jim Handy, 'The 
Guatemalan Revolution and Civil Rights: Presidential 
Elections and the Judicial Process under Juan Jose Arevalo 
and Jacobo Arbenz Guzman', Canadi an _ Journa_l_of __ ~_~t in 
American and Caribbean Studies, 10, (19, 1985), p.11. glves 
slightly different figures. 
108 I b i d.. p. 9 . 
109 Ibjd., pp.7-11. 
56 
In 1950 however, he had been implicated in a failed plot 
to overthrow the government, and while his campaign at the 
head of one party - Redenci6n - had been hampered for this 
reason, he was permitted to continue as a candidate for the 
Partido Unido Anticomunista (PUA).110 Notwithstanding 
Arevalo's reluctance to openly endorse Arbenz, the latter 
was clearly the official candidate and as such was afforded 
certain advantages not available to other contenders, 
including the use of government vehicles for campaign 
purposes, support from local government officials and sole 
propaganda access at offi ci al ceremoni es and government 
rallies. 111 Nevertheless, if it is unlikely that the bulk 
of the rural population would have voted against a 
candidate who clearly had the support of the government and 
the military, as Scheider has argued, it is clear that 
Arbenz had a substantial political and popular base which 
would have guaranteed him the election in any case. 112 
Arbenz's inaugural speech of 15 March 1951 outlined the 
three fundamental objectives of his government: economic 
independence, capitalist development and an improvement in 
the standard of 1 i vi ng of the majori ty of the 
population. 113 In- following many of the recommendations 
made by a World Bank mission to Guatemala in 1950, the 
programme was hardly the bolshevik programme it came to be 
perceived of by the internal opposition and Washington 
offi cia 1 s, yet together wi th the encouragement of mass 
110 Ibid., pp.8-9. The fai led plot had been launched 
by Colonel Castillo Armas who would lead the 
counterrevolution in 1954. Arrested conspirators who were 
members of Redenci6n repeatedly implicated Ydigoras Fuentes 
and a warrent for the latter's arrest was issued: see also, 
Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, pp.82-4. 
111 Handy, .'The Guatemalan Revolution', pp.9-10. 
112 Schneider, Communism in Guatemala, p.34; Handy, 
'The Guatemalan Revolution and Civil Rights'. p.10-11; 
Gleijeses. Shattered Hope, pp.83-4. 
113 Villagran Kramer, Biografia Politica, p.92. 
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organisation and legalisation of the Communist Party under 
Arbenz. it represented a concerted challenge to established 
interests at home and abroad .114 
At the heart of the programme lay agrarian reform, the 
punto critico on which the regime finally foundered. While 
the moderation of the proposals are well-established and it 
has become a commonplace to argue their similarity to the 
type of land reform proposed by the Alliance for Progress 
some ten years later. it is indicative that by the early 
1960s the landed elites were prone to view the Alliance 
itself as communist-inspired. If in 1952, the spectre of 
the Mexican Revolution and agrarian chaos hovered in the 
minds of the oligarchy and the urban middle classes, the 
counter-revolution was founded upon the repudiation of what 
was interpreted as a massive assault upon the social and 
economic order. lIS At the same time however, it is 
significant that the rhetoric of land reform was never 
completely erased from the political agenda. while it 
remained by definition central to the identity and politics 
of the Partido Revolucionario following its creation in 
1957. Nevertheless, the parameters imposed by the counter-
revolution were such that private property remained 
inviolable. while in 1966 the PR's promise to redistribute 
national finca land proved to be largely unworkable. 
The conditions for such a reform had been established in 
the 1945 Constitution which explicitly outlawed L~~if~ndj~ 
and provided for the expropriation of land for the social 
good. To this end. the government sought a rationalisation 
along capitalist lines of the exceptionally skewed pattern 
114 Handy. Gi ft~ of the Devi 1, p.115; Dunkerley, P~Q~~J:: 
in the Isthmus, p.147. 
115 Villagran Kramer. Biografia Politica, p.96; 
Dunkerley, 'Guatemala 1944-1954'. pp.106-7. 
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of land tenure indicated by the 1950 census. 116 While two 
per cent of the population controlled almost 74 per cent of 
farml and, 76 per cent of farms had access to on 1 y 9 per 
cent of land; 88.4 per cent of all farms possessed less 
than 17 acres and 21.3 per cent worked less than two acres, 
some 7 acres less than that considered the bare minimum to 
support a fami 1 y. 117 Passed by Congress on 17 June 1952, 
Decree 900 provi ded for the expropri at i on of unused or 
underused land from different types of agricultural 
enterprises, including national fincas and municipal land, 
which would then be redistributed in ownership or lifelong 
usufruct to peasants and workers .118 All farms under 90 
hectares (219 acres) and those of up to 300 hectares (488 
acres) of which two-thirds were cultivated were exempt from 
the decree, together wi th all communa 1 1 ands, forests and 
full y-cul t i vated farms. 119 
Expropriations were to depend on local initiative, it 
being necessary to 'denounce' illegally-held land to local 
agrarian officials before action would be taken under the 
law. 120 Thus, the signal importance of the reform lay as 
much in the participation it induced at local level as in 
the expropriation of private property itself. The 
st i pu 1 at i on that it wou 1 d be compensated in government 
bonds at a price determined by the property values 
submi t ted for the 1 ast tax assessment caused part i cu 1 ar 
116 Handy, Gift of the Devil, p.127. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Handy, Revolution in the Countryside, p.90. That 
much of the land distributed was given in usufruct was one 
of the main criticisms of the law: Handy, 'Corporate 
Community, Campesino Organisations, and Agrarian Reform', 
in Smith, Guatemalan Indians and th~~~~~_;. see al:o, 
Villagran Kramer, Biografia Politica! p.1~~; NaJera Farfan, 
Los . ~ ~_1: ~f a c! 0 ~~ s, p. 1 57; S i err a Ro 1 dan, D, ago los, p. 65 . 
119 Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus, p.148. 
120 Handy, R~vo 1 ut ion in the Count r~; de, pp. 88-90 . 
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resentment, given the general propensity to undervalue land 
as a means of tax avoidance. Even so, the measures 
rebounded far less sharply on the oligarchy than a cursory 
glance at the figures might suggest. Of the 917,659 acres 
expropriated and redistributed to 87,569 families, more 
than one-third belonged to national fincas and other state 
and municipal lands. 121 Moreover, apart from land held by 
UFCo - with some 653,197 acres marked for expropriation _ 
only 3.9 per cent of privately-owned land was affected by 
the measures .'22 
It was support for UFCo's claims for compensation that 
drew the United States government into a headlong campaign 
against the Arbenz administration, the company demanding 
compensation of $75 per hectare or a total of $15.8 million 
instead of the $627,527 at $2.99 per hectare offered by 
Guatemala on the basis of UFCo's 1950 tax declaration. '23 
The role of UFCo in accelerating the US government's anti-
communist campaign against the Arbenz regime and the 
campaign itself have been treated extensively elsewhere, 
and wi 11 not be addressed in deta i 1 here. 124 Nonethe 1 ess, 
it is worth noting UFCo's early campaign against the Labour 
Code which fanned State Department concern regarding 
communist influence within Arevalo's government, 
121 Whetten, Guatemala, Table 24, p.163; Dunkerley, 
Power in the Isthmus, p. 148. Gl ei j eses, Shattered Hope, 
p.156 and Handy, Revolution in the Countryside, p:94, argue 
that 1.4 million acres of land were exproprlated and 
distributed to some 100,000 campesinos. 
122 Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus, pp.148-9. 
123 Ibid., p.149. 
124 See, in particular, Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen 
Kinzer, Bi tter Frui t. The Unto 1 d Story of th~~_~ri can Coup 
in Guatemala (London, 1982); Aybar de Soto, Depende~~y and 
Intervention; Immerman, The CIA in GuatemaJ~; GlelJeses, 
$t1att~rect H_o~ J esp. pp. 223-387 . 
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latter's stated aversion to 
A similar view of Arbenz took some time to emerge, with 
initial expectations that the former would curb the 
radicalism of the Arevalo years, influenced in large part 
by the convi ct i on that the Guatema 1 an mi 1 i tary rema i ned 
untainted by communist infiltration. 126 However, while the 
importance of the communist threat was consistently 
overstated by the US government - the PGT won only four 
seats in the 1953 congressional elections and there was at 
no stage any overt Communist representation in the Cabinet 
the PGT became a full partner in the revolutionary 
coalition under Arbenz and its leadership was consulted on 
all major government matters. 127 Indeed, its influence far 
outweighed its size, of which estimates vary between 
Monteforte Toledo's conservative figure of 1,300 and PGT 
Secretary General Fortuny's claim to a rather more 
impressive 5,000 members by June 1954. 128 
At the same time, the impression of communist dominance 
within the regime remained central to subsequent 
interpretations of the Arbenz administration and became a 
key poi nt of reference wi th the Thi rd Government of the 
Revolution in 1966 when the communist threat again loomed 
large on the horizon. As in the 1950s, the combined forces 
125 Areva 10' s nat i ona 1 i sm wi th regard to US compan i es 
was often viewed by US officials in terms of crypto-
communism, as were his escapades with the Caribbean Legion: 
Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, pp.85-124. 
126 Ibid., pp.123-6; Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus, 
pp.144. 147. 
127 Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus. p.145; Gleijeses. 
Shattered Hope, p.182. 
128 Monteforte Toledo, Guatemala, p.316; Gleijeses. 
Shat!~re~_ Hope, p.195. citing interview with Fortuny. 
Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus, p.164. n.104. notes the 
State Department's assessment of fewer than 1.000 ;n 1953; 
see a 1 so. Car do z a y A r a g6 n • La Re v 0 11.J c i 6n _G ua t ~ rn~J tec a • 
p.139; Schneider. Comml!nism ;n Guatemala. pp.1, 44. 
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of the new radical challenge were small, yet in the post-
1954 order, their impact was sufficient to provoke a 
backlash which seriously undermined the attempt at civilian 
democratic government. 
It was the question of communist influence in the 
government, together with the growing importance of rural 
mobilisation and the central role played by activists 
within the CGTG and the CNCG - on whom Arbenz relied to 
implement the reform - which became the focus for internal 
opposition during the final months of his 
admi n i st rat ion. 129 Most important 1 y, the hitherto neutral 
military became increasingly concerned at the unprecedented 
levels of rural organisation in its traditional sphere of 
control. 130 This issue should not be underestimated, since 
the CGTG and the CNCG were begi nni ng to trai n popul ar 
militias and were successfully countering military attempts 
to retain vigilance 
commi ssi oners. 131 
by removing troublesome military 
Moreover, in January 1953, the 
opposi t i on press had begun to focus on a seri es of 1 and 
invasions as further evidence of communist-fomented 
agitation and the loss of control in the countryside. 132 
Unt i 1 1954, Arbenz had managed to reta in the mi 1 i tary' s 
acqu i escence by extendi ng the benefi ts extended to the 
institution under Arevalo and ensuring its monopoly on 
arms. A further unspoken understanding was that its ranks 
129 Schneider, Communism in Guatemala, 
Re~QJution in the Countryside, p.46. 
p. 39; Handy, 
130 Han d y , Rev 0 1 uti 0 n i nth e Co un try s i dJ~ , P P . 1 8 7 - 9 ; 
Villagran Kramer, Biografia Politica, p.135; Sierra Roldan, 
Diagolos con el Coronel Monzon, p.72. 
131 Handy, Gift of the Devil, p.135. 
132 Ibid., pp.105-8; Gleijeses. Shattered Hope, p.155. 
Gleijeses, ibid., p.162. argues that there were few 
concrete cases of illegal land occupations and that reports 
were exaggerated by the opposition press to further 
undermine the regime. 
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remain free from communist subversion. 133 The growing 
threat of US aggression altered this balance of forces. In 
earl y June 1954, the mi 1 i tary Chi ef of Staff presented 
Arbenz with a questionnaire - in essence an ultimatum. The 
President's refusal to cede to the implicit demand that he 
forsake the support of the Communists and remove hostile 
elements, was decisive in the withdrawal of military 
support for the government and the mi 1 i tary fai 1 ure to 
defend the revolution. 134 
On 17 June 1954, a ramshackle army of some 150 mostly 
Guatemalan rebels led by Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, 
crossed the border from Honduras. The fi nal stage in the 
multifaceted United States operation 'PBSuccess' which had 
managed to isolate Guatemala internationally through the 
United Nations and the Organisation of American States, the 
success of the so-called 'forces of liberation' owed little 
to military prowess and almost everything to the refusal of 
the Guatemalan armed forces to fight. The internal coup 
precipitated Arbenz's resignation on 27 June, when to all 
intents and purposes the Guatemalan revolution ended. 
While United States intervention was crucial in bringing 
about this defeat, the internal tensions generated by the 
agrari an reform had ensured Arbenz' s downfall. I f the 
counter-revolutionary forces inside Guatemala remained weak 
in terms of organ i sat i on beyond the voca 1 ant i comun i smo 
employed by the Church and the oligarchy, the ease with 
which the 'liberaci6n' took power testified to the limits 
of organised political support for the regime. The weakest 
link of all however, had proved to be the Guatemalan 
military. 
133 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, pp.202-3. 
134 Villagran Kramer, Biografia Politica, pp.129-34. 
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Th~~Counter- revo 1 ut ion 
In the same way that the transition from military to 
civilian rule in 1966 must be set against the reformist 
decade, a brief account of the counter-revolution is 
essential to understanding the political culture after 
1954. Together with its leitmotif of anticomunismo, the 
central feature of the counter-revol ut i on was its 
essentially disorganised character. It is possible 
however, to distinguish between two separate periods in 
which the dominance of the liberacionista forces gave way 
to military intromission and a tentative liberalisation 
under military auspices. Between 1954 and 1957, under the 
increasingly tenuous rule of Castillo Armas, a profoundly 
unstable reactionary coalition set about dismantling the 
apparatus of the revolutionary decade. The caudillo's 
assassination and the fraudulent elections that followed, 
marked a second period in which the balance of forces 
shifted towards a rather more confident military emerging 
from the shadow of its phantom defeat in 1954. 
It is important to note the tensions which continued to 
ex i st between what rema i ned a mi 1 i tar i 1 y undefeated army 
and the 1 i beraci oni sta forces. In the aftermath of the 
invasion a series of US-orchestrated manoeuvres 
systematically discarded combinations of military juntas 
until Castillo Armas remained in sale charge of the 
government. Simultaneously, two separate pacts between the 
liberacionista forces and the Guatemalan military sought to 
reach a settlement, the limitations of which were revealed 
on 2 August when military cadets rose against 
liberacionista forces, in reaction to attempts to 
incorporate the 1 at ter into the regu 1 ar forces. 135 It is 
si gni fi cant however, that at no poi nt di d the rebell ion 
135 Villagran Kramer, Biografia Politica, pp.163-195; 
Guillermo Flores Avendano, Memorias (1~OO-1970) (Guatemala, 
1974), pp.443-445. 
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either call for a return to the revolution, or attempt to 
free those in asyl um in forei gn embassi es. 136 
Nevertheless, the action was praised by the high command in 
full-page advert i sements in the press, whi 1 e the Defence 
Minister described the revolt as a 'glorious act which 
vi ndi cated the good name of the army'. 137 
The repressive tendencies of anticomunismo in power were 
initially directed at removing the channels for political 
expression and the decisive demobilisation of society. The 
1945 Constitution was declared to be at the root of the 
country's problems and was replaced by a temporary charter, 
which cancelled municipal and judicial autonomy and 
disenfranchised illiterates. 138 At the same time all urban 
and rural union leaders were deregistered with the Comite 
Nacional de Reorganisacion (CNRS) established to ensure the 
apolitical and non-communist bona fides of future union 
leadership, and 533 rural sindicatos and unions were 
cancelled. 139 Within a year, union membership stood at 
27,000. 140 In the anti-communist psychosis that followed, 
the Comite Nacional de Defensa Contra el Comunismo (CNDCC) 
136 Villagran Kramer, Siografia Politica, pp.224-41. 
137 Andrew Schlewitz, 'The Institutionalization of 
Militarism in Guatemala', unpublished paper for the 
Historical Studies Spring Conference 1995, New School for 
Social Research, New York, p.9. 
138 Melville and Melville, Another Vietnam, p.111; 
Asociacion de Investigacion y Estudios Sociales 
Guatemalteca [ASIES], Mas de 100 Anos del Movimiento Obrero 
Urbano en Guatemala. Tomo III: Reorganizacion, Auge Y 
Desarticulacion del Movimiento Sindical (1954-19821 
(Guatemala, n.d.), p.3. The latter forms part of a 
valuable four-volume study which reconstructs the history 
of the urban labour movement in Guatemala between 1877 and 
1990 using a combination of primary and secondary 
documentary sources and oral history. 
139 ASIES, Mas de 100_Anos, p.6; Dunkerley, Power in 
tlL~thmus, p.435. 
140 Ibid., p.436. 
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was authorised to compile a register of all those who could 
be associated in any way with 'Communist' activities, a 
system of control which was to be revived by the military 
after 1963. By mid-November some 72,000 people had been 
blacklisted and those arrested on the orders of the CNDCC 
were deni ed the ri ghts of habeus corpus. 141 
Measured against the extensive repression, the rhetorical 
attachment to the concept of social justice as part of the 
liberacionista ideology - and insisted upon by Castillo 
Armas and his ministers - appeared contradictory. That the 
regime felt the need to pay lip service to the reformist 
ethos of the revolution is indicative of its need to build 
a social base beyond the unstable anti-communist coalition 
which was already breaking down into rival factions. But 
while the retention of the Labour Code at the urging of the 
CNRS, the Federaci6n Aut6noma Sindical (FAS) and the 
American Federation of Labour (AFL) and to the 
displeasure of the AGA - represented a small victory for 
labour, its most important provisions on basic rights and 
social welfare were suppressed. 142 Moreover, the flurry of 
anti-communist decrees continued to violate what remained 
of its safeguards. 
In the same way, the agrarian reform was all but 
di smant 1 ed over the fo 11 owi ng two years, notwi thstandi ng 
the moderate and conciliatory tone of the relevant 
legislation. Exluding the land returned to UFCo, 368,481 
of the 529,939 manzanas (626,418 and 900,896 acres 
respectively) expropriated under Decree 900 were 
141 I bi d.; Handy, Gi ft of the Devi 1, p. 151; Monteforte 
Toledo, Guatemala, pp.320-1. 
142 ASIES, Mas de 100 Arios, pp.18-21; Dunkerley, Power 
in the Isthmus, p.436. 
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returned. 143 The central tenet of post-intervention 
agrarian legislation was the exclusion of direct campesino 
involvement in either the administration or the decision-
making process in agrarian issues, while the prevailing 
atmosphere of repression meant that few peasants were 
willing or able to take advantage of the theoretical 
protect ions extended to them. 144 
In the face of official repression, the popular 
opposition remained generally muted, yet occasional 
protests continued to be registered. The student 
organi sat ion El Derecho publ i shed a mani festo in March 
1955, which called for the speedy emission of a new 
constitution, without which there could be no democratic 
future for Guatemala. 145 Repeatedly, during 1955 and 1956, 
secondary and university students acted through strikes and 
demonstrations to show their discontent with the regime, 
while at the 15,000-strong May Day parade of 1956, students 
and unionists took over the platform and denounced 
violations of the Labour Code as well as the 'yellow' 
unionism of their official representatives. 146 The 
, independent' press began to express simi 1 ar sent i ments 
and, notwithstanding its role in the fall of Arbenz, 
criticised the negative character of anticomunismo as the 
sole basis for political action. 147 
The essentially unstable character of the new regime was 
143 Handy, Re\lolution in the Countryside, p.195: Handy 
notes that this figure was considerably less than the 
usually-quoted figure of 99.6 per cent; see, for example, 
Susanne Jonas Bodenheimer, Guatemala: plan pi10to p~ra el 
continente (Costa Rica, 1981), p.239. 
144 Handy, Revo 1 ut ion i n the Count rys ide, pp. 195-7 . 
145 ASIES, Mas de 100 Anos, pp.80-1. It is notable 
that this manifesto wholeheartedly embraced anticomunismo. 
146 lb i d., p p • 95 - 6 . 
147 El Imparcial, 15.6.55, cited in ibid., p.82. 
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revealed in at least three military uprisings between 
January 1955 and January 1956 and the imposition of a State 
of Si ege. 148 Such unrest was symptomat i c of the i nterna 1 
struggle taking place within a politically diverse 
liberacionista bloc which encompassed traditional 
conservatives, the newly-formed Christian Democratic Party 
(DCG) and a collection of ultramontane elements and pure 
opportunists. 149 Out of a series of ephemeral anti-
communist organisations, the Movimiento Democratico 
Nacional (MDN) emerged as the 'official' party, led by the 
self-proclaimed Fascist, Mario Sandoval Alarcon. 1SO Based 
in the government bureaucracy, the anti-communist students' 
association and local liberacionist~ forces in the north-
east of the country, the MDN mutated into the MLN after 
1957 which was to be at the centre of the extreme right-
wing violence of the mid-1960s. 
The 1956 Constitution was promulgated after 17 months of 
debate and took its predecessor as a negat i ve poi nt of 
reference. lSI 
revolution's 
It broadly confirmed 
reactionary principles 
the 
and 
counter-
explicitly 
prohibited communist organisation. While social guarantees 
remained, their protective character was reduced. 
Similarly, union activity was limited to economic questions 
and the section on labour rights abolished. The social 
function of property was eliminated as was the prohibition 
on latifundia, and for the first time since the Liberal 
Revolution, the Church acquired the right to own property 
148 ASI ES, Mas de 100 Anos, p. 80. 
149 Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus, p.438. The DCG 
was registered as a legal party on 24 August 1955. 
150 ASIES, Mas de 100 Anos, p.86; Dunkerley, Power in 
the Isthmus, p.436. 
151 Garcia Laguardia and Vasquez Martinez, Constitucion 
y--<2rc!elLPemoG_cat i co, p. 98. 
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for religious, educational or charitable use.152 
Significantly, the power of the president was strengthened 
in relation to the armed forces. 
The promulgation of a new constitution did nothing to 
resolve the inherent instabil ity of the regime in which 
Castillo Armas was becoming increasingly isolated. On 26 
July 1957 he was assassinated. Despite the alleged 
communism of the assassin who 'committed suicide' 
immediately following the deed - and the detention of some 
400 persons under the State of Siege which followed - there 
is general agreement among analysts that the caudillo's 
demise was the result of infighting within the anti-
communist bloc. 153 
In the political vacuum which followed Castillo Armas' 
death, a struggle for power unfolded within the 
anticommunist bloc with the military eventually moving to 
annul fraudulent elections in what appeared to be a 
reassertion of democratic procedure. While the MDN 
presented the Interior Minister Ortiz Passar elli as the 
official candidate in elections to be held on 20 October, 
this attempt at continuismo was thwarted by the return from 
diplomatic exile of Castillo Armas' erstwhile rival, 
General Ydigoras Fuentes. 154 Campaigning on the platform 
152 Ibid., p.99. 
153 A prime suspect was Major Enrique Trinidad Oliva -
brother of the Defence Minister - who was later tried and 
acquitted. Speculation also centred on the involvement of 
the Dominican dictator, General Rafael Trujillo: Dunkerley, 
Power in the Isthmus, p.439; Villagran Kramer, Bi~~_fi~ 
Politica, p.292. Thirty years on, MLN leader Mario 
Sandoval Alarcon stated that only he and fellow right-
wi nger Eduardo Taracena de 1 a Cerda knew who was rea 11 y 
responsible: ibid. 
154 For Ydigoras Fuentes' earlier history see 
Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, p.82; Villagran Kramer, 
Biografia Politica, pp.105-8; Ydigoras Fuentes, My War with 
Communism (Englewood Cliffs, 1963). The US government had 
rejected--him in favour of Castillo Armas to lead the 
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of 'a clean slate' ('borron y cuenta nueva'), his 
i nsi stence that a vi ctory for Ort i Z Passarell i woul d be 
tantamount to fraud indicated that he was not prepared to 
lose the election. Indeed the US Embassy noted that his 
'reckless' language 'makes it abundantly clear his hopes of 
attai ni ng [the] presi dency are based not on wi nni ng at 
[the] polls but on marshalling public opinion behind him 
after elections' .155 
It is generally accepted that the October poll was 
fraudulent and it is significant that a good proportion of 
the votes remained uncounted when Ortiz Passarelli declared 
his victory the day after the elections. 156 A massive 
convergence of Ydigoras Fuentes supporters on the National 
Palace ended in violence and the imposition of a State of 
Siege, much of the repression being directed against the 
newly-formed Partido Revolucionario which had reportedly 
supported Ydi goras in exchange for guarantees for its 
participation in a new poll.157 Led by ex-militants of the 
revolutionary RN and FPL outlawed by the counter-
revolution - the PR had been denied registration on the 
basis that many on its requisite list of 5,000 party 
members corresponded to those on the so-called 'blacklist' 
1 i beraci on, though in 1954 the CIA predi cted that he was 
one of two possible heirs to the presidency 'when Castillo 
Armas steps down': Carrolton Press Declassified Reference 
System [hereafter DDRS], (83)000038, CIA memorandum, 19 
November 1954. 
155 
1957. 
DDRS DOS R493H, US Embassy te 1 egram, 18 October 
156 The votes in this election were probably never 
counted. Some days after the 20 October poll, the chairman 
of the Electoral Tribunal showed US Embassy officers rooms 
full of sealed boxes which he said he had no intention of 
opening, given the current charges of fraud: DDRS DOS R-
500C, American Embassy Despatch No.337, 23.11.57. 
157 Villagran Kramer, ~iografia Politica, pp.305-6; 
DDRS DOSR-496C, US Ambassador Sparks to C. Allan Stewart, 
Memorandum of telephone conversation, 25.10.57. 
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of Communists compiled in the wake of the liberaci6n. 158 
By 24 October the mi 1 i tary had taken control of the 
situation. The 1956 Constitution was suspended and an 
interim military junta established, effectively removing 
the MDN from government in a move indicative of the 
continuing tensions between the two entities. In the 
negotiations that followed, the issues at stake revolved 
around the question of whether or not new elections should 
be held, and whether these should take place under de facto 
or de jure conditions. Another question, and one of 
particular concern to anxious US monitors, was whether or 
not the PR would be permitted to participate in new 
elections. 1S9 
The military intervention and installation of Colonel 
Flores Avendano as interim president signalled a period of 
contradictory trends in which the military promoted a 
political apertura before subsequently moving into full 
political power. While Avendano's determination to allow 
the PR to regi ster had altered the ba 1 ance of forces to 
some degree, the new political conjuncture also represented 
an irrevocable reversal of the roles of the military and 
the liberacionista forces, effectively ending the latter's 
strangl ehol d on government .160 
Ydigoras won a plurality in a new poll in January 1958 
and was duly elected President by the MDN-dominated 
Congress on 12 February in exchange for guaranteed MDN 
158 DDRS DOS R-500E, 
Despatch 346, 27.11.57. 
Weeka No. 48, American Embassy 
Kramer, Biografia Politica, pp.310-311; 
Outgoing Telegram 217 from Dulles to 
25.10.57; DDRS DOS R-496C. Ambassador 
159 Vi 11 agran 
DDRS DOS R-495G, 
Ambassador Sparks, 
Sparks to Stewart; 
Ambassador Sparks. 
DDRS DOS R-496E, Telegram 163 from 
160 Flores Avendano. Memori as, p. 468. 
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cabinet positions. 161 While Cruz Salazar has suggested 
that the friendship between Flores Avendano and Ydigoras 
Fuentes secured his victory, there is little doubt that the 
General was abl e to garner consi derabl e support at thi s 
juncture. 162 Hi s campai gn had promi sed an end to 
repression and revenge, the return of political exiles, 
labour and agricultural reforms, all of which had been a 
contributing factor in the show of working class support 
for him following the October elections. 163 
Notwithstanding the evident right-wing orientation of the 
new regime, the promise of borron y cuenta nueva indicated 
a new toleration and created a palpable air of expectation 
in terms of the possibilities inherent in the apertura 
politica which appeared to be taking place. 164 
It is worth contrasting the honeymoon period of this 
government with that of Mendez Montenegro a few years later 
when the parameters for democratisation were a good deal 
more limited. The new spirit of reconciliation was 
shortlived. While the deepening economic crisis provided 
the background to increasing industrial conflict, within 
the Ydigoras Fuentes administration corruption reached 
unprecedented levels, most notoriously with the sell-off of 
the nati onal fi ncas .165 The admi ni strati ve chaos was 
mirrored in the deterioration of the political process as 
161 
12.11.57. 
follows: 
DDRS DOS, American Embassy Despatch No.308, 
The resu 1 ts for the rna in contenders were as 
Ydigoras Fuentes (Redencion) - 190,972; Col Cruz 
Salazar 
132,824: 
(MDN) 138,488; Mario Mendez Montenegro (PR) 
Villagran Kramer, Biografia Politica, pp.315-23. 
162 Cruz Sa 1 azar, I El Ej erci to como una fuerza 
political, pp.150-151; Flores Avendano, Memorias, p.471. 
163 ASIES, Mas de 100 Anos, p.122. 
164 Monteforte Toledo, Guatemala, pp.301-302; Villagran 
Kramer, Biografia Politica, p.316. 
165 Villagran Kramer, Biografia Politica, p354; Handy, 
Gift of the Devil, p.190; Melville and Melville, Another 
yj~tnam, pp. 150-5. 
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the President sought to sustain his weak political base by 
exploiting serious divisions within the MDN and the PR, 
both of which fragmented into rival groups. Moreover, by 
mid-1959, the PR together with other groups identified with 
the 1944 revolution were becoming the focus of government 
repression, while the campaign for congressional elections 
was characterised by illegal detentions and kidnappings. 166 
A central factor in the increasingly unstable political 
si tuat i on was the Cuban Revol ut ion. Thi s event had a 
profound effect on Guatemalan politics, becoming at once an 
inspiration and a threat as castrocomunismo replaced 
arbenzcomunismo as the invisible hand behind all acts of 
opposition, whether emanating from the left, the right, or 
the military. In this way, a series of bomb attacks in the 
capital in May 1960 was variously blamed on the Partido 
Unificaci6n Revolucionaria (PUR) - a splinter from the PR -
the PGT, as well as the MDN, all 'supported by Fidel 
Castro' .167 However, the attempt by Ydi goras to present 
the military uprising of 13 November 1960 in similar terms 
was received with scepticism. As US Ambassador Mucc i 0 
reported to the State Department, the air force and 
military, 'because of [the Government of Guatemala's] cries 
of wo 1 f over past months' were no longer prepared to 
believe that the rebels 'are really Castro agents,.168 
The irony of this observation is that participants in 
this revolt did indeed come to lead the first guerrilla 
166 AS I E S , :..:..:M=a=s'----=d=e'---~1_=0_=0_A'___'_'__'_n_=0_=_s , 
Toledo, Guatemala, p.326. 
pp.205-7; Monteforte 
167 Prensa Libre, 16.5.60 in ASIES, Mas de 100 Anos, 
p.207. 
168 DDRS DOS 
14.11.60. This 
lending 'discreet 
reinforcements or 
Memorandum to The 
16. 11 . 60 
(76)71-E, American Embassy Telegram 226, 
di d not however, prevent the US from 
surveillance' in order to intercept any 
supplies from Cuba: DDRS DOS (84) 2074, 
President from Secretary of State Herter, 
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focos in Guatemala. At the time however, the uprising was 
in part a nationalist response to the US training of Cuban 
exiles on Guatemalan soil - for the Bay of Pigs invasion _ 
underpi nned by more mundane i nst i tut i ona 1 concerns and 
resentments. Central to these was the long-standing 
tension between line and academy-trained officers, 
aggravated by Ydigoras Fuentes' practice of appointing his 
ubiquista cronies -generally line officers - to command 
pos it ions over academy graduates. 169 Moreover,; n a 
situation where government employees and military personnel 
had not been paid for two months, the large bonuses earned 
by Guatemalan officers selected to train the Cubans and 
the superior materiel of the latter, was the source of as 
much indignation as the existence of what was effectively 
a foreign army on Guatemalan territory.17D 
It is important to stress the role of the United States 
in the suppression of the revolt, with CIA pilots 
reportedly joining the bombardment of the conspirators in 
Zacapa. 171 One year 1 ater, the air force - wh i ch had been 
generously rewarded for its loyalty during the 13 November 
revolt joined with wealthy landowners in another 
attempted coup, apparently provoked by Congressional 
approval of a new income tax and increases in land taxes 
two days earlier. 172 
169 These pos it ions were frequent 1 y abused, as in the 
case of the Defence Minister who used army personnel and 
machines to harvest cotton on his plantation: Captain Juan 
Fernando Ci fuentes Hernandez, i ntervi ew, Guatema 1 a Ci ty, 
30.9.94; see a 1 so Ci fuentes Hernandez, 'Causas y 
consecuencias del alzamiento del 13 de noviembre de 1960', 
Cronica, 19.11.93, p.34; Cesar Augusto Silva Giron, Cuando 
Gobiernan Las Armas: Guatemala - 31 ARos de Miseria 
(Guatemala, 1987), pp.130-131. 
170 I bid. 
171 Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus, p.442. 
172 Handy, Gift of the Devil, p.154; Ydigoras Fuentes. 
My __ War ____ wj_th_~mmuni sm. p. 78. Ydi goras c 1 aims that 
opposition to these taxes, proposed in 1958, had resulted 
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The first clear indication of guerrilla activity appeared 
in early 1962 coinciding with the most serious popular 
opposition to the government to date. The spark to this 
latest crisis had been the congressional elections in the 
previous December when the official party had scooped 
thirty of the thirty-three available seats provoking 
inevitable cries of fraud. Initially led by the three main 
opposition parties - the MLN, DCG and PR -secretly united 
in a pact of cooperation to unseat the government, the AEU 
coordinated a fresh wave of protests in March as the new 
deputies took their seats in Congress. The most serious 
cl ashes occurred on 16 and 17 March wi th hundreds of 
arrests and several deaths. Faced with such a concerted 
challenge across the political spectrum and alarmed by 
guerri 11 a act i vi ty in 8aj a Verapaz, Ydi goras appoi nted a 
military cabinet leaving only the post of Foreign Relations 
in the hands of a civilian. 
The ultimate failure to remove Ydigoras at this stage was 
due to a variety of factors. The movement lacked organic 
leadership, its very heterogeneity and unorganised 
character precluding its cohesion into a politically 
defined force. Only belatedly was the Frente Civico 
Nacional (FCN) formed, a coalition incorporating the three 
parties to the left of the PR - all splinters resulting 
from internal struggles and expulsions - FASGUA, SAMF, FUMN 
and FUEGO, as well as the Asociaci6n Guatemaltec~_para la 
Defensa de los Derechos Humanos, the Asocociaci6n Q~ 
Locutores and several other small groupings. None of the 
officially-recognised parties nor the professional sectors 
were included. 173 Meanwhile, a significant section of 
organised labour had remained outside the struggle, while 
the Church vociferously condemned the protests and ordered 
in four years of unrest, manipulated by the left. 
1 73 AS I E S, M c3_S d ~_ 1 00 A Ii 0 s, p p . 22 7 - 228 . 
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catholics to do likewise. 174 
Most importantly perhaps, the military was not yet ready 
to act. Nevertheless, the mobilisations of March and April 
served to expose once again the extreme fragility of the 
political system imposed since 1954, both in terms of the 
sterile competition within the counter-revolutionary bloc 
and the risks involved in any putative attempts at 
liberalisation. By March 1963, the picture had changed 
with the military feeling compelled to move in defence of 
Guatemalan democracy against those abusing 'the widespread 
liberty granted by the Constitution' and intending to 
implant Communism from within.175 
174 Ibid., p.228. 
175 'Manifiesto: El Ejercito de Guatemala' J Ejercito, 
Ano 1 J No.8, (Abri 1 1963), p.16. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE 1963 COUP AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT 
... 10 apoyamos porque sabi amos que e.l coronel 
Peralta era un hombre muy ... honrado. El boto a 
Ydigoras Fuentes ... Por eso fue que nosotros [el 
PRJ acuerpamos a ese movi mi en to , como acuerpo 
todo Guatema 1 a, por que 1 a ca ida de Ydi goraT significaba romper con un sistema muy corrupto. 
Con aquel acto final de fuerza, el Ejercito no 
solo liquida un Gobierno constitucional 
mas ... Cerro, ademas ... el camino a una posible 
vida democratica del pais, al impedir la 
celebracion de las elecciones presidenciales ... 2 
Introduction 
On the night of 30 March 1963, a three-man commi ttee 
arrived at the presidential residence on foot. 3 
Accompanied by the Director of the Escuela Politecnica and 
the Second-in-Command of the Guardia de Honor, Colonel Juan 
de Dios Aguilar de Leon woke President Ydigoras Fuentes to 
de 1 i ver the news that he had been removed from offi ce. 
Short 1 y afterwards, a tank from the Guardi a de Honor 
smashed down the main door of the residence. The President 
and his wife were transported to the Air Force Base, from 
where they were flown to Nicaragua the following day.4 
1 Mario Fuentes Pieruccini, interview, Guatemala City, 
2.2.94. 
2 Edelberto Torres Rivas, 'El golpe militar de marzo 
de 1963', Polemica (October 1982), p.35. 
3 Colonel Juan de Dios Aguilar de Leon, interview, 
Guatemala City, 4.4.94. 
4 Co lone 1 Agu i 1 a r de 
di ffers markedl y from that 
with Communism. p.2. 
Leon's versi on of the events 
in Ydi goras Fuentes', My War 
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The military incursion into the political sphere was 
nothing new in itself. What distinguished this particular 
i ntervent i on was its i nst i tut i ona 1 character. The coup 
decision had been taken unanimously at a meeting of all 
high-ranking military officers and base commanders at the 
Cuartel General de la Zona Militar General Justo Rufino 
Barrios, with the Minister of Defence, Colonel Enrique 
Peralta Azurdia, as highest-ranking officer, becoming Jefe 
del Gobierno rather than president. 5 Moreover, while the 
new regime acknowledged its transitory assumption of power 
in order to defend Guatemalan democracy, it was clear that 
there would be no early return to constitutional rule. 6 
The fi rst act of the mi 1 i tary government upon sei zi ng 
power was to suspend the Constitution and all party 
political activity: 
Que por la situacion caotica a que ha llegado el 
pais, es imposible resolver sus graves problemas 
dentro del margen constitucional, que los 
comunistas, aprovechandose de la amplia libertad 
que concede la Constitucion vigente, se han 
i nfi 1 t rado en e 1 Gobi erno y en los di ferentes 
partidos politicos, propiciando el 
5 Clause 2, 'Manifiesto: El Ejercito de Guatemala', 
Ejercito (April 1963), p16; 'Accion Reivindicador del 
Ejercito', Ibid., p.4; Art.2, Decree Law No.8, in Decreto 
Ley. Carta Fundamental de Gobierno (Guatemala, 1963); Cruz 
Salazar, 'El Ejercito como una Fuerza Political, pp.153-4; 
Brian Jenkins and Caesar D. Sereseres, 'United States 
Military Assistance', Armed Forces and Society, (Winter 
1977), p.584. 
6 Decree Law No.8, pro 1 ogue, Carta Fundamenta 1 de 
Gobierno, p.1. As Alan Angell has pointed out, for all the 
times it has been violated, the basic political discourse 
of Latin America remains that of constitutional and 
representative government, 'And this is the tradition that 
the military claims it has come in to protect, perfect and 
eventually transfer to civilians ... A military government 
has therefore to present itself as transitory': Angell, 
'The Soldier as Politician', pp.282-3. 
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fraccionamiento de las fuerzas democraticas, al 
mismo tiempo que unifican sus propios recursos, 
10 que daria por logico resultado que ellos se 
apoderen del Gobi erno dentro de una aparente 
legalidad, para luego implantar un reglmen 
comunista, tal como 10 demue7tra la practica que han usado en otros paises ... 
The following three years saw a determined effort to 
restructure the Guatemalan polity in the name of a putative 
democracy in which the emphasis lay decisively with order 
and security.S As part of this restructuring process a new 
party was established and the parameters for political 
competition severely circumscribed. Attempting to 
stabilise an intensely unstable political situation, the 
mi 1 i tary reorgani sed the internal securi ty apparatus and 
succeeded in carving out for itself greater autonomy and 
power base. This chapter begins by exploring the 
military's motives and sources of support underlying the 
coup and goes on to examine some of the key policies of the 
mi 1 i tary in government. Of part i cu 1 ar interest for our 
purposes, is the military role in refashioning the 
political system and the dynamics involved in the return to 
the constitutional process. 
MQ~ives for the Coup 
El Ejercito se hizo cargo del mando de la Nacion 
para poner fi n a 1 a demagogi a, a 1 as ambi ci ones 
politicas, a la inmoralidad administrativa y al 
peligro comunista; asi como para rescatar al pais 
7 'Manifiesto: El Ejercito de Guatemala', p.16. 
8 For an example of the military's vision of democracy 
see 'Conceptos Equivocados de Libertad y De~ocracia. 
Principios de orden, disciplina y respeto en los cludadanos 
como condicion previa para gozar1as'. f~ercito (January 
1965), p.3. 
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de una grave situacion economica y fiscal.9 
Nosotros actuamos corno Institucion a favor de 
Guatemala y nada mas.lO 
The proximate cause of the 1963 coup was the presence of 
ex-president Arevalo on Guatemalan soil, and his declared 
intent i on to stand in the forthcomi ng presi dent i a 1 
elections. 11 The issue of the ex-president's return - and 
more importantly the apparent readiness of Ydigoras Fuentes 
to accept this state of affairs - had been of increasing 
concern to the armed forces since Arevalo's declaration of 
his candidacy from Mexico. 12 In January 1963, Defence 
Minister Peralta Azurdia had warned that the army would use 
a 11 means at its di sposa 1 to prevent a government 'wi th 
communist tendencies' from taking power and invoked its 
constitutional duty in this regard. 13 
9 
'Mensaj e de 1 Jefe de 1 Gobi erno 
Peralta Azurdia al Pueblo de Guatemala', 
p.5. 
Coronel Enrique 
31 . 3. 65, m i meo, 
10 Defence Minister Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdia, 
'Categorica Posicion del Ejercito en 10 Nacional e 
Internacional', Ejercito, (January 1963). 
11 According to the CIA, Arevalo arrived in Guatemala 
from Mexico on the night of 27 March, landing at a farm 
near Coatepeque, San Marcos. His reception committee was 
1 ate and he spent two hou rs in the company of 1 oca 1 
campesi nos before bei ng dri ven to the capi tal: DDRS CIA 
001817, Information Report, 29.3.63. 
12 While the President's public position had been 
somewhat erratic on this question, in private talks with US 
officials he had repeatedly argued against attempts to 
prevent Arevalo's entry on the grounds of illegality, 
believing a strategy of divide and rule with the left would 
be more effective and would undermine Arevalo's support at 
the polls: DDRS DOS 001952, Ambassador Bell for Assistant 
Secretary Martin, Telegram 489, 11.2.63; DDRS DOS 001954, 
Ambassador Bell to Secretary of State, Telegram 580, 
25.3.63. 
13 Peralta Azurdia, 'Categorica Posicion del 
Ejercito'; Prensa Libre, 10.1.63. 
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As Edelberto Torres Rivas has noted, the coup represented 
conti nui ty as well as rupture. 14 In response to the 
concerted challenge to his leadership one year earlier, 
Ydigoras Fuentes had provisionally appointed an almost 
exclusively military cabinet. Although Peralta Azurdia 
i nsi sted the offi cers were cabi net members in thei r own 
right, the new ministers signalled their difference by 
refusing to present their end-of-year resignations to the 
Pres i dent, as was customary. 15 Yd i goras Fuentes' move 
succeeded in deflating the protests as well as maintaining 
the loyalty of the armed forces for the time being. It 
also proved a critical step in the military trajectory from 
veto power to absol ute control of the state. 16 The 
military failure to respond to repeated calls for a 
cuartelazo in March 1962 had been due primarily to an 
inherent 
motives. 17 
suspicion of civilian 
In particular, it 
politicians 
was believed 
and their 
that the 
'subversive elements' perceived to be behind the protests 
would ultimately benefit from any such military action. 18 
Peralta Azurdia asserted that the 'Guatemalan Communist 
14 Torres Rivas, 'El golpe militar', p.35. 
15 Peralta Azurdia, 'Categorica posiclon del 
Ejercito'; Hispanic American Report, Vol.15, No.4, p.306; 
ASIES, Mas de 100 Anos, p.228; Caesar D. Sereseres, 
'Military Development and US Military Assistance: The Case 
of Guatemala 1961-1969', PhD diss. (University of 
California at Riverside, 1971), p.53. Villagran Kramer, 
Biografia Politica, p.370, notes that these military 
ministers were all university professionals and implausibly 
argues that this was evidence that Ydigoras Fuentes did not 
intend to subordinate his government to the military. 
16 Torres Rivas, 'El golpe militar', p.35; Adams, 'The 
Development of the Guatemalan Military', p.91. 
17 See Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies Jr., 
'Military Rule and the Latin American Tradition'. in 
Loveman and Davies, The Politics of Antipolitics. p.7. 
18 Alvaro Contreras Velez, 'Por que puede fracasar el 
movimiento contra el general Ydigoras Fuentes', Prensa 
L i bre, 25.4.62; Rene Poi tevi n, El Proceso de 
Industrializacion en Guatemala (Costa Rica, 1977), p.182. 
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Party' had explicitly pointed to military unity as a 
central factor in the fai 1 ure of the protest movement .19 
However, his comment that the communists had since been 
targeting the political inexperience of 'some army members' 
to persuade them to undertake a coup d'etat suggests that 
institutional solidarity was less firm than the Defence 
Minister indicated. 20 
The question of institutional unity is of primary concern 
for military establishments. Perceived threats to 
institutional cohesion are often a precipitating factor in 
regime liberalisation. In the same way, corporate self-
preservation is frequently the impetus for military revolts 
- although by the same token, their success usually depends 
on a significant degree of unity. Moreover, as Alan Angell 
has argued, a military regime that subsequently attempts a 
fundamental reordering of the social and political 
structure, must have other concerns beyond that of self-
preservat ion per se. 21 The experi ence of the Ydi goras 
Fuentes regime had 
Guatemalan military, 
been profoundly 
the resultant 
unsettling 
tensions 
for the 
having 
19 
Ejercito' . 
Peralta Azurdia, 'Categorica posicion del 
20 Ibid. 
21 Angell, 'The Soldier as Politician', p.279. There 
is a vast literature presenting an array of theories on 
military intervention in Latin American politics. A select 
survey of earlier material would include S.E. Finer's 
classic, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in 
Politics (New York, 1962); the 'modernisationists': John J. 
Johnson (ed.), The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped 
Countries (Princeton, 1962); Jose Nun, 'The Middle Class 
Military Coup' in Claudio Veliz (ed.), The Politics of 
Conformity in Latin America (Oxford, 1967); Samuel P. 
Huntington, Political Order in Changing _Societie~ (New 
Haven, 1968) . More recent debates are summa r i zed in 
Angell, 'The Sol di er as Pol it i ci an' and i ncl ud~ '~ew 
professionalism': Alfred Stepan (ed.), Authorltarlan 
Brazil: Origins. Policies and Future (New Haven. 1973); and 
'bureaucrat i c authori tari ani sm' : Gui 11 ermo 0' Donnell, 
Modernisation and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in 
South American Politics (Berkeley, 1973). 
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contributed to the two unsuccessful military rebellions in 
November 1960 and November 1962. 
In particular, Arevalo represented an intolerable threat. 
In the eyes of many he had been responsable for delivering 
Guatemala into the hands of Communism and remained its 
in the form of so-called 'arevalo-representative 
arbenc i smo' .22 Nor had his role in the death of Colonel 
Francisco Arana in 1949 been forgotten. The 'hoja 
ap6crifa', issued by the 'comite de defensa de las 
i nst i tuci ones armadas' and supposedl y emanat i ng from the 
Guardi a de Honor, 1 i sted numerous sol di ers 'massacred' 
during Arevalo's regime and argued that his objective now _ 
as then - was to eliminate the military.23 Memories of the 
phantom defeat at the hands of the liberacionista forces in 
1954 still loomed large in the collective military psyche -
as did the fragmentary effects of liberacionista attempts 
to integrate themselves into the regular army. The fear of 
revolutionary revenge and institutional destruction 
remai ned strong and had been exacerbated by the fate of 
Batista's armed forces in the wake of the Cuban Revolution. 
Attempting to win army approbation for his presidential 
ambitions, Arevalo had claimed that his government had 
maintained good relations with the military and offered to 
reinstate the military autonomy which the 1956 Constitution 
had effectively suppressed. 24 In his lengthy written 
22 MLN: 'La grave situaci6n anarquica que priva en el 
pais ... ', Prensa Libre, 11.3.63; DDRS DOS 001953, 
Ambassador Bell to Secretary of State, Telegram 534, 
6.3.63; DDRS DOS 001954, Ambassador Bell to Secretary of 
State, Telegram 580, 25.3.63; see also, Juan Jose Arevalo, 
Carta Politica, pp.7, 21-33; Franklin Patterson, 'The 
Guatemalan Military and the Escuela Politecnica', Armed 
Forces and Society (Spring, 1988), pp.376-7. 
23 La Hora, 1.3.63. 
24 Areva 10 J Carta Po 1 it i ca J pp. 48-49; Journa 1 i st 
Marroquin Rojas [pseudo Canuto Ocana], La "Carta Politica" 
del ciudadano Juan Jose_Arevalo, p.109-110, warned that 
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address to the Guatemalan people, he also sought to 
distance himself from the Arbenz regime and strongly 
implied that it had been Arbenz who had planned and 
executed Arana's murder. By March 1963, however, the 
Ydigoras Fuentes government was openly accusing Arevalo of 
having ordered the assassination, while Foreign Minister 
Unda Murillo suggested to the United States Embassy that 
Arevalo's return to Guatemala might be blocked on grounds 
of criminality.25 
Given the extent of military antipathy to Arevalo - and 
by implication any suggestion of a return to the reformist 
decade -i tis stri ki ng that onl y three years after the 
coup, the i nst i tut ion permi tted the i nsta 11 at i on of a 
civilian president, who, together with the political party 
he represented, unambiguously claimed to be the legitimate 
heir of the 1944 Revolution. Most importantly, of course, 
Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro was not Arevalo; nor was the 
Partido Revolucionario arevalista in its sympathies. On 
the cont rary, its very success as one of three 1 ega 11 y-
registered political parties in 1966 was largely premised 
on its anti-Arevalo position. 26 While the answer lies to 
a great extent in the speci a1 ci rcumstances accompanyi ng 
that transfer of power - and these will be addressed in the 
fo 11 owi ng chapter the experi ence of the mi 1 i tary in 
government is also important. Its success in completely 
reorganising political life and setting new parameters for 
this was simply a ploy to abrogate the former and return to 
1945 Constitution with all that it entailed. 
25 Hispanic American Report, Vol.16, No.3; DDRS DOS 
001953, Ambassador Bell to Secretary of State, Telegram 
534, 6.3.63. 
26 The PR's erstwhile leader and Julio Cesar's brother 
Mario Mendez Montenegro was al igned with the Arana camp in 
1949. For specific references to the rivalry that existed 
between Mario Mendez Montenegro and Arevalo see DDRS ~OS 
001952, Ambassador Bell for Assistant Secretary Martln, 
Telegram 489, 11.2.63; DDRS DOS 001953, Ambassador Bell to 
Secretary of State, Telegram 534, 4.3.63. 
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a 'guided democracy' in which all but 'safe' organisations 
were excluded from elections, was not matched in other 
areas. 27 Not only had its actions against the guerrillas 
proved largely ineffective, but its claims to 
administrative honesty and efficiency became increasingly 
open to quest ion. 28 As the 1966 elect ions approached and 
with the guerrillas pursing a politically-damaging campaign 
of kidnapping wealthy Guatemalans for ransom, it became 
clear that the mi 1 i tary government had lost much of its 
initial support. 
In April 1963 however, the private sector had been quick 
to extend its approval to the new regime following the coup 
- in the form of an acuerdo delivered to the new Chief of 
Government by representatives of the Comite Coordinador~de 
Asociaciones Agricolas. Industriales. Comerciales ~ 
Fi nanci eras (CACIF). 29 The prospect of a return to the 
policies of the reformist decade under Arevalo was anathema 
for the 01 i garchy. Moreover, by thi s time there was a 1 so 
profound antagonism towards the economic policies of the 
Ydigoras Fuentes adminstration. While outrage at endemic 
corruption within the government may have had as much to do 
with who did and did not receive a share of the spoils as 
any principled position on the matter, the passing by 
Congress of the country's first income tax bill proved too 
much to swallow. 30 The timing of the liberacionista-backed 
27 DDRS CIA 002411, 'Guatemalan Communists Take 
Hardline as Insurgency Continues', Special Report, 6.8.65. 
28 Lyndon Sai nes Johnson Library [hereafter LSJL], 
Office of Central American Affairs, 'Report on Guatemala', 
13.12.65; Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro, La Hora, 
20. 11 .65. 
29 'El Respaldo Unanime de Pueblo No se Hizo Esperar', 
~i~rcito (April 1963), p.5. 
30 
No.1559, 
Va 1 .81 , 
RecQQilaci6n de Leyes, Congressional Decree 
'Ley de Impuesto sobre la Renta', 24.11.62, 
p.74. In contrast to most accounts of this 
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Air Force rebellion on 25 November 1962 coincided 
suggestively with the new legislation, while the CIA cited 
the 'rapidly deteriorating' situation under Ydigoras and 
the desire to prevent Arevalo's return, as motives for the 
predicted attempt to overthrow the government. 31 There is 
thus a certain irony in the fact that the Peralta Azurdia 
government itself went on to impose an income tax,32 as 
well as displaying a tendency toward state intervention is 
speci fi c areas of the economy and most notabl y wi th the 
nationalisation of the National Coffee Association 
(ANACAFE) in early 1966. 33 
... neither Guatemala nor the US could accept the 
control of the GOG getting into hands which would 
be likely to deliver [the] country into Communism 
again ... [The] problem was therefore one of 
strategy and tactics ... Certainly, if it were 
government, Jerry L. Weaver, 'Administration and 
Development in Guatemala', PhD diss. (University of 
Pittsburgh, 1968), p.40, disputes claims that a prima face 
case of maladministration under Ydigoras Fuentes was 
convincingly established by his accusers. 
31 DDRS CIA 001815, 'Possible Attempt to Overthrow the 
Guatemalan Government', 24.11.62; Rene de Leon Schlotter, 
interview, Guatemala City, 8.2.94; Ydigoras Fuentes, My War 
with Communism, p.78; Juan Fernando Cifuentes H., 
'Operacion latigo', Cronica, 11.2.94; New York Times, 
1.4.63. This latter source suggests that the 'Ley de 
Transformacion Agraria', passed in October, was an 
additional cause of discontent: see Recopilacion de Leyes, 
Congressi onal Decree 1551, 'Ley de Transformaci on Agrari a' , 
11 . 10 . 62, Vo 1 . 81, p. 39 . 
32 Recopi 1 ac i on de Leyes, Dec ree Law No. 229, 'Ley de 
Impuesto Sobre la Renta', 23.6.64, Vol.83, p.64: Jerry L. 
Weaver, 'The Political Style of a Military-dominated 
Regime: The Guatemalan Example', The Journal of Developing 
Areas (April 1969), p.69, notes that the new income tax 
granted generous exempt ions to economi c eli tes and was 
weighted against shopkeepers, professionals and other 
middle-sector interests. 
33 Decree Law No.417, 'Ley de la Asociacion Nacional 
del Cafe', 4.1.66, Recopi lacion de Leyes, Vol.84, p.194, 
was replaced by Decree Law 449, 19.4.66 , ibid., Vol.SS, 
p.40, after intense opposition from coffee interests: see 
Weaver, 'Political Style', pp.76-77. 
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possible to defeat Arevalo in an honest and clean 
election this would be ideal solution. However, 
there was great danger that Areva 10 mi ght wi n 
election either because the issues weren't clear, 
because the opposition was too divided, or 
because the people were deceived by his 
character. 3~ 
The US State Department was al so anxi ous to prevent 
circumstances under which Arevalo might triumph in 
presidential elections, as revealed in Ambassador Bell's 
reports of his communications with Ydigoras Fuentes. 
Although Arevalo now distinguished between the 'dinosaurs' 
of Truman's America and the Harvard-educated elites 
populating Kennedy's administration, State Department 
officials continued to focus on his earlier denunciations 
of United States imperialism. 35 Reminding US officials 
that Arevalo's administration ha.d permitted Communist 
i nfi 1 trat ion, Secretary of State Dean Rusk further 
commented, 
[i ] t seems doubtful that Arevalo has any 
understanding of or sympathy for the Alliance for 
Progress, which ... he referred to as being 
desi gned onl y for the progress of the Uni ted 
States' .36 
It is usually argued that the US position was central to 
the decision to stage a military coup, Kennedy reportedly 
having given the 'green light' to such action in March 1963 
34 Ambassador Be 11 to Secretary of State, DDRS DOS 
001954, Telegram 580, 25.3.63. 
35 Arevalo, Carta Politica, p.38. For Arevalo's 
earlier vilifications of United States foreign policy .see 
J u a n J 0 seA rev a 1 0 , F a b uJ a del t i bur 6 n y 1 ass a r d 1 n ~ s 
(Santiago de Chile, 1956); idem., Guatemala: la democracl~ 
Y __ ~l_iJ!1gJ~Ei 0 ( Buenos Ai res. 1955). 
36 Rusk. 'Telegram to all ARA Diplomatic Posts', Cable 
No.7769. 24.1.63. cited in Bowen, 'US Policy toward 
Guatemala 1954-1963'. p.185. 
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on the advice of his four 'Latin America experts,.37 
However, while this argument is persuasive, it has yet to 
be conclusively proven. 38 The CIA reported in mid-February 
the growing unity of officers around a plot to overthrow 
the Presi dent, but noted that Peral ta Azurdi a 'has 
definitely decided to remain neutral and take no active 
part,.39 Peralta Azurdia himself affirms in his memoirs 
that the coup had been in preparation for two years under 
hi s di rect i on and that the Uni ted States Embassy knew 
nothing about it. 40 
Whatever the case, the failure of the United States to 
recognise the new government for almost three weeks - while 
it attempted to 'extract' a tentative promise of elections 
from the de facto government suggests that any such 
short-term formula to remove Arevalo from the electoral 
37 The source for this appears to be an article by 
Georgie Anne Geyer in the Miami Herald 24.12.66, although 
it is rarely cited directly: see, for example, Susanne 
Jonas Bodenheimer, Guatemala: plan piloto para el 
continente (Costa Rica, 1981), p.363, n.20; Melville and 
Melville, Another Vietnam, p.171. 
38 Nei ther Ambassador Bell, nor Assi stant Secretary of 
State Edwin Martin - two of the five participants at the 
meeting in which this approval was allegedly given - were 
prepared to confirm this story, although both implied that 
the US was not unhappy that the coup took place. The other 
three part i ci pants were not contacted: Schl esi nger and 
Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, p.244, 291. 
39 
against 
21.2.63. 
DDRS CIA 001816, Information Report, 'Plan for Coup 
the Government by Ant i -Areva 10 Army Off i cers ' , 
40 Cited in Gabriel Aguilera, Jorge Romero Imery et 
al Dialectica del _ Terror en Guatemala (San Jose, 1981) 
p.89. General Ricardo Peralta reportedly. also maintains 
that the Uni ted States Embassy was onl y , nformed of the 
coup when it was a fa~~c~ompl i: Captai n Juan Fernando 
Cifuentes, interview with Andrew Schlewitz, Guatemala City, 
28.7.94. 
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scene had immediately begun to run into difficulties.41 
Peralta's fiercely nationalistic disposition, 'very 
sensitive to any form of pressure ... especially from 
Gringos' made for a problematic relationship between the 
two governments, particularly in the delicate area of 
counteri nsurgency. 42 In terms of the 1 atter, it was wi th 
obvious relief that Bowdler reported to President Johnson 
in March 1966, that the Pera 1 ta government had fi na 11 y 
responded pos it i ve 1 y to US offers to ' improve its 
capabilities for dealing with rural and urban 
insurgency' .43 
Above and beyond the quest i on of whether the Uni ted 
States explicitly approved the coup, lies the issue of how 
far US military aid and influence enabled the coup to take 
place. Adams implies a direct correlation between the 
amounts of military aid supplied to Guatemala in the 
precedi ng years and the abi 1 i ty of the Guatemal an armed 
forces as an institution to take action at this time. 44 
Handy has made a similar argument, asserting that US 
military aid resulted in increased expenditures and levels 
41 Britain and France recognised the new government 
shortly after the coup. New York Times, 1.4.63, 6.4.63, 
9.4.63, 18.4.63; Hispanic American Report, Vol.16, No.5, 
p.437. While Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions. The 
United States in Central America (New York, 1984) p.165, 
has remarked on Washington's 'quick reaction' in 
recognising the Peralta regime, Jonas, Plan piloto, p.295, 
stresses the delay and implausibly asserts that it was a 
deliberate ploy to suggest US opposition to the coup. 
Nevertheless, the US response was a good deal more muted 
than it had been with Peru in July 1962, and there were no 
moves to cut economic aid. 
42 DDRS DOS 001391, Ambassador Be 11 to Ass i stant 
Secretary Vaughn, Te 1 egram 965, 27 . 5.65; see a 1 so, 
Villagran Kramer, Biografia, p.384; New York Times, 1.4.63. 
43 DDRS White House [hereafter WH] 003442, Memorandum 
for the President from William G Bowdler, 5.3.66. 
44 Adams, 'The Development of the Guatemalan 
Military' J p.103. 
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of technological competence, growing involvement in rural 
development and better-educated officers, all of which 
'solidified [the military] as the most cohesive and 
efficient organisation in Guatemala' .45 In their somewhat 
inconsistent efforts to refute this position, Sereseres and 
Jenkins place greater emphasis on the internal political 
and institutional processes which bring about military 
intervention in national politics - notwithstanding their 
lengthy introduction describing the major institutional and 
operational effects that the US Military Assistance Program 
(MAP) have had upon the Guatemalan military.46 They argue 
that whi 1 e Uni ted States mi 1 i tary assi stance faci 1 i tated 
the process, many of the numerous changes that took place 
within the military would have happened anyway, as a result 
of the institutional development and growth in Guatemala 
itself. 47 In relation to the 1963 coup, this was also the 
opinion of Ambassador Bell - for the record at least. In 
a tel egram di scussi ng the status of MAP in Guatemal a he 
emphasised that it 'did not weigh in balance in the 
slightest in [the] army's decision to depose Ydigoras' .48 
In view of the latter comment, it is instructive to note 
that the 1963 MAP budget of $1,667,000 approved for 
Guatemala in January 1963 was later revised upwards to a 
total of $2,524,000 on 19 March. 49 According to Michael 
45 Handy, Gift of the Devil, pp.156-7. 
46 Jenkins and Sereseres, 'US Military Assistance', 
pp.583-4, pp.575-8. 
47 Ibid. 
48 DDRS DOS (77)60E, Ambassador Bell to State 
Department, Telegram 480, 26.2.64. 
49 Michael McClintock, The American Connection V91ume 
2 State Terror and Popular Resistance in Guatemala 
(London and New Jersey. 1985), p.56, citing DOS. 'US 
Internal Security Programs in Latin America'. Vol.II. 
Guatemala, Internal Security Evaluations Group, 30.11.66. 
p.l. 
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McClintock, 1963 was also the first year in which United 
States Agency for International Development (AID) funds 
went to the Guatemalan military in the form of a budget of 
$325,000 for 'Civic Action' operations, with an additional 
$382,000 of AID money allocated to its 'Public Safety' 
programme. 50 It is impossible to ignore the role of United 
States military assistance to Guatemala over time - a total 
of $14.1 million between 1953 and 1970. 51 At the same 
time however, direct correlations between United States aid 
and the actions of the Guatemalan military remain 
problematic and over-simplistic, not least because - as we 
shall see for the 1963-66 period such aid was no 
guarantee that the mi 1 i tary in government wou 1 d act in 
accordance with the wishes of United States officials. 
The alacrity with which the three major political parties 
- the MLN, the PR and the DCG - aligned themselves with the 
de facto government also deserves comment at this stage. 
On 2 April, they called their supporters to a joint rally 
in the Parque Central in support of Peralta's new 
government. More striking still, appeared the brotherly 
embrace amidst the throng between Mario Mendez Montenegro 
(PR) and Mario Sandoval Alarcon (MLN) - hitherto supposedly 
arch political enemies. 52 The answer to this surprising 
unity of spirit can be found in an earlier secret agreement 
50 Ibid. 
51 Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and 
Revolution in Latin America. A Comparative Study of 
Insurgents and Regimes since 1956 (Princeton, 1992), p.73, 
citing U.S. Agency for International Devel,opment ,(AID), 
Statistics and Reports Division, U.S. Forelgn Asslstance 
and Ass i s t a nc e fro mIn t ern at ion a lOr g a nj s a t ion s . J u 1 y 1. 
1-945-June _~Q-L---t~62 (Revi sed), pp. 28-50; and U. S. Ove~seas 
Loans--anq _ Grants and Assi stanc~ __ from Internat 1 ona 1 
Organisai~ons: Obligations and Authorizations. July 1. 
1945-June 30. 1966, pp. 25-52 and Ju 1 y 1. 1945-June 30 ~ 
1975, pp.33-61; see also, Dunkerley, powe_r~'l_th_~_IsthmlJ~, 
p.508, n.58 and 59. 
52 Prensa Li_bre, 12.8.66, pp.8,45; Villagran Kramer, 
Bi~afia P~litic~, p382. 
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between the three parties. 53 Si gned in December 1960 
less than one month after a serious military revolt had 
shaken the government - the pact's immediate objective had 
been the removal of Ydigoras Fuentes, to be followed by: 
[i]ntegracion y sostenimiento de un nuevo regimen 
en Guatemala en el cual participen con 
exc 1 us i v i dad, en todo momento y con i dent i ca 
representacion, los tres partidos que suscriben 
este pacto. 54 
The exi stence of thi s agreement was cruci al to the 
unfolding of events up to the military coup, as well as in 
underwriting the exclusionary character of the post-1963 
political system. 55 While the radicalisation of the 
protests in March and April 1962 had caused the traditional 
parties temporarily to withdraw their demands for Ydigoras 
Fuentes' resignation, after November 1962 his removal 
became seen as imperative. Decisive to this renewed sense 
of urgency were the results of the November 1962 elections 
for Guatema 1 a Ci ty mayor. The vi ctor was j ourna 1 i st 
Francisco Montenegro Sierra - an independent 'of extreme 
leftist leanings' according to the White House - closely 
followed by PR dissident 
Democratica (URD) leader 
and Unidad Revolucionaria 
Francisco Villagran Kramer. 56 
While the two front-runners shared an almost equal number 
of votes - 24,428 and 23,017 respect i ve 1 y - the MLN/DCG 
coalition candidate received some 13,000 votes and the PR's 
Mario Fuentes Pieruccini trailed in last after Jorge 
--------~-- ----- ------
53 
.!j)id. 
54 'Pacto Tripartito DC-PR y MLN, Clause 40, in 
Villagran Kramer, Biografia Politica, p.357. 
55 The full text of the 'tripartite' pact can be 
in Villagran Kramer, BioJrrafi~ __ P()litica, pp.355-8 
together with his commentary, in Marroquin Rojas, 'El 
Tripartito del ano 1960', La Hora, 23.8.66, p.6. 
found 
and, 
Pacto 
56 DDRS WH (80)218B, Colonel Burris to The Vice 
President, 7.11.62. 
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Toriello with less than 5 JOOO. 57 
Torres Rivas has argued that the outcome of these 
elections underlined what everyone already knew - that in 
a free election Arevalo would win the presidency - and it 
appears that the results prompted Arevalo's declaration of 
his candidacy from Mexico. 58 Yet J it remains unclear 
exactly which sections of the politically organised left 
did support Arevalo. While Victor Manuel Gutierrez later 
appeared to be giving the PGT's endorsement of Arevalo in 
his response to the latter's Carta Politica J in the 
December 1962 elections the party had backed Jorge Toriello 
- with impressively poor results. 59 Villagran Kramer was 
supported by the four tiny areva 1 i sta part i es J but has 
since denied that the URD backed Arevalo's candidacy: 
La veia con una gran simpatia pero no apoyaba. 
No la apoyaba abiertamente. Nos daba la 
impresion que un retorno a la tesis muy atras J 
muy vieja J que estaba cambiando muy rapidamente 
1 ' 60 e pa, s ... 
Indeed J it appears that Arevalo and Villagran Kramer were 
potential rivals for political power J a fact recognised by 
57 El Imparcial J 5.11.62; Torres Rivas J 'El Golpe 
Militar'J p.36. The PGT supported Toriello - the lone 
civilian on the revolutionary junta following the events of 
20 October 1944: 'Declaracion de Cesar Montes' reproduced 
in Informacion Documental de America Latina [hereafter 
INDAL]J Movimientos Revolucionarios de America Latina (1). 
Documentaci on Propi a Dossi er No.1 I Novi embre 1972 
[hereafter Movimientos Revolucionarios de America Latina] 
(Heverlee J Belgium J 1972)J pp.88-91. 
58 Torres Rivas J 'El golpe militar'J p.36. 
59 Victor Manuel Gutierrez in La Hora J 12.3.63. 
Guerri 11 a 1 eader Cesar Montes 1 ater denounced the PGT' s 
alliance with Toriello: 'Declaracion de Cesar Montes'J 
cited in Richard Gott, Rural Guerrillas in LatinAm~rica 
(Harmondsworth J 1970). 
60 Francisco Villagran Kramer J interview, Guatemala 
CitYJ 22.10.93. 
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Ydi goras Fuentes who argued that the 1 atter' s el ectoral 
made him 'ambitious and vulnerable to success had 
suggest ions' .61 In addition, Villagran Kramer and Mario 
Mendez Montenegro were confirmed political enemies, as were 
Mendez Montenegro and Arevalo. With the opposition so 
divided, Ydigoras Fuentes' proposed solution to the Arevalo 
'threat' was to manipulate the rivalry between its three 
central protagonists, and particularly that between 
Villagran Kramer and Arevalo. 62 
More generally, the central effect of the November 1962 
elect i on had been to convi nce the 1 eft of the need to 
retain Ydigoras Fuentes in power until the presidential 
elections. Conversely, the traditional parties now 
desired his rapid removal in order to eliminate the 
'fantasm6n' of areval i smo and its threat to the party 
political status quo. 63 Accordingly, the PR declared that 
the next presidential elections should not take place until 
'Ydi goras Fuentes is no longer in power', whi 1 e the MLN 
argued that the only solution to the current political 
crisis lay in the hands of the military.64 
The Military in Government 
As is genera 11 y the case wi th mi 1 i tary regi mes of an 
institutional character, the government over which Peralta 
Azurdia presided was a complex coalition of military 
officers, economic notables and technocrats in which the 
61 DDRS DOS 001952, Ambassador Be 11 for Ass i stant 
Secretary Martin, Telegram 489, 11.2.63. 
62 I bid. 
63 'Declaraciones del PR', Prensa Libre, 11.3.63. 
64 I bj.J1. ; MLN, La Hora, 30.3.63. 
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offi cer corps predomi nated. 65 Pre-dating the Brazilian 
coup by a year, it is interesting to consider the 
Guatemalan military government in the light of the military 
regimes which seized power in the Southern Cone and Brazil 
during the following decade. While the comparison with 
Guatemala should not be overstated - the Peralta government 
achieved neither the institutional cohesion nor the 
autonomy of its South American counterparts - underpinning 
all these regimes lay their belief in the military 
qualities of patriotism and self-sacrifice in the service 
of national welfare and security. The military as an 
institution was thus distinguished from the venal and self-
seeking political class who were perceived to have 
consistently failed to live up to their national 
responsibilities and brought the nation to economic and 
political crisis. Similarly obsessed with internal 
subversion and security, the Peralta government attempted 
to assume control of economic, social and political 
activities and to eliminate administrative corruption with 
varying degrees of success. 
Immediately following the coup, leading arevalistas, a 
number of promi nent student and uni on 1 eaders and other 
'undesirable' elements, including Ydigoras Fuentes' close 
associate, Roberto Alejos Arzu, were rounded up, many being 
briefly held in Chimaltenango's prison before being sent 
into exile. 66 All political parties were suspended 
Reconcilacion Democratica Nacional (Redencion) and Colonel 
Cruz Salazar's Movimiento Democratica Nacional (MDN) were 
later banned and political activity prohibited. 67 
Somewhat surprisingly, it appears that the URD retained its 
65 Weaver, 'Political Style', p.64. 
66 New York Times, 1.4.63; Hispanic American Report, 
Vol .16, p.437; Villagran Kramer, Biografia Politica, p.381. 
67 Recop i 1 ac i on de Leyes, Dec ree Law No.1 41, 21. 11 . 63, 
Vol.82, p.359; Hispanic American Report, Vol.16. 
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legal status as a 'civic committee' and - according to 
Vi 11 agran Kramer was permi tted a certai n margi n of 
tolerance until early 1965, when its leaders were arrested 
and expell ed from the country. 68 
Under Peralta Azurdia, arbitrary road blocks, house-to-
house searches, harrassment and expatriation of regime 
critics, and press censorship, were all standard 
procedure. 69 The country was under siege, off and on, for 
some twenty months. Subst i tut i ng the previ ous Ley de 
Defensa de las Instituciones Democraticas passed in 
February 1961, Decree Law 9 outlawed 'Communism' which was 
vaguely defined in the following terms: 
Art. 10 ... todas 1 as act i vi dades que t i endan a 
atacar, vulnerar 0 destruir el sistema 
democratico en que se basa la vida institucional 
de la Naci6n. 
Art.20 Queda prohibida la organizaclon y el 
funcionamiento de Partidos Pol iticos, 
agrupaciones, asociaciones, comites, celulas ... en 
genera 1, toda c 1 ase de ent i dades d~ ideo log i a 
comunista en el territorio nacional. 7 
Penalties ranging from two years in prison to death were 
established for infractions of this law, which were to be 
adjudicated exclusively by military tribunals. Echoing the 
style of the Castillo Armas regime, Article 19 authorised 
the Ministry of Defence to compile a register to record the 
names of those individuals found guilty under the new Ley 
68 Vi 11 agran Kramer, i ntervi ew, Guatema 1 a Ci ty, 
22.10.93; Villagran Kramer, Biografia Politica, pp.401-3. 
69 The press generall y heeded the warni ng not to 
criticise the government, the exception being the prolific 
Clemente Marroquin Rojas whose pithy editorials in La Hora 
made it only newspaper to have an official censor imposed. 
Foreign correspondents' dispatches were also censored: New 
York Times, 27.9.63, 3.11.63. 
70 D~~reto Ley. ~ftrta Fundamental de Gobierno, 
'Decreto Ley No.9', pp.11-12. 
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de Defensa de las Instituciones Democraticas, together with 
those affiliated to communist organisations, the names of 
the organisations themselves, and those countries 
'considered within the commmunist bloc' .71 
Union leaders were obvious targets of this legislation, 
particularly those who were not the objects of regime 
strategies of cooptation. While the Confederaci6n Sindical 
de Guatemala (CONSIGUA) enjoyed official support throughout 
the military government, the directorate of the Federaci6n 
Aut6noma Sindical de Guatemala (FASGUA) was subject to 
constant harassment duri ng the Peral ta regi me. 72 The most 
serious incident followed a demonstration organised for May 
Day 1965, in which several demonstrators were injured and 
some 40 were deta"i ned. 73 A 1 most the ent i re execut i ve 
committee of FASGUA was arrested on the pretext of having 
planted a bomb in the Ministry of Labour and sentenced for 
having infringed the Ley de Defensa de las Instituciones 
Democrat i cas. 74 
71 Ibid., p.14. 
72 CONSIGUA was affiliated with the AFL-CIO and ORIT. 
FASGUA had evolved from its liberacionista origins into a 
radical organisation with links with the PGT and had been 
an active participant in the 1962 protests: ASIES, Mas de 
100 Arios, pp.97-113, 223, 245-6, 259; Deborah Levenson-
Estrada, Trade Unionists against Terror: Guatemala City 
1954-1985 (Chapel Hill and London, 1994), pp.36-38; Brian 
Mu rphy, 'The Stunted Growth of Campes i no Organ i sat ions' , 
p.459. 
73 El Imparcial, 3.5.65; Prensa Libre, 
cited in ASIES, Mas de 100 Arios, p.246-7. 
3.5.65; both 
74 Prensa Libre, 31.8.65, cited in ibid., p.247. The 
facts of this case remain somewhat unclear since, 
notwi thstandi ng the ci ted newspaper report, the records 
from the AuditoriaQe Guerra de la Zona Central record that 
all seven defendants were absolved of guilt 'por falta de 
plena prueba' and note that the evidence presented by the 
judicial police was unreliable. Tribunal Militar: 
Guatemala, 11.10.65, Auditoria de Guerra de la Zona 
Central, Copias de Sentencias Sep-Dic 1965. 
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The rai lway workers union (SAMF) was also subject to 
repression in the early days of the military government as 
a result of its prominent role in the 1962 popular 
mobilisations in the capital. In mid-April 1963, 17 
arrested and samfi stas were 
measure' .75 A February 
investigation of the union's 
imprisoned as a 'security 
1964 Ministry of Labour 
accounts found evi dence of 
'excess and negligence' on the part of the executive and 
has been similarly interpreted as an attempt by the regime 
to restrain SAMF activities. 76 
In addition to outright repression in selected cases, 
procedural obstruction continued to be a common method of 
dealing with attempts by labour to organise. 77 Union 
registration itself remained a lengthy and drawn-out 
process, while workers attempting to organise under 
existing labour legislation often faced mass dismissal by 
their employers. At the same time however, Weaver's 
contention that Labour Ministry officials were distinctly 
pro-management in industrial disputes does not appear to 
have been un i forml y the case. 78 The attempt by Pape 1 era 
Centroamericana to sack 140 employees - in retaliation for 
their petition to the labour courts for union recognition -
failed when the Labour Ministry ordered the plant to re-
75 Prensa Libre, 19.4.63. 
76 ASIES, Mas de 100 Anos', p.270. A US Embassy 
report commented that the audit had 'revealed ... what had 
long been suspected ... [that] the previous ~Communi~t­
infiltrated) Executive council of SAMF had serlously mld-
managed ... union funds: DDRS DOS 003221, Airgram 3~3, Wee~a 
No.8, 24.2.64. In fact, the union was noted for lts antl-
communist position. 
77 Levenson-Estrada 'Trade Unionists Against Terror', 
p.41, recounts the problems faced by the Tailors' Union in 
this respect; see also, Weaver, 'Political Style', p.73. 
78 Weaver, 'Political Style', p.73. 
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open. 79 Conversely, the attempt by the Frente Cristiano de 
Trabaiadores de Guatemala (FECETRAG) to obtain union 
recognition for the workers of tyre-makers Ginsa was 
thwarted when employees were forced to join a parallel 
un ion estab 1 i shed by the management. After along 1 ega 1 
battle, the latter was finally registered with the 
Departamento de Administraci6n de Trabajo (OAT) in August 
1963. 80 
Amidst rumours that the Labour Code was to be altered -
reportedly accompanied by various illegal actions against 
colonos and urban workers by employers and landowners - the 
new government issued the Carta Guatemalteca de Trabajo.81 
This charter effectively guaranteed those rights pertaining 
to labour contained within the suspended constitution, and 
Peralta used the occasion of May Day to declare the army's 
concern to improve living conditions and social justice for 
the workers. 82 To some extent these pl edges were adhered 
to. The setting of minimum wages in various economic 
categories and the introduction of the aguinaldo - the end 
of year bonus have both been acknowl edged by trade 
unionists as important innovations in labour legislation, 
albeit within a framework of 'economic paternalism' .83 
The rate of union registration actually gained pace under 
79 Prensa Libre, 14.8.63, 22.8.63, cited in ASIES, Mas 
de 100 Alios. 
80 Prensa Libre, 28.8.63, 13.9.63, 6.1.64, cited in 
ibid. Both Ginsa and Papelera Centroamericana were new 
industries products of the industrial expansion prompted 
by the Central American Common Market (CACM) established in 
December 1960: ibid, p.250. On the CACM see Bulmer-Thomas, 
The Political Economy of Central America, pp.173-199. 
81 Prensa Libre, 2.4.63, 5.4.63,15.4.63, cited in 
ASIES, Mas de 100 Alios, p.238. 
82 Prensa Libre, 3.5.63. 
83 Miguel Angel Albizures, interview, Guatemala City, 
15.2.94; ASIES, Mas de 100 Alios, p.239. 
99 
Peralta, if only in post-intervention terms. 84 While the 
previous regime had registered thirteen new unions of which 
only one was agrarian, between 1963 and 1966 personaria 
juridica was granted to twenty-five new unions including 
six rural organisations. 8S In addition, the first liga 
campesi na to be organi sed under the aegi s of FECETRAG 
received 1 egal recognition in September 1965. 86 
Nevertheless, rural organisers were closely monitored and 
often arrested, whi 1 st the newl y-created Mobile Mi 1 i tary 
Police (PMA) was directed to help keep order on the 
plantations. 87 Repression became gradually more extensive 
and reached its apogee wi th the sei zure and subsequent 
murder of 28 labour activists and Communists in the weeks 
leading up to the March 1966 elections. 88 
As part of the Pera 1 ta government's dec 1 ared goa 1 s to 
purify public administration and achieve the honest 
management of public funds, Operacion Honestidad took 
immediate measures against certain executive and middle 
level bureaucrats, while a 'Black Book' recorded the names 
of all former public employees suspected of dishonesty or 
84 The percentage of the economi ca 11 y act i ve 
population which was unionised hardly reached 2 per cent 
overall, while in the countryside the figure was a bare 0.1 
per cent: ibid., pp.259-60. 
85 Ibid. 
86 The 1 i gas incorporated 'i ndependent' campes i nos; 
those who farmed thei r own parcel of land, or farmed 
rented land, or who were employed seasonally: ibid., p.252. 
87 Recopi 1 ac i on de Leyes, Decree Law 332, 23.2.65, 
Vol.83, p.210; El Imparcial, 24.2.65, cited in Melville and 
Melville, Another Vietnam, p.196. 
88 I bi d., p. 197; Comi te Guatema 1 teco de Defensa de los 
Oerechos Humanos, 'Terror en Guatema 1 a! " mi meo, (n. d. ) , 
reproduced in Centro Intercultural de Documentacion 
[hereafter CIOOC], Guatemala. La Viol~nci~, Dossier No.21 
(Mexico, 1968) pp.5/10-5/13. 
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disloyalty.89 Decree Law 52 declared all transactions 
i nvol vi ng state property 
subject to investigation, 
Ydigoras back to the 
under the previ ous government 
and attempts were made to bring 
country to stand trial for 
corruption. 90 In economic terms, the government's 
corrective policies included currency exchange controls to 
halt capital flight, and fiscal reform, including the 
imposition of a new income tax law. 
In March 1964, the United States Embassy reported the 
'noteworthy progress' achieved by anti-corruption measures 
and in fiscal management more generally.91 Revenue from 
tax collection had increased by 24 per cent compared with 
same six-month period a year earlier. 92 Wages and salaries 
of government employees were up-to-date 'for the first time 
in recent history' .93 However, these early endorsements 
were qualified by a more critical assessment of the 
government's longer term socio-economic policies and the 
1 ack of progress towards All i ance for Progress goa 1 s. 94 
The government's attempts to regulate economic activities 
brought it into conflict with the private sector on 
occasion. 95 As the State Department noted in March 1964, 
89 Weaver, 
Guatemala' p.25. 
'Administration and Development in 
90 
Vol.82, 
p.175-6. 
!...CR~e~c~o~p~i~l~a~c~i ~6-=--n~~d~e~-=L=e:"""YL-'e=-=s , Dec r e e 
p.62; Melville and Melville, 
Law 52, 
Another 
19.6.63, 
Vietnam, 
91 DDRS DOS 003223, ' I nterna 1 Defense Pl an For 
Guatemala: Progress Report and Prospects', Airgram A-428, 
6.3.64, p.6. 
92 I bid. 
93 I bid. 
94 I bid., p. 2, 7. 
95 For example, Decree Laws 444 and 468, 12.4.66 and 
4.5.66, Recopilacion de Leyes, Vol.8S, p.34, 82, obliged 
the transportation of tax-exempted imports with state-owned 
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While expressing interest in a wide variety of 
reforms, the GOG has been unable to arrive at an 
internal consensus on how far or how fast (or in 
Some cases even in what di rect ion) to proceed. 
Conservatives within the Government and the Army 
and business elements who fear change have thus 
far been i nfl uenti al enough to resi st reforms 
bei ng sought by some. 96 
It is in this light that the new income tax law should be 
seen. In 1963, Pera 1 ta had defended income tax as a 
capitalist development' and not necessary 'instrument for 
'a soc i ali st po 1 icy' .97 
1961 legislation with a 
However, the rep 1 acement of the 
law which shifted the tax burden 
from industrialists and planters to commercial and other 
middle sector interests, suggested the limits to the 
military's capacity and/or willingness to modernise the 
economy. 
Significant policy differences existed between different 
groups within the government. Whereas the 'economic 
reformers' headed by Fi nance Mi ni ster Major Jorge Lucas 
Caballeros advocated measures to combat insurgency with 
basic socio-economic reforms, government hardliners 
represented the interests of the t radi tiona 1 agro-export 
sector which rejected any alteration of the status quo. 98 
A third group of 'moderators' supported Peralta and strove 
to remain above the factionalism. 99 Such problems go some 
carriers. They were subsequently repealed by the Mendez 
Montenegro government. 
96 DDRS DOS 003223, 'Internal Defense Plan For 
Guatemala: Progress Report and Prospects', Airgram A-428, 
6.3.64, p.7. 
97 'Speech by Colonel Enri que Peralta Azurdia to the 
people of Guatemala, 1963', reproduced in Loveman and 
Davis, The Politics of Antipolitics, p.290. 
98 Weaver, 'Political Style', p.65. 
99 Ibid., pp.65-7; Sereseres, 'Military Development', 
pp.58-69. 
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way to explaining the 'suspicion and apathy of Guatemalan 
officials' encountered by US officials attempting to 
complete negotiations on several loans authorised by AID, 
as well as the impression that the Ministry of Economy 
often appeared 'confused and unwilling to do anything but 
hold the line,.100 
Moreover, the struggle for the nomination for the 
military's presidential candidate to stand as the 
candi date of its newl y-created party, the Part i do 
Institucional Democratico (PID) - produced partisan schisms 
within the institution which, by early 1966, had resulted 
in two of the three military contenders being nominated by 
opposing political parties, several coup conspiracies, and 
a stern warning from the United States that it would not 
recogni se another de facto government. If one of the 
objectives of the coup had been to secure institutional 
cohesion, by late 1965 it was coming under considerable 
stress. 
The Military Government and Counterinsurgency 
... ese gobierno dentro de su ilegalidad quiso 
actuar dentro un marco legal ... el deseo de 
mantenernos dentro la legalidad fue 10 que 
hizo ... no se combatieron [los guerrilleros] como 
se combati,era ftfspues, dieron la marcha ala 
guerra SUCla ... 
Notwi thstandi ng its promi se to el i mi nate the communi st 
threat in Guatemala, the Peralta regime failed to eradicate 
100 DDRS DOS 003223, 9.3.64; DDRS DOS (78)404C, 
12.6.65. The State Department noted that' [t]his inability 
to come to terms on international loans in support of the 
government investment program' was not unique to US 
agencies, the Inter-American Development Bank having 
experienced similar difficulties: ibid. 
101 Capta in Juan Fernando Ci fuentes Herrera, i ntervi ew, 
Guatemala City, 30.9.94. 
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the small but persistent guerrilla challenge which had been 
harrassing government forces since 1962. Estimated at no 
more than 80 to 100 men in early 1964 - and divided into 
small, mobile groups operating in the north-east with an 
additional 50 to 70 Guatemalans reportedly being trained in 
Cuba - the guerrillas were not considered 
seri ous threat to the government. 102 
officials were concerned about their 
to represent a 
United States 
potential for 
expansion, however, and became increasingly frustrated with 
the Guatemalan government's failure to take decisive action 
against the insurgents whom Peralta insisted on classifying 
as 'bandits,.103 
Government resistance to US counterinsurgency advice and 
training was a further source of irritation. Specific 
grievances included Peralta's restrictions on the number of 
officers participating in US-sponsored training programmes 
and his instructions that military information should not 
be divulged to the United States Military Assistance 
Advi sory Group because 'the US a 1 ready know too much'. 104 
In June 1965, the 'Latin American Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Group 
on Counter-Insurgency' concluded that 
102 DDRS DOS 003218, Ambassador Bell to Secretary of 
State, Telegram 412, 15.1.64; DDRS DOS 003223, 'Internal 
Defense Plan For Guatemala: Progress Report and Prospects', 
Airgram A-428, 6.3.64, p.6. The New York Times, 20.12.64, 
reported guerrilla numbers to be estimated at 150-300 with 
more than 1,000 adherents in urban areas. 
103 DDRS DOS (78)404C, Transmittal Memorandum, Robert 
M Sayre to McGeorge Bundy, 12.6.65; DDRS CIA 002411, CIA 
Special Report, 'Guatemalan Communists Take Hardline as 
Insurgenccy Continues', 6.8.65; Hector Alejandro Gramajo 
Morales, De la Guerra ... A la Guerra. La Dificil Transici6n 
Politica en Guatemala, (Guatemala, 1995), p.l02. 
104 Lawrence A. Yates, 'The United States and Rural 
Insurgency in Guatema 1 a, 1960-1970', in Ra 1 ph . L. Woodward 
Jnr. Central America. Historical Perspectlves on the Cont~mporary Crisis (New York, 1988), p.58, citing Susanne 
Jonas and David Tobis (eds.), Guatemala (B~rkeley, 1984), 
p 195. On the military ambivalence to the Unlted States see 
Adams, 'The Development of the Guatemalan Military', p.102. 
104 
one of the key impediments to the development of 
a counter-insurgency program in Guatemala is 
ineffective government leadership and the 
unwillingness of the Peralta government to make 
decisions involving the economic, Dolitical and 
soc i a 1 deve 1 opment of the count ry. 105 
In addi t i on to governmental rel uctance to take what US 
officials considered appropriate socio-economic measures to 
counter the growth of subversion, a further bone of 
contention was the role of the police. The Peralta regime 
proved particularly resistant to United States efforts to 
improve and define police functions for counterinsurgency 
purposes. Fourteen months after dismissing the Guatemalan 
police as being 'not worth much', Ambassador Bell was 
forced to admit that United States criteria regarding the 
'roles and missions' of police as distinct from those of 
the military 'are not shared by GOG': 
... problem is not one of adequacy of amount of US 
aid but rather one of basic philosophy of 
government and of functions of police and 
military ... For forseeable future fact is role to 
be played by police in providing internal 
security in Guatemala is going to be very 
limited. 106 
The Guatemalan military was clearly not prepared to 
countenance the development of a rival security apparatus 
'd 't t 1 107 outSl e 1 s con ro . 
While US military aid to Guatemala had risen 
significantly under Ydigoras Fuentes, by the last year of 
105 DDRS DOS (78) 404C, Robert M 
Bundy, Transmittal Memorandum, 12.6.65. 
106 DDRS DOS (77)60E, Bell to 
Telegram 480, 26.2.64; DDRS DOS 003239, 
of State, Telegram 950, 23.5.65. 
Sayre to McGeorge 
State Department, 
Bell to Secretary 
107 See McClintock, The American Connection, p.59; 
Kenneth F. J~hnSOn, 'Guatema 1 a: from Terrori sm to Terror' , 
Conflict Studies, 23 (May, 1972), p.8. 
105 
Peralta's regime it had fallen from a peak figure of $2.6 
million in 1963 to $1.3 million. 10S At the same time 
however, it shou 1 d be remembered that Pera 1 ta had been 
Minister of Defence at the time of this largest 
disbursement. Indeed, the emphasis that is often placed on 
his nationalism and hostility towards the United States and 
various forms of US aid can be misleading. Peralta proved 
to be an enthusiastic proponent of coordinated regional 
security measures and 
establ i shment of the 
(CONDECA) in December 
his support was central to the 
Consejo de Defensa Centroamericana 
1963. 109 With funding from USAID's 
'Public Safety Program', Guatemala's intelligence system 
was successfully linked to the rest of Central America and 
the Canal Zone through the Regional Telecommunications 
Centre - known locally as 'la Regional' .110 
Of particular impact was the strengthening of the rural 
security apparatus and the reinvigoration of the military 
commissioner system. Previously an army reserve appointee, 
whose major task was to maintain public order and ensure 
adequate levels of military conscription in the villages, 
the comisionado militar was transferred to active status 
and became a cent ra 1 component in the cont ro 1 of the 
countryside following the 1963 coup.lll It further appears 
lOB Jonas and Tobi s, Guatema 1 a, p. 195; DDRS DOS 
(78)404C, Sayre to McGeorge Bundy, Transmittal Memorandum, 
12.6.65. 
109 Bulmer-Thomas, Political Economy of Central 
America, p.178, notes that the formation of CONDECA 
exemplified the limits to Central American integration at 
a time when military-dominated governments were in power 
everywhere except Costa Rica; see also, Gramajo Morales, De 
la Guerra, p.94; McClintock, The American Connect jon, p.5S. 
110 
Guerra, 
Ibid., 
p.109. 
pp.70-75; see also Gramajo Morales, De la 
111 McClintock, The American Connection, p.65-66; 
Adams, 'The Development of the Guatemalan Military' ,.p.1~~; 
Sereseres, 'Military Development', pp.111-112; Recop~lac~on 
de Leyes, Decree Law No. 13, 'Reforma 1 a Ley Const, tut, va 
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that commissioners and their auxiliaries assisted in 
Peralta's political restructuring at local level, forcing 
through personnel changes on muni ci pal counci 1 s .112 
Whilst it seems unlikely that their increase in numbers was 
as steep as McCl i ntock has argued - from as few as 300 
under Ydigoras Fuentes to more than 9,000 by the mid-1960s 
-a measure of the full scope of the system can be gauged 
from statistics collected in the department of Jutiapa. 113 
Here, in 1965, some 971 comisionados and their auxiliares 
were employed -a ratio of one agent to every fifty adult 
mal es. 114 
At the same time however, the system operated differently 
in different regions. In the north-east the majority of 
military commissioners were known to have close links with 
the MLN, and the system later became a means through which 
to recruit irregulars for vigilante and death squad 
operations against guerrillas and 'guerrilla sympathisers', 
del Ejercito ... ', 18.4.63, Vol.82, p.29. 
112 G. A. Moore, 'Social and Ritual Change in a 
Guatemalan Town', PhD Diss., (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1966), 
cited in Adams, 'The Development of the Guatemalan 
Military', p.110, n.10. Hispanic American Report, Vol.16, 
No.8, reports Peralta's reorganisation of municipal 
governments by which elected officials were replaced by 
'more malleable appointees'. 
113 Duri ng the reformi st decade the mi 1 i tary expanded 
the number of commissioners in an effort to maintain its 
control in the countryside. Handy, Revolution in the 
Countryside, pp.184-6, cites an interview with Arbenz in 
which he claims that the number of military commissioners 
had grown from 2,000 to 7,000 by 1947; see also Sereseres, 
'Military Development', p.111. 
114 Weaver, 'Political Style', p.74 citing Durston, 
Power Struc1.:ure ina Rural Regi on of Guatema~a: __ The 
De fLa r !ltu~Dt~9 1. _ ~ _:tt a p a, MA The sis, ( A ~ s t ~ n, T e x a s 1 966); see 
~jso Ricardo Falla's discussion, QUlche Rebelde, p.S07, of 
the 'role and number of military commissioners ln San 
Antonio Ilotenango. 
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in addition to MLN supporters. llS By contrast, in the 
Indi an departments of the western hi ghl ands, Adams 
maintains that there was little evidence of 'commissioner 
turned-spy' activities. 116 The obvious reason for this was 
the almost total lack of guerrilla activity in the region 
at the time. Nevertheless, here as elsewhere, the 
commissioner system was firmly entrenched as part of the 
local rural power structure and the potential for its 
development into a local spy network certainly existed. 
Indeed, the capacity of commissioners to appoint civilian 
auxiliaries prefigured the highly controversial civil 
defence patrols (PACS) in the conflict 20 years later. 117 
Finally, Ricardo Falla has observed how, in the town of San 
Antonio Llotenango, military 
powerful police function and 
throwing drunks into jail on 
keepi ng 1 aw and order. 118 
commissioners acquired a 
acted as local bailiffs, 
fi esta days and generall y 
Two further aspects of the system of rural surveillance 
shou 1 d be noted. I n February 1965 J the Mobile Mi 1 i tary 
Police (PMA) was established. Articles five and six of 
Decree Law 332 made the PMA responsible for the defence of 
commercial agriculture and the observation and control of 
the peasantry.119 Military civic action was also a crucial 
component of counterinsurgency activities, both in terms of 
lIS McClintock, The American Connection, pp.68-69. 
116 Adams, I Deve 1 opment of the Guatema 1 an Mi 1 i tary , , 
p.106. 
117 McClintock The American Connection, p.249. In a 
, , I 
si gni fi cant sl i p of the tongue, Mendez ~on.tenegro.s ex-
Interior Minister referred to the 19605 vlgllan~es ln .the 
north-east as PACs: Hector Mansilla Pinto, lntervlew. 
Guatemala City, 9.3.94. 
118 Falla, Quiche Rebelde. p.S07. 
119 Recopi 1 aci on de Leyes. Decree Law 332. 23.2.65. 
Vol.83. p.210; McClintock. The Amer;Gan Connection, pp.64-
5. 
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an additional surveillance 
public relations function 
mechanism and an 
for the military 
at the end of 
important 
in the 
countryside. Begun in earnest 1963, the 
Ci vi c Act i on programme was a coordi nated effort by the 
Ministries of 
and 
Defence, 
financial advisory 
MAP. 120 Designed with 
gathering and forging 
Educat i on and 
assistance from 
the dual purpose 
closer links 
Health receiving 
both USAID and 
of intelligence 
with the rural 
population, military civic action carried out innoculation 
programmes, school lunches and literacy campaigns. 121 
Indeed th is was one aspect of the All i ance for Progress 
package that was seized upon with particular enthusiasm by 
the government. 
numerous articles 
of State Pera 1 ta 
b.' Accion Civica Militar was referred"in 
in military journals and speeches by Head 
Azurdia, and was the subject of prize-
winning dissertations by junior officers. 122 However, 
whilst United States officials acknowledged this military 
effort to counter the pub 1 i c percept i on of 'an army of 
occupation in the areas [it] visit[s]', they continued to 
express di sappoi ntment that so few of the c i vi c act ion 
proj ects had been located in areas of rura 1 insurgent 
120 According to Yates, 'The United States and Rural 
Insurgency in Guatemala', pp.57, 65, n.10, the United 
States Army established a formal civic action programme in 
Guatemala as early as May 1960, with a Civic Action Mobile 
Training Team (MTT) arriving in Guatemala on 26 November 
1960. Lack of funding hampered its activity for two years. 
121 LBJL, AID Agency Reports, WHCF, Confidential File, 
Box 107, 'AID and Alliance for Progress Report: Program and 
Project Data Related to Proposed Programs - FY 1965 Region 
Latin America, Table III', p.160. 
122 See for example, 'Mensaje del Gobierno Militar al 
Pueblo de Guatemala', Ejercito, (April 1963); 'Accion 
Civica Militar y Comunismo', Ejercito, (October 1965); 'La 
Prensa Opina', Ejercito, (September 1965); Sargento Primero 
de Infanteria, Raul Bogumil Marchena Barrios, 'Accion 
Civica del Ejercito (lenguaje de esperanza)', Academia 
Militar de Capacitacion para Aspirantes a Oficiales de 
Reservas Mi 1 i tares, mi meo (Guatema 1 a, 1963); Corone 1 de 
Infanteria D.E.M., Pedro Diaz M., 'Estudios Sobre "Accion 
Civica"', mimeo (Guatemala, n.d.). 
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activity.123 
Finally, in this regard, it should be stressed that - in 
its earl y stages at 1 east - the guerri 11 a presented the 
Guatemalan military establishment with a more complex 
challenge than simply one of left-wing revolutionaries 
attempt i ng to overthrow the state. The ori gi ns of the 
insurgency in the failed 1960 military rebellion and the 
fact that its pri nci pal 1 eaders were graduates of the 
Escue1a Po1itecnica, contributed to a certain ambiguity of 
att i tude among some in the offi cer corps towards thei r 
dissident 'brothers-in-arms'. While Peralta's amnesty to 
almost all the participants in the 1960 and 1962 rebellions 
was an example of the overall institutional reluctance to 
impose severe sanctions on its own, it further appears that 
personal loyalty and military esprit de corps afforded the 
key guerrilla leaders a certain degree of protection. 124 
Lieutenant Marco Antonio Yon Sosa was rumoured to have been 
present at a party for members of his promocion in 
Guatemala City, while Second lieutenant Luis Turcios Lima 
reportedly used to stay at the Escue1a Politecnica whenever 
he was in the capi ta 1 .125 Moreover, it can be assumed that 
the irony of both having been trained by the United States 
123 DDRS DOS (78)404C, Sayre to McGeorge Bundy, 
Transmittal memorandum, 12.6.65. This was to change 
following Mendez Montenegro's establishment of the 'Pilot 
Plan for the socio-economic development of the north-east' 
at the end of 1966; see a 1 so, Sereseres, 'Mi 1 i tary 
Development', p.253, n.26; Gott, Rural Guerrillas, pp.126-
130. 
124 'Concede amni st i a a los authores, compl ices y 
encubridores de los de1itos politicos cometidos ... [e1] 13 
de noviembre de 1960 y 25 de noviembre de 1962. Hace 
excepc i ones ... " Decree Law 16, 23.4.63, Recopi 1 ac i on de 
Leyes, Vo1.82, p.31. A simi lar amnesty for the 1960 
rebels had been passed under Ydigoras Fuentes: 
Congressional Decree 1538,28.6.62, ibtg., Vol.81, p.18; on 
mi 1 i tary ~~ri t de corps see Adams, 'Deve 1 opment of the 
Guatemalan Military', p.94. 
125 ~bJd., p.101; Captain Juan Fernando Cifuentes 
Herrera, interview, Guatemala City, 30.9.94. 
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mi 1 i tary in counteri nsurgency techni ques woul d not have 
been lost on an institution which continued to be imbued 
with a residual anti-American;sm. 126 
Any such military ambiguity toward the guerrillas, 
however, was decisively erased by the Zunzapote ambush in 
May 1966, when an army patrol was ambushed by a group led 
by Turcios Lima, killing between 12 and 18 soldiers. 127 
While the success of the attack 'en las barbas de la Zona 
Militar de Zacapa', provoked public criticism of the 
military, the execution of the wounded captain in charge of 
the patrol - reportedly by Turcios Lima himself - served to 
harden remaining agnostics within the officer corps.128 As 
Gramaj 0 Mora 1 es poi nts out, th is was not the fi rst time 
that fellow officers on both sides had been killed in 
confrontat ions. 129 However, the significance of the 
Zunzapote attack seems to have been twofold. In the first 
place, the manner in which the officer was killed - in cold 
blood by a former classmate - represented a fundamenta 1 
break with an unwritten code of honour. And secondly, the 
recognition that this was no longer simply a fight with 
disaffected officers, but a different kind of struggle 
which now involved military outsiders and more 
126 Turci os Lima had spent si x months at the ranger 
school at Fort Benni ng, Georgi a between 1959 and 1960 J 
while Yon Sosa has received training at Fort Gulick in the 
Canal Zone: Gott, Rural Guerrillas, pp.74-5; Adams, 
'Development of the Guatemalan Military' J p.105. 
127 The subsequent military bulletin which reported the 
attack, published in La Hora, 17.5.66, did not give precise 
numbers for casualties; see Regis Debray, The Revolution on 
Trial (Harmondsworth, 1978), p.298; Gramajo Morales, De la 
Guerra, p.102; Yates, 'United States and Rural Insurgency', 
p.59. 
128 Marroquin Rojas, 'Quien conozca el sitio se quedara 
asombrado', La Hora, 18.5.66; Yates, 'The United States and 
Rural Insurgency', p.59. 
129 Gramajo Morales, De la Guerra, p.102. 
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specifically, 'Communists' :130 
Eramos ami g<?s. Eso es ci erto, de un di a para 
otro los amlgos, companeros de clase resultaban 
en diferentes bancos ... ya era en la segunda fase 
cuando la JPT se involucra en la lucha .... con 
gente de la universidad ... Zunzapote marca el 
punto en que los oficiales indecisos ya no 
estuvi eron mas, porque e 1 Capi tan Do 1 ores 
Amezquita era muy querido, muy recto ... Entonces 
abrimo: los ojos que estabamos en guerra, que ya 
no vallan las amnistades nj los compadrazgos ni 
los companeros de clase ... 1J1 
The 1965 Constitution 
La const i tuci an se semej a ahora a una pi nata 
suspendida sobre la fiesta electoral, pero las 
'~olosinas' que cont,iene no podian ser sabQreadas 
Slno hasta que la flesta haya terminado. 132 
The promulgation of the new constitution on 15 September 
1965 effectively confirmed the government's intention to 
return to the constitutional order, its resolve on this 
issue having been constantly called into question during 
the long months of the Constitutional Assembly 
(ConsJ:ituyente) and before. Yet, even at this stage the 
path to free elections and a 'return to democracy' was far 
from clear. A series of transitory articles suspended the 
ope rat i on of the new const i tut ion unt i 1 5 May of the 
following year - the day when the newly-elected Congress 
would take its seats. 133 While this situation recalled 
130 Captai n Juan Fernando Ci fuentes Herrera, i nterv; ew, 
Guatemala City, 30.9.94. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ell mpa rc i a 1, 1. 9 . 65. 
133 Unt i 1 th is date the Carta Fundamenta 1 conta i ned ; n 
Decree Law 8 remained in force (Trans. Art.10), while the 
Constituyente was empowered to rule on the validity of the 
~~ngressional elections and install those elected in office 
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Arevalo's election in 1945 which also took place under de 
facto conditions, a central criticism of the 1965 
constitution was i~ lack of legitimacy deriving from the 
unrepresentat i ve character of the Const i tuyente. 134 
Following increasing domestic political pressure and 
continuous urging from the United States, elections to a 
National Constituent Assembly were finally convoked in 
March 1964 and the State of Siege - in place since the coup 
1 i fted. 135 A pet it i on from more than 200 respected 
professionals demanding immediate steps towards free 
elections had been openly circulated during the previous 
autumn. 136 The Uni ted States Embassy reported that vari ous 
political figures 'ranging from left to right ... including 
some who strongly backed [the] army coup' were either 
planning to participate or were actively engaged in a 
'Nat i ona 1 Front' to demand a rapid return to the 
const i tut i ona 1 process. 137 
(Trans. Art.6). 
134 Adolfo Mijangos, 'La Constituci6n Guatemalteca de 
1965', Cuadernos Americanos (3, 1966) pp.65-6. This 
question became the brief focus of debate in September 1966 
between Clemente Marroquin Rojas - now vice-President - and 
the IV Congreso Juridico. The latter, having declared the 
illegitimacy of the Constitution, found itself forced to 
declare categorically that the Mendez Montenegro government 
was 'democratically and juridically legitimate' in the face 
of taunts to the contrary from Marroquin Rojas: Prensa 
Libre, 20.9.66, 23.9.66; La Hora, 22.9.66 J 23.9.66. 
135 Decree Laws 190 and 191, 25.3.64 J Recopi laci6n de 
~~~sJ Vol.83 J pp.11-12. 
136 DDRS DOS 001955, Corrigan to Secretary of State, 
Telegram 234, 17.10.63; Villagran Kramer, Bi9grafia 
Politica, pp.401-2. 
137 MDN leader, Colonel Cruz Salazar - a vehement 
critic of the de facto government - was apparently the 
lynchpin of this movement. The same report mentions 
rumours of plots involving certain officers J but concluded 
that whi 1 e there were two opposi ng currents of thought 
wi thi n the mi 1 i tary regardi ng an earl y 'return to the 
barracks', the di fferences were 'not profound at thi s 
11 3 
The subsequent elect ions in May were carefu 11 y 
controlled. Decree Law 175 imposed stringent eligibility 
conditions upon political parties, requiring a minimum 
50,000 members to permit registration for electoral 
purposes. Villagran Kramer's URD was thus excluded from 
the poll. In effect, the elections became a plebiscite to 
approve the government-imposed single slate coalition, of 
which 60 of the 80 available seats had been alotted to 
'unaffiliated elements friendly with the Peralta 
government' .138 The remai ni ng 20 were di vi ded between the 
M L Nan d the P R , the DCG h a v i n g p u 1 1 e d 0 uta t the 1 as t 
minute after a national general assembly of the party in 
April 1964 rejected the 'deal' being negotiated between its 
1 eadersh i p and the government. 139 An attempt to regi ster 
a separate DCG slate failed with the refusal of the 
Electoral Tribunal to recognise the legitimacy of the new 
party leadership. While both the URD and the DCG called on 
their supporters to abstain, US officials expressed concern 
at the excl usi onary nature of these arrangements in 
particular, the possibility that disenfranchised groups 
would move to join 'more extremi st forces' .140 
Nevertheless, they seemed ready to accept the premise on 
stage': DDRS DOS 001955, Corrigan to Secretary of State, 
Telegram 234, 17.10.63; New York Times, 3.11.63. 
138 New York Times, 5.5.64, 24.5.64. These appointees 
including some individuals associated with the 
formulation of the previous Constitution - were to form the 
basis of the new official party, Partido Institucional 
Democratico (PID): Sloan, 'The Electoral Game in 
Guatemala', PhD diss. (University of Texas at Austin, 
1968), p.104; Villagran Kramer, Biografia Politica, p.393. 
139 As a resul t the party 1 eadershi p passed to younger, 
more radical party members associated with the Frent~ 
Estudantil Social Cristiano (FESC), including future 
president Vinicio Cerezo and Fernando Andrade,Diaz Duran: 
Rene de Leon Schlotter, interview, Guatemala C,ty, 8.2.94; 
see also DDRS DOS 003226, Intelligence Note, 7.5.64. 
140 DDRS DOS 003223, Ambassador Be 11 to State 
Department, Airgram A-428, 9.3.64. 
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which the Guatemalan government 
parties appeared to be relying, 
generally politically apathetic 
and the legally-registered 
that 'the majority of the 
popu 1 ace wi 11 heed the 
blandishments of neither extremists nor excluded leaders, 
but will be content to make the choice offered to them at 
the poll s ... 141 
In the event, an estimated 40 to 50 per cent of 
registered voters went to the polls, compared with 66.8 per 
cent in 1958 and 71.5 per cent in 1950 and despite repeated 
warnings about the penalties for abstention. 142 While the 
turnout was somewhat higher in the departmental capitals, 
a significant number of ballots were spoiled. In Guatemala 
City, of approximately 81,500 votes cast, almost one third 
were invalid. 143 
Based in form on the 1956 Constitution, the new 
constitutional arrangements reaffirmed the former's 
anticomunismo, the scope for the definition of 'communist 
organisations' being expanded to cover those whose 
'doctrinal tendency, methods of action or international 
links, threaten the sovereignty of the State or the bases 
of democratic organisation in Guatemala,.144 Private 
141 Ibid. 
142 Ne 1 son Amaro, , Factores i nfl uyentes de 1 a 
votacion', in Nelson Amaro (ed.), El Reto de Desarrollo en 
Guatemala (Guatemala, 1970) p.275; New York Times, 26.5.64; 
Mario Monteforte Toledo, Centroamerica - Subdesarrollo y 
p~endencia, Vol. II (Mexico, 1972) p.88. Others have 
claimed a 1964 abstention rate of almost seventy percent: 
Mi j angos, 'La Const i tuc ion Guatema 1 teca de 1965', p. 59; 
Garcia Laguardia and Vasquez Martinez, Constitucion y Orden 
Democratico, p.101. The Director General of the Registro 
de Ciudadanos announced that the junta electoral munici~ 
would prosecute those 28,000 citizens of the central 
district who had failed to vote: Cronica, 20.5.94, p.85. 
143 New York Times, 26.5.64; Villagran Kramer, 
Biografi~._~ol itica, p.393-94. 
144 Art.27. 
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property was guaranteed and the social function of property 
continued to be denied. In common with that of 1956, the 
new constitution admitted the possibility of 'agrarian 
transformation' and even expropriation under certain 
conditions. However gi ven the furore caused by the 
manner in which parties expropriated under Decree Law 900 
were compensated - it is notable that both constitutions 
speci fi ed that expropri ated property be compensated in 
advance accordi ng to 
compensation be paid in 
its 'real value', 
1 egal tender. 145 
and that 
Hailed by Peralta for its progress in the institutional 
realm, the new constitution's most significant permutation 
in thi s area was its treatment of the party system. 146 
Codifying Decree Laws 175 and 387, the 1965 constitution 
laid down the minimum membership necessary for a 
'democratic' 
el ecti ons .147 
political party to present candidates in 
The requi rement of a 50, OOO-strong party 
list, of whom at least 20 per cent be literate, effectively 
ossified the Guatemalan party system for the next 20 years, 
with the political landscape limited to the MLN, the PlD, 
the PR and the DCG. These disproportionate exigencies - in 
a population of some 4,300,000 of whom 63 per cent were 
officially illiterate 148 and designed principally to 
exclude the participation of reformist forces, were 
just i fi ed by Pera 1 ta on the grounds that a profus i on of 
parties exacerbated instability. Moreover, the capacity of 
145 Arts.125 and 71 respectively. 
146 Colonel Peralta Azurdia, El lmparcial, 13.9.65. 
147 'Ley Electoral y de Partidos Politicos', Decree Law 
387, 23.10.65, Recopi laci6n de Leyes, Vol.84, p.138. The 
previous requirements introduced in March 1960 had been 
10,000 members, of which 10 per cent had to be literate. 
The 1956 electoral law had required only 5,000 members and 
the same percentage of literates: Sloan, 'The Electoral 
Game'. p. 1 29 . 
148 Oirecci6n General de Estadistica, 1964 cited in 
Amaro, ~_l_Reto de~esaJ:E9llo, p.334. 
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the Registro de Ciudadanos to determine the eligibility of 
the names on the requisite lists provided the regime with 
an additional tool to exclude organisations which managed 
to fulfill the numerical requirements. 149 How far these 
measures were originally aimed at preventing the 
participation of the DCG as some have asserted -is 
arguable, since the party leadership had clearly acquiesced 
to both the coup and to Decree Law 175. 150 Neverthe 1 ess, 
the party's exclusion from the 1966 elections - on the 
basis of incomplete lists and other delay tactics employed 
by the Registro de Ciudadanos - should be seen in the light 
of its refusal in May 1964 to continue its compromiso with 
the Pera 1 ta government, and represented in the eyes of 
regime critics, 'the first step towards electoral fraud 
that the people fear ... will happen with the elections of 
next March'. 151 
Further institutional innovations included the reduction 
of the presidential term from six to four years with a 
concomitant increase in the minimum age of the incumbent 
from 35 to 40 years, a move apparently designed to exclude 
149 Colonel Peralta Azurdia, El lmparcial, 13.9.65. 
Nevertheless, even the imposition of such stringent limits 
on party formation controlled by a politically-manipulated 
electoral body eventually proved too liberal for a regime 
which, by 1974, felt compelled to resort to blatant fraud 
to prevent the election of Rios Montt and the Christian 
Democrats. 
150 Josef Thesing, 'Elecciones y Cambio Politico en 
Guatema 1 a " Po 1 it i ca y Soc i edad (2, 1976) p. 18; George 
Black, Garrison Guatemala (London, 1984) p.21. 
151 Rene de Leon Schlotter, 'Carta Abi erta al Jefe del 
Gobierno' J El Grafico, 12.1.66. De Leon Schlotter, 
interview, Guatemala City, 8.2.94, argues that the DCG was 
the only party to have genuinely collected the 50,000 
members and that its efforts in thi s area perm; tted the 
formation of strong links with the popular and peasant 
sectors. 
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the candi dacy of the URD' s Franci sco Vi 11 agran Kramer. 152 
Peralta expressed the conviction that a shorter 
presidential term would minimize the threat of 
constitutional rupture and amendments to any article 
referring to the principle of non-reelection were 
constitutionally prohibited. 153 A particular point of 
contention was the question of whether or not authors of 
the 1963 coup should be permitted to stand as presidential 
candidates. While Article 184 prohibited the incumbency in 
the future of leaders of a coup d'etat, it did not apply 
retroactively. Vigorous in its opposition on this point, 
the PR's failure to prevent such an outcome provided the 
catalyst for its exit from the Assembly in April 1965. 154 
Article 191 instituted the vice-presidency to substitute 
the fi rst and second desi gnates to the presi dent. In 
addition to his traditional roles - to represent or replace 
the president as necessary - the vice-president presided 
over the newl y created Counci 1 of State .155 Thi s body -
originally signalled in Article 28 of the Carta Fundamental 
152 Art.182; Sloan, 'The Electoral Game', p.135; 
Villagran Kramer, Biografia Politica, p.399. Art.183 also 
stipulated that the president should never have adopted 
foreign nationality or citizenship, a condition which 
effectively excluded Arevalo. 
153 Peralta Azurdia, El Imparcial, 13.9.65. While 
Mijangos, 'La Constitucion Guatemalteca', p.65, has 
commented on the 'rigidity' of the 1965 Constitution which 
demanded a two-thirds vote of Congress to call a 
Constituent National Assembly to undertake any such reform, 
the principle of non-reelection had become an article of 
faith, similarly enshrined in the 1945 and 1956 
Constitutions as well as in existing 1985 Constitution. 
154 Garcia Laguardia and Vasquez Martinez, Constitucion 
y Orden Democratico, p.100, n.150; DDRS DOS 003236, Report 
on Guatemala, 12.6.65. In 1994-5, this question was once 
again very much to the fore in Guatemala as General Efrain 
Rios Montt attempted to find a way around the 1985 
constitutional prohibition on golpistas as presidential 
candidates. 
155 Arts. 207 -1 4 . 
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de Gobierno and given legal substance in May 1963 
represented a corporatist attempt to institutionalise 
interest groups and provide a forum for the resolution of 
conflicts. 1S6 Its duties included issuing opinions on the 
negotiation of contracts and concessions for the creation 
of public services on legislation and other government 
matters submitted to it for study, and on disputes arising 
between decentralised, autonomous or semi-autonomous 
agencies where no other solution was provided by law. In 
addition, the Council of State had authority to initiate 
legislation and to submit for consideration by the 
president initiatives and solutions regarding the general 
problems of the country. 
While Garcia Laguardia and Vasquez Martinez pointed to 
the potent i ali mportance of these att ri butes, they state 
elsewhere that such co-legislative functions were in fact 
very limited. 1S7 Adolfo Mijangos speculated in 1966 that 
the surprise election of the PR had somewhat confounded the 
purpose of this mechanism of legislative control, given the 
possibility of a democratic and progressive majority within 
the organism. 1SS In this respect, it is interesting to 
note the appoi ntment of a FASGUA-affi 1 i ated trade uni on 
156 Decree Law No.30, 17.5.63, Recopilacion de Leyes, 
Vo 1 .82, p. 43, 17.5.63; Garci a Laguardi a and Vasquez 
Martinez, Constitucion y Orden Democratico, pp.201-223. 
According to the Constitution the Council of State would be 
composed of two members for each of the branches of 
government, designated by Congress, the President, and the 
Supreme Court (CSJ) respectively; one member designated by 
the presidents of the professional associations recognised 
by the University of San Carlos; one member appointed by 
the municipalities; one member representing urban workers 
and one representing farm workers (trabajadores del agro), 
appoi nted by the juntas di rect i vas of thei r respect i ve 
legally-registered unions; and one for each representative 
organisations of agriculture, industry, commerce and 
private finance (banca privada). 
157 Ibid., p.103, 207. 
158 Mijangos, 'La Constitucion Guatemalteca de 1965', 
p.64. 
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leader as 'alternate' to the labour representative on the 
Council of State in October 1966 and military complaints of 
communist influence within the government as a result.'S9 
Notwithstanding criticisms of the 1965 Constitution 
overall, in some instances it was rather progressive - at 
least in terms of its immediate predecessor. Mario Lopez 
Larrave has pointed to certain improvements in the labour 
system which were incorporated into the new constitution, 
and particularly to the mention of social justice as a 
governi ng concept. 160 Protect i ve measures for 1 abour 
included rights to social security, compensation and the 
aguinaldo. The employment of minors and workers over 60 
years of age was to be regulated and women were to receive 
100 per cent of wages whilst on maternity leave. While the 
right to union organisation continued to be recognised 
exclusively in terms of 'economic defense and social 
betterment', the 1956 distinction made between urban and 
rural conditions was dropped. A less-recognised innovation 
was the acquisition of the vote for illiterate women, who 
had rema i ned exc 1 uded even under the 1945 Const i tut ion. 
Suffrage was declared to be universal and secret for all, 
although the illiterate vote continued to be optional. 
Gi ven the nature of government whi ch took control in 
1963, Garcia Larguardia and Vasquez Martinez have 
questioned the need to abrogate the 1956 Constitution at 
all. 161 Yet thi s fai 1 s to take into account the very 
different origins and circumstances of the movement which 
formulated that earlier constitution. For while there was 
159 DDRS CIA 003061, 'Guatemal a - A Current Apprai sal' , 
Intelligence Memoradum, 8.10.66. 
160 Lopez Larrave, Breve 
Sindical Guatemalteco, p.72. 
Histo[ia del Movimiento 
161 Garcia Laguardia and Vasquez Martinez, Constitucion 
y Orden Democratico, p.102. 
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certainly a high degree of ideological coincidence between 
the liberaci6n and the golpistas of 1963 in terms of their 
anti-communism, the underlying tensions remained. In this 
sense, with the 1965 Constitution. the military was finally 
laying the humiliation of the liberaci6n to rest. 
Perhaps a more interesting question to ask is why, having 
seized power. the military pursued a return to the 
constitutional order at all. The most obvious answer must 
be that it came under considerable pressure to do so, from 
wi th in as we 11 as wi thout. I n terms of the 1 atter, wi th 
the threat of Arevalo dispatched, the US State Department 
had been pressi ng for 
government since the 
an early return to constitutional 
coup and had become increasingly 
frustrated wi th the mi 1 i tary regi me's performance on a 
number of fronts. 
Party political support for the coup had been similarly 
short-term and instrumental and had surely not envi saged 
either its relegation to the margins of the political 
process in the const i tuyente, nor the estab 1 i shment of a 
new party to carry the military into constitutional 
government. The Partido Institucional Democratico 
formed in November 1964 though not registered until January 
1965 - incorporated businessmen and government candidates 
in the Const i tuent Assemb 1 y and threatened to usurp the 
political ambitions of such politicians as Mario Mendez 
Montenegro. 162 Moreover. if business and agricultural 
sectors had been initially wary of a rapid return to 
constitutional government, as the US Embassy reported in 
mi d-1964. the longer-term performance of the mi 1 i tary in 
government convi nced them otherwi se. In th is regard, 
Guatemala's dominant position in the CACM should be 
stressed, with the combination of rapid growth and high 
levels of US investment providing an additional rationale 
162 Mario Monterroso Armas. El Grafico. 6.1.66. cited 
in Sloan, 'The 1966 Presidential Election'. p.18. 
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for civilian management of the economy, particularly in the 
context of unwelcome government attempts at economic 
regul at ion. 163 
Finally, Peralta Azurdia's character has been cited as a 
factor in the decision to return to constitutional rule. 164 
Yet a central assumption of the Chief of State had remained 
an electoral victory for the PID. In the event, it proved 
impossible to obtain the conditions necessary to achieve 
this outcome. Forced to submit to the uncertainty inherent 
even in such ali mi ted democrat i c process as were the 
elections of March 1966, the strength of the PR vote and 
the correspondi ng ri ght-wi ng response, requi red that the 
government reformulate the terms of the transition. 
----------- --- - --
163 Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus, p.446. 
164 Rene de Leon Schlotter, interview, Guatemala City, 
S.2.94; Mario Fuentes Pieruccini, interview, Guatemala 
City, 2.2.94; Adams, 'Development of the Guatemalan 
Military', p.10S. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE ELECTIONS OF MARCH 1966: FROM MILITARY TO CIVILIAN RULE 
la realizacion de est as elecciones, es el 
resultado mas elocuente de que el Ejercito cumple 
lealmente sus promesas. Asumio el poder sin 
ambicion alguna y retornara a sus cuarteles 
. , 
s 1 empre y cuando se respete e 1 resu 1 tado de 1 a 
voluntad popular. 1 
Introduction 
The elect ions of 6 March 1966 resu 1 ted in an unexpected 
victory for the Partido Revolucionario and its presidential 
candidate, Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro. 2 Yet the victory 
i tsel f seemed 1 ess surpri si ng than the fact that it was 
accepted by the military government, albeit after an 
interval of several days. Not only was this the first time 
in Guatemalan history that an opposition party had 
triumphed against oficialismo in an election,3 but the 
winning party and its candidate claimed their roots in the 
revo 1 ut i onary decade, a prospect wh i ch had prompted the 
intervention of the military three years earlier. However, 
the PR' s revo 1 ut i onary credent i a 1 s had been constant 1 y 
called into question by dissident groups since 1958. 4 The 
Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdia, 'Oirigido a la 
Nacion Antes de las Elecciones Realizadas el 6 de marzo', 
Ejercito, (March 1966), pp.3, 12. 
2 PR, 44.4 per cent; PIO, 31.7 per cent; MlN, 23.9 per 
cent: see Table 1, p.148, for a breakdown of results by 
department. 
3 John W. Sloan, 'Electoral Frauds and Social Change: 
The Guatema 1 an Examp 1 e " Sc i ence and Soc i ety (34, 1970), 
p.89. 
4 Intra-party conflicts led to the formation of three 
splinter groups in 1958: Partido Autentico Revolu~ion~rio 
(PAR); Partido Nacional Revolucionario de 1944 (PNR-44); 
Part i do Uni d_Q~ Revq}uc ;ona-F i 0 (PUR). 
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term 'opposition party' needs also to be qualified. The PR 
was one of only three 'acceptable' parti-es allowed to 
participate under a system in which exclusionary electoral 
laws were reinforced by their selective application. While 
its eligibility had been obtained through its support of 
the March 1963 coup and subsequent submission to the terms 
of the constituent elections of 1964, the willingness of 
the party leadership to make alliances with its supposed 
political enemies had alienated many to its left. 
Nevertheless, by the time of the 1966 elections the 
reformist platform of the PR had apparently achieved such 
a level of consensus on the left that even the guerrilla 
had suspended armed operations. S The implications of this 
ceasefire compounded the deep sense 
sectors of the military and the right, 
suspicious of any reformist project. 
spurred the final challenge to the 
of unease within 
already profoundly 
Thei r res; stance 
transition, the 
resolution of which suggested less a victory for electoral 
democracy than its limits: 'a sorry lesson in how military 
power is superior to ... that of civil authority,.6 
The Pre-electoral Balance of Forces: Conflict and Consensus 
While a certain consensus existed around the return to 
constitutional rule, the electoral campaign was 
characterised by a general lack of faith in the electoral 
process itself, and this was true both for the political 
part i es 1 ega 1 and extra-l ega 1 -as we 11 as for the 
population at large. The exclusionary nature of the 
5 Gabriel Aguilera, Jorge lmery et al, Dialectica del 
Terror en Guatemala (San Jose), p.95; the ceasefire will be 
discussed in more detail below. 
6 Edelberto Torres Rivas, Crisis del Poder en 
Centroamerica (San Jose, 1981) p.149. 
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political system was not simply reflected in the legal 
restrictions applied to political competition, but more 
widely in a socio-cultural and economic context in which 
of the population 
Party machi nes 
remained 
did not 
politically 
encourage 
large sectors 
marginalised. 
participation, their organisation and action being 
primarily directed at the election of their candidate. 
Outside electoral periods, party political activity was 
minimal, a situation which had been exacerbated by frequent 
states of exception. 7 Remarking on the difficulties 
involved in gathering the requisite number of members to 
ensure party registration 'even though it is no secret 
that many of them are ei ther invented or dead' El 
Imparcial also noted the tendency of party leaderships to 
act in small committees, 'almost exclusive clubs, in whose 
decisions only a few were involved and particularly when it 
came to sharing out positions,.8 
Centrally-organised and unrepresentative, party 
leaderships 
elected at 
and candidates were 'ratified' rather than 
alack of nat i ona 1 convent ions. 9 Such 
democratic practice within the party organisations 
themse 1 ves mi rrored the absence of a nat i ona 1 democrat i c 
consensus and agreement between competing entities to abide 
by the rules of the game. Elections were thus viewed as 
only one way of obtaining political power, to be 
supplemented or pre-empted by other means. 
The new constitution itself a limiting document in 
7 The tota 1 per i od spent under states of except ion 
between 15 March 1945 and 31 December 1968 was 
approximately 6 years: Josef Thesing, 'La Politica en 
Guatemala' J in Amaro, El Reto de Desarrollo, p.243. 
8 El Imparcial, 17.3.69, cited in ibid., pp.243-4. 
9 John W. Sloan, 'The 1966 Presidential Election: Can 
a Radical Party Desiring Fundamental Social Change Win an 
Election in Guatemala?', Inter-American __ ~~onofl'1j~AffaLr~, 
22 (Autumn, 1968), pp.20-7. 
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terms of the scope for true political competition - had 
been suspended until after the elections had taken place 
and would not come into effect until 5 May. It was widely 
believed that this delay was designed to favour the 
official party, the Partido Institucional Democratico, and 
Peralta Azurdia's persistent efforts to forge a political 
alliance 'around programmes and not persona 1 it i es to 
avoid the proliferation of candidates' were seen as 
evidence of his intended continuismo through imposition, 
despi te hi s frequent statements to the contrary.l0 
Allegations of fraud were commonplace throughout the 
election campaign, directed mainly - though not exclusively 
- at the PID. 11 The PR response to such a possibility was 
to threaten ci vi 1 unrest. 12 The readi ness to cry fraud on 
all sides also reflected a reluctance to accept an 
unfavourable electoral outcome. With its dual strategy of 
overt electoral campaigning 
Movimiento 
and behind-the-scenes 
conspiracy, 
epitomised 
political 
Resort to 
the de Liberaci6n 
the acutely partisan manner in 
parties approached the democratic 
coups and electoral fraud in the 
Nacional 
which the 
process. 13 
past had 
contri buted to the apathy and pessi mi sm wi th whi ch the 
population viewed elections - this 'sharp indifference' 
being identified by El Imparcial as the most serious 
problem confronting the political process in 1966: 
10 El Imparcial, 8.9.65, 1.9.65,11.9.65; 'Peralta: 
Fue el PR el que pidi6 el Pacto Militar', Diario La Tarde, 
24.8.73. 
11 LBJL DOS, Ambassador Mei n to Secretary of State, 
Incoming Telegram 377, 16.12.65. In the election 
aftermath, the PID even accused the PR of fraud: Prensa 
Libre, 9.3.66, 10.3.66; El Grafico, 10.3.66. 
12 Ne~_ York Times, 21.10.65; Prensa Libre, 5.3.66. 
13 DDRS DOS 003248, Ambassador Mein to Secretary of 
State, I ncomi ng Te 1 egram 355, 8.12.65; DDRS DOS 003249, 
Ambassador Mei n to Secretary of State. Incomi ng Tel egram 
360, 9.12.65; LBJL, Office of Central American Affairs, 
'Report on Guatemala'. 13.12.65; LBJL DOS, Vaughn to 
Ambassador Mein, Outgoing Telegram 278, 15.12.65. 
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actitud que no puede atribuirse solamente a falta 
de civismo de la poblacion J sino a una 
concurrencia de hechos y facto res que mantienen 
a 1 c i udadano comun a 1 ej ado de 1 as cuest i ones 
pol iticas. 14 
The failure of the MLN and the PIO to agree on a joint 
presidential candidate was the single most important factor 
in the defeat of the right in 1966 J and one for which each 
party angrily blamed the other in the election aftermath. 15 
If Peralta Azurdia's intention had been to legitimise the 
military regime through controlled elections to be won by 
the officially-sponsored partYJ his failure to forge an 
alliance around the PIO J together with the size of the PR 
vote in key areas J effectively scuppered such a plan. 16 
While the possibility of a national coalition around an 
official candidate had been under discussion for some time J 
by early 1965 these plans were floundering. 17 The 
establishment of the PIO and its rapid accumulation of some 
110 JOOO members thereby more than fulfulling the 
conditions of Decree Law 175 - sparked the disintegration 
of the already weakened alliance which had supported the 
14 EL_Imparcial J 9.11.65. In the event approximately 
one quarter of the electorally-qualified population voted: 
see Table 1J p.2. 
15 El Imparcial J 12.3.66. El Imparcial J 5.12.65 and 
7.12.65 J had earl i er warned of the dangers posed by the 
separate candidacies of Ponciano and Aguilar de Leon in 
terms of a possible unification of the left. 
16 'An election may also liberalize without 
democratizing. that iS J an authoritarian regime may relax 
its usual repression during an election for the purpose of 
legitimizing itself or refurbishing its image J but without 
truly adopting lasting participatory norms': BoothJ 'A 
Framework for Analysis' J in Booth and Seligson J Elections 
and Democracy in Central America J p.15; see also O'Donnell 
and- Schmitter J Tentative Concl~sionsJ pp.7-11. 
17 DDRS DOS 003234 J Hughes to The SecretarYJ 
I nte 11 i gence Note J 12. 1 .65. 
127 
1963 coup. 18 
The struggle for the PID candidacy reinforced divisions 
between moderate and hardline groups within the military, 
embodied respectively in Finance Minister Major Jorge Lucas 
Caballeros, and Air Force Commander and Chief of General 
Staff, Colonel Miguel Angel Ponciano. 19 The competition 
between the two conformed to the enduring legacy of the 
'revolution' and its aftermath: 'la vuelta al arbencismo' 
versus 'el regreso ala liberacion,.20 Lucas Caballeros 
had been an economic advisor to Arbenz and had a reputation 
as a 'reformer'. 
status in 1958. 
He had retired from active military 
By contrast, Ponciano was a hardliner, 
reportedly sensitised to the communist threat by an earlier 
stint as Ambassador to Cuba and popular both with the MLN 
and 'conservative' elements within the military.21 Peralta 
Azurdia was said to dislike him for 
profess i ona 1 reasons'. 22 
'personal and 
The eventual choice of Colonel Juan de Dios Aguilar de 
Leon has been interpreted as Peralta Azurdia's effort to 
steer a moderate course between these two opposing 
factions, but could equally be seen as an attempt to retain 
control over the transition process. 23 A civil engineer 
18 El Imparcial, 16.1.65. The Christian Democrats 
(DCG) had pulled out of this alliance when it refused to 
support the single slate for the 1964 Constituent Assembly. 
19 Sloan, 'The 1966 Presidential Election', pp.19-20; 
Weaver, 'Political Style', pp.65-67. 
20 Prensa Libre, 12.8.65, 
Presidential Election', p.19. 
21 LQid.; DDRS DOS 003234, 
Intelligence Note, 12.1.65. 
22 
cited in Sloan, 'The 1966 
Hughes to The Secretary, 
23 
Weaver, 
reported 
Sloan, 'The 1966 Presidential Election', p.20; 
'Political Style', pp.65-67. In mid-1965, the CIA 
that Peralta Azurdia had given his 'tacit 
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and Director of the National Electrification Institute, 
Colonel Aguilar de Le6n had acted as Peralta Azurdia's 
personal envoy in the removal of Ydigoras Fuentes from 
office. Like Peralta Azurdia, he subscribed to the view 
that the free worl d was under threat from communi sm and 
that the military remained the ultimate bulwark of 
democracy.24 He had been an opposition deputy during the 
Arbenz government, but remained sympathetic to the latter's 
nationalist project and in 1966 sought a 'reencuentro' with 
the reformist decade in these terms: 25 
... ni Arevalo ni Arbenz eran comunistas ... Jacobo 
Arbenz era el hombre mas burgues que se puede 
imaginar. Nunca vi Jacobo sin rasurarse y siempre 
con su vestido 0 su uniforme pulcro ... fue un gran 
guatemalteco, un gran patriota y su programa 10 
resumio en 3 puntos: la carretera Atlantico, el 
Puerto Santo Tomas de Ca~f i 11 a, y 1 a hydro-
el ectri ca Jurun-Mari nal a ... 
The announcement of Aguilar de Le6n's nomination prompted 
the immediate selection of Ponciano as the MLN candidate 
and produced precisely the 'proliferation' of candidates 
that Peralta Azurdia was so anxious to avoid. 27 Supporters 
of Lucas Caballeros within the PID were already in the 
process of organising the Partido Social Guatemalteco (PSG) 
approval' to the selection of Colonel Jose Luis Aguilar de 
Le6n - brother of Juan de Dios -who had been attempting to 
rally support amongst arevalistas: DDRS CIA (84)35, 
Memorandum, July 1965. 
24 Colonel Juan de Dios Agui lar de Le6n, La Hora 
Domi n i ca 1, 13. 2 . 66. 
25 Marco Antonio Villamar Contreras, interview, 
Guatemala City, 14.11.94. 
26 Colonel Juan de Dios Aguilar de Le6n, interview, 
Guatemala City, 4.4.94. 
27 E 1 I mpa rc i a 1, 8.9.65. 
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which later allied itself with the PID28 and in 
December 1965 Lucas Caballeros was also nominated by the 
Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca (DCG) as its presidential 
candi date. 29 
The split between the two major parties on the right 
contrasted with the temporary coalescence of opposition 
interests as certain disenfranchised sectors pledged their 
support for the PR candidate. Following the PRes electoral 
success in March 1966, MLN leader Sandoval Alarc6n openly 
criticised Peralta Azurdia and argued that the 
marginalisation of the left had allowed its unification 
around a single candidate. 3D However, tactical voting was 
not a uniform response by those parties disqualified under 
the new electoral laws. While Colonel Cruz Salazar 
instructed his Movimiento Nacional Reformista (MNR) 
supporters to join the ranks of the PR in February, and the 
URD conceded their support for the PR candidate at the last 
mi nute, the DCG ca 11 ed on its members to spoi 1 thei r 
ballots -apparently after its offer of support in return 
for an electoral alliance had been rejected by the PR. 31 
28 The understandi ng between the PSG and the PIO 
prompted the resignation of certain PIO members, while the 
PR cl ai med that such an agreement represented the fi rst 
step towards an alliance between the official party and the 
PGT: Prensa Libre, 7.8.65 and El Grafico, 8.8.65, cited in 
Sloan, 'The 1966 Presidential Election', p.19; Prensa 
Libre, 4.3.66, 5.3.66. 
29 Villagran Kramer, Biografia Politica, p.406, claims 
that it was Peralta Azurdia's exasperation with this new 
setback to his plans which caused him to 'order' the 
administrative delay in processing OCG party lists which 
effectively excluded the party from the elections. 
30 E 1 I mpa rc i a 1, 12. 3 . 66 . 
31 El Grafico, 11.2.66, 5.3.66; 'OCG al pueblo de 
Guatemala' La Hora, 4.3.66; Rene de Leon Schlotter. 
interview, Guatemala City, 8.2.94. The MNR was Cruz 
Salazar's latest vehicle. the MON having been dissolved 
along with Ydigoras Fuentes' R~c_onciliaGt6'l __ O~m9cr~tJca 
Nacional (Re.-,j~_ncion) in November 1963. 
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Interestingly, an exception was 
election for Guatemala City's 
basi s of its better-educated 
made in the case of the 
opportunities for electoral 
mayor, apparent 1 y 
population and the 
fraud. 32 Here, 
on the 
reduced 
the DCG 
supported the eventua 1 vi ctor, independent Rami ro Ponce 
Monroy.33 Notwi thstandi ng the party stance on ba 11 ot-
spoiling nationally, DCG presidential candidate Lucas 
Caballeros later claimed that he had told supporters to 
vote according to their conscience. He believed most of 
his potential votes to have gone to Julio Cesar Mendez 
Montenegro - because of the Christian Democrats' 'outspoken 
stand against militarism,.34 
On 31 October 1965, PR leader and presidential candidate 
Mario Mendez Montenegro was found dead in his bedroom, shot 
through the heart. Predictably perhaps, neither the PR nor 
the Mendez Montenegro family accepted the official version 
of suicide, insisting that he had been assassinated for 
political reasons. 35 In this regard, it is interesting to 
note Mendez Montenegro's apparent convi ct i on that Lucas 
32 
'DCG al pueblo de Guatemala', La Hora, 4.3.66. 
Neither the PR, MLN nor the PIO endorsed any candidate for 
the capital's mayor. 
33 Ponce Monroy was considerably to the left of the PR 
and considered to be a 'communist' in some quarters: New 
York Times, 8.3.66. 
34 Kenneth F. Johnson, 'The 1966 and 1970 Pres i dent i a 1 
Elections' World Affairs, 134 (1971/2), p.38. 
35 The Fourth Party Convention held in November 1965 
declared Mario Mendez Montenegro a martyr: 'Declaracion 
Ideologica de 1965. La Cuarta Convencion Extraordinaria del 
Partido Revolucionario', reproduced in Cartilla del Segundo 
Congreso de la Juventud Revolucionaria (Guatemala, 1968). 
Ju 1 i 0 Cesar Mendez Montenegro, together wi th other 
prominent PR members and sympathisers during the period. 
continue to insist that Mario was murdered to prevent him 
coming to power: Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro. written 
reply, Guatemala City, 31.1.94; Hector Mansilla Pinto. 
interview, Guatemala City, 9.3.94; Mario Fuentes 
Pieruccini, interview, Guatemala City, 2.2.94; Oscar de 
Leon Aragon, interview, Guatemala City, 4.2.94. 
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Caballeros and Jose Luis Aguilar de Leon - brother of the 
PIO candidate - were conspiring to eliminate him. 36 His 
son, Alberto Mendez Martinez, further denied suggestions 
that economic problems may have been a motive for suicide, 
claiming Mario had recently raised Q10,OOO for the election 
campaign from the party leadership.37 While Handy has 
argued that Mendez Montenegro's death disrupted Peralta's 
plans for a PR-PIO alliance, the PR's withdrawal from the 
Constituent 
possibility 
exhausted. 38 
Assembly in 
of such an 
April 1965 suggests that the 
alliance had long since been 
Thi s departure had been prefaced by Mendez 
Montenegro's earlier announcement that he would no longer 
discuss a coalition with an official party, and should be 
seen in the context of his fading hopes of gaining official 
backing for his candidacy, together with opposition from 
within the party towards unification. 39 The PR's attempt 
to secure a ban on coup-participants standing for 
36 A CIA Memorandum, DDRS CIA (84)35, July 1965, cited 
reports that Mario Mendez Montenegro believed the two to 
have instigated 'an alleged abortive attempt by two 
guerrilla leaders to kill him on 28 May 1965'. 
37 He named PR stalwarts Gregorio Prem, Enrique 
Claverie, Francisco Montenegro Giron, Carlos Sagastume, 
Mansilla Pinto among others, as contributors: El Imparcial, 
2.11.65. El Imparcial, 1.11.65, reported that Mario Mendez 
Montenegro had acknowledged, in an interview the day before 
hi s death, that the party temporari 1 y 1 acked suffi ci ent 
funds for its campaign. Mansilla Pinto has stated that he 
obtained the Q10,OOO for Mendez Montenegro from his friend 
Arturo Castillo, a member of the economically powerful 
Castillo clan: Hector Mansilla Pinto, interview, Guatemala 
City, 9.3.94. 
38 Handy, Gift of the Devil, p.159. 
39 OORS DOS 003234, Hughes to The Secretary, 
Intelligence Note, 12.1.65; 'Peralta: Fue el PR el que 
pidi6 el Pacto Militar', Diario La Tarde, 24.8.73. As PR 
Secretary General, Carlos Sagastume Perez declared in 1973 
that the MLN, PIO and PR had earl i er agreed to support 
Mario Mendez Montenegro as a unity candidate and that the 
agreement had been guaranteed by Peralta .. The MLN a~d PIO 
had 1 ater broken thi s agreement and noml nated thel r own 
candidates: La Hora, 30.8.73. 
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presidential election represented a final attempt to 
achieve such backing and its failure prompted the party's 
belated move into opposition. Villagran Kramer claims it 
was these events, together with a lack of funds with which 
to finance the PR electoral campaign, which lay behind 
Mendez Montenegro's suicide: 
Desilusion con el gobierno de Peralta. 
Desilusion con los sectores financieros quien ya 
no estaban dando apoyo financiero para su 
campana. Peralta le habia prometido a el que 
seria candidato de la presidencia. Y despues 
Peralta 10 traiciona porque pone a otro, a un 
militar ... el se queda muy solo. No crecia su 
candidatura y posiblemente una gran desilusion de 
que se habia penado tanto, que habia entrado en 
relaciones con Peralta, que habia sido 
traicionado, y la cuestion financiera 10 golpio 
mucho' 40 Habria sido un momento de un rapto tal vez ... 
Mario Mendez Montenegro's death is generally said to have 
been an important factor in bri ngi ng together previ ous 1 y 
alienated sections of the left. 41 The caudillismo and 
pragmatism of the PR's erstwhile 'lider maximo' had been a 
divisive element within the party since its inception and 
had provoked several splits, most notably in 1958 when 
rumours of secret deals between Ydigoras Fuentes and the PR 
leader caused the party's opposition status to be denounced 
as fraudu 1 ent .42 I n December of that year the PR Second 
40 Franc i sco Vi 11 agran Kramer, 
City, 22.10.93. 
interview, Guatemala 
41 ASIES, Mas de 100 Anos, p.290; Dunkerley, Power in 
the Isthmus, p.448; Monteforte Toledo, Centro America, 
Vol.2, p.34; Handy, Gift of the Devil, p.159; Sloan, 'The 
1966 Presidential Election', p.28; also interviews with 
Rene de Leon Schlotter, Guatemala City, 8.2.94; Mario 
Fuentes Pierruccini, Guatemala City, 2.2.94; Francisco 
Villagran Kramer, Guatemala City, 22.10.93. 
42 QQinion Revolucionaria, 2.7.58, and New York Times, 
18.1.58,22.1.58, cited in Sloan, 'The Electoral Game'. 
The splits produced three new 'revolutionary' parties: 
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Extraordinary Convention expelled sixty members - including 
Francisco Villagran Kramer and Adolfo Mijangos Lopez who 
later went on to form the URD -
por no seguir la linea de conducta eminentemente 
democratica que el Partido ha trazado y tambien 
por atentar conlfa la unidad y accion del Partido 
Revolucionario. 
Further purges took place in 1959 and 1962, the latter 
spawning the Partido Revolucionario Ortodoxo (PRO).44 In 
part a product of the personalista jockeying for position 
within the party and illustrating the leadership's 
pragmatic accommodation with the exigencies of 
anticomunismo, this fragmentation also echoed the 
centri fugal forces at work wi thi n the revol ut i onary bloc 
during the 1944-54 period. 
At the time of Mario Mendez Montenegro's death, the PR 
had been shorn of much of its 'revolutionary' credibility. 
This was subsequently briefly resuscitated by the swift 
installation of his brother as the party's new candidate. 45 
Partido Autentico Revolucionario (PAR), 
Revolucionario de 1944 (PNR-44) and 
Revolucionario (PUR). 
Part i do Nac i ona 1 
Part i do Uni do 
43 
'Algo que el Revolucionario Debe Saber de su 
Partido! " in Cartilla del Segundo Congreso de la Juventud 
Revolucionaria (Guatemala, 1968), p5; see also Monteforte 
Toledo, Centro America, Vol.2, p.33; Sloan, 'The Electoral 
Game' . 
44 'Algo que el Revolucionario Debe Saber de su 
Partido! ',in Cartilla del Segundo Congreso de la Juventud 
Revolucionaria, p.5; Monteforte Toledo, Centro America, 
Vol. 2, p. 34. The former does not record the 1962 purge 
which, according to Monteforte Toledo, was directed against 
arevalistas. 
45 The decision was formally ratified by the party 
convention two weeks later, at which journalist Clemente 
Marroquin Rojas was confirmed as vice-presidential 
candidate and Alberto Mendez Martinez as the new PR 
Secretary General: ~Imparcial, 31.10.65,15.11.65. 
134 
Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro's participation in the events 
of 20 October 1944, together with his passing into 
political obscurity shortly thereafter - to continue his 
and academic career 'totally apart from professional 
po 1 i tics' 46 aided his reputation as a genuine 
representative of the ideals of the revolutionary decade. 47 
The fact that his withdrawal from active politics had been 
prompted by the assassination of Colonel Francisco Arana in 
1949 - whose presidential ambitions were supported by both 
Mendez Montenegro brothers - seems to have been 1 arge 1 y 
ignored. 48 A net result of this move, however, was that 
Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro was not identified with 
anticomunismo unlike his brother. 49 He was widely 
respected as Dean of the University of San Carlos law 
school and had been a labour lawyer during the 1950s with 
close connections to the powerful railway workers' union, 
SAMF . 50 
This reputation undoubtedly produced support for the PR 
46 Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro, interview, 24.1.94. 
47 URD assessment in El Grafico, 5.3.66. Julio Cesar 
Mendez Montenegro had been a student leader in the struggle 
agai nst Ubi co and had taken up arms wi th several other 
students in the insurrection launched against Ponce Vaides 
from the Guardia de Honor on 20 October 1944. Together 
with his brother, Mario, he was a founding member of the 
arevalista Frente Popular Libertador (FPL), served as Vice-
min-i ster of the Inter i or dur i ng the Junta Revo 1 uc i onar i a 
and held several posts in the Arevalo government. 
48 From Chile - where he was studying labour law - he 
publicly condemned the government's inaction in pursuing 
the culprits and renounced his government scholarship: 
Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro, written reply, Guatemala 
City, 31.1.94; Irma Flaquer, La Hora, 2.3.66. 
49 Miguel Angel Albizures, interview, Guatemala City, 
15.2.94. A close friend, Rene Montes, interview, Guatemala 
City, 11.3.94, has suggested that Julio Cesar left politics 
so as not to compete with Mario. 
50 Brian Murphy, 'The Stunted Growth of Campesino 
Organisations', p.471. 
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presidential candidate which may not otherwise have been 
forthcoming - including widespread student backing. 51 The 
Comite de Derechos Humanos declared in 1969 that without 
the death of Mario Mendez Montenegro, there would have been 
no popular choice in the elections, while a publication by 
the Asociaci6n de Investigaci6n y Estudios Sociales de 
Guatemala (ASIES) assumes - in the absence of statistical 
evidence - that large numbers of workers voted for the PR 
candi date hopi ng for a return to the 1 abour condi t ions 
experienced during the revolutionary decade. 52 
For the US State Department, Mendez Montenegro remained 
something of an enigma. As Ambassador Mein reported: 
On the Communist issue MM is simply a big 
questionmark ... We believe him to be 
anticommunist ... but he does not show any desire 
to risk lo~ing extremist votes by taking a firm 
stand now. 
Of part i cu 1 ar concern for the State Department was the 
51 J. H. Peterson, 'Political Role of University 
Students', PhD diss., (University of Pittsburgh, 1969) 
p.184, n.10, questions Johnson's claim that the Association 
of University Students (AEU) mobilised 6,000 students to 
campaign on behalf of the PR candidate: Kenneth Johnson, 
The Guatemalan Presidential Election of March 6, 1966 
(Washington, 1967). The national university student 
population in 1966 was 9,388: Amaro, El Reto del 
Desarrollo, p.335. 
52 La Violencia en Guatemala. Dramatica y Documentada 
Denuncia Sobre 'El Tercer Gobierno de la Revoluci6n' 
(Mexico, 1969) p.31, cited in ASIES, Mas de 100 Anos, 
p.290; ibid., p.295. Road-workers claimed that they had 
voted for Mendez Montenegro 'en un 95 por c i ento': El 
Grafico 17.8.66, cited in ibid.: see also manifestos in 
support of the PR presidential and vice-presidential 
candidacies by the Frente Civico Universitario Por la 
Revoluci6n and the Bloque Ferrocarrilero Revolucionario, La 
Hora, 1.3.66; statement of support by the URD, El Grafico, 
5.3.66. 
53 DDRS DOS 003252, Ambassador Mein to Secretary of 
State, Incoming Telegram 594, 24.2.66. 
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taci t endorsement that the Mendez Montenegro candi dacy 
received from the revolutionary movement. 54 While Sloan 
has noted the sudden cessation of guerrilla activity 'for 
unknown reasons' a few weeks before the elections,55 this 
situation was the outcome of an ideological dispute within 
the Provisional Central Directorate (CPDR) of the Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR) in which the view of the PGT 
leadership - to support the Mendez Montenegro candidacy -
had prevai 1 ed over that of the guerri 11 as. 56 Despi te an 
apparently unqualified commitment to armed struggle 
estab 1 i shed ina May 1965 party 
political scene revitalised the 
, peacefu 1 road to soc i ali sm' : 57 
document, the changi ng 
PGT's interest in the 
[U]n gobierno democratico, revolucionario y 
patri6tico en el que esten represent ados la clase 
obrera, los campesinos, la pequena burguesia y la 
54 Miguel Angel Albizures, interview, Guatemala City, 
15.2.94, recalls the circulation of a leaflet in which the 
revolutionary movement urged electoral support for Mendez 
Montenegro: see also, Comite de Derechos Humanos, La 
Violencia en Guatemala, p.31, cited in ASIES, Mas de 100 
Anos, p.279; El Grafico, 5.3.66; Gott, Rural Guerrillas, 
pp.118-19; Aguilera, Dialectica del Terror, p.95; Handy 
Gift of the Devil, p.159. 
55 Sloan, 'The Electoral Game', p.123. 
56 Some of the nature of thi s di spute between the PGT 
and the guerrillas is revealed in FAR documents 
'Comunicaci6n de Caracter Nacional e Internacional de las 
FAR', 10.1.68, and 'Declaraci6n de Cesar Montes', 21.1.68, 
both reproduced in INDAL, Movimientos Revolucionarios de 
America Latina: see also Fortuny, 'Guatemala: the Political 
Situation and Revolutionary Tactics', World Marxist Review, 
10 (February 1967), pp.30-34; Gott, Rural Guerrillas, 
pp.117-118; David A. Crain, 'Guatemalan Revolutionaries and 
Havana's Ideological Offensive of 1966-1968', Journal of 
Interamerican and World Affairs, 17 (May 1975), p.190; 
Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus, p.455; Debray, The 
Revolution on Trial, pp.295-6. 
57 Crain, 'Guatemalan Revolutionaries', p.185; Comite 
Cent ra 1 de 1 Part i do Guatema 1 teco de 1 Trabaj 0 (PGT), 'Di ez 
tesis sobre organizaci6n', May 1965, reproduced in Centro 
Intercultural de Oocumentaci6n [hereafter CIOOC], 
Guatemala. La Violencia, Dossier No.21, pp.4/228-249. 
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burguesia nacional. Este gobierno es condicion 
indispensable para la realizacion de la 
revoluci6n democratica que a su vez abrira a 
nuestro pais la perspectiva socialista ... En el 
camino hacia la constitucion del gobierno arriba 
menc i onado apoyamos todo movi mi ento popu 1 ar ::i. 
democratico ... todo paso, por modesto que sea ... ~ 
Reiterating the line determined at the PGT's 1960 Congress, 
and emphasising that the PR had broken its previous links 
wi th the government and the MLN, 
Victor Manuel Gutierrez 
elections represented a 
argued 
valid 
leading party theorist 
in La Hora that the 
form of struggle in 
Guatemala's revolutionary development: 
Ahora, la principal tarea es poner punto final a 
la dictadura militarista y establecer un regimen 
democratico y patriotico, respetuoso de la vida 
humana y de todos los derechos inherentes a los 
guatema 1 tecos .59 
Using the opportunity of Turcios Lima's absence in 
Havana, the CPDR deci sion to support Mendez Montenegro 
overrode opposition from guerrilla leaders Cesar Montes and 
Nestor Valle. 60 This decision also clashed directly with 
58 'Plataforma Politica - Aprobado por el III Congreso 
del PGT', May 1960, mimeo. In its efforts to pursue 
peaceful and legal forms of struggle the PGT apparently 
sustained negotiations with the URD and the DCG as well as 
the PRo 'Comunicaci6n de Caracter Nacional e Internacional 
de las FAR', reproduced in INDAL, Movimientos 
Revolucionarios de America Latina, pp.83-7. 
59 Gutierrez, 'Las elecciones deben realizarse', La 
Hora, 3.1.66. The tragic irony of Gutierrez' support for 
these elections is underlined by his abuduction and summary 
execution together with several other labour and communist 
militants by the authorities on the eve of the poll: Prensa 
~;br~, 7.3.66. 
60 Cesar Montes, i ntervi ew, San Sa 1 vador, 6.9.94; 
'Declaraci6n de Cesar Montes', 21.1.68, reproduced in 
INDAL, Movimientos Revolucionarios de America Latina, 
pp.88-91; Debray, The Revolution on Trial, p.296; Gott, 
R u r a 1 G u err ill as, p . 1 1 8 ; C r a in, , G u ate rna 1 an 
Revolutionaries', p.190. 
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the position of Turcios Lima expressed at the 
Tricontinental - in which he vilified the PR leadership and 
the defunct Mario Mendez Montenegro in particular: 
Si los revolucionarios participaramos en esas 
elecciones 0 si llamaramos al pueblo a participar 
en ell as votando por el PR 0 cual qui er otro 
partido de oposicion, le estariamos brindando 
nuestro propio apoyo, nuestro respaldo de 
principios, nuestra aprobacion revolucionaria y 
el apoyo de las masas que creen en nosotros, a 
gente que sabemos que no tiene ningun escrupulo, 
que sabemos que son complices de la reaccion y el 
i mperi al i smo. 61 
The 1966 Election Campaign 
The electoral campaign was dominated by two main issues: 
the likelihood of official fraud, and the threat of 
communism. Neither were new issues in terms of Guatemalan 
electoral politics. Protests against official fraud had 
caused the elections to be annulled in 1957, while the 
communist threat had been the primary justification for the 
military coup in 1963. 
the period of military 
However, in contrast to 1957 when 
intromission had been relatively 
brief, the return to constitutional rule after three years 
of de facto military government unleashed a partisan power 
struggle within the institution itself. Divided military 
loyalties complicated any attempt at official manipulation 
of the poll, yet the PR and the MLN appeared convinced that 
a PID victory could represent nothing else: 
61 FAR Commander Turcios Lima cited in Orlando 
Fernandez, Turcios Lima (Havana 1968), p.89. 
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... both PR and MLN seem convi nced that Pera 1 ta 
regi me is so much commi tted to support of PID 
that elections will be rigged, and both parties 
see. on 161 hope for free elect ions is change of 
reglme. 
This issue was subsequently taken on board by the US State 
Department, which by February 1966 had decided that Mendez 
Montenegro was the best option in Alliance for Progress and 
counterinsurgency terms, and that a victory for either the 
MLN or the PID would 'probably be the result of a managed 
elect i on or a po 1 it i ca 1 dea 1 or both'. 63 
The shape of the communist threat had altered since 1963 
and had been sharpened in the early months of the election 
campaign by the new guerrilla tactic of kidnapping wealthy 
Guatema 1 ans for ransom. 64 Systematically dismissed by 
Peralta as bandits and subject to rigorous press 
censorship, the guerrillas had hitherto been viewed more as 
an irritation than a serious threat by urban government 
officials and private individuals alike. 65 Having claimed 
legitimacy for its de facto status in the need to defend 
the country's institutions from communism, the regime's 
apparent inability to confront the guerrilla assault on its 
'last significant sector' of civilian support proved 
62 LBJ L DOS, Ambassador Mei n to Secretary of State, 
27.12.65, Incoming Telegram 395. 
63 DDRS DOS 003157, Rusk to Ambassador Mein, 14.2.66, 
Outgoing Telegram 390. Ambassador Mein disputed this view: 
DDRS DOS 003252, Ambassador Mei n for Sayre and Burrows, 
24.2.66, Incoming Telegram 594. 
64 By early December the five publicly-acknowledged 
cases were wi de 1 y be 1 i eved to be just the tip of the 
iceberg. Journalist Manuel Angel Ponce put the number at 
ten: 'El caso de los secuestros', ~l Graftco, 26.11.65; see 
also, ~ew York Times, 21.1.66; LBJL, Office of Central 
Ameri can Affai rs, 'Report on Guatema1 a', 13.12.65. 
65 Adams, Crucifixion by Power, p.268. 
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particularly damaging. 66 The government's loss of prestige 
in this area reflected sharply on the PID, which found 
itself forced to echo official denials regarding the 
prevailing state of insecurity.67 At the same time 
however, the military failure to eliminate the guerrillas 
was also potentially harmful to Ponciano, given his 
previous position as Army Chief of General Staff. Called 
to account for military actions during his time in office, 
he defended the army ro 1 e in' the emergency', but was 
unequivocal as to where the blame for any failure should 
1 i e : 68 
las ordenes militares no emanan de la jefatura 
del Estado Mayor, de cuartel 0 seccion especial 
alguna, sino directamente del comandante general 
del ejermito y del ministro de la defensa 
nacional. 9 
The kidnap threat provided a suitable context for hardline 
opponents of the regime to seek support for bypassing the 
electoral process altogether. While the MLN strove 
publicly to maximise the government's predicament, calling 
on the PR and PID to meet to di scuss the probl em, 70 
66 LBJL, Offi ce of Central Ameri can Affai rs, 'Report 
on Guatemala', 13.12.65. The MLN claimed that the country 
was investing in communism through payment of ransoms, the 
total amount paid by early December being estimated as at 
least $255,000: DDRS DOS 0003250, Vaughn to The Secretary, 
Information Memorandum, 10.12.65. 
67 El Imparcial, 1.12.65; LBJL, Office of 
American Affairs, 'Report on Guatemala', 13.12.65. 
Central 
68 El Imparcial, 1.12.65, 2.12.65; 'Lucha de 
guerrillas: diagolo entre Marroquin Rojas-Ponciano', El 
Grafico, 22.12.65, 'Los guerrilleros: dialogo Marroquin 
Rojas-Ponciano-II', ibid., 24.12.65. 
69 'Los guerrilleros: diagolo Marroquin Rojas-
Ponciano-II', El Grafico, 24.12.65. 
70 The PR and the PID refused the ; nvi tat; on: El 
I!l1JElrcial, 31.11.65,1.12.65.2.12.65; LBJL. Office of 
Central American Affai rs. 'Report on Guatemala', 13.12.65. 
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elements of the party leadership - together with Ponciano -
secretly plotted to overthrow the government. 71 
The MLN's position reflected its increasing political 
isolation. 72 With little possibility of winning an 
election against either an official party which had assumed 
the mantle of anticomunismo whilst sidelining the 
liberacion, or a party claiming to embody the ideals of the 
1944 Revolution, the only chance of political power for the 
MLN at this stage was the exploitation of divisions and 
ambitions within the military high command. The party 
published no programme of government, Ponciano maintaining 
that el aborate government pl ans were 
political stability.73 Discussion of 
limited to a promise of austerity 
developmental projects: a good road 
worthless without 
future policy was 
and the standard 
to 
electrification programme and a new 
the Peten, an 
Pacific port. 74 
Instead, MLN propaganda concentrated on the struggle 
against communism and the chaos facing the country in the 
event of either a PID or a PR victory. For Ponc i ano and 
the MLN, the pri ori ty rema i ned the eradi cat i on of the 
guerrillas through a combination of repression and military 
civic action in affected zones: 75 
in 
a 
from 
71 The MLN 1 eadershi p approached General Somoza 
Ni caragua and Guatemal an exi 1 e Roberto Al ejos Arzu 
crony of Ydigoras Fuentes: ibid; see also, letter 
Alejos Arzu in New York Times, 14.3.66. 
72 The CIA rel ated the MLN' s decl i ni ng 
influence to the appearance of 'several rightist 
groups' in June, even before Mendez Montenegro 
office: DDRS CIA 003057, National Intelligence 
'Prospects for Stability in Guatemala', 24.6.66. 
73 El lmparcial, 8.11.65. 
74 Ibid. 
political 
terrorist 
had taken 
Estimate, 
75 La Hora, 28.2.66. These were of course precisely 
the measures subsequently taken by the Mendez Montenegro 
government. 
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A las urnas! Ha 11egado e1 momento de sa1var con 
votos, 10 que mas tarde - sino actuamos como 
guatema1tecos patriotas - tendriamos que defender 
con las armas... A las urnas! A las urnas! No 
puede haber neutral es frente a1 comuni smo 
sedi ento de sangre!... Para no ser otra Cuba! 
Para no ser otra Republica Dominicana! Para no 
ser otro Vi et Nam! A 1 as urnas! Para no tener 
que decir nunca A las armas! Todos los 
guatemaltecos deben concurrir a las urnas, e1 
domingo proximo, para sepultar con votos al 
comunismo, aliado de las izquierdas 
revolucionarios e infiltrado en los cuadros del 
ofi ci ali smo! 76 
That the MLN's plotting was ultimately unsuccessful was 
due to a number of factors. While the army was clearly 
divided in its loyalties, the extent of support for 
Ponciano was uncertain, notwithstanding the frequency with 
which his name was associated with various conspiracies. 77 
Perhaps most importantly, there remained military suspicion 
of the MLN, as well as an enduring awareness of the dangers 
of a divided institution. It is notable that the 
negotiations following the elections specifically excluded 
the MLN, while the pact that Mendez Montenegro eventually 
signed with the military retained the principle of 
institutional unity established in its manifesto of 31 
March 1963. 78 Peralta's address to the nation in early 
December warned against political interference in the 
mi 1 i tary i nst i tut i on and represented a 'vi rtua 1 order to 
76 MLN election publicity, Prensa Libre, 1.3.66 
77 Marroquin Rojas, La Hora, 28.2.66. Colonel Ricardo 
Peralta Mendez, Chief of Presidential Staff and Peralta 
Azurdia's nephew, was also rumoured to be plotting a pre-
electoral coup, with the possible knowledge of the Chief of 
State hi mse 1 f: DDRS DOS 003250, Vaughn to The Secreta~y, 
Information Memorandum, 10.12.65; DDRS CIA 002412, 'The 
Situation in Guatemala', Intelligence Memorandum, 10.12.65; 
LBJL DOS, Ambassador Mein to Secretary of State, Incoming 
Telegram 395, 27.12.65. 
78 'Guatemala: el pacto secreto de 1966', in Polemica 
(May-June, 1982) pp.80-2; also 'Acta de compromiso para 
asumir la Presidencia'. La Hora, 23.4.91; 'Manifiesto: El 
Ejercito de Guatemala'. Ejercito, (April 1963). 
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[the] army to desist from political intrigue and remain 
united behind [the government]' :79 
Mal signo es, por cierto, el afan de los 
dirigentes de un partido a inducir al Ejercito a 
intervenir en la politica. Tal actidud merece el 
mas energico rechazo y justifica toda prevision 
del Gobi erno acerca de 1 as consecuenci as que 
podria acarrear al pais. Debe comprenderse que 
ya no hay inexperiencia en el Ejercito, que 
puedan explotar los politicos. Los miembros de 
la Institucion, todos, tienen plena conciencia de 
cual es el cumplimiento de su deber, de manera 
que, como 10 dije hace unos arios en reunion de 
jefes y oficiales en el Casino Militar, a quienes 
creen que es de otra forma y tratan de inducir a 
la intervencion del Ejercito en la politica para 
provecho de tortuosas intenciones, les repito que 
'estan predi cando en el desi erto y estan 
perdiendo sus energias'. Con satisfaccion plena 
confirmo en esta oportunidad que la unidad de la 
Institucion Armada prosigue inquebrantable y su 
estructuracion granitica es un hecho frente al 
cual se estrellan y han de estrellarse las 
intrigas de la politica de bajo fondo. eO 
The tenor of this speech sought to reassure the population 
of the government's ability to maintain public order and to 
guarantee the scheduled return to constitutionality, but a 
measure of the tension can be gauged from Peralta's 
demeanour at a minor public ceremony two 
an , impromptu 
literally wept, 
present' .81 
and 
to 
highly emotional 
the astonishment 
days earlier. In 
speech ... he had 
of all those 
The US State Department actively discouraged a coup, both 
at this stage and later, more publicly, after the 
79 DDRS DOS 003249, Ambassador Mein to Secretary of 
State, Incoming Telegram 360, 9.12.65. 
80 Co 1 one 1 En r i que Per a 1 t a A z u r d i a , Ell mp a r ct~J J 
9.12.65. 
81 LBJL, Office of Central American Affairs, 'Report 
on Guatemala' J 13.12.65. 
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elections. 82 While the prospect of an Arevalo victory had 
been considered inimical to US interests in 1963, Mendez 
Montenegro was judged to be 'a reasonably good candidate, 
[who] would follow a program of moderate reform within a 
democratic framework ... and is acceptable to us on security 
grounds' .83 Couched in terms of All i ance for Progress 
precepts, thi s manner of thi nki ng was i nfl uenced both by 
the negative experience of dealing with the military 
government as we 11 as fears that a vi 01 ent react i on to 
either a coup or official fraud might create a 'Dominican 
Republic situation' .84 Specific approaches were made to 
Ponciano to make clear US support for the election process 
and the problems involved in US recognition of a de facto 
government; President Schick of Nicaragua was also advised 
of the US position, and the message transmitted to 
Somoza. 85 At the same time however, if the threat of a 
coup by disaffected officers and political schemers was 
serious enough to elicit US diplomatic intervention on more 
82 Marroquin Rojas, La Hora, 16.2.66, questioned the 
unity of US government officials on this point and asserted 
that the Pentagon was pressi ng for a 'cuartel azo 
preelectoral'. The US Embassy issued a statement following 
the elections to the effect that it did not support plans 
for a coup as was being claimed by 'a political party': 
Prensa Libre, 15.3.66. 
83 DDRS DOS 003157, Rusk to Ambassador Mein, Outgoing 
Telegram 390, 14.2.66. 
84 The Washington Post, 20.3.66; see also Bowdler's 
angry response to this article which suggested differences 
between Embassy off i cia 1 s and Wash i ngton : DDRS WH 00471, 
Bowdler to Komer, Memorandum, 22.3.66. It is worth noting 
that the Dominican Republic scenario was an important point 
of reference in the calculations of key actors at this 
stage: see MLN election publicity, Prensa Libre, 1.3.66; 
'Discurso en la Conferencia Tr;continental. Cmdte. Turc;os 
Lima', reproduced in INDAL, Movimientos Revolucionarios en 
AmeTtCjl Lat ina, pp. 54-56. 
85 DDRS DOS 003248, I ncomi ng Te 1 egram 355, 8.12.65; 
LBJL DOS, Ambassador Mei n to Secretary of State, I ncomi ng 
Telegram 377, 16.12.65; LBJL DOS, Ambassador Mein to 
Secretary of State, Incoming Telegram 380, 17.12.65; LBJL 
WH, Bowdler to Bundy, Memorandum, December 1965. 
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than one occasion, there was also an element of 
brinkmanship and 'psychological warfare' in many of these 
rumours. The regi me responded in ki nd by uncoveri ng a 
spuri ous communi st conspi racy ina 1 ast-di tch effort to 
unite the country against the common enemy and encourage a 
political alliance around the PID. 86 
As self-proclaimed heir to the 1944 Revolution, the PR 
was particularly vulnerable to charges of communism in 
spite of considerable efforts to distance itself from the 
left over the years. Like the MLN, it declined to publish 
a comprehensive programme of government,87 confining itself 
to a reiteration of the 'Declaration of Principles' 
proclaimed at the First Extraordinary Party Convention in 
June 1958 and rat i fi ed by a 11 subsequent convent ions. 88 
Specifiying communism in its rejection of all forms of 
totalitarianism, this statement called for democracy and an 
'evolutionary' capitalist system based on social justice: 89 
El Partido Revolucionario es un producto genuino 
de la Gloriosa Revolucion del 20 de Octubre. 
Todos sus esfuerzos se encaminan a la realizacion 
y desarrollo de los principios que informan ese 
86 The regime's 'discovery' of the subversive plot was 
followed up by a 'discreet' attempt by the PID to persuade 
its opponents to renounce their candidacies 'for the sake 
of democratic unity': El Imparcial, 14.12.65, 15.12.65; 
LBJL DOS, Ambassador Mein to Secretary of State, Incoming 
Telegram 377, 16.12.65. Ambassador Mein speculated that 
coup rumours over the Christmas weekend which prompted a 
government denial were part of a 'war of nerves' initiated 
by the PR and the MLN against the regime: LBJL DOS, 
Ambassador Mein to Secretary of State, Incoming Telegram 
395, 27.12.65; El Imparcial, 26.12.65. 
87 The PID was the only party to publish a Programme 
of Government, 'based entirely on government plan submitted 
to CLAP 1 ast November': DDRS DOS 003252, Ambassador Mei n 
for Sayre and Burrows, Incoming Telegram 594, 24.2.66. 
88 'Declaracion ldeologica de 1965: La IV Convencion 
Extraordinaria del Partido Revolucionio 14.11.65'. 
89 I bid., p. 28 . 
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movimiento esencialmente democratico ... [L]a 
democracia [no es] un simple instrumento y mucho 
menos ... un montaje para justificar el dominio de 
ci ertas mi nori as. Se requi ere un concepto de 
democracia que aproveche a todo el pueblo y no 
descanse unicamente en criterios 
formalistas ... Para la realizacion de sus 
objetivos el Partido Revolucionario considera 
indispensable... [f]ortalecer, crear y 
desarrollar los instrumentos de la democracia 
(Partidos Politicos, Sindicatos, Cooperativas, 
Reforma Agraria, Autonomia Universitaria y 
Municipal, Derechos Humanos, Seguro Social, 
Democratizacion de la Cultura, Racionalizacion de 
la Produccion, etcetera) ... 90 
While allegations of communism were inevitable in a 
context where even the military government was accused of 
being infiltrated by communists, the PR's position was 
complicated by an electoral strategy which appeared to 
offer the chance of a negot i ated end to the guerri 11 a 
challenge, at the same time attempting both to placate and 
put pressure on the military. The former proposition stood 
in stark contrast to Ponciano's promise of a 'war without 
quarter' against the guerrillas and suggested some kind of 
pre-electoral agreement with the FAR, coinciding as it did 
with the suspension of the latter's kidnapping campaign. 91 
A similar conclusion can be drawn from the 'armed truce' 
declared by the FAR after the inauguration of Mendez 
Montenegro - the PGT having allegedly negotiated with the 
PR, 'before, during and after the elections of March 
1966' .92 A 1 though Mendez Montenegro cont i nued to deny 
this, Cesar Montes has claimed that negotiations took place 
90 Ibid., pp.25-26. 
91 El Imparcial, 21.2.66; 'Lucha de guerrillas: 
diagolo entre Marroquin Rojas-Ponciano' and 'Los 
guerrilleros: diagolo entre Marroquin Rojas-Ponciano-II'. 
El Grafico, 22.12.65, 24.12.65; Flaquer, 'Un mensaje a los 
senores guerrilleros', La Hora, 4.2.66; Marroquin Rojas, La 
t!QJ:~, 25.2.66; Sloan, 'The Electoral Game', p.123. 
92 'Comunicacion de Caracter Nacional e Internacional 
de las FAR' 10.1.68, reproduced in INDAL, Movimientos 
R~volucionactos de America Latina. p.84. 
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after the elections between the former's representative _ 
Foreign Minister Emilio Catalan Arenales and members of the 
FAR's Provisional Directorate. 93 But if there are 
indications that elements within the PR were indeed seeking 
'an honorable peace' with the insurgents, the PR's public 
stance on this issue was contradictory. While vice-
presidential candidate Clemente Marroquin Rojas apparently 
advocated a pact, he was also deeply critical of the 
mi 1 i tary fa i 1 ure to defeat the FAR. 94 
At this point, the maverick and almost machiavellian role 
played by Marroquin Rojas in Guatemalan politics should be 
noted. A veteran of the 'gene rat i on of 1920' and the 
political struggles against Estrada Cabrera and an out-
spoken anti-cleric and anti-communist, Marroquin Rojas had 
stood down as a rival presidential candidate to Arevalo in 
1945 and later ran against Arbenz in the 1950 elections. 
He used his newspaper La Hora as a tribune from which to 
campaign for and then castigate the Ydigoras Fuentes 
government and he was similarly unrestrained in his 
criticisms of the military government which followed. His 
evident influence on public opinion had encouraged Mario 
Mendez Montenegro and the PR to i nvi te hi m to stand as 
vice-presidential candidate in March 1966 and Marroquin 
Rojas was personally convinced that his support had been 
central to the party's victory in these elections. 95 
However, his relationship with Julio Cesar Mendez 
93 Mendez Montenegro i nsi sted that he never personally 
had any contact with the guerrillas, nor received proposals 
for any dialogue: Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro, written 
reply, Guatemala City, 31.1.94; Cesar Montes, interview, 
San Salvador, 6.9.94; Debray, The Revolution on Trial, 
p.300. 
94 'Lucha de guerrillas: dialogo entre Marroquin 
Rojas-Ponciano', El Grafico, 22.12.65; Marroquin Rojas, 'El 
Ejercito Nos Entregara el Poder', Impacto, 16.1.66; La 
Hora, 25.2.66. 
95 Marroquin Rojas, La Hora, 27.9.66. 
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Montenegro was strai ned from the begi nni ng and once in 
power, relations between the vice-president and the PR also 
deteriorated. Following the kidnapping of the Guatemalan 
Archbi shop Mari 0 Casari ego in March 1968 and rumours of 
Marroquin Rojas' own involvement, his censure by PR 
deputies in the legislature led him to place La Hora at the 
disposal of the MLN/PIO alliance for the 1970 election 
campaign in which he openly backed the candidacy of Colonel 
Carlos Arana Osorio. 96 
Notwithstanding articles by Marroquin Rojas in which he 
argued the need for negotiations with the guerrillas 
'before it is too late' ,97 the PR public relations office 
refuted PIO claims that either the party or its 
presidential candidate had arrived at such an agreement: 
El PR ... [e]sta decidido a terminar con la 
subversion en el campo y en la ciudad ... Si las 
pet i c i ones de los a 1 zados son i naceptab 1 es e 1 
gobierno nacional del PR las rechazara y 
entablara contra aquellos una lucha a muerte con 
ayuda de todos los recursos militares, economicos 
y morales del pais. 9B 
Such a vague position was perhaps to be expected given that 
the party's primary objective was to establish the 
confidence of the military, but it also suggests that 
96 For a somewhat uncritical biography of Marroquin 
Rojas to 1966 see Argentina Diaz Lozano, Aqui Viene Un 
Hombre: Biografia de Clemente Marroquin Rojas (Mexico, 
1968); Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro, written response, 
Guatemala City, 31.1.94 and interview, Guatemala City, 
18.11 .94, refused to answer any quest ions regardi ng hi s 
relationship with his vice-president. 
97 Esp. Marroquin Rojas, La Hora, 25.2.66. 
98 'Refutaci on del PR a 1 as decl araci ones del PIO -
Posicion Franca', La Hora, 4.3.66; see also, Comite Pro 
Salvacion Nacional, 'Posicion franca; el PR proclama su 
entendido con la "guerrilla marxista"', El Grafico, 2.3.66; 
and 'Aclaracion: el PR no esta mezclado con la izquierda 
roja (como dice el PID)'. El Grafico, 3.3.66, reproduced in 
CIOOC, La ViplenGia. Dossier 19, pp.4/44-4/50. 
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voters' percept ions on thi s issue may not have been as 
clear-cut as Kenneth Johnson has argued. 99 Indeed, it is 
1 i ke 1 y that of at 1 east equa 1 concern to voters was the 
return to the achievements of the revolutionary era that 
the 'Third Government of the Revolution' appeared to 
promi se. 100 
Similarly, claims regarding the PR's 'strongly anti-
militarist' character need to be qualified. 101 For while 
its fielding of the sole civilian presidential candidate 
was clearly of central importance in an election which 
marked the transition from a de facto military government 
to a constitutional regime, the party had previously been 
an ally of this same government and continued to recognise 
the validity of the army's seizure of power in 1963. 102 
Seeking to exploit divisions within the officer corps and 
drive a wedge between the military as an institution and 
its Commander-in-chief, the PR appealed for the outcome of 
the elections to be respected: 
Se han propalado interesadas versiones, emitidas 
por los enemigos del pueblo, del PR y del 
Ejercito de Guatemala ... Que el PR pretende la 
destrucci6n del Ejercito, y que el Ejercito jamas 
entregara el poder al PR ... El Ejercito es 
emanaci6n del pueblo ... Es el pueblo en armas ... El 
PR es un partido nacido del pueblo y destinado a 
servir al pueblo ... Luego, no puede estar contra 
el Ejercito ... El Ejercito asumi6 con beneplacito 
general, el gobierno de la Republica; El Ministro 
de la Oefensa Nacional, Colonel Enrique Peralta 
99 Johnson, 'From Terrori sm to Terror', p. 12; and 'The 
1966 and 1970 Elections', p.38. Adams has commented that 
shifting party alliances made it difficult to see 
consistently just how voters perceived the particular bent 
of a party: Adams, Crucifixion by Power, p.206. 
100 Miguel Angel Albizures, interview, Guatemala City, 
15.2.94. 
101 Johnson, 'The 1966 and 1970 Elections', p.39. 
102 'El PR Se Oirige Al Noble Ejercito de Guatemala', 
l.,.a_Hora, 2.3.66. 
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Azurdia asumlo, como delegado del Ejercito, las 
funciones legislativas y ejecutivas. Significa 
esto que el Coronel Peralta haya asumido por si 
la soberania de la nacion y el mando irrestricto 
de los destinos patrios? No, y el PR estima que 
el Ejercito debe ser simplemente el garante de la 
voluntad popular, y no seguir a su actual y 
transitorio jefe en el camino equivocado de 
apoj~~, impolitica y antimilitarmente, una 
candidatura oficial. Exigid Ejercito de 
Guatemala, a vuestro jefe, que deje a un lado sus 
simpatias 8ersonales a favor de determinado 
candi dato! 1 
The Elections of 6 March 1966 
El espectaculo de los ciudadanos frente a las 
mesas electorales el dia de ayer ratifica la 
urbani dad de los guatemaltecos, su postura civica 
y su proposito de contribuir a resolverse, dentro 
de los canones de la convivencia civilizada, los 
problemas politicas ... Los que hablaban de apatia 
a 10 largo del proceso eleccionario 
menospreciaban festinadamente las cualOidades 
notables de la ciudadania guatemalteca ... 4 
Although it had polled badly in the November 1962 municipal 
election in Guatemala City, by March 1966, a PR electoral 
victory seemed inevitable for a number of reasons. Most 
crucially, the MLN and the PID were unable to negotiate an 
alliance. Moreover, the lack of legal political 
competition to its left, cleared the way for the PRo The 
impact of support for Mendez Montenegro from the 
revolutionary movement is difficult to measure, although 
CIA estimates putting the number of PGT members at 1,200 
with another 3,000-4,000 supporters, provide a possible 
----~~~~ 
103 Ibid. A press bulletin from the military's public 
relations office interpreted this appeal as an attempt to 
split army ranks: La Hora, 4.3.66. 
104 Editorial, Prensa Libre, 7.3.66. 
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indication. 10S 
Table 1 
Presidential Election Results: 6 March 1966 
Department PID % MLN % PR % 
Guatemala 20,667 18.3 29,997 26.6 62,058 55.1 
Escuintla 4,206 18.5 4,476 19.7 14,050 61 .8 
Sacatepequez 2,710 28.9 2,676 28.4 4,012 42.7 
Chimaltenango 5,560 38.4 3,995 27.6 4,927 34.0 
Quezaltenango 12,029 39.5 5,558 18.2 12,927 42.3 
Solola 5,054 47.7 1 ,770 16.7 3,766 35.6 
Totonicapan 7,047 58.3 2,831 23.4 2,207 18.3 
San Marcos 10,393 31 .2 5,453 16.3 17,487 52.5 
Retalhuleu 3,714 32.6 1 ,584 13.9 6,109 53.5 
Suchitepequez 5,795 25.0 4, 131 17.9 13,251 57.1 
Santa Rosa 5,409 34.6 3,819 24.4 6,416 41 .0 
Jutiapa 7,443 38.6 6,136 31.9 5,698 29.5 
Jalapa 2,834 38.0 1 ,536 20.6 3,085 41 .4 
El Progreso 2,057 32.8 2,058 32.8 2, 161 34.4 
Zacapa 3,309 34.7 2, 101 22.0 4,136 43.3 
Chi qui mula 3,866 25.6 5,627 37.2 5,633 37.2 
Izabal 3,183 33.3 2,102 22.0 4,266 44.7 
Alta Verapaz 8,418 51 .3 3,912 19.5 4,790 29.2 
Baja Verapaz 4,074 44.8 2,178 24.0 2,830 31 .2 
Quiche 6,674 53.3 3,561 28.4 2,288 18.3 
Huehuetenango 10,268 42.3 6,793 28.0 7,228 29.7 
Peten 1,547 40.9 659 17.4 1,574 41.6 
TOTALS: 136,257 31 .7 102,953 23.9 190,899 44.4 
Source: Q.laLlode Lentroamerlca, 14.3.66. 
105 DDRS CIA 003057, 'Prospects for Stabi 1 i ty in 
Guatemala', National Intelligence Estimate, 24.6.66. The 
same report put the number of guerrillas in the FAR and MR-
13 at no more than 200 members each. 
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While the DCG responded to its exclusion with a call for 
ballot-spoiling, the URD urged its supporters to vote for 
Mendez Montenegro. Leader of the URD, Villagran Kramer has 
claimed the party brought between 80,000 and 100,000 votes 
to the PR in March 1966. 106 The effects of th is tact i ca 1 
voting were clearest in metropolitan Guatemala, although 
the propensity of this area to return an oposicionista vote 
should also be recognised. 107 Here, the PR's 1966 showing 
was more than halved in 1970, although its losses overall 
were 1 ess dramat i c. 108 
If the PR vote was sufficiently strong to discourage any 
serious attempts at ballot-stuffing by the government, its 
plurality represented a rather more modest rejection of 
militarism nationally 
Kramer have argued. 109 
five of the country's 
than ei ther Johnson or Vi 11 agran 
The PR won a clear majority in only 
22 departments and would have been 
defeated by an MLN-PID coalition in every other province. 
Conversely, in the 1970 elections, the MLN-PID would 
probably have lost with a combined PR and DCG vote. 
The areas where the PR di d wi n a cl ear majori ty were 
significant and suggested not only support for the party 
106 Francisco Villagran Kramer, interview, Guatemala 
City, 22.10.93. This figure is clearly exaggerated, but 
the November 1962 municipal elections had shown that the 
URD commanded considerable support in the capital. 
107 Adams, Crucifixion by Power, p.207; Nelson Amaro, 
'Factores Influyentes de la Votacion', in idem., El Reto de 
Desarrollo, p.267. 
108 In the 1970 presidential election, the PID-MLN won 
42.1 per cent in Guatemala City, the PR 21.7 per cent, and 
the DCG (Frente nacional) 36.2 per cent: see Table 2, 
p. 2'37 . 
109 Villagran Kramer, Bigrafia Politica, p.408; 
Johnson, 'The 1966 and 1970 El ect ions', p. 35. Johnson's 
declaration that the results of the 1970 election - in 
which the joint PID-MLN ticket won a plurality - was a 
clear vote for military reactionism is similarly an 
overstatement: ibid., p.42. 
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from particular social groups, but also that an association 
was being made between the PR and the earlier revolutionary 
experience. Located along the Pacific coast, Escuintla, 
Suchitepequez, Retalhuleu were areas geared to export 
agriculture with large numbers of migrants and wage 
earners, a combination of factors which Nelson Amaro has 
argued makes a vote for the 'left' more likely.ll0 They 
had also been centres of mobilisation and agitation during 
the reformist decade. San Marcos established more than 300 
local agrarian committees to petition for land under Decree 
900. 111 Similarly, Escuintla had large numbers of agrarian 
committees and was the scene of illegal land invasions 
following Arbenz's land reform. As an area of UFCo banana 
cultivation, large tracts of land in Escuintla had been 
marked for expropriation. More recently in 1964, 2,500 
UFCo workers had lost their jobs when the company closed 
down its operations on the Tiquisate plantations, in 
compliance with a 1958 anti-trust ruling against it in the 
110 Guatema 1 a and, to a 1 esser extent, San Marcos a 1 so 
had relatively high levels of migrant and waged labour. 
Amaro, 'Factores influyentes en la votacion', pp.269-70 and 
Table 8, p.282, posits a correlation between levels of 
migrants and waged workers in a department and its 
propensi ty to vote for part i es of the '1 eft': the PR in 
1966 and the DCG (Frente Nacional) in 1970. That this 
correlation was less clear in some areas in 1970 is 
explained by specific factors for example anti-
c 1 er i ca 1 i sm i n San Marcos - and more genera 11 y wi th the 
argument that the DCG, in its new leftist incarnation, 
remained as yet an unfamiliar alternative: see also, Sloan, 
'The Electoral Game', p.223. 
111 Gustavo Porras Castejon, 'Analysis Estructural y 
Recomposicion Clasista', in Centro de Estudios Integrados 
de Desarrollo Comunal (CEIDEC), Guatemala: Seminario 
~stago~ Clases Sociales y Cuestion Etnico-Na~;onal (Mexico, 
1992) p.93. 
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Uni ted States. 112 Fi nall y, in the 1 i ght of PGT support for 
Mendez Montenegro in the 1966 elections, it is also worth 
noting that party's traditional influence among waged 
labour on the banana plantations. 113 
El sewhere, support for the PR was more patchy. In the 
ladino eastern districts the majority voted for the right, 
although all but Jutiapa delivered a plurality for the 
PR. 114 In the core areas of guerrilla activity - Zacapa 
and Izabal - the PR showed strong pluralities but did not 
win outright. It was weakest of all in the Indian-
populated west where the PID did particularly well, 
ill ustrati ng the tendency of these areas to return an 
oficialista or rightist vote. 11S This tendency reflected 
a combination of cultural traditions, landlord coercion and 
patron-client relationships in the highlands, yet the 
Indian vote was clearly important and political parties 
often exploited local religious and ethnic tensions in 
order to acquire support at municipal and national 
level. 116 
112 Whetten, Guatemala, p.133, n.7. Attempts by the 
UFCo workers' union to buy the lands failed: Melville and 
Melville, Another Vietnam, pp.201-2. 
113 Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution, p.147. 
114 See John W. Durston, La Estructura del Poder en una 
Region Ladina de Guatemala' (Guatemala, 1972) p.116, for a 
discussion of the debilitating effects of the 1958 anti-
communist purges in the PR on the local party organisation 
in Jutiapa. 
115 Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution, p.194; 
see al so, Amaro, 'Factores Infl uyentes de 1 a Votaci on' , 
pp.271-2. 
116 See Falla, Quiche Rebelde, pp.430-432; Benjamin 
Colby and Pierre van de Berghe, Ixil Country: A Plural 
Society in Highland Guatemala (Berkeley, 1969) p.126. 
Roland H. Ebel, 'When Indians Take Power', in Robert M. 
Carmack (ed), tiarvest of Violence: The Maya Indians and_ th~ 
Guatemalan Crisis (Norman, 1988) p.175, discusses how the 
1966 elect ions exacerbated conf 1 i ct between t rad it i ona 1 
catol; cos and the younger categui stas in the i ndi genous 
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However, Sloan's prediction that 'the traditional Indian 
will support - or be controlled by - the PR government in 
the next election' proved to be only partially correct. 117 
The PR was able to increase its share of the vote in most 
of these areas in March 1970, but won only Alta Verapaz 
outright. With respect to the 1966 election results, Vice-
President-elect Marroquin Rojas echoed the familiar ladino 
lament regarding the easy manipulation of the illiterate 
indigenous vote: 
... estan todavia en la epoca mas barbara: 
temerosos, sometidos, analfabetas y abandon ados 
por el gobierno de todos los tiempos. En cambio, 
todos los pueblos en donde la civilizacion va 
penetrando, donde el analfabetismo pierde 
terreno, donde el ladino se ha confundido ya con 
el indio puro de los altillanos, la victoria fue 
del PR. 118 
The problems inherent in a PR plurality of this kind had 
earlier been acknowledged by the US State Department, when 
the question of resistance by military and 'other 
conservative elements' had been raised. 119 For if the PR 
had expressed its intention to promote the private sector 
and establish an 'evolutionary capitalist regime' in 
Guatemala, its references to social justice and the need to 
resolve socio-economic problems remained anathema to the 
'upper sector'. 120 The 1 atter, reported the CIA, 'regards 
Mendez Montenegro as a Communist, as it does any 
community and exposed latent ethnic rivalry between Indians 
and ladinos in San Juan Ostuncalco. 
117 Sloan, 'The Electoral Game', p.224. 
118 Marroquin Rojas, La Hora, 14.3.66. 
119 DDRS DOS 003157, Rusk to American Embassy, 
Guatemala, Outgoing Telegram 390, 14.2.66. 
120 'La I V Convenc ion 
Revolucionario', pp.26. 29; 
Montenegro's rep 1 y to 
Agropecuaria', El Imparcial, 
Extraordinaria del Partido 
PR publicity quoting Mendez 
the 'Iniciativa Privada 
28.2.66. 
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reformi st ' .121 Articulating this aspect of elite concern, 
El Imparcial warned that the concept of 'social justice' 
was a call to marxist agitation and unrest. 122 A similar 
view prevailed amongst many in the officer corps. Captain 
Juan Fernando Cifuentes recalls being told by his military 
chiefs that Mendez Montenegro's victory represented a 
vi ctory for communi sm whi ch had to be opposed. 123 
While visceral anticomunismo was central to this 
resistance in its own terms, at the same time it also gave 
expression to other fears associated with the prospect of 
a PR government - in particular the fear of 'revolutionary' 
revanchism and revenge-taking by those uprooted by the 1954 
events. These concerns were highlighted by journalist 
Isidoro Zarco who urged a conciliatory formula in order to 
diminish fears of reprisals. Failure to guarantee the 
integrity of the losers through some kind of power-sharing 
agreement would drive them to desperate measures. 124 For 
the military such fears apparently centred on the prospect 
of retired arbencista officers being reinstated - a concern 
addressed by the PR and its candidates on several 
occas ions. 125 Of equal concern was the possible 
121 LBJL CIA, Office of National Estimates, 'Special 
Memorandum' 18.1.66. This document predicted a military 
coup before or shortly after the March elections. 
122 Editorial, El Imparcial, 1.11.65. 
123 Capta in Juan Fernando Ci fuentes Herrera, i ntervi ew, 
Guatemala City, 30.9.94; General Enrique Daniel Cifuentes, 
interview, Guatemala City, 4.11.94, confirmed that many in 
the military believed Mendez Montenegro to be a communist. 
124 Isidoro Zarco, Prensa Libre, 10.3.66. 
125 Clemente Marroquin Rojas, 'El Ejercito Nos 
Entregara el Poder si Triunfamos', Impacto, 16.1.66, and 
'El PR y el Ejercito deben llegar a un Entendido', La Hora, 
11.3.66; 'El PR Se Dirige Al Noble Ejercito de Guatemala', 
La Hora, 2.3.66; 'Manifiesto al Pueblo y al Ejercito de 
Guatema 1 a de 1 PR y de sus Candi datos: L i cenc i ados Jul i 0 
Cesar Mendez Montenegro y Clemente Marroquin Rojas', Prensa 
Libre, 22.3.66. 
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persecution of government and military officials or their 
families for actions carried out in the line of duty during 
the de facto regime. 
The Secret Pact 
... hacemos la advertencia de que dificilmente el 
gobierno militar hara entrega del Poder al PR y 
que posiblemente exigira muchas condiciones, 
entre otras, no tocar al Ejercito en su 
organisacion y desenvolvimiento. Esto es que 
habra un
26 Estado mi 1 i tar dent ro de un Estado . . 1 1 Cl Vl ... 
El pacto tiene algunos puntos especiales pero no 
tiene mayor importancia porque tanto Mendez 
Montenegro como Clemente Marroquin Rojas eran 
abogados. Ellos sabi an muy bi en hasta donde 
podia l~,gar ese pacta de punta de vista 
1 ega 1 ... 
Within the restricted parameters for competition in the 
March 1966 elections, a PR victory was not entirely 
unexpected. Indeed, as a White House memorandum pointed 
out in mid-March, , it was pretty evident that if the 
elections were reasonably honest' Mendez Montenegro would 
win. 128 However, the delay in releasing the official 
results indicated that the way to a smooth transition 
remained far from clear. In addition, the arrest and 
subsequent disappearance of some 28 leading communists and 
labour activists - including Victor Manuel Gutierrez and 
126 Marroquin Rojas, La Hora, 15.4.66. 
127 General Enrique Daniel Cifuentes Mendez, interview, 
Guatemala City, 4.11.94. 
128 DDRS WH 
15.3.66; see also 
Outgoing Telegram 
Mein to Sayre and 
001052, Bowdler to Komer, Memorandum, 
DDRS DOS 003157, Rusk to Ambassador Mein, 
390, 14.2.66; DDRS DOS 003252, Ambassador 
Burrows, Incoming Telegram 594, 24.2.66. 
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Leonardo Cast i 110 Flores in the weeks precedi ng the 
elect ions cast an uneasy shadow over the proceedi ngs. 129 
The fate of the '28' - execution followed by secret burial 
or maritime disposal - was viewed by many as emblematic 
both of the ultimate violence of the Peralta Azurdia regime 
and of the counter-terror which was to crystallise under 
the Mendez Montenegro government. 130 Equa 11 y however, 
Peralta Azurdia's own role in the deed remains in question 
and several respondents have argued that the Chief of State 
was presented with a fait accompli, carried out by high-
ranking subordinates in league with the civilian security 
forces and act i ng 
i ntell i gence: 131 
on information provided by 
Es probable que algunas listas de lideres de la 
izquierda encubiertos las hayan proporcionado la 
CIA ... quienes estuvieron la iniciativa de 
desaparecer a los 28 del PGT ... es mi opinion 
persona 1, pero en ese entonces e 1 mi edo, 1 a 
sicosis, el ambiente dentro el ejercito los hizo 
comentar: que bueno que han matado a esos 
US 
129 Both had been key labour organisers during the 
Arbenz government. 
130 The Association of University Students (AEU), El 
Imparcial, 16.7 66, 20.7.66, announced that the '28' had 
been murdered by the judicial police and ordered three days 
of mourning; The 'Guatemalan Committee for the Defence of 
Human Rights', 'La Violencia en Guatemala', n.d., 
reproduced in CIDOC, Guatemala. La Violencia, Dossier 
No.21, pp.5/4-5/27, named high-ranking officers including 
Peralta Azurdia and Arriaga Bosque as the intellectual 
authors of the crime, p.5/11; the latter was also named by 
El Grafico, 17.7.66, cited in Melville and Melville, 
A80ther Vietnam, p.199. 
131 According to Cesar Montes, interview, San Salvador, 
6.9.94, the sweep was a CIA-led operation which narrowly 
missed himself and Turcios Lima; see also, Marco Antonio 
Villamar Contreras, interview, Guatemala City. 14.11.94; 
Captain Juan Fernando Cifuentes Herrera. 30.9.94; General 
Hector Gramajo Morales, interview, Guatemala City, 
31.10.94; DDRS DOS 003158, Hughes to The Secretary, 
Intelligence Note 290, 11.5.66. DDRS WH 003442. Bowdler to 
The President. Memorandum, 5.3.66, and DOS 003254, Rusk to 
Mein, Outgoing Telegram 460, 11.3.66. hint at US 
involvement in these events. 
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dirigentes comunistas porque son el enemigo que 
quiere destruir al ejercito, tal ~omo hizo Fidel 
Castro con el ejercito cUbano ... 1 
While the Cuban Revolution may have been foremost in the 
thinking of those who planned and executed this action, it 
is also significant that two of the victims were key labour 
organisers during the reformist decade. The remova 1 of 
these 'enemies' apparently did little to quell hardline 
resistance to Mendez Montenegro. In the face of mounting 
opposition to the prospect of a PR government, a deal had 
to be st ruck to enab 1 e the former to take offi ce. 133 
Eventually signed on 4 May 1966 by the army high command 
on the one hand and Mendez Montenegro, Marroquin Rojas and 
Mendez Mart inez on the other, 134 the terms of th is' secret 
pact' had been agreed in March and guaranteed the transfer 
of power on certain conditions. 135 In one sense the pact 
was a means by which to force formal subscription to the 
principles of anticomunismo, a position which Mendez 
Montenegro and Marroquin Rojas had been careful to avoid 
during the election campaign. 
Article Two of the document explicitly referred to 
Articles 27, 49, and 64 of the 1965 Constitution each of 
132 Capt a in Juan Fernando Ci fuentes Herrera, i ntervi ew. 
Guatemala City. 10.9.94. 
133 Marco Antonio Villamar Contreras, interview. 
Guatemala City. 14.11.94. has speculated that it may have 
been the 'fallout' from the crime itself which drove Mendez 
Montenegro to compromise with the military in this way. 
134 President-elect, Vice-President-elect. and PR 
Secretary General respectively. 
135 Two di fferent versi ons of the pact exi st and vary 
slightly in their content: the final document is reproduced 
in original form in. 'El Pacto Secreto de 1966'. Polemica 
(March-June, 1984) pp.80-82; an earlier version. negotiated 
immediately following the March elections is given in 
Gramajo Morales, De La Guerra, pp.462-64; see also, 
Villagran Kramer, Biografia Politica, pp.418-35. 
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which underlined the proscription of Communism. Article 
Three dealt with concerns which had been generated 
regarding the possibility of an agreement with the 
guerri 11 as and expressl y forbade any understandi ng other 
than one based on their total surrender. In the absence of 
the 1 atter, the government was to offer the mi 1 i tary all 
possible collaboration in their elimination. The new 
president and vice-president were expected to constitute a 
government of national unity, including elements from 
outsi de the PR, but expressl y excl udi ng Communi sts. In 
addition, the families, rights and property of ex-
functionaries of the military regime were to be protected. 
None would be subject to repressive actions related to 
their deeds while in office. This guarantee was extended 
to the candidates and leaderships of the losing parties. 
Article Six established the organisational autonomy of the 
military institution and the means by which key military 
personne 1 were appoi nted. The rei nstatement of ret ired 
officers was prohibited. Article Seven reiterated and 
elaborated on the central principle of military political 
neutrality as enshrined in the 1965 Constitution. The 
initial agreement in March also included an article 
committing the new Congress to an amnesty for repressive 
actions by members of the army and the police against 
'subversive activities,.136 However, the amnesty 
subsequently passed by the Constituent Assembly on 28 April 
and covering the whole period from 3 July 1954, indicates 
that the military did not trust a PR-dominated Congress to 
be able or willing to promulgate such legislation, and the 
undertaki ng was omi tted from the fi nal versi on of the 
pact. 137 
136 'Pacto Politico entre el Presidente Electo y la 
Jerarquia Militar', in Gramajo Morales, De la Guerra, 
p.464. 
137 Villagran Kramer, Biografia Politica, pp.411-12. 
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This final version no longer incorporated the PID 
representat i ves, Juan de Oi os Agui 1 ar de Leon, Gustavo 
Miron Porras or Hector Menendez de la Riva. While Colonel 
Aguilar de Leon has claimed that he refused to sign the 
agreement, Mendez Montenegro was unwilling to compromise 
his victory with the losing party.138 But if the PIO was 
not formally included in the pact, it is nonetheless clear 
that it obtained concessions. Article Five provided an 
undertaking to protect civilian as well as military 
functionaries of the previous regime, and a government of 
national unity was promised, with the PIO later receiving 
control of three congressional committees. 139 Indeed, the 
US State Department noted that relations between Peralta 
Azurdia and the PID on the one hand and Mendez Montenegro 
and the PR on the other, improved significantly during the 
transition period leading up to the presidential 
inauguration. 140 In response to the kidnappings of the 
government Secretary for Information and the president of 
the Supreme Court by FAR guerrillas in May, the PR-
dominated Congress ratified a new State of Siege, while 
Peralta Azurdia reciprocated with a supplementary decree 
committing the regime to installing the new government 
accordi ng to schedu 1 e. 141 
Significantly, the MLN was entirely excluded from the 
138 ODRS DOS 003256, Ambassador Mei n to Secretary of 
State, Incoming Telegram 702, 18.3.66; Colonel Juan de Dios 
Aguilar de Leon, interview, Guatemala City, 4.4.94. 
139 New York Times, 29.6.66. 
140 DDRS DOS 003518, Hughes to The Secretary, 
Intelligence Note 290, 11.5.66. 
141 LQjj:i.; DDRS DOS 003258, Ambassador Mei n to 
Secretary of State, Incoming Telegram 866, 11.5.66. The 
FAR had kidnapped Baltazar Morales de la Cruz and Augusto 
de Leon in retaliation for the arrest and disappearance of 
the 28 PGT and 1 abour act; vi sts. Hector Menendez de 1 a 
Ri va was a 1 so kidnapped but managed to escape and 1 ater 
left the country in fear of his life. 
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post-electoral negotiations, and it appears that a 
'gentlemen's agreement' was reached between the PR and the 
PIO to deny the MLN a place on any congressional 
committe~142 Initial suggestions that the MLN would join 
forces with the PIO to prevent the second-round election of 
Mendez Montenegro in the Const i tuyente came to nothi ng. 143 
Re 1 yi ng on old tact i cs, the MLN cont i nued to push for a 
coup with hardline officers still averse to a PR 
vi ctory. 144 Under pressure ei ther to annul the el ect ions 
or to stand down and allow a successor to do so, it appears 
that Peralta Azurdia's determination to respect the 
election results was decisive in the eventual outcome. In 
a key meeting with the capital's base commanders, the Chief 
of State insisted that the proposed autogolpe would merely 
strengthen the guerrilla and create 'problems of an 
international character' .145 The latter point was 
emphasised with a letter from Ambassador Mein which stated 
that the US government woul d not recogni se a government 
that was the product of a coup. 146 At a further meet i ng of 
142 In April 1968, PIO deputy Mauro Monterroso called 
for an end to this 'pacto de caballeros' so that MLN deputy 
Blanca Luz Rodriguez could be included on the congressional 
committee dealing with social reform: Prensa Libre, 
19.4.68. 
143 El Imparcial, 9.3.66, 11.3.66. Mendez Montenegro 
and Marroquin Rojas were confirmed as electoral victors by 
the newly-installed Congress on 10 May by 35 votes to 19: 
La Hora, 10.5.66. 
144 LBJL WH, Bowdler to the President, Memorandum, 
10.3.66; Colonel Ricardo Alberto Pinto Recinos, 'Autogolpe 
que evit6 el Coronel Peralta Azurdia con la ayuda de un 
embajador', La Hora, 23.4.91. 
145 Pi nto Rec i nos, 
General Enri que Oani el 
Guatemala City, 4.11.94. 
'Autogolpe', La Hor~, 23.4.91; 
Cifuentes Mendez, interview, 
146 Pinto Recinos, 'Autogolpe', La Hora, 23.4.91. In 
his memorandum of 10 March, LBJL WH, Bowdler to The 
President, 10.3.66, Bowdler had suggested to President 
Johnson that it would strengthen Mein's efforts to 'prop up 
Peralta's determination to stay in power ... if he were able 
to convey to Peralta that the 'WH' would like to see the 
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all military commanders it was reportedly established by a 
majority vote that Colonel Rafael Arriaga Bosque would 
succeed Peralta Azurdia as Minister of Defence. 147 This 
did not prevent a further attempt to stage a coup. Headed 
by the then-commander of the presidential guard, Colonel 
Callejas Soto - backed by 'an agro-industrial millionaire' 
- the plotters planned to annul the elections and to ban 
the PID. 148 
Rene Poi tevi n has suggested that at th is stage, the 
alternative to the pact was civil war. 149 While the PR and 
its representatives continued to hint at the violence that 
would be unleashed if the 'popular will' was not respected, 
Marroquin Rojas launched a campaign through La __ ~"forC! 
insisting that the army transfer power. 1SO However, the 
precise circumstances of the pact remain open to dispute, 
principally as to whether it was instigated by the military 
results fully respected and power tranferred peacefully ... ' 
However, this message was intended to be oral, while the 
suggested text did not refer to possible US responses to a 
coup: DDRS DOS 003254, Rusk to Mein, Outgoing Telegram 460, 
11 .3.66. 
147 Pinto Recinos, 'Autogolpe', La Hora, 23.4.91. This 
account is somewhat at variance with that of General Hector 
Gramajo Morales, interview, Guatemala City, 31.10.94, who 
asserts that Arriaga Bosque was selected by Mendez 
Montenegro from a list of three presented to him by the 
military high command and that Peralta Azurdia's preferred 
successor was Colonel Carlos Vielman. 
148 Alerted by military intelligence and supported by 
the three other base commanders in the capi tal, Peralta 
moved Callejas Soto to the post of Vice-Minister of 
Defence: Pinto Recinos, 'Autogolpe', La Hora, 23.4.91; see 
a 1 so DDRS DOS 003256, Ambassador Mei n to Secretary of 
State, Incoming Telegram 702, 18.3.66. 
149 Poitevin, 'Presentacion' in Villagran Kramer, 
Biografi~ __ Eol'L't-Lc;a, p. II. 
ISO Mendez Montenegro, P£en~a L i bre, 5.3.66; 
'Secretaria de Publicidad y Propaganda del PR a los 
Honorables Miembros del Ejercito Nacional', f»rensa J-:ibr~, 
10.3.66; New _V_ork limes, 9.3.66; Pinto Recinos, ~utQgo1~, 
La ~~Qr~, 23.4.91. 
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or the PR leadership. Peralta Azurdia subsequently claimed 
the latter in 1973, an assertion which Christian Democrat 
Rene de Leon Sch 1 otter has a 1 so argued to have been the 
case. 151 For his part, Mendez Montenegro simply maintained 
that he could not have received the presidency without the 
pact, while the newly-instated PR president of congress, 
Mario Fuentes Pieruccini, recalls being sent to negotiate 
directly with Peralta Azurdia after learning of an MLN plot 
to annul the elections. 152 
According to US Embassy reports, Peralta Azurdia's 
struggle to contain ultramontane military elements occured 
simultaneously with his negotiations with the PR leadership 
whi ch had been under way for several days .153 Wi th regard 
to the 1 atter, it appears that Co lone 1 Gu i 11 ermo Mendez 
Montenegro - brother of the President-elect and director of 
the military hospital played a central role in the 
arbitration process. 154 At the same time, Julio Cesar 
Mendez Montenegro was also reportedly having meetings with 
151 'Peral ta: Fue el PR el que pi di 0 el Pacto Mi 1 i tar' , 
Diario la Tarde, 24.8.73; Rene de Leon Schlotter, 
interview, Guatemala City, 8.2.94. 
152 Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro, written response, 
Guatemala City, 31.1.94; idem., El Grafico, 15.12.85; Mario 
Fuentes Pieruccini, interview, Guatemala City, 2.2.94; see 
also Marroquin Rojas, La Hora, 20.2.70; Villagran Kramer, 
Biografia Politica, pp.418-35. 
153 DDRS DOS 003256, Ambassador Mei n to Secretary of 
State, Incoming Telegram 702, 18.3.66. 
154 Co lone 1 and Doctor Gu i 11 ermo ' Pi no' Mendez 
Montenegro subsequently occupied the position of 
Presidental Chief of Staff for some time before returning 
to the Directorship of the Military Hospital: Julio Cesar 
Mendez Montenegro, written reply, Guatemala City, 31.1.94; 
General Enrique Daniel Cifuentes, interview, Guatemala 
City, 4.11.94; Captain Juan Fernando Cifuentes Herrera, 
interview Guatemala City, 30.9.94; Hector Mansilla Pinto, 
interview: Guatemala City, 9.3.94; Gabriel ~guilera 
Peralta interview, Guatemala City, 16.11.93; Dan,lo Roca 
Barilla~, interview, Guatemala City, 17.10.94; Villagran 
Kramer, B(9_grafia Politica, p.411. 
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Guatemal an busi nessmen 'to reassure them' .155 
If not decisive, the role of the US State Department and 
Embassy appears to have been significant in securing 
recognition of the PR victory. Even before the elections, 
the need for some kind of deal had already been recognised 
by the State Department: 
... we wonder whether the confidence gap between 
MM and military-conservatives cannot be bridged. 
We wonder, for example, whether MM could not 
reassure business community on how far he 
proposes to go in economic and social reforms and 
mi 1 i tary establ i shment on future status thTi r 
programs and control of communist activities. 56 
Following the elections, Ambassador Mein and Embassy staff 
visited party candidates, business and military leaders, 
and Colonel Peralta, 'to convey to them our strong desire 
to see the results of the elections fully respected and our 
extreme distaste with any effort to alter or annul 
them' .157 I n response to the attempted coup by Ca 11 ej as 
Soto and claims by the MLN of US Embassy backing, the 
latter issued a categorical denial. 15S While Pinto Recinos 
has underl i ned the importance of US support in enabl i ng 
Peralta Azurdia to withstand pressure to annul the 
elections, General Cifuentes Mendez has stated that it was 
the last-minute agreement reached after a series of talks 
with Mendez Montenegro that were decisive in reaching a 
155 DDRS DOS 003256, Ambassador Mei n to Secretary of 
State, Incoming Telegram 702, 18.3.66. 
156 DDRS DOS 003157, Rusk to Ambassador Mein, Outgoing 
Telegram 390, 14.2.66. 
157 LBJL WH, Bowdler to the President, Memorandum, 
10.3.66. 
158 Prer:1~~ Libre, 15.3.66. 
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resolution to the situation. 159 
Clearly the two positions are not mutually exclusive, 
since the State Department had encouraged the 'meeting of 
mi nds' that the 1 atter represented. 160 However, it is not 
clear from the - admittedly scanty - evidence that the US 
actua 11 y 'brokered' the pact, nor that negot i at ions took 
pl ace on the 'neutral ground' of the US Embassy as some 
have claimed. 161 Indeed, the State Department was anxious 
not appear as the 'go-between' in efforts to 'bri dge the 
confidence gap' between Mendez Montenegro and those 
suspicious of the PR. 162 It seems further significant that 
the outspoken and nationalistic Marroquin Rojas made no 
mention of US involvement in his public disavowal of the 
pact in 1973, as mi ght otherwi se have been expected. 163 At 
the same time however, the US government was clearly 
sat i sfi ed wi th the outcome of its efforts to effect a 
'modus operandi 
military,:164 
between [Mendez Montenegro] and the 
159 General Enrique Daniel Cifuentes Mendez, interview, 
Guatemala City, 4.11.94. 
160 DDRS DOS 003157, Rusk to Ambassador Mei n, Outgoi ng 
Telegram 390, 14.2.66; DDRS DOS 003255, Ambassador Mein to 
Secretary of State, Incoming Telegram 675, 12.3.66. 
161 Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, p.60; George A. 
Bowdler and Patrick Cotter, Voter Participation in Central 
America 1954-1981: an Explanation (Washington, 1982) p.130. 
Mendez Montenegro. written reply, Guatemala City. 31.1.94. 
has den i ed any US i nvo 1 vement in the pact and Agu i 1 era 
Peralta, interview. Guatemala City, 16.11.93, also believes 
this to be the case. 
162 DDRS DOS 003157, Rusk to Ambassador Mein. Outgoing 
Telegram 390, 14.2.66. 
163 Marroquin Rojas, La Hora, 25.8.73. 26.11.73. 
164 LBJL WH. Bowdler to Komer. Memorandum. 22.3.66; see 
also LBJL WH. Bowdler to Komer. Memorandum. 14.3.66. 
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The assumption of power by Mendez will represent 
an impressive victory for democracy in this 
hemisphere. The formula of civilian, reform-
minded presidents with the political knack for 
reaching practical working relationships with the 
military and other conservative elements, is one 
which I hope will continue to prosper in this 
hemi sphere. It is a formu 1 a for short-term 
political stability which allows the gove~nment 
to concentrate on development and reform. 1tiS 
Much of the recent literature on democratisation places 
significant weight on the role of elite agreements and 
pacts in the process of democratic transition and 
consolidation. However, the series of conditions to which 
the Mendez Montenegro put his name represented 'an 
explicit ... agreement among a select set of actors which 
seeks to define ... rules governing the exercise of power on 
the basis of mutual guarantees for the "vital interests" of 
those entering into it' only in its most narrow sense. 166 
The pact was a primari ly a quid pro quo between the 
leadership of the PR and the military with the 'vital 
interests' of the civilian signatories amounting to their 
being allowed access to office for a constitutional term. 
Their military counterparts were guaranteed organisational 
autonomy, as well as the retention of certain 'tutelary 
powers' and 'reserved domains', specifically in the area of 
counteri nsurgency. 167 Whi 1 e it seems cl ear that a 
transi t ion coul d not have been effected wi thout such an 
agreement, the transition process itself was to be 
fundamental 1 y fl awed by the fai 1 ure to subordi nate the 
military to civilian rule that the secret pact represented. 
165 DDRS WH 00472, Memorandum from Rostow to the 
President, 5.4.66. 
166 
p.37. 
O'Donnell and Schmitter, Tentative Conclusions. 
167 J Samue 1 Va 1 enzue 1 a. 'Conso 1 i dat ion 
T ran sit ion a 1 Set tin 9 s'. i n Ma i nwa r i n 9 ~~Ll • 
Democratic Consolidation. pp.62-7. 
in Post-
Issues in 
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However, it is also important to stress that this was not 
the first time that the Guatemalan military had required 
that its autonomy be underwritten before endorsing an 
elected civilian government. Nor was it the last. 168 In 
addition, in many respects the pact simply reiterated 
principles enshrined in the 1965 Constitution, itself a 
legacy of the military government. This is the position 
subsequently maintained by Mendez Montenegro in his 
defence. According to the ex-president, his only point of 
compromise - that of agreeing to appoint the Minister of 
Defence and Chief of Military Staff from a list of three 
presented by the high command - was abrogated in March 1968 
with the removal of several key military figures. 169 
It is worth also considering the more recent cases of 
democratisation in South America in which militaries have 
usually been able to retain considerable institutional 
autonomy and oversi ght over key areas of government .170 
The depth and resilience of the transition is subsequently 
tested by the willingness and capacity of the civilian 
regime to 'claw back' control over these areas, often 
through a seri es of precedent-sett i ng confrontat ions on 
such issues as mi 1 i tary i mpun i ty or tax reforms. The 
following two chapters will address these questions through 
an examination of aspects of socio-economic policy and the 
168 In 1945, Areva 10 was forced to concede to certa in 
military demands before he became president. Similarly, 
while Vinicio Cerezo (1986-1990) insisted that he would 
never make concessi ons to the army, it was cl ear that he 
did: see Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus, p.514, n.163. 
169 However, he has acknowl edged that before March 1968 
the Executive had little control over the army: Julio Cesar 
Mendez Montenegro, written reply, Guatemala city, 31.1.94; 
Mendez Montenegro, letter to La Hora, 6.12.78; 'Confesiones 
de un expresidente', El Grafico, 15.12.85; 'No me manejo el 
Ejercito', Prensa Libre, 12.12.85. 
170 It is significant - if 
Fuentes Pieruccini compared 
government with that of Aylwin 
military constraints: interview, 
exaggerated - that Mario 
the Mendez Montenegro 
in Chile with respect to 
Guatemala City. 2.2.94. 
169 
government response to the guerrilla challenge. 
170 
CHAPTER FIVE 
REFORMISM WITHOUT REFORM: THE POLITICS OF DISENCHANTMENT 
La asuncion del poder del presidente Julio Cesar 
Mendez Montenegro abria una esperanza de que era 
posib1e retomar e1 camino de 1a democracia social 
participativa y ega1itaria de 1a revo1ucion de 
1944-54, a pesar de que e1 1icencio Julio Cesar 
Mendez ~ontenegro nunca fue un revo1 uci onari 0 
radical. 
El Presidente y Vicepresidente electos ... se han 
comprometido publicamente a no permitir 1a 
intromision del comunismo en el gobierno ... debe 
confiarse en que haran honor a 1a pa1abra 
empenada y cuidaran de que la justicia social se 
realice sin desatar 1a venganza social; de que 1a 
Reforma Agraria no conlleve e1 irrespeto a 1a 
Propiedad Privada ... en fin, de que los elementos 
de reconocida filiacion marxista no ocupen cargos 
en la administracion pub1ica. 2 
Introduction 
In the days following the inauguration of Julio Cesar 
Mendez Montenegro on 1 July 1966, 'Guatemala was almost 
euphori c', accordi ng to US observers. 3 Few had bel i eved 
that the military and the extreme right would accept defeat 
and permi t the PR and its candi date to take offi ce yet 
'once this was done, most sectors of the country were 
willing to try this experiment in democracy,.4 While there 
is good reason to doubt such a democratic commitment on the 
part of elements within both the armed forces and the MLN 
Marco Antonio Vil1amar Contreras, 
Guatemala City, 14.11.94. 
interview, 
2 Colonel Guillermo Flores Avendano, 
Ejercito', La Hora, 11.4.66. 
'Mi Mensaje al 
3 DDRS CIA 003061. Intelligence Memorandum, 8.11.66. 
4 Ibid. 
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even at thi searl y stage, the extent to whi ch the Mendez 
Montenegro government was constrai ned in its abi 1 i ty to 
deliver a 'return to democracy' is perhaps clear only in 
retrospect. 
In many ways, the inauguration appeared to represent an 
historic opportunity for Guatemala. Not only did it mark 
the transition from a de facto military regime to 
constitutional rule, but also the return to office of 
declared representatives of the 1944-54 reformist decade. 
Holding 30 of the 55 seats in the congress, the PR claimed 
to be 'a genuine creation of the Glorious Revolution of 20 
October,.5 The new President had personally taken part in 
the Guardi a de Honor upri si ng whi ch had dri ven the 1 ast 
vestiges of ubiquismo from power. The PR's appeal to the 
memory of the 1944 'revolution' undoubtedly struck a 
popular chord. 6 
It was precisely this appeal which set the military and 
the right on edge. Whilst the agreement signed between the 
elected candidates of the PR and the military high command 
was pri mari 1 y a guarantee of mi 1 i tary autonomy and an 
assu rance that there wou 1 d be no accommodat i on wi th the 
guerrillas, it also reflected deeper concerns associated 
with a possible resurgence of the 'revolutionary' current 
so decisively suppressed by the liberacion in 1954. The 
consensus reached by the 1 eft in favour of the Mendez 
Montenegro candidacy - and the popular support that this 
implied - raised the spectre of the social mobilisation 
which had accompanied the reforms of 1944-54. 7 Similarly, 
5 
'La IV 
Revolucionario' , 
convencion 
p.25. 
Extraordinaria del Partido 
6 New York Times, 26.6.66; DDRS CIA 003057, 'National 
Intelligence Estimate', 24.6.66. 
7 Paradoxically, it was this image that Mendez 
Montenegro played upon when he suggested that it might not 
be possible to control his supporters if the election 
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powerfu 1 sectors in the economi c eli te cont i nued to be 
profoundly suspicious of the PR and its candidate and the 
prospect of socio-economic reform. In particular, the 
agro-export sector - claiming to represent 70 per cent of 
the working population - set out its pre-electoral demands 
and warned of the deleterious effects in terms of 
'political 
accompanied 
agitation and explosions' which 
attempts at agrarian reform. S This 
pagado elicited public assurances from all 
always 
campo 
three 
presidential candidates, and there are indications that 
Mendez Montenegro went to further lengths to reassure these 
groups before his inauguration, a 'meeting of minds' 
encouraged by the US State Department. 9 
There is little evidence to support Jim Handy's claim 
that the 'new domest i c manufacturi ng bourgeoi si e' backed 
the Mendez Montenegro candidacy.10 While this sector has 
occasionally allied itself with reformist projects in 
Central America - most notably during the Honduran military 
experiment between 1972 and 1978 - in Guatemala elements of 
local manufacturing capital had been incorporated into the 
governing coalition under Peralta Azurdia and were more 
results were not properly recognised: New York Times, 
6.3.66, 9.3.66. 
S 
'La Iniciativa Privada Agropecuaria Se Dirige al 
Pueblo y Gobierno de Guatemala', El Imparcial, 4.2.66. 
While coffee remained the dominant export, the agro-export 
sector had undergone considerable diversification since the 
1950s and now inc 1 uded cotton, sugar and to a 1 esser 
degree, beef: Bulmer-Thomas, The Political Economy of 
Central America, pp.156-60. 
9 El Imparcial, 28.2.66; Prensa Libre, 5.3.66, 
24.3.66; DDRS DOS 003157, Rusk to Mein, Outgoing Telegram 
390, 14.2.66; DDRS DOS 003256, Ambassador Me;n to Secretary 
of State, Incom;ng Telegram 702. 18.3.66; DDRS DOS 003257. 
Ambassador Me;n to Secretary of State, Incoming Telegram 
808, 22.4.66. 
10 Handy, Gi ft of tt:L~LJ)eyfl, p. 192. 
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1 i kel y to have supported the PID than the PR." Despite 
growing industrialisation promoted by the CACM, the 
development of a modernising 'national bourgeoisie' was 
impeded both by the close links maintained between 
traditional agro-export interests and local manufacturing, 
and strong 
capi tal .12 
ties between the 1 atter and 
Mendez Montenegro's base 
North Ameri can 
of support lay 
primarily in an expanding urban middle class deprived of 
any other channel of democratic representation, and sectors 
of the campesinado and the organised working class hoping 
to recoup the gains of the reformist decade. 
While Guatemala had experienced rapid growth since the 
1950s, wi th an average increase in GDP of 4.4 per cent 
between 1950-52 and 1964-66, its effects were highly 
uneven. 13 The 1964 figure of $369 GDP per capita (1970 
prices) did not reflect the reality for the bulk of the 
population, whose share of wages as a percentage of 
nat i ona 1 income dec 1 i ned between 1960 and 1971. 14 Th is 
deterioration was particularly acute in the rural Guatemala 
where 66 per cent of the country's inhabitants still lived 
and worked. The regressi ve pattern of 1 and tenure had 
hardly improved since 1950, while non-traditional exports 
and especially cattle raising were placing new pressure on 
subsistence land hitherto considered unsuitable for 
agricultural purposes. Accordi ng to the 1964 agrari an 
11 For an analysis of the contradictions within the 
manufactoring sector and between it and the traditional 
bourgeoisie see Poitevin, El Proceso de Industrialisaci6n 
en Guatema 1 a, pp. 185-225. On the mi 1 i tary reformi sm in 
Honduras see Rachel Sieder, 'Honduras: The Politics of 
Exception and Military Reformism (1972-78)', Journal of 
Latin American Studies, 27 (February 1995), esp. pp.109-12. 
12 Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus, pp.462-6; Jonas, 
Battle for Guatemala, pp.89-90. 
13 
14 
America, 
Handy, Gift of the Devil, p.192. 
B u 1 mer - Thorn as, .:...-P..::o~l_i=-t~i ..::c~a=-l:..---=E:..:::c~o:..:n~o~m:...r:y __ o=--:...f __ C=-=e..:..:n,-"t:....:r--=a=--:...l 
pp.196, 312, Table A-3. 
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census, 2.1 per cent of agricultural units controlled 62.6 
per cent of farml and whi 1 e 87.4 per cent of farms had 
access to just 18.6 per cent of cultivable land. 15 
Officially calculated at 63 per cent in 1964 (for the 
national population aged over seven years), the illiteracy 
rate reached 90.7 per cent in some departments of the 
cent ra 1 and western high 1 ands . 16 
By early 1966, the PR and its candidate were seen by US 
officials as offering the best possibility for 'a program 
of moderate reform within [a] democratic framework which 
Guatema 1 a so desperate 1 y needs' under the A 11 i ance for 
Progress. 17 The expulsion of 'most of [the PR's] extremist 
elements, some of whom were Communists', and its move 
'toward the political centre of Guatemalan politics', had 
made the party politically acceptable to Washington 
although Ambassador Mein continued to express doubts about 
some PR element sand ' spec i all y rega rd i ng some PR 
congressional candidates,.18 Central to this State 
Department strategy was the increasing guerrilla activity 
and the recognition that concessions to reform needed to be 
made in order to stall the radicalisation of the 'moderate 
1 eft' . I t was a 1 so hoped that the Mendez Montenegro 
government would be less prone to the 'petulant 
nationalism' shown by Peralta Azurdia's administration 
towards certai n US counteri nsurgency and soci o-economi c 
15 Mario Solorzano Martinez, Guatemala. Autoritarismo 
y Democracia (San Jose, 1987), p.149. 
16 Vinicio J. Aguilar, 'La Educacion', 
Re~o de Desarrollo, p.334, Table 2. 
17 Ibid. 
in Amaro, El 
18 DDRS CIA 003057, National Intelligence Estimate, 
24.6.66; DDRS DOS 003252, Mei n for Sayre and Burrows, 
Incoming Telegram 594, 24.2.66; see also Ambassador Sparks' 
similar comments, DDRS DOS R-496, Telegram 163, 26.10.57, 
made in respect of the PR almost a decade earlier. 
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development i ni t i at i ves: 19 
[Mendez Montenegro] expects govt to devote major 
ef for t to co n st r uc t ion new road s , 
electrification, and agricultural reform with 
emphasis on cooperatives. He expects seek 
foreign financial assistance ... Major objectives 
his govt will be strengthening democratic forces 
and social and economic development of country. 
He will not permit communist infiltration of govt 
and wi 11 devote maj or effort to eli mi nat i on of 
conditions which ~ive communists a platform ... for 
their operations. 0 
Taxation and the Limits of Reform 
propuse una 
suscit6 una 
Los grupos 
impulsado por el propio Presidente, 
reforma tributaria; pero entonces se 
tempestad que el prefirio no encarar. 
pudientes y la prensa a su servicio 
veneno. Se me acus6 de ser un 
embozado. Se me amenaz6 de muerte. 
que..el gobi erno caeri a ... 21 
rezumaron 
comunista 
Se asegur6 
Outlining its minimum plan of government, the new 
administration emphasised its commitment to education, 
social security and infrastructural improvements, together 
with agrarian reform and protection of labour rights. 22 
Particular attention was to be given to rural Guatemala and 
to the campesinos who remained 'virtually abandoned' .23 
Whilst modest in their detail, the proposals appeared to 
19 
Poverty' , 
DDRS CIA 003062, 'Guatemala: The 
Intelligence Memorandum, May 1968. 
Problem of 
20 DDRS DOS 003257, Ambassador Mein to Secretary of 
State, Incoming Telegram 808, 22.4.66. 
21 Alberto Fuentes Mohr, Secuestro y Prisi6n - dos 
caras de la violencia en Guatemala (San Jose, 1971) p.15. 
22 El Imparcial, 2.7.66, 4.7.66, 8.7.66. 
23 Ju 1 i 0 Cesar Mendez Montenegro, press conference, El 
Imparcial, 2.7.66. 
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confirm the reformist credentials of the new government and 
gave weight to the popular belief that the PR was indeed 
'the heir to the popular October Revolution of 1944 ... and 
its still unrealised goals,.24 At the same time, Mendez 
Montenegro pointed to financial and economic constraints 
together with the question of internal security as the most 
serious challenges facing the new administration. 25 
Mendez Montenegro had already expressed his concerns to 
Ambassador Mei n before tak i ng offi ce regardi ng the poor 
state of the government's coffers and his hopes for foreign 
assistance to finance his development programme. 26 While 
the Guatema 1 an economy had grown at around 8 per cent 
annually between 1963 and 1965 and the agro-export sector 
was booming, the balance of payments deficit had been 
gradually increasing since 1960 and began to lurch upwards 
in 1966. 27 At 31 December 1965 the total public debt stood 
at Q136,800,000 (1 Quetzal = 1 US Dollar).28 The fiscal 
deficit had increased since the formation of the Central 
American Common Market (CACM) in 1960. 29 In common with 
other Central American republics, Guatemala was 
disproportionately dependent on import duties for public 
24 New York Times, 26.6.66; DDRS CIA 003057, 'National 
Intelligence Estimate', 24.6.66. 
25 Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro, inaugural address, 
Ell mpa rc i a 1, 1. 7 . 66. 
26 DDRS DOS 0003257, Mei n 
Incoming Telegram 808, 22.4.66. 
to Secretary of State, 
27 DDRS CIA 003061, Intelligence Memorandum, 8.10.66 
emphasises the exceptional harvest experienced in 1966: see 
a 1 so Bu 1 mer-Thomas, Po 1 it i ca 1 Economy of Cent ra 1 Amer i ca. 
pp.17S-6; Prensa Libre, 27.6.66, El Grafico, 19.6.66, cited 
in ASIES, Mas de 100 Anos, p.317. 
28 Impacto, 20.5.66, cited in ASIES, Ma~~O~~nos. 
p.317. 
29 The General Treaty of Central American Integration 
was signed by all the republics except for Costa Rica in 
December 1960: Bulmer-Thomas. Political Economy. p.174. 
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revenue.
30 Duty exemptions on almost all intra-regional 
trade, together with the skewed application of duties on 
extra-regional imports and generous incentives for new 
industries, threatened serious revenue shortfalls. 31 
Guatemala's tax system was particularly regressive. While 
tax revenue in Guatemala in 1964 remained the lowest in 
Central America at 7.1 per cent of GNP, direct taxes 
accounted for 10.8 per cent of this total, again the lowest 
in the region. 32 
Following the inauguration of the new government, Finance 
Minister Alberto Fuentes Mohr underlined the extent of the 
fiscal crisis and promised a policy of 'absolute austerity' 
in the management of pub 1 i c funds. 33 As a fi rst step in 
this direction he reaffirmed his prohibition on the 
purchase of any new cars for government officials. 34 Such 
displays of administrative thrift were inevitably more 
popular than other measures aimed at raising tax revenue. 
30 Ibid., p.181. 
31 Ibid., pp.180-85. Between 1960 and 1976 Guatemala 
forewent Q217 million in taxes from industries protected 
under a series of industrial promotion laws: SEGEPLAN, El 
Sector Industrial de Guatemala 1960-76, p.94, cited in 
ASIES, Mas de 100 Anos, p.324. 
32 Jonas, Plan Piloto, p.288, citing ROCAP Memorandum, 
'Comparative Revenue Performances of the Central American 
Countries, 5.2.65, p.6,13. These figures fell still 
further in relation to GNP between 1965 and 1967: ASIES. 
Mas de 100 Anos. p.325. citing Rosenthal. La Asistencia 
Fi nanci_era Externa Como Instrumento de Programaci 6n: 
E~riencia Reciente de Guatemala (Santiago de Chile. 1967) 
p.6. 
33 The mi ni ster stated that cl ai ms by the outgoi ng 
government that Q40 million remained in the treasury were 
misleading since all but Q160.752.45 of this amount had 
already been allocated: El Imparcial. 4.7.66. 
34 This declaration elicited an immediate response 
from the new Secretary of I nformat i on. Doctor Chavarri a 
Flores who protested that the vehicle pertaining to his 
office' had been abducted by the FAR, along with the 
previous postholder. Baltasar Morales de la Cruz: Ibid. 
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While these included undertakings to improve the collection 
and administration of existing taxes, a central bone of 
contention became the attempts by the government to reform 
the tax system itself. This was argued to be necessary not 
only to counter the dependence on 'international commerce', 
but also to bring 'an element of fiscal justice to the 
system' .35 Another key consideration was the capacity of 
the government to provi de counterpart funds in order to 
qualify for Alliance for Progress development aid for 
pub 1 i c investment. 36 While the contraction of foreign 
loans was criticised by both the left and the right, the 
ability of the government to draw on these continued to be 
restricted by its failure to raise the necessary matching 
funds: 37 
El tercer gobierno revolucionario esta firmamente 
empenado en la realizaci6n de un vasto programa 
de inversiones publicas, pero es necesario contar 
con el financiamiento del exterior, que no seria 
posible obtener, si Guatemala no dispone de los 
recursos minimos, resultantes de la reforma 
tributaria que se estudia en el congreso de la 
republica. Cad a quetzal de Guatemala se 
35 Informe del Presidente Constitucional de Guatemala 
al Honorable Congreso de 10 de Julio de 1966 al 15 de Junio 
de 1967 (Guatemala, 1967) p.154. 
36 Jonas, Plan Piloto, p.288: see also LaFeber, 
Inevitable Revolutions, p.150. The government's access to 
loans was improved by its sett 1 ement of the 'sterl i ng 
debt', incurred in the 1820s. The debt had continued to be 
a point of conflict with the British Government which had 
blocked a series of multilateral loans to Guatemala, 
including those negotiated with the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. The Guatemalan left 
condemned the sett 1 ement: Bauer Pa i z, 'The "Thi rd 
Government of the Revolution" and Imperialism in 
Guatemala', Science and Society, pp.146-165; DDRS CIA 
003062, Intelligence Memorandum, May 1968; Oscar Casteneda 
Fernandez, interview, Guatemala City, 14.3.94. 
37 DDRS CIA 003062, I nte 11 i gence Memorandum, 
Alfonso Bauer Pa i z, 'The "Thi rd Government 
Revolution" pp.153-154, 158-165; Marroquin Rojas, 
22.3.67, 1.4.67, 2.8.67; Fuentes Mohr, 'Los 
Externos no Hipotecar al Pais', La Hora, 29.3.67. 
May 1968; 
of the 
La Hora, 
Creditos 
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tradu~ira e~ un~ inv~rsi6n de tres quetzales con 
la aSlstencla flnanclera del exterior ... 38 
Together with agrarian reform, the question of taxation 
in Guatemala has traditionally been one of great political 
sensitivity. Although it is generally given less 
prominence in the literature, moves by the Arbenz 
government to legislate the country's first income tax at 
the end of 1953 had provoked fi erce protests. 39 The 
Ydigoras Fuentes regime had also faced staunch opposition 
to its attempts to pass income tax legislation, its 
eventual success coinciding suggestively with the Air Force 
rebell ion in November 1962. 40 On 14 October 1966 the PR 
presented a draft tax reform bill to Congress. The fi rst 
in a series of annual confrontations on the issue - from 
which the administration invariably withdrew - the measures 
aimed to augment government revenue by 010 mi 11 ion. 41 
Covering a variety of taxes including those on income, 
inheritance, air travel, vehicles and salt production, the 
main element in this reform package was a proposed increase 
in property taxes. 42 The progressi ve character of the 
38 Government communique, Prensa Libre, 12.11.66. 
39 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, pp.169-70: Congress had 
approved the draft bill in the first of three readings on 
28 May 1954 and was on the way to passing the income tax in 
June when events intervened. 
40 Prensa Libre, 11.1.68, claimed that prominent 
members of the PR government had opposed this legislation. 
The Peralta Azurdia regime initially made a series of 
changes to the Income Tax Law before replacing it entirely. 
41 Prensa Libre, 15.10.66; New York Times, 14.11.66. 
In his 1967 address to Congress, Mendez Montenegro stated 
that the amount raised would have been around 015 million: 
Informe del Presidente ... del 10 de Julio de 1966 al 15 de 
Junio de 1967, p.154. 
42 The flat rate of property tax was to be abolished 
and replaced by progressively increasing rates ranging from 
3 per 1000 to 2 per cent according to property value bands. 
Thus, for example, taxes on a farm valued at 0100,000 would 
increase from 0300 to 01,415: Prensa Libre, 15.10.66, 
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latter involved sharp increases for larger property owners 
and became the immediate focus of elite opposition. 43 
While the government defended the measures in terms of the 
dual need to guarantee public security and raise loans for 
socio-economic development projects, the indignant clamour 
against the tax increases recalled the protests against the 
1947 Labour Code: 44 
Estamos viviendo los dias aquellos, previos al 
primero de mayo de 1947, durante los cuales el 
codigo de trabajo fue objeto de la mas grande 
cri t i ca ... En estos momentos ... se repi te 1 a 
historia; la misma critica, los mismos gritos y 
las mismas injurias se confabulan para detener la 
aprobacion de la ley de reforma tributaria, en 
i gua 1 forma que ayer se ama 1 gamaron 
desesperadamente para detener la marcha del 
codi go de trabajo y el regi men de seguri dad 
social ... son los mismos grupos, los mismos 
sectores, para qui enes el tercer gobi erno 
revolucionario constituye un valladar a su facil 
y creci ente enri queci mi ento. 45 
17.10.66; Goulden, 'Guatemala: 
unpublished manuscript for The 
(Guatemala City, November 1966), 
14. 11 . 66. 
A Democracy Falters', 
Alicia Patterson Fund 
p.22; New York Times, 
43 New York Times, 14.11.66; Isidoro Zarco, 
'Tergiversacion de los postulados de la Carta de Punta del 
Este', Prensa L i bre, 3.11.66, and 'La Ri posta de 1 Doctor 
Fuentes Mohr', ibid., 8.11.66; 'Camara de Industria de 
Guatemala', ibid., 7.11.66; 'CACIF - La Iniciativa Privada 
no esta en contra de una reforma tributaria', ibid., 
8.11.66; Asociacion Nacional de Constructores de Viviendas, 
i bid., 1 2 . 11 . 66 ; i bid., 10. 11 . 66, 11. 11 . 66, 3. 12. 66. 
44 Prensa Libre, 15.10.66, 18.10.66; 
interview. El Grafico, 23.10.66-25.10.66. 
Fuentes Moh r , 
45 Letter from Felix Loarca Guzman, 'Delegacion de la 
Secretaria de Relaciones Publicas de la Presidencia de la 
Republica en el Ministerio de Hacienda' to Isidoro Zarco, 
Prensa~Ll2re. 4.11.66. In August, opposition from CACIF 
and the press to a 'private member's bill' to reform the 
Labour Code achieved its 'temporary' withdrawal: ibid., 
17.8.66, 18.8.66, 26.8.66: see below. 
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Together with the amnesty for political crimes declared 
on 26 June and the announcement of ali mi ted agrari an 
reform programme, the attempts to reform the tax system 
provided the right with another opportunity to present the 
Mendez Montenegro government as infiltrated by 
commun i sts. 46 CACI F i mmedi ate 1 y condemned the reforms as 
misconceived. The pr i vate sector was not aga i nst tax 
reform per se it claimed: what was needed was 'a proper 
national reality' .47 The tax reform ... based on 
construction industry complained that one hundred large-
scale building projects had been halted in the uncertainty 
caused by the government proposals, and journalist Isidoro 
Zarco reported associated problems in the agricultural 
property market. 48 Joi ni ng the fray, Vi ce-Presi dent 
Marroquin Rojas condemned taxes whose only purpose was to 
mai ntai n 'a caste of bureaucrats' and pay interest on 
unnecessary foreign 10ans. 49 The strongest criticisms were 
directed against Finance Minister Alberto Fuentes Mohr. SO 
The phantom Comite de Defensa Cuidadana de los Intereses 
Naciona1es published purported extracts from The Communist 
Manifesto alongside the minister's declarations, while 
Zarco went so far as to compare the measures unfavourably 
46 New York Times, 14.11.66. 
47 'CACIF - La Iniciativa Privada no esta en contra de 
una reforma tributaria', Prensa Libre, 8.11.66; Asociaci6n 
Nacional de Constructores de Viviendas, ibid., 12.11.66. 
48 Zarco, Prensa Libre, 9.11.66. 
49 Open letter from Marroquin Rojas (as Acting 
President) to Fuentes Mohr, La Hora, 22.3.67; Prensa Libre, 
1.4.67; Don Canuto Ocana (pseud. Marroquin Rojas), La Hora, 
2.8.67. See also reply by Fuentes Mohr, 'Los Creditos 
Externos no Hipotecan a1 Pais', Prensa Libre, 29.3.67. 
50 Goulden, 'A Democracy Falters', p.2, has suggested 
that by targeting Fuentes Mohr, opponents of the tax reform 
were both avoiding a direct clash with Mendez Montenegro 
and providing him with an escape route. 
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with Arbenz's 'more gentlemanly' Decree 900: 51 
Por 10 menos aqual ... fue un ataque frontal a la 
propiedad privada. En cambio, el que se propone 
el ministro de hacienda, es un golpe bajo, no 
solo contra el capi ~al, si no contra el progreso 
total de la nacion. 5 
Others were more explicit about the consequences for the 
government if Fuentes Mohr was not dismissed from his post: 
Todos los propietarios tiemblan. Ante el 
proyecto del economista Alberto F Mohr. Un 
hombre comunista poniendo en jaque a miles de 
personas de poder financiero y a la vez en 
peligro tambien al Presidente de la Republica que 
se encuentra en la disyuntiva de destituir a Mohr 
o suf~i~ las consecuencias del desastre que esto 
traera. 
The protests did not reach the extremes of 1947 when 
opponents of the Labour Code took to the streets on Sundays 
they di d not need to. 54 Meet i ngs between the 
congressional finance committee and representatives of the 
pri vate sector, and between the latter and Mendez 
Montenegro, quickly set in motion a face-saving exercise 
whereby the draft bill was withdrawn and a 'high-level 
51 Zarco, 'La Ri posta de 1 Doctor Fuentes Mohr', Prensa 
Libre, 8.11.66; 'Comite de Defensa Ciudadana de los 
I ntereses Nac i ona 1 es ' , i bi d . , 5. 11 .66. Government 
propaganda enlisted the support of the 'Asociacion de 
Obreros de Guatemala' rejected as a phantom organisation by 
the right: CACIF, ibid., 14.11.66. 
52 Zarco, 'Tergiversacion de los postulados 
Carta De Punta del Este', Prensa Libre, 3.11.66. 
de la 
53 Prensa Libre, 18.11.66. One of a series of campos 
pagados on this subject signed by Alfonso Alejos - 'un 
fi nquero' . Fo 11 owi ng hi s '5i Yo Fuera Presi dente de 1 a 
Republica' on 22.11.66, Interior Minister Mansilla Pinto 
requested him to refrain from further public comment on the 
matter: ibid., 19.11.66,21.11.66,22.11.66,23.11.66. 
54 Galich, Por Que Lucha Guatemala, p.133; Villagran 
Kramer, Biografia Politica, pp.57-8. 
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mixed committee' established to consider an 'integral' tax 
reform. 55 In its place, an interim package was agreed for 
one year and was expected to ra i se around 08 mi 11 ion 
towards the 1967 budget. 56 It is notable that 
Congressional Decree 1627 in fact increased several taxes -
i ncl udi ng those on income and property al though the 
increases were spread more wi del y and affected the very 
wealthy far less sharply than had the previous proposals. 57 
Aguilera Peralta and De Leon Schlotter have both 
commented on the ease with which the PR leadership gave way 
to the economic elites on the issue of reform. 58 While the 
po 1 it i ca 1 space for soc i o-economi c reforms was 1 i mi ted, 
critics argue that the government could have used its room 
for manoeuvre more effectively than it did. 59 However, 
this particular struggle over taxation must be set against 
the wider background of a serious campaign to destabilise 
55 Prensa L i bre, 12.11.66, 14.11.66, 18.11.66; New 
York Times, 13.11.66. Consisting of representatives from 
the Congress, the Execut i ve and the pri vate sector, the 
committee's 6-month mandate was extended on several 
occasions. In December 1968 a new committee was 
estab 1 i shed to undertake yet another study, th is time on 
the collection, control and administration of taxes: Prensa 
Libre, 30.6.67,11.7.67,9.1.68,19.12.68. 
56 Instead of the 015 million the original proposals 
were supposed to have raised: Informe del Presidente ... del 
10 de Julio de 1966 al 15 de Junio de 1967, p.154; 
Congressional Decree 1627 'Impuestos para el Ario 1967', 
30.11.66, Recopilacion de Leyes, Vol.86, p.35. 
57 In terms of property tax this meant that a $100,000 
finca would now pay $600 per annum, instead of the 
projected $1,415: Goulden, 'A Democracy Falters', p.24; 
Pren sa Lib re, 25. 11 .66, 1. 12. 66. 
58 Both were active in the DCG at the time: Gabriel 
Aguilera Peralta, interview, Guatemala City, 16.11.93; Rene 
de Leon Schlotter, interview, Guatemala City, 8.2.94; see 
also Agui lera Peralta et al, Dialectica del Terror en 
Guatemala, pp.95-6. 
59 De Leon Schlotter. interview, Guatemala City, 
8.2.94. 
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the government. What limited political will there had been 
on the issue rapidly evaporated with the campaign against 
the measures. In addition to a right-wing bombing campaign 
in Guatemala City - against which the 3 November State of 
Siege was at least in part directed - troops began to move 
towards the capital from the interior on the weekend of 12-
13 November 1966. 60 Coinciding with the uproar over 
taxation and coordinated by Colonel Callejas Soto and the 
commander of the Quezaltenango military base in conjunction 
with extreme right-wing elements, the plot apparently 
foundered on lack of unified military support. 61 
Having weathered a coup attempt, the government climbdown 
on taxation nevertheless set the scene for subsequent 
confrontations on the issue. A year 1 ater, in December 
1967, a similarly negative response on the part of most of 
the pri vate sector62 and the press followed congressi onal 
approval of a two-tier tax on goods and services as part of 
the budget for 1968. 63 I n force from 1 January 1968, the 
60 Several hi gh-ranki ng members of the MLN - i ncl udi ng 
Manuel Villacorta Vielmann and the brother of Mario 
Sandoval Alarcon - were subsequently arrested in connection 
with terrorist offences. Most were released a month later 
after discussions between Sandoval Alarcon and Mendez 
Montenegro: Mario Sandoval Alarcon, interview, Guatemala 
City, 31.8.94; New York Times, 4.11.66; Prensa Libre, 
4. 11 . 66, 2. 12 . 66 . 
61 Ca 11 ej as Soto was arrested and ex i 1 ed together wi th 
Base Commander Co lone 1 Fe 1 i x Est rada and other unnamed 
officers: Prensa Libre, 14.11.66; New York Times, 13.11.66, 
15.1.67; Goulden, 'A Democracy Falters', p.18; DDRS CIA 
003061, Intelligence Memorandum, 8.10.66; Gramajo Morales, 
De la Guerra, p.244. 
62 While Fuentes Mohr claimed the support of most 
members of the Chamber of Commerce and part of the Chamber 
of Industry for the new tax, CACIF was quick to disavow 
these dissenters: Prensa Libre, 15.12.67; New York Times, 
18.12.67. 
63 Congress i ona 1 Decree 1729, 'Presupuesto de I ngresos 
y Egresos del Estado ... " Recopilacion de Leyes, 13.12.67, 
Vol.87, p.47. A flat rate five per cent tax was imposed on 
a 11 goods and serv; ces, exc 1 ud i ng export s and spec i f i ed 
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new taxes caused confusion and then chaos as some 
businesses used the opportunity for commercial speculation, 
and it was widely suspected that such actions were part of 
a strategy by the opposition to undermine the measures. 64 
The Guatemalan press remained restrained in its reporting 
of the extent of the popul ar protests agai nst the pri ce 
rises, although Prensa Libre reported 'rumours' that a 
group of people had tried to demonstrate against the new 
taxes. 65 Right-wing resistance was epitomised in a renewed 
press campai gn agai nst the government by its dedi cated 
critic Alfonso Alejos. Recalling the weekly protests 
outside the National Palace 'al sistema minuto de silencia' 
following the assassination of Colonel Francisco Arana in 
1949, he threatened similar demonstrations in Sixth Avenue 
- the central commercial street in the capital - together 
wi th bi cycl es 'ri di ng up and down' and stri kes if Mendez 
Montenegro did not act. 66 At the same time bus company 
owners in the capital went ahead with a long sought after 
price rise and doubled fares from five to 10 centavos, a 
move which reportedly resulted in several buses being 
articles and services deemed of basic need and goods 
subject to the new 20 per cent luxury sales tax. Stamp tax 
was reduced from 1.5 per cent to one per cent: Prensa 
Libre, 14.12.67, 27.12.67. 
64 Mendez Montenegro issued a presidential acuerdo on 
4 January 1968, introducing fine of between 05 and 0500 and 
the prospect of cancellation of business licences for those 
raising prices on articles of basic need: Prensa Libre, 
4 . 1 . 68, 5. 1 . 68, 6. 1 . 68 . 
65 Judicial Police Chief Stuardo Garcia Gomez insisted 
that any illegal demonstration would be broken up by the 
security forces - a position supported by Interior Minister 
Mansilla Pinto: Prensa Libre, 5.1.68; New York Times, 
22.1.68. 
66 The threats were classified as subversive by the 
Interior Minister. Alfonso Alejos was assassinated less 
than a fortnight later: Prensa Libre. 5.1.68. 18.1.68. 
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attacked. 67 
At thi s stage the loss of publ i corder in the capi tal 
would almost certainly have prompted military intervention. 
While the counterinsurgency campaign had been largely 
successful in driving the guerrillas from their rural 
stronghold in the north-eastern sierra by the end of 1967, 
the FAR was beginning to focus its actions on urban centres 
instead. In addition, there were reports that the bus 
attacks had been fomented by 'Communist underground 
groups' .68 Barely a week after their introduction the new 
taxes were suspended by the Executive pending further 
consideration and the Judical Police Chief warned of the 
'drastic sanctions' awaiting those who raised the price of 
goods in their establishments. 69 Two days later Congress 
restored the stamp tax to 1.5 per cent and extended the 
provisions made for taxation under Congressional Decree 
1627 for a further year. 70 The issue momentarily split the 
PR leadership wi th Presi dent of Congress Prem Betata 
calling from his sickbed for Fuentes Mohr's interpelacion 
before Congress. 71 Party discipline apparently forced the 
67 New York Times, 22.1.68. This issue came to a head 
once more in April 1969 when Guatemala City bus companies 
stopped services in response to the continuing municipal 
refusal to permit a fare rise from five to 10 centavos. On 
the seventh day of the paro patronal and ami dst growi ng 
unrest, the municipality took over the bus companies. A 
subsequent agreement retained fares at 5 centavos while the 
bus companies received further concessions on import 
duties: ASIES, Mas de 100 Anos, pp.342-345. 
68 
69 
70 
Leyes, 
New York Times, 22.1.68. 
Prensa Libre, 6.1.68. 
Decreto del Congreso 1731,8.1.68, Recopilacion de 
Vol.87, p.54. 
71 The President of Congress - who had been injured 
when the private plane he was piloting crashed - had been 
a co-signatory to an electoral manifesto for the Central 
District planilla of PR deputies, promising not to approve 
any increase in taxes: La Hora, 4.3.66. 
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former to withdraw his list of questions prepared for the 
occasion and the finance minister survived this particular 
challenge without a vote of no-confidence from the 
legislature. 72 His reprieve was shortlived. Long the 
target of the right, a cabinet reshuffle on 1 March 
repl aced Fuentes Mohr wi th ex-presi dent of congress, PR 
veteran Mari 0 Fuentes Pi erucci ni .73 
The full impact of government's second major retreat on 
the tax question was felt with the announcement that the 
current budget was bei ng sl ashed by some 020 mi 11 i on of 
wh i ch more 
invest ment. 74 
than 
As 
half represented cuts i n public 
a result, the planned social security 
programme to provide general sickness cover was to be 
delayed for a year,75 while the budget for the Instituto 
Naci onal de Transformaci on Agrari a (INTA) was more than 
hal ved to 0500,000. 76 The remai ni ng amount represented 
72 PID and MLN members complained that during the 
i nterpelacion, the publ ic gallery was fi lled exclusively 
with PR supporters who waved placards in support of Fuentes 
Mohr and shouted down opposition deputies trying to 
question the Finance Minister: Prensa Libre, 6.1.68, 
8. 1 . 68, 9. 1 . 68, 10. 1 . 68, 12. 1 . 68 . 
73 Mendez Montenegro has declined to comment on the 
significance of this event, except to maintain that such 
changes in government are norma 1 and to poi nt out that 
Fuentes Mohr was later appointed foreign minister: Mendez 
Montenegro, written reply, Guatemala City, 31.1.94, and 
interview, Guatemala City, 18.11.94; see also Fuentes Mohr, 
Secuestro y Prision, p.15. 
74 Prensa Libre, 24.1.68. 
75 The programa de enfermedad comun was eventually 
inaugurated in October 1968: Mendez Montenegro, Informe al 
Honorable Congreso de la Republica, 15.6.69. There was an 
increase in social security provision throughout the 
Central American region during the 1960s and 27 per cent of 
the labour force in Guatemala were covered by the end of 
the decade. Bulmer-Thomas, Political Economy, p.198. 
76 
24.1.68, 
were the 
Instituto 
I twas 1 ater part i all y rei nstated: Prensa L i bre, 
1.2.68. Other parastatal organisations affected 
Instituto Nacional de Vivienda (INVI), the 
Nacional de Electrificacion (INDE) and the 
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reductions in the salaries of public employees - five per 
cent for those earning between Q300 and QSOO per year and 
10 per cent for those earning over QSOO. 77 In the light of 
advice emanating from the extreme right-wing organisation 
MANO, it is unsurprising that most congressmen interviewed 
by Prensa Libre some days earlier had stated they would not 
oppose a reduct ion in thei r earni ngs. 78 Argui ng that 
Guatemala was a poor country and that Guatemalans must live 
accordingly, MANO had suggested that deputies balance the 
budget by reducing 'useless expenditure', including their 
own salaries and those of the Executive: 
De no proceder como indica se les tratara como 
traidores a la patria y recibiran 10 que han 
recibido los comunistas y los picaros, pues para 
el pueblo es preferible pagar una pension f una 
viuda que tener que mantener a un traidor. 7 
The failure of this latest attempt to raise government 
revenue appeared to signal the end of any serious reformist 
initiative, as those counselling political prudence won out 
over partisans of socio-economic reform. 80 The right had 
retained their political leverage in a continued game of 
'coup poker' which undermined the democratic transition and 
further entrenched the military as the principal political 
Instituto de Fomento y Desarrollo del Peten (FYDEP). 
77 Ibid. 
78 Prensa L i bre, 20.1 .68. The Movi mi ento 
Anticomunista Nacional Organizado (MANO or Mano Blanca) was 
the first of several right-wing terrorist organisations to 
appear following Mendez Montenegro's inauguration: see 
Chapter Six for further discussion. 
79 MANO advice to congressmen, Prensa Libre, 9.1.68. 
80 A cartoon in Prensa Libre 6.1.68, following the 
withdrawal of the sales tax depicted the stark choice 
facing the government. Featuring a funeral procession and 
a coffin labelled 'impuestos', an Indian man remarks to his 
neighbour, 'Comadre, better this funeral than that of the 
government ... ' 
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arbiter in Guatemalan politics. From now on, the principal 
objective for the Mendez Montenegro government was to reach 
its end of term constitutionally intact. 
United States officials had apparently reached the same 
conclusion, and Jonas has emphasised the lack of concerted 
pressure from the United States to force through changes in 
taxation. 81 According to Jonas and Tobis, such a scenario 
had been debated and rejected by State Department and USAID 
officials. 82 The question of whether to tie a 'program 
loan,83 to Guatema 1 a to effect i ve tax reform had been 
postponed indefinitely, after advice from 'more pragmatic 
US officials' i ncl udi ng Ambassador Mei n that such 
pressure risked bringing down the Mendez Montenegro 
government. 84 Instead, US aid resources went towards 
improving and restructuring the administration and 
collection of taxes and in particular to the establishment 
of a systematic property survey aimed at eliminating 
property tax evas ion. 85 
81 In contrast to Bauer Paiz, who maintained that 'US 
advisers have been very insistent on promoting the issue of 
fiscal reform' since Mendez Montenegro's accession: Bauer 
Paiz, 'The "Third Government of the Revolution", p.161; 
Jonas Bodenheimer, Plan Piloto, pp.292-3; Jonas and Tobis. 
Guatemala, p.106. 
82 Ibid. 
83 A large multi-purpose loan for general commodity 
imports from the United States, based on negotiated 
agreements with the recipient country on specific fiscal 
and other policies, which are then closely monitored by 
U5AID: Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid.; Prensa Libre, 11.2.69. 
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Agrarian Reform: Rhetoric and Reality 
Al anunciar su decision de entregar en propiedad 
las fincas nacionales y las de los bancos 
estatales a los trabajadores del campo que los 
han 1aborado y habitado, e1 gobierno 
constitucional da un primer paso decisivo, dentro 
del marco de la constitucion en materia de 
reforma agrari a ... 86 
... 1a 11amada Reforma Agraria, del reparto de las 
Fincas Naciona1es; solucion que no es ni la 
acertada ni 1a definitiva, del problema agrario 
en nuestro pais. Sin embargo, a1rededor de est a 
medida Reformista, se ha hecho todo una campana 
demagogica para demostrar 10 bondadoso del actual 
regimen y dar1e una fa1sa aparencia 
revo1 uci onari a. 87 
Agrarian reform as a principle had been included on the PR 
agenda since the party's inception in 1957. 88 In one sense 
it could be argued that such inclusion was obligatory, 
gi ven its central i ty to the experi ence of the reformi st 
decade and the PR's claims to be the genuine political heir 
to that period. Indeed, the force of the land question in 
Guatemala - brought into sharp focus by Decree 900 in 1952 
was such that subsequent governments were unable to 
ignore it completely. While the Castillo Armas regime 
proceeded to 
practice, 
continued 
land 
to 
dismantle Arbenz's agrarian reform i n 
legislation enacted under this 
pay 1 i p servi ce to the idea of 
government 
reform. 89 
86 Government bulletin, Prensa Libre, 5.B.66. 
87 Turcios Lima, 'Nuestras Tareas Fundamenta1es en 1a 
Actual Situacion Po1itica y Nuestra Preparacion para su 
Inminente Cambio Futuro', INDAL, Movimientos 
Revo1ucionarios en Latino America, p.96. 
88 'Acta Notarial de Fundaci6n del Partido, Testimonio 
de Juridicidad', reproduced in Carti11a del Segundo 
Congreso de 1a Juventud Revo1ucionaria, p.1? 
89 For example, the 'fundamental principles' of Decree 
31 recognised the right of each Guatemalan to the land 
necessary to ensure his own and his family's subsistence 
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Similarly, in October 1962, Ydigoras Fuentes declared that 
his new Ley de Transformaci6n Agraria was the anti-
communist and Christian answer to Decree 900. 90 
Both the 1956 and the 1965 constitutions theoretically 
allowed for the expropriation of idle lands for the 
purposes of redistribution. Both also permitted private 
property to be expropriated for the collective good - duly 
proven and wi th appropri ate compensat ion. 
however, expropriation was politically 
In practice, 
impossible. 
Taxation of idle lands remained the preferred and largely 
ineffective alternative for freeing-up land for 
redistribution, together with colonisation and the 
resettlement of government lands. 91 Achievements in terms 
of numbers of beneficiaries and area of land distributed 
were dismal by comparison to those of the Arbenz era. 92 
and promised a colonisation programme to achieve this. The 
Agrarian Statute (Congressional Decree 559) of February 
1956 committed the government to distribute public and 
private lands, emphasising a tax on idle lands rather than 
expropiation: Whetten, Guatemala, pp.166-173; Melville and 
Melville, Another Vietnam, pp.115-140. 
90 Its sudden passage - after three years of heated 
debate was said to be linked to the desire for Alliance for 
Progress funds: El Imparcial, 29.9.62, 17.10.62, cited in 
Melville and Melville, Another Vietnam, p.148; 
Congressional Decree 1551, 'Ley de Transformaci6n Agraria', 
11.10.62, Recopilaci6n de Leyes, Vol.81, p.39. 
91 Whetten, Guatemala, p.167; Melville and Melville, 
~A:.:..:n=o~t~h~e~r=------.:V:...-l!-· e=t~n=a~m, pp. 128-130; Handy, Gi ft of the Devi 1 , 
p.214. 
92 87,569 heads of families received 917,659 acres of 
1 and under the agrari an programme between June 1952 and 
June 1954. 15,475 received 275,877 acres of land between 
2 July 1955 and 27 December 1957 (excluding urban lots): 
Whetten, Guatemala, Tables 24 and 25, p.163, 171. The 
Ydigoras Fuentes regime distributed land to 8,979 heads of 
families (including urban lots and minifundios): Melville, 
Another Vietnam, p.166; see also, Handy, Gift of the Devil, 
p.128; Lehman B. Fletcher, E. Graber, W.C. Merrill and E. 
Thorbecke, Guatema 1 a's Economi c Deve 1 opment: The Ro 1 e of 
Agriculture (Ames, Iowa, 1970) pp.137-139. 
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The PR had never challenged this post-intervention 
tradition. Appealing to the principle of agrarian reform, 
the party had been careful to reiterate its commitment to 
private property, concentrating instead on the question of 
the national fincas for redistribution. 93 Yet, even this 
measure was historically more controversial than it at 
fi rst appears. Acqui red by the Guatema 1 an state under 
Ubico through the expropriation of the German-owned coffee 
farms during the Second World War, the national fincas had 
constituted a considerable proportion of the land 
di stri buted to peasants as part of the 1952 Agrari an 
Reform. 94 According to Whetten and based on figures from 
the Direcci6n General de Asuntos Agrarios (DGAA), more than 
a quarter of the land distributed under Decree 900 belonged 
to national fincas. 95 Following the Castillo Armas 
invasion, Decree 57 of 20 August 1954 returned this land to 
the state and cancelled the legal basis (personaria 
juridica) of the cooperatives. 96 The fate of many of the 
132 national fincas later became a national scandal under 
Ydi goras Fuentes. 97 Desi gnat i ng a dozen for 1 and 
distribution, the government proceeded to return, sell and 
otherwise dispose of 115 state-owned plantations in deals 
93 See for examp 1 e, 'Acta Notar i a 1 de Fundac i 6n de 1 
Partido. Testimonio de Juricidad', in Cartilla del Segundo 
Congreso de la Juventud Revolucionaria, p.17; 'La Ideologia 
del Partido', in ibid., p.22. 
94 
95 
Handy, Gift of the Devil, p.215. 
Whetten, Guatemala, p.163, Table 24. 
96 Melville and Melville, Another Vietnam, pp.119-120, 
allege that the government was trying to recoup the ten to 
15 per cent of revenue that these national plantations had 
represented in 1950. The Departamento de Fomento De 
Cooperat i vas was rei nstated in February, 1956 wi th ~e~ta in 
modifications: Maria Guadalupe Navas Alvarez, El Movlmlento 
Sindical Como Manifestacion de la Lu~b~ d~ ___ Clases 
(Guatemala, 1979) p.107. 
97 Melville and Melville, Anotb~L_Vietnam, p.149. 
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that often smacked of fraud and corruption. 98 
On 4 August 1966, the government announced its plans to 
transfer the national fincas to the mozos-colonos (resident 
workers who rented 1 and in exchange for employment) and 
permanent 1 abourers who worked them. 99 The 1 and wou 1 d be 
distributed in cooperative form in order to retain economic 
unity and avoid losses in production 100 problems INTA 
president Leopoldo 
Decree 900 and 
Sandoval explicitly 
the system of 
associated with 
land-parcelling 
(parcelamiento) which subsequent governments had continued 
to pursue. 101 Further aspects of the new agrarian policy 
were unveiled two weeks later when the Cabinet declared the 
agrari an development of the north-eastern department of 
Izabal to be of 'national urgency,.102 This measure was 
later incorporated into the so-called 'pilot plan' for the 
98 Ibid., pp.149-157. As part of Peralta Azurdia's 
'operacion honestidad', Decree-Law 52, 19.6.63, 
Recopi 1 aci on de Leyes, Vol. 82, p. 62, decl ared to be voi d 
all transactions of state property considered either to 
have been conducted fraudulently or which seriously damaged 
national interests. 
99 Prensa Libre, 5.8.66. Farms owned by state-run 
banks were also to be included. According to the president 
of the Instituto Nacional de Transformacion Agraria (INTA), 
there were 24 nat i ona 1 fi ncas wi th a tota 1 1 and area of 
1,001 cabellerias (1 cabelleria = 109.8 acres). Of these, 
12.5 per cent were under cultivation (coffee, cardamon, 
sugar cane, honey, 1 emon tea and rna i ze), 14.3 per cent 
could be cultivated, and 73 per cent were usable only for 
grazing purposes. 4,666 families (15,000) lived on 
national finca land. Another 12,000 families (50,000 
people) lived on 17 farms belonging to the Banco Nacional 
Agrario, Credito Hipotecario Nacional, and Instituto de 
Fomento de la Produccion: Prensa Libre, 6.8.66. 
100 Prensa L i bre, 5.8.66; Ju 1 i 0 Cesar Mendez 
Montenegro, interview, Guatemala City, 18.11.94. 
101 Leopo 1 do Sandova 1, press conference, 'E 1 Fracaso 
del Agro', Prensa L i bre, 23.8.66. In fact, 1 and had been 
distributed in the form of cooperatives as well as in lots 
under Decree 900. 
102 E 1 !~mparc i a 1, 20.8.66; Prensa L; bre, 20.8.66. 
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socio-economic development of the north-east announced by 
the government in ear 1 y 1967 the' hearts and mi nds ' 
element of the counterinsurgency operations taking place in 
the area. 103 Additional measures of Mendez Montenegro's 
'agrarian reform' included the restructuring of existing 
agrarian parcelamientos and the colonisation of territories 
to the north of Alta Verapaz, Quiche and Huehuetenango - an 
area 1 ater to become infamous 1 y known as the Northern 
Transverse Strip - and the Peten. 
Reports of increased agricultural unrest and a series of 
land invasions followed these pronouncements, and in 
October 1966, INTA announced an 'agrarian explosion' on the 
Pacific coast where it had received some 20,000 requests 
for land. 104 Reminiscent of the alarm accompanying the 
implementation of Decree 900 in 1952, the issue exposed 
divisions within the ranks of the governing party. Earlier 
land invasions in mid-March had been condemned by the PR as 
actions promoted by official agents provocateurs to 
undermine the election results and alienate the right. 10S 
However, Vice-President Marroquin Rojas now named three PR 
deputies as responsible for the 'brotes anarquizantes' 
taking place in the countryside. 106 The stability of the 
PR government, he argued, was being put at risk by its own 
agitators. Such accusations were bound to fan right-wing 
suspicion of the government as were the vice-president's 
warnings regarding the recrudescent ligas campesinas and 
103 Gott, Rural Guerrillas, p.129. 
104 El Imparcial, 10.10.66; Prensa Libre, 27.8.66, 
8.9.66; Melville and Melville, Another Vietnam, pp.220-21. 
105 'En a 1 gunas ofi c i nas pub 1 i cas se esta 11 amando a 
campesinos y se le dice: El PR manda, asi es que ya pueden 
uds comenzar a invadir tierras y expulsar a los 
propi etari os. Esto es para predi sponer al sector 
derechista contra el PR': PR, La Hora, 16.3.66. 
106 The three were deput i es for Santa Rosa, El Tumbador 
and Escuintla: Marroquin Rojas, La Hora, 22.8.66. 
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the political organisation of those who in his view, had 
not yet attained the cultural level to 
independent 1 y: 107 
... hay en el pais muchos de estos revolucionarios 
que han creido que retornaran, en todo vigor, los 
dias de Jacobo Arbenz ... Y ellos deben comprender 
que no ha triunfado una revolucion marxista sino 
un partido revolucionaria moderado ... Si el 
si ndi cal i smo [en el campo] prospera vendra un 
terrible anarquia: no habra cosecha de cafe en 
septiembre y octubre ... Nuestro sindicalismo 
siempre ser~8 una organizacion politica, 
disfrazada ... 
act 
It is probable that the promise of land reform inspired 
some campesinos with an enthusiasm which at times spilled 
over into invasions of privately-owned and cultivated 
property. However, it is a 1 so 1 i ke 1 y that the extent of 
these invasions was exaggerated to undermine the 
government. 109 For many campesi nos there was consi derabl e 
unease concerning the fate of 
established agrarian development 
existing 
zones. 110 
parcel sin 
While the 
Mendez Montenegro regime never entirely abandoned the land 
107 At the same time as warning the PR to keep its 
members in order, Marroqui n Roj as remi nded the fi nqueros 
that the regrowth of rural uni oni sm had begun under the 
previous military government: ibid.; El Imparcial, 5.9.66, 
cited in Melville and Melville, Another Vietnam, p.121; see 
also. Murphy, 'The Stunted Growth of Campesino 
Organizations', p.450. 
108 Marroquin Rojas, La Hora, 22.8.66. 
109 Similarly, Gleijeses, Shattered Hope. p.162. 
suggested that reports of land invasions following Arbenz's 
agrarian reform were overplayed by the opposition press. 
110 Mendez Montenegro, I nforme de 1 
Constitucional _de la Rep~blica al Honorable 
15.6.67. 15.6.68. 15.6.69, 15.6.70. pp.189-91, 
171-178, 242-254, respectively. 
~residente 
Congreso, 
201-204. 
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parcelling system~IIJ official statements continued to be 
critical of the policy of parcelamientos in favour of 
cooperatives. 112 Nevertheless J the head of INTA had felt 
obliged in July 1966 to reassure campesinos that those who 
cont i nued to be 1 ega 1 rec i pi ents under the terms of the 
1962 Agrarian Transformation Law (Congressional Decree 
1551) had nothi ng to fear. 113 The sense of precari ousness 
felt by many beneficiaries of successive 'land reforms' in 
Guatemala is well-illustrated by the views expressed by 
campesinos on the national finca 'El Cacahuito' - the first 
state farm to be turned over to its workers. 114 Fearful 
that a future government would divest them of their newly-
acqui red 1 ands 'and gi ve them to new supporters' J many 
expressed a desire to be able to buy their parcels in the 
bel i ef thi s woul d bri ng greater securi ty of tenure .115 
On 15 July 1967J national finca 'El Cacahuito' became the 
first to be distributed to its 203 resident families. It 
was followed by that of 'Las Cabezas' in Oratorio J Santa 
111 Melville and Melville J Another Vietnam J pp.216-270 J 
provide a critique of this process and of the whole 
agrarian programme under Mendez Montenegro. As Maryknoll 
missionaries J Thomas and Marjorie Melville worked among 
peasants in the department of Huehuetenango. Together with 
two other Maryknoll priests they were expelled from 
Guatemala in December 1967 for guerrilla involvement and 
were subsequently suspended from the Maryknoll order: LBJL 
WHJ Note for Rostow from Bowdler J 28.12.67j LBJL WHJ Note 
for Rostow from Bowdler J 9.3.68j Prensa Libre J 18.1.68; 
Reverend Blase Bonpane J 'Guatemala is the Next "Vietnam"J 
Priest Says' J The Sunday Star Bulletin and Advertiser 
11.2.68j New York Times J 19.1.68 J 21.1.68 J 22.1.68 J 
23.1 .68. 26.1.68. 
112 El Imparcial J 25.7.66j Prensa Libre J 23.8.66. 
113 Leopoldo Sandoval J El Imparcial J 16.7.66. 
1 14 Prensa Libre J 8.7.67 J 18.7.67. 
115 Hector Luna Troccoli J 'Como Piensan los Campesinos 
sobre el Nuevo Plan de la Reforma Agraria' J El Imparcial J 
12.10.66. 
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Rosa, to 173 co 1 onos on 18 October. 116 One year 1 ater, the 
new INTA president Antonio Colom Argueta announced that 571 
resident families on five national fincas in Coban, Alta 
Verapaz would receive land in honour of the 24th 
anniversary of the October Revolution. 117 While this 
transfer did not take place until mid-January 1969, it is 
interesting to note that Alta Verapaz was the only 'Indian' 
department that the PR won outright in the 1970 elections. 
At the end of Mendez Montenegro's term, only seven of these 
42 state-owned plantations had been transferred to their 
workers in cooperat i ve form as promi sed. 118 
Melville and Melville have 
distribution of the national 
commented that 
fincas was the 
the 
least 
controversial aspect of the government's three-pronged 
agrarian programme. However, such relative inoffensiveness 
was clearly no guarantee of success. 119 In contrast to the 
campaign waged against attempts to increase taxation, there 
had been little overt opposition from the right regarding 
the transfer of the national fincas or to other aspects of 
the government's agrari an programme. Nevertheless, the 
agro-export sector had a 1 ready made thei r vi ews on the 
question known and commentators noted that the. rhetoric of 
agrarian reform - together with the guerrilla 'amnesty' 
had served to deepen right-wing suspicion of the 
116 INTA, Cooperativa Agricola "El Cacahuito": 
Informacion General, (Guatemala, n.d.); Prensa Libre, 
8.7.66, 18.7.66, 13.10.67, 23.10.67, 25.10.67; Mendez 
Montenegro, Presidente Constitucional de la Republica 
Informe al Honorable Congreso, 15.6.68, pp.201-3. 
117 Prensa Libre, 10.10.68, 15.1.69; Mendez Montenegro, 
Presidente Constitucional de la Republica Informe al 
Honorable Congreso, 15.6.69, pp.171-73. 
118 This overall figure apparently includes the 
seventeen farms belonging to state-run banks, and two 
others the long-running legal battle over which was 
eventually resolved in the government's favour: Melville 
and Melville, Another Vietnam, p.219. 
119 Ibid., p.218. 
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government. '20 Underlying hostility to the measures ;s 
also suggested by the fact that administration officials 
cont i nued to fee 1 it necessary to pub 1 i c 1 y defend the 
cooperat i ve system aga i nst accusat ions of commun i sm. 121 
Mendez Montenegro himself repeatedly emphasised the non-
confiscatory character of his agrarian reform and argued 
that while ~e constitution permitted the expropriation of 
pri vate 1 ands J the government had del i beratel y not 
exercised this right so as 'to give confidence to the 
capitalist class' .'22 On the other side of the political 
spectrum J the FAR was openly critical of the government's 
'demagogic' manipulation of the agrarian reform issue and 
particularly of the plans to redistribute state-owned 
land: '23 
Lo que nosotros nos proponemos es terminar con la 
propiedad privada de los terratenientes sobre la 
tierra. Al contrario J el PR teme J como al fuego J 
tocar esa propiedad. Prefiere destruir la 
propiedad estatal J anarquizarla y hacer una 
"reforma agraria" publicitaria. No es reforma 
agraria revolucionaria repartir la propiedad del 
Estado ... para que menos de 4 mil familias 
empiecen y concluyan la "reforma agraria".'24 
An obvious obstacle to the distribution of national finca 
land remained lack of resources and this was itself related 
120 
'La Iniciativa Privada Agropecuaria Se Oirige al 
Pueblo y Gobierno de Guatemala' J El Imparcial J 4.2.66; New 
York Times J 15.10.66 J 13.11.66. 
121 
16.6.68. 
Prensa Libre J 18.7.67; New York Times J 13. 11 .66 J 
122 New York Times J 13.11.66. However the President 
al so admi tted that the government 1 acked the necessary 
funds to compensate expropri ated 1 and accordi ng to the 
constitutional requirements. 
123 Turcios Lima J 
p.96; Gabriel Salazar J 
problemas y soluciones' J 
124 
'Nuest ras Tareas Fundamenta 1 es' J 
'Vocero de las FAR responde a 
Prensa Libre J 10.8.66. 
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to governmenta 1 i nabi 1 i ty increase revenue through tax 
reforms. 125 The quality of the available land may also 
have been a factor. While 12.5 per cent of national finca 
lands were under cultivation, only 14.3 per cent could be 
cultivated, the remaining 73 per cent being suitable for 
grazi ng purposes onl y. 126 Bureaucracy was a further 
problem. The initial transfer of the properties to INTA 
from the 1 i qu i dat ion commi ttee of the ex-department of 
national fincas was delayed due to 'red tape' and it is 
1 i kely that the measure would have been unpopular with 
functionaries faced with unemployment. Indeed, the 
'Usumacinta' land colonisation cooperative in the Peten was 
apparently established with precisely such ex-national 
fi nca bureaucrats in mi nd .127 
As a result of the withdrawal of the luxury sales tax in 
January 1968, INTA' s budget was cut by 66 per cent. The 
cuts prompted telegrams of protest from colonos on 
plantations scheduled for distribution, as well as from 
those who already owned plots of land as a result of 
earlier distribution programmes concerned at the possible 
loss of INTA-sponsored development projects in their 
areas. 128 The financial crisis accompanied by some 
personal animosity between Treasury Minister Fuentes Mohr 
125 Some 1,600 INTA employees were laid off in 
September 1967 because of lack of funds: ASIES, Mas de 100 
Anos, p.330. 
126 Sandoval, Prensa Libre, 6.8.66. 
127 El Grafico, 7.3.67; Prensa Libre, 3.3.67, 8.7.67. 
128 INTA's budget was cut from 01,186,532 to 0500,000. 
Prensa Libre, 1.2.68, 6.2.68, 7.2.68; see also Carmen 
Escri bano de Leon, , I rregul ari dades en 1 as Fi ncas 
Nacionales', El Grafico, 6.3.68, and Sandoval's response, 
ibid., 13.3.68. 
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and INTA director Leopoldo Sandoval 129 1 ed to the 
latter's resignation and his replacement by Antonio Colom 
Argueta. 130 
The Confederacion de Trabajadores de Guatemala 
(CONTRAGUA) followed up a vote of confidence in the new 
INTA president in September 1968 with a call for increased 
government support for the i nst i tut ion. 131 A petition to 
Mendez Montenegro the following January expressed concern 
at the stagnation of INTA programmes due to lack of funds 
which was affecting some 40,000 campesinos. 132 An increase 
in the INTA budget for 1969 was announced a few days 
1 ater. 133 Overa 11 however, the resu 1 ts of the government's 
agrarian programme stood in stark contrast to the rhetoric 
and rema i ned poor even by post- i ntervent i on standards. 134 
129 INTA' s announcement that it had recuperated 1 and 
parcel 38-1 regi stered in the name of Al berto Fuentes 
Mohr and located in the agrarian development zone of Santo 
Tomas de Cast i 11 a, I zaba 1 - in 1 i eu of payments due, was 
interpreted by the Finance Minister as Sandoval's personal 
reprisal for INTA's budget cut. The latter complained that 
a 'guerra friar had been waged against him: Prensa Libre, 
1.2.68, 2.2.68; El Grafico, 6.3.68. 
130 Prensa Libre, 1 .3.68. Fuentes Mohr also resigned 
at this time. 
131 Prensa Libre, 10.9.68, 15.10.68, 21.10.68. 
132 Prensa Libre, 10. 1 .69. 
133 Prensa Libre, 15. 1 . 69 . 
134 According to the administration's own figures, the 
combined number of families benefitting from INTA's various 
land titling, parcelling, colonisation and national finca 
programmes between 1966 and 1970 bare 1 y 7,000 wi th the 
settlement of a further 13,000 planned through colonisation 
of the area known as the Northern Transverse Zone: Mendez 
Montenegro, E~esidente Constitucional de la Republica 
Informe al Honorable Congreso 15.6.67, 15.6.68, 15.6.69, 
15.6.70, pp.189-91, 201-4, 173, 249-254 respectively. 
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~L~a=b~o==u~r~:~~From Illusion to Disenchantment 
In Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, 
O'Donnell and Schmitter discuss the resurgence of civil 
soci ety as an integral part of the transi t i on process .135 
Including trade unions, grass-roots movements and human 
rights organisations, this sector converges under certain 
conditions to push the limits of liberalisation towards a 
more genuine transition to political democracy. O'Donnell 
and Schmitter add that this 'popular upsurge' is less 
likely to occur where the transition is firmly controlled 
over an extended period of time. In this case the form of 
democracy achieved is likely 'to contain more oligarchic 
elements, more "islands" of institutionalised inequality in 
participation and accountability ... ,.136 In Guatemala in 
early 1966, there was little evidence of such popular 
mobilisation. Yet the prospect of a popular upsurge under 
a PR government was feared by the el i tes and the armed 
forces, while Mendez Montenegro and the PR used the threat 
of a popular explosion to press for recognition of the 
election results. 
It is unclear whether the PR could have carried out this 
threat, although the brief and ultimately fruitless 
outbursts of popular discontent in 1957 and in 1962 
provided possible precedents for such a scenario. Civil 
society in terms of organised labour had been undergoing a 
gradual recomposition since the 1954 liberacion, with the 
carefully circumscribed boundaries for union activity 
g i vi n g r i set 0 two dis tin c t cur r e n t s wit hi nth e 
movement. 137 On the one hand, 'si ndi ca 1 i smo 1 i bre' 
135 O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule, pp.44-56. 
136 Ibid., p.55. 
137 Miguel Angel Albizures. interview, Guatemala City, 
15.2.94; ASIES, Mas de 100 Anos, pp.1-43. 
202 
defended the mi ni mum conquests of the reformi st peri od 
under American Federation of Labour-C-<;'A.~rt2SS ()t l"'d .... sk(\c-L 
OV"i('''~\~'\.'""'c",s (AFL-CIO) and Organizaci6n Regional 
Interamericana de Trabajadores (ORIT) guidance; on the 
other, 'sindicalismo socialcristiano' sought to establish 
a more humane and just relationship between employers and 
employees within a Catholic and anticommunist framework. 138 
While the latter originated with the Federaci6n Aut6noma 
Sindical (FAS) which had close ties to the liberaci6n 
government, FASGUA as it later became known -was 
appropriated from below by communists and their 
sympathisers and by the late 1950s was firmly on the left 
of the political spectrum. 139 FASGUA played a central part 
in coordinating the jornadas civicas in March and April 
1962 against Ydigoras Fuentes, as did the important railway 
workers' union, the Sindicato de Acci6n y Mejoramiento 
Ferrocarri 1 ero (SAMF) .140 In contrast, most of the uni ons 
in the ORIT-affiliated Confederaci6n Sindical de Guatemala 
(CSG) refused to take part in the actions. 141 In 
comparison with the situation under Arbenz, however, the 
labour movement sma 11 and 
'characterised by 
remained 
fear,.142 According 
fragmented and 
to Ministry of 
Labour figures, in 1964 just two per cent of the 1,223,723 
economically active population were unionised, of which 
138 Ibid.; Levenson-Estrada, Trade Unionists against 
Terror, pp.29-36; Miguel Angel Albizures, interview, 
Guatemala City, 15.2.94. 
139 Levenson-Estrada, Trade Uni oni sts agai nst Terror, 
pp.36-38. 
140 
141 
142 
15.2.94. 
ASIES, Mas de 100 Anos, pp.223-228. 
Prensa Libre, 23.4.62, cited in ibid., p.228. 
Miguel Angel Albizures, interview, Guatemala City, 
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onl yO. 2 per cent were campesi nos .143 
Although it rejected the 'politics of class' J the PR 
confirmed its populist pretensions in pledges to defend the 
interests of 1 abou rand 'the most needy sectors'. 144 Such 
promises were routine in the rhetoric of Guatemalan 
politics Peralta's address to mark May Day 1963 had 
contained similar undertakings - yet the PR's roots in the 
1944 revolution appeared to offer new hope for their 
ful fi 11 ment. 145 Mendez Montenegro had been a 1 abour 1 awyer 
and had acted in the 1950s in representation of SAMF - the 
strongest single affiliate of CONTRAGUA. 146 The unusually 
large turnout for the traditional May Day parade in 1966 
suggests that expectations were high of a return to the 
pro-labour policies and political freedoms of the reformist 
decade. 147 
143 Department of Statistics J Ministry of LabourJ July 
1964 J cited in L6pez Larrave J Breve Historia del Movimiento 
Sindical Guatemalteco J p.56. In 1968 J the Department of 
Labour and Social Welfare recorded a national total of 
23 J073 unionised workers: Nelson Amaro and Mauro Cuevas J 
'Intensidad del Movimiento Sindical y Cooperativo en el 
Pais' J in Amaro J El Reto de Desarrollo J pp.386-405 J Table 
1J p.398. 
144 'Acta Notarial de Fundaci6n del Partido: Testimonio 
de Juridicidad'J reproduced in Cartilla del Segundo 
Congreso de la Juventud Revolucionaria J pp.16-17. 
145 Prensa Libre J 3.1.63. 
146 CONTRAGUA was established in November 1965 J 
apparently in response to the creation of the Confederaci6n 
Sindical de Guatemala (CONSIGUA) in November 1964. Both 
represented rival factions in the leadership of the CSG 
which was itself a founding member of CONTRAGUA: ASIES J Mas 
de 100 Arios J pp.255-259; MurphYJ 'The Stunted Growth of 
Campesino Organisations'J pp.457-471. 
147 El Grafico J 1.5.66 J cited in ASIES J Mas de 100 
Arios J p.291; Miguel Angel Albizures J interview J Guatemala 
CitYJ 15.2.94. The tailors' union recorded in the minutes 
of a meeting the hope that under the 'Third Government of 
the Revolution... more activities can be developed: 
Levenson-Estrada J Trade Unionists against Terror J p.41. 
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The limits to the new government's ability to act 
independently on labour issues became apparent almost 
immediately after Mendez Montenegro had taken office. A 
motion to reform the Labour Code - proposed by PR deputy 
Julio Leiva on behalf of the United Fruit Company workers' 
un ion J SETUFCO was swi ft 1 y wi thdrawn by its sponsor. 
While President of Congress Fuentes Pieruccini clarified 
the procedure for the presentat i on of a 11 mot ions to 
Congress in the future J Leiva explained the reasons for his 
change of heart. 148 Havi ng been informed by the PR' s 
political committee that an integral series of reforms to 
the Labour Code was already under consideration J he now 
believed his proposals were unnecessary.149 
What is particularly notable about this incident is the 
manner in which the upper echelons of the PR closed ranks 
to minimise the consequences of Leiva's action - and the 
unambiguous message that this delivered to any other 
idealists sitting on the party bench in Congress. 150 It is 
al so cl ear that the pri vate sector brought consi derabl e 
pressure to bear on the matter. 151 Following a meeting 
with CACIF J Labour Minister Barillas Izaguirre requested 
that Congress take account of the private sector's 
obj ect ions to the SETUFCO proposa 1 s. 152 After the mot ion 
was wi thdrawn J the mi n i ster cont i nued to reassure the 
private sector on the scope of any future reforms: 
Las reformas que se i ntroduzcan al codi go de 
trabajoJ de acuerdo con la constitucion de la 
republica se ajustaran a la realidad nacional y 
buscaran la conciliacion nacional. De ninguna 
148 Prensa Libre J 18.8.66; 26.8.66. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Prensa Libre J 18.8.66. 
151 El Imparcial J 17.8.66; Zarco J 'Peligrosas Reformas 
Laborales' J Prensa Libre J 17.8.66. 
152 I bid. 
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manera 1 as reformas a esas 1 eyes debe causar 
preocupaClon pues el gobierno planteara su 
convenien9ia, hasta despues de hacer un estudio 
a fondo. 5 
Thi searl y experi ence set the pattern for the Mendez 
Montenegro government's approach to the labour question. 
As with other politically difficult issues, 'national 
reality' became a coded term for what was acceptable to the 
economic elites and the military. Relatively 'safe' 
options such as the aguinaldo and the gradual introduction 
of minimum wages in various productive categories, simply 
continued policies initiated under the military regime. 154 
El acto de hoy ... [r]atifica ... el movimiento 
sociopolitico iniciado el 20 de octubre de 
1944 .... La Revol uci on de Octubre pri nci Pl 0 en 
1946, el Programa de Seguridad Social en 
Guatemala; la Revolucion de Octubre continua, en 
1968, [con] el program? que cubre la Enfermedad 
Comun en Guatema 1 a ... 15 
According to the government's own propaganda, a principal 
achievement for labour during this administration was the 
programa de enfermedad comun wh i ch eventua 11 y went into 
operation in January 1969 under the auspices of the 
153 Barillas Izaguirre, Prensa Libre, 18.8.66. 
CONTRAGUA was still awaiting discussion of these reforms in 
May 1969: El Grafico, 3.5.69. 
154 Congressional Decree 1633. 'Reglamento del 
Aguinaldo'. 6.12.66, and Congressional Decree No.1634, 'Ley 
Reguladora de la Prestacion de Aguinaldo para los Empleados 
Particulares', 6.12.66, Recopilacion de Leyes. Vol.86, 
p. 39. 41 ; Mendez Montenegro, I nforme a 1 Honorab 1 e 
Congreso. . .• 1967 , 1968, 1969, pp. 102-4, 128-30, 122-3 
respectively. 
155 Mendez Montenegro, speech during inauguration of 
the programa de enfermedad comun and IGSS General Hospital, 
20.10.68, 'IGSS Cubre Enfermidad y Maternidad', reproduced 
in Trabaio y Honestidad 1968-1970. (Guatemala, n.d.) 
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Instituto Guatemalteco de Seguridad Social (IGSS).156 
Originally envisaged under legislation which established 
the IGSS as an autonomous institution in 1946, the new 
provisions provided medical care and 
workers who contributed to the social 
A further presidential acuerdo in April 
benefi ts to those 
securi ty system. 157 
1969 granted sick 
leave on full salary for up to two months for public sector 
workers not covered by the IGSS. 158 The new programme -
which effectively ended the limites medicos by which IGSS 
doctors attended higher wage earners privately and charged 
thei r fees to the IGSS - provoked a doctors' stri ke .159 
Presented by government officials as part of an anti-labour 
campaign to sabotage the social security system, the strike 
was vigorously opposed by several union bodies including 
the pro-government CONTRAGUA, but also the far more 
independent Frente Nacional Sindical (FNS).160 
Overall however, advances in social security remained 
156 En un Regimen de Trabajo y Libertad: Dinamica 
Realizacion en Menos de 4 Anos de Gobierno Revolucionario 
(Guatemala, 1969),p.14; 'Gobierno Cubre Programa de 
Enfermedad Comun a Trabajadores', Prensa Libre, 1.5.68; El 
Grafico, 5.5.68. 
157 The IGSS was funded by joint contributions from the 
state, employers and employees for a variety of different 
programmes including accidents at work, general accident. 
neo-nata 1 and from 1 January 1969 genera 1 si ckness: see 
Carlos Gehlert Mata, 'Salud y Seguridad Social', in Amaro, 
El Reto de Desarrollo, pp.339-350. 
158 Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro, Informe al Honorable 
Congreso (Guatemala, 1969) p.124. 
159 Accordi ng to IGSS di rector Dr Ri cardo Asturi as 
Valenzuela, cited in ASIES, Mas de 100 Anos. p.309. the 
system of limites medicos had been 'prostituted' and was 
causing huge financial losses; see also remarks by Health 
Minister Dr Emilio Poitevin, Prensa Libre, 8.9.67. on his 
efforts to combat the practice by which doctors in public 
hospitals referred patients to their own private clinics 
rather than treat them at hospital. 
160 Prensa Libre. 26.10.68, 28.10.68, 29.10.68, 
30.10.68; ASIES. Mas de 100 Anos. p.309. 
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limited, certainly in terms of the kind of protection 
outlined in the original IGSS mandate. 161 According to 
Carlos Gehlert Mata, the application of the new IGSS 
sickness benefits was restricted to the central department 
of Guatemala, while IGSS programmes in general continued to 
exclude both the marginalised populations in the urban 
centres and the considerable numbers engaged in subsistence 
agri cul ture. 162 
In terms of PR promises on the right to unionise,163 
there was a percept i b 1 e increase in the rate of un ion 
recognition during this administration, with a particular 
emphasis on rural organisation. The Asociacion de 
Investigacion y Estudios Sociales Guatemalteca records that 
230 new union organisations were recognised between July 
1966 and June 1970, of wh i ch on 1 y 56 were urban. 164 Of the 
remainder, 147 were ligas campesinas -associations of 
independent campesinos - and 27 were unions organised on 
fincas. 165 Guatemalan trade unionist Miguel Angel 
Albizures has suggested that the surge in campesino 
organisation was primarily directed at the cooptation of 
this rural constituency while Brian Murphy noted that the 
initial flurry of rural organisation had slowed 
161 Gehlert Mata, 'Saldud y Seguridad Social', p.343. 
162 Ibid., p.346. 
163 'Acta Notarial de Fundacion del Partido', in 
Cartilla del Segundo Congreso de la Juventud 
Revolucionaria, p.17; 'Declaracion Ideologica de 1965', in 
ibid., p.25. 
164 ASIES, Mas de 100 Anos, p.296. Details of the 
urban unions only are given on pp.674-680. 
165 
personaria 
pp.259-6. 
Under Peralta. 
juridica, of 
25 new unions 
which six were 
were 
rural: 
granted 
; bi d .• 
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considerably by late 1967. 166 
Whether or not an organisation had official sanction 
appeared to influence its chances of success. Writing in 
El Grafico in May 1968, journalist Carmen Escribano de Leon 
commented on the police harassment being suffered by 
campesinos attempting to organise in Tecpan, Chimaltenango, 
and more generally about discriminatory practices against 
independent union organisation. 167 According to Escribano 
de Leon, peasants and workers organising under the auspices 
of government-sponsored entities were able to do so without 
d iff i c u 1 t y : 168 
Pero si los campesinos y los trabajadores quieren 
organizarse por su cuenta en sindicatos libres y 
en ligas campesinas independientes, entonces 
cualquier alcaldito de pueblo puede deshacer el 
fisico de los dirigentes que han osa~~ ser libres 
e independientes del poder central. 1 
166 Murphy's figures, 'The Stunted Growth of Campesino 
Organisations', p.470, are difficult to reconcile with 
those given by ASIES: of more than 50 rural organisations 
in process in July 1967, he claims that only eight had 
succeeded i n ga in i ng 1 ega 1 recogn it i on by February 1968. 
Using data from the Department of Labour and Social 
Welfare, Amaro and Cuevas, 'Intensidad del Movimiento 
Sindical y Cooperativo en el Pais', Table 2, p.399, give 
the following figures for unionisation up to 1968 but do 
not distinguish between urban and rural unions: 43 unions 
requesting personaria juridica; 58 unions registered with 
personaria juridica. 
167 Escribano de Leon, El Grafico, 23.5.68; see also, 
ibid., 21.5.68, 9.5.69; La Hora, 20.3.70. 
168 Escribano de Leon, El Grafico, 23.5.68. Murphy 
suggests that it was deliberate government policy to 
obstruct FASGUA-sponsored applications. By contrast, 
CONTRAGUA/CONSIGUA's expedient renaissance as the Central 
de Trabajadores Federados (CTF) following the 1970 
elections was processed in less than a month: Murphy, 'The 
Stunted Growth of Campesino Organisations', p.471; Miguel 
Angel Albizures, interview, Guatemala City, 15.2.94. 
169 Escri bano de Leon, El Grafi co, 23.5.68. 
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Nevertheless, membership of an oficialista union was 
neither a guarantee of immunity from official harrassment, 
nor of physical integrity in the context of the death squad 
activity which characterised this period. Indeed, it 
became extremely dangerous to be a union activist during 
the Mendez Montenegro government and many were 
'di sappeared' or found murdered. 170 Notwi thstandi ng its 
close links with the President, even the traditionally 
militant but determinedly anti-communist SAMF was subjected 
to official and extra-legal intimidation. Eighteen 
samfistas were detained for the possession of subversive 
propaganda under the Ley de Defensa de las Leyes 
Democraticas in May 1967, while the union protested that 
three of its leaders had received death threats from the 
Consejo Anticomunista de Guatemala (CADEG).171 A month 
later, FASGUA, SAMF and CONTRAGUA were amongst groups 
accused by CADEG of planning acts of communist sabotage to 
celebrate the anniversary of the Cuban Revolution. 172 
Jaime Monge Donis - then second secretary of CONTRAGUA -
appeared on a separate CADEG list described as an 'emergent 
collaborator of the PGT,.173 In November 1967, telegrams 
demandi ng effect i ve protect i on for CONTRAGUA and FASGUA 
leaders amongst others were sent to Mendez Montenegro, the 
interior and defence ministers, as well as to the chiefs of 
the various police forces. 174 CONTRAGUA leaders were again 
th reatened the fo 11 owi ng June and 1 eaders of the Frente 
170 ASIES, Mas de 100 Anos, pp.314-316. 
171 Prensa Libre, 3.5.67; El Grafico, 12.5.67. CADEG 
was one of the several extreme right-wing organisations or 
death squads linked to the security forces which emerged 
after Mendez Montenegro had taken office. 
172 
Guatemala. 
Violencia, 
CADEG, 'Boletin del CADEG alerta pueblo 
Junio Rojo', 24.6.67, in CIDOC, Guatemala: 
Dossier No.21, p.4/311. 
de 
La 
173 CADEG, 'Junio Rojo, Comunistas de Guatemala! 
Pueblo de Guatemala!', reproduced in ibid., p.4/308. 
174 La Hora, 3.11.67. 
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Cr i st i ano de Trabaj adores de Guatema 1 a (FECETRAG) a 1 so 
requested military protection after receiving death threats 
in March 1968. 175 
Declining to celebrate May Day 1968 with the traditional 
procession, FASGUA's executive committee declared it to be 
a day of mourning and banners inscribed to this effect were 
hung from bri dges throughout the capi tal .176 In contrast, 
CONTRAGUA went ahead with their rally in the Olympic 
Gymnasium on 1 May 1968, with Mendez Montenegro and other 
high-ranking government officials in attendance. 
Subsequent government publicity focused in particular on 
the speech by CONTRAGUA' s Second Secretary, Ja i me Monge 
Donis, which endorsed moves taken by the President against 
the military high command in March and April 1968: 177 
... hace un ano planteamos categoricamente 
que ... debia romper las cadenas y disponerse a 
gobernar con sentido exclusivo de ese mismo 
pueblo que 10 habia electo. Y ese aspecto 
dificil que requeria valor pragmatico. firme 
habilidad, integridad y consecuencia ... ha sido 
por fin cumplido cuando con motivo de los sucesos 
trascendentales ... el Presidente deci di 0 
consolidar el regimen de Derecho ... y a fianzar la 
paz y la institucionalidad del pais ... Esta 
decision exigida y esperada por los trabajores, 
ha merecido el respaldo absoluto y total ... 178 
The close links nurtured with CONTRAGUA the 'brazo 
obrero' of the PR - continued to permit the government a 
175 Prensa Libre, 30.3.68, 19.6.68. 
176 Prensa Libre. 25.4.68; Zarco, ibid .• 3.5.68. 
177 Mendez Montenegro removed from office his Defence 
Minister. Colonel Arriaga Bosque. the Commander of the 
Zacapa military base. Colonel Carlos Arana Osorio and 
Police Chief Colonel Manuel Sosa Avila: see Chapter Six for 
further discussion. 
178 Jaime Monge Donis quoted in publicity from the 
presidential public relations office, El Grafico, 5.5.68. 
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substantial measure of support from organi sed '79 labour.! 
Mendez Montenegro routinely presided over annual CONTRAGUA 
congresses and the confederation regularly expressed its 
support for the 'presidente amigo' and his 
admi ni strat ion. 180 
workers' union 
The 
within 
key position of the 
CONTRAGUA and its 
relationship with Mendez Montenegro was 
railway 
earlier 
probably 
influential in this, as was the fact that the alternative 
ORIT-affiliate - CONSIGUA - had received support from the 
military regime. 181 
Attempts to organise a counterweight to CONTRAGUA in 1969 
reflected the increasing importance of the Christian 
Democrats -belatedly permitted to register as a political 
party for the August 1968 municipal elections. In November 
1968 the three 'socialcristiano' federations 182 unified in 
the Confederacion Nacional de Trabajadores (CNT), despite 
misgivings in some FCG base organisations. 183 This 
oppositionist trend in the union movement was reinforced 
with the emergence of the Frente Nacional Sindical (FNS) in 
1969 and its stagi ng of an independent May Day 
demonstration in competition with that of CONTRAGUA. 
Comprising FASGUA and the organisations within the CNT -
CONSIGUA defected to the CONTRAGUA march at the last minute 
- the 2,OOO-strong FNS demonstration included the AEU and 
179 El Grafico, 1.5.69. 
180 Prensa L i bre, 16.10.67, 28.1.69, 12.5.69; 20.10.69; 
El Grafico, 5.5.68. 
181 Murphy. 'The Stunted Growth of Campesino 
Organisations', p.471; ASIES, Mas de 100 Anos, p.259, 295. 
182 FECETRAG, Fe_deracion Campesina de Guatemala (FCG) 
and Federaci6n Nacional de Obreros del Transporte (FENOT). 
183 Accordi ng to A 1 bi zures, many in the FCG vi ewed such 
a union as detrimental to campesino interests: ASIES, Mas 
de 100 Anos. pp.301-2. 
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the Juventud Obrera Cri st i ana (JOC). 184 
The political content and significance of this event was 
underlined by the presence of veteran Christian Democrat 
Rene de Leon Schlotter and the DCG presidential candidate 
Jorge Lucas Caball eros at the head of the march, and 
contrasted with the heavy representation of PR officials at 
the far 1 arger CONTRAGUAjCONSIGUA rall y. 185 However, the 
press detected a more critical stance at this gathering 
also, as speakers called for action to reform the Labour 
Code and demanded the dismissal of officials who were 
failing to 
courts. 186 
enforce labour legislation in the labour 
Denunc i at ions from the plat form of out rages 
committed by military commissioners against finca workers 
subsequently became the focus of a bitter exchange between 
the military's public relations office and the CONTRAGUA 
leadership, and Marroquin Rojas noted the deepening 
hostility between labour and the military establishment. 187 
At this point, the events leading to the effective 
nationalisation of IRCA operations in December 1968 should 
be briefly outlined. Given the historical implications of 
such actions against US interests in third countries, the 
muted US response to this takeover was particularly notable 
and can be understood in terms of IRCA's evident wish to 
divest itself of its Guatemalan operations. Since the late 
1950s there had been continuous conflict between IRCA and 
the railway workers' union, SAMF, due to the company's 
184 El Grafico, 1.5.69; La Hora, 2.5.69; Prensa Libre, 
3.5.69. 
185 In contrast to CONTRAGUA's claims of more than 
35,000, El Grafico estimated 12-13.000 participants on this 
march: El Grafico, 3.5.69; Prensa Libre. 12.5.69; La Hora, 
2.5.69 
186 El Grafico. 3.5.69; Prensa Libre. 3.5.69. 
187 El Grafico. 3.5.69; Prensa Libre. 3.5.69, 5.5.69, 
7.5.69, Marroquin Rojas, La Hora, 6.5.69. 
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dismissal of some 1,500 workers between 1958 and 1966 and 
its continued resistance to union attempts to improve wages 
and conditions. l88 IRCA's traditional monopoly over 
freight transport - originating in a series of concessions 
granted to US interests in the 1 ate 19th and earl y 20th 
century - had been undermined following the completion of 
the Transatlantic Highway in 1956, a project begun by the 
Arbenz administration in 1951 following the recommendations 
of a 1951 World Bank mission to Guatemala. l89 The closure 
of UFCo operations at Tiquisate in 1964 had further 
depleted IRCA's profits, and the company's financial 
problems were compounded by legislation enacted under 
Peralta Azurdia which forced duty-free exports to be 
transported by national carriers. 190 
IRCA's December 1966 declaration that it was on the verge 
of bankruptcy and unable to pay the end-of-year aguinaldo 
exacerbated fri ct i on between the company and SAMF. The 
fi rst of severa 1 temporary government takeovers of I RCA 
resolved matters in the short-term, but a pattern of unpaid 
wages and other benefits during the following year provoked 
renewed union protests and culminated in a 67-day national 
strike between January and March 1968. 191 Declared legal 
by the Labour Courts, the strike was a rare example of 
union militancy and generated considerable support. By 
188 Rafael Piedra-Santi Arandi, Introduccion a los 
Problemas Economicos de Guatemala (Guatemala, 1971), p.123. 
189 IRCA's income had more than halved from 012.9 
million between 1955 and 1957 to 06.1 million in 1966: 
ASIES, Mas de 100 Anos, p.273; see also Piedra-Santa 
Arandi, Introduccion a los Problemas Economicos, p.100-101. 
190 Ibid., p.94. The close relations between UFCo and 
IRCA were exemplified by the preferential tariffs charged 
for the transportation of the former's bananas from its 
plantations on the Pacific coast to Puerto Barrios. 
191 Prensa Libre, 4.1.68; ASIES, Mas de 100 
p.350; Lopez Larrave, Breve Historia, p.62; Bauer 
'The "Third Government of the Revolution", pp.155-7. 
Anos, 
Paiz, 
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contrast, company claims of financial difficulties were met 
with widespread skepticism in Guatemala and there was 
speculation that this was a strategy on the part of its US 
shareho 1 ders to force the government to nat i ona 1 i se the 
operation. 192 In this regard. it is significant that, by 
the time of the nationalisation in December 1968, the 
Guatemalan state was IRCA's major creditor. The Mendez 
Montenegro government had underwritten loans totalling 06.3 
million to cover the company's bill for overdue payments to 
and on behalf of its employees. 193 
Desde el punto de vista del ejercicio de la 
soberania nacional, la culminacion del asunto de 
los ferrocarriles no acepta la menor discusion. 
Guatemala. por prima vez en mas de 90 anos, pone 
fin a una serie de conseciones onorosas e 
i nj ustas para nuest ras i ntereses. 194 
Hemos rescatado para 1 a patri a un muerto. 195 
One of the few examples of concerted trade union 
mi 1 i tancy duri ng the Mendez Montenegro government, the 
nationalist dimensions of SAMF's dispute with IRCA can be 
assumed to have been important in generating sympathy for 
the railway workers. Equally, the 'special relationship' 
between the union and Mendez Montenegro enabled the former 
to exert part i cu 1 ar pressure on the government. As has 
already been noted, however, samfistas were not exempt from 
right-wing death threats and MLN leader Sandoval Alarcon 
192 Prensa Libre, 19.1.67. cited in ASIES. Mas de 100 
Anos, p.347. 
193 Piedra-Santa Arandi. Introduccion a los Problemas 
Economicos, pp.97. 101-5; Mario Fuentes Pierrucini, 
interview, Guatemala City. 2.2.94. stated that the 
government paid 05m for the company. 
194 Oscar de Leon Aragon, El Grafi co J 5.1.69: De Leon 
Aragon had been appointed by Arbenz as IRCA auditor in 
1953. 
195 Marroquin Rojas cited by Piedra-Santa Arandi. 
Introduccion a los Problemas Economicos, p.105. 
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commented that the un; on was as much to bl arne as the 
company for the confl i ct. 196 The fi na 1 takeover was 
precipitated by IRCA's failure to abide by the terms of a 
Q4 million loan to the company in March 1968 and a further 
6-day stri ke by SAMF in September. 197 Endorsed by the 
Faculty of Economy at the University of San Carlos and 
greeted with jubilation by SAMF and CONTRAGUA, this 
symbolic victory for national sovereignty and for labour in 
genera 1 was tempered by the recogn it i on that the 
government's hand had been forced by IRCA i tsel f .198 In 
the opinion of many, the company represented a 'moribund' 
1 i abi 1 i ty for the state, wh i 1 e SAMF began to express 
dissatisfaction with the new management as early as March 
1969. 199 
Entonces nosotros decimos, si no se van a poder 
hacer reformas estructurales en el orden social, 
porque se ve que no es el momento para hacerles, 
por 10 menos demosle a est a gente casas, dernosle 
carreteras, demosle escuelas. Entonces fue 
cuatro arios de una intensa actividad de 
trabajo.200 
In his closing address to the Fourth CONTRAGUA Congress 
in October 1969, Mendez Montenegro included the 
196 E 1 G r a f i co, 1 2 . 5 . 67; Pre n saL i b r e , 24. 5 . 67 . 
197 Congressional Decree 1736, 'Autoriza la emision de 
Notas de 1 Tesoro hasta por 1 a cant i dad de 
Q4,OOO,OOO.00 ... ', 7.3.68, Recopilacion de Leyes, Vol.87, 
p.57; La Hora, 23.9.68; El Grafico, 28.9.68, 
198 Prensa Libre, 28.12.68, 11.1.69; 'La Facultad de 
Economia ante la Nacionalizacion de la IRCA', Prensa Libre, 
3.1.69. 
199 Zarco, Prensa Libre, 5.8.67; De Leon Aragon, El 
Grafico, 5.1.69; Piedra-Santa Arandi, Introduccon a los 
Problemas Economicas, p. ; ASIES, Mas de 100 Arios, p.355-6; 
Levenson Estrada, Trade Unionists against Terror, p.33. 
200 Mario Fuentes Pieruccini, interview, Guatemala 
City, 2.2.94. 
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nationalisation of the rail network as one of the 
government's achievments on behalf of Guatemalan labour. 201 
In addition, he signalled advances in the areas of 
education, low-cost housing and minimum salaries together 
with the establishment of sickness benefits for the 
labouring classes. 202 His 'vast' programme of public works 
had provided jobs and a living for thousands of workers and 
their families. 203 
Yet the results of the March 1970 elections revealed 
considerable popular disenchantment with the 'Third 
Government of the Revolution' and there is little evidence 
that the combi ned support of the CONTRAGUA and CONSIGUA 
leadership translated into votes for the PR at the 
grassroots. I n the department of Guatema 1 a - where the 
highest proportion of unionised workers were located - the 
201 Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro, 'Discurso 
pronunciado por el Ciudadano Presidente Constitucional de 
la Republica, en el acto de Clausura del IV Congreso 
Nacional de Organizaciones Sindicales, convocado por la 
Confederacion de Trabajadores de Guatemala - CONTRAGUA', 
pamphlet (Guatemala, n.d.). 
202 I bi d. At the end of its term the government 
claimed to have built almost 1,300 new schools and some 
6,000 low-cost homes - 'one school ... [and] eight homes for 
the people every 24 hours': 'Mensaje de Navidad. Texto del 
Mensaje de Navidad que el Presidente Constitucional de la 
Republica, Licenciado Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro, 
dirigio al Pueblo de Guatemala el 23 de diciembre de 1969, 
a traves del sistema nacional de radio y television', 
pamph 1 et (Guatema 1 a, n . d. ) ; and speech to Congress, 
15.6.70, mimeo, pp.4-8. 
203 Major infrastructural developments included the 
extension of the Transatlantic Highway into the Peten, the 
conclusion of the hydro-electric plant at Jurun-Marinala, 
Escuintla and the expansion of the port of Matias de Galvez 
at Santo Tomas on the Caribbean Coast. Road capacity had 
been increased by a 1 most 300 per cent: 1966-1970: 
Ministerio de Comunicaciones y Obras Publicas; Oscar 
Casteneda Fernandez, interview, Guatemala City, 14.3.94; 
Mario Fuentes Pieruccini, interview, Guatemala City, 
2.2.94, Mendez Montenegro, speech to Congress, 15.6.70, 
mimeo, pp.4-8. 
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PR vote was more than ha 1 ved in favou r of the DCG. 204 In 
four of the five departments it had won outright in 1966, 
the PR lost votes to the DCG in 1970. Perhaps most 
significantly, only one of the ten union members selected 
to stand as candi dates for the PR won a seat in the 
congressional elections in 1970, notwithstanding 
CONTRAGUA/CONSIGUA claims that together they represented 
over 65 per cent of organised labour. 205 While this was 
indicative of the lack of genuine participation in the 
decision-making structures of the major bodies of organised 
labour - and the susceptibility of the union leadership to 
regime cooptation overt support for the PR had 
potentially dangerous consequences. 206 Following Colonel 
Arana Osorio's victory at the polls in March 1970, 
CONTRAGUA and CONSIGUA were rapidly dissolved and the 
Central de Trabajadores Federados (CTF) came into being, in 
an effort to avoi d persecut i on by the new regi me. 207 
During its four years in office, the Mendez Montenegro 
government had failed to live up its rhetoric as the 
genuine heir of the October 1944 Revolution. Indeed, the 
'Third Government of the Revolution' had proved largely 
unable to carry through its own modest proposals for reform 
and development. Despite certain advances for labour in 
terms of social security benefits and minimum wage 
204 Of 23,073 unionised workers in 1968, 44 per cent 
were located in the department of Guatema 1 a: Amaro and 
Cuevas, 'Intensidad del Movimiento Sindical', in Amaro, El 
Reto de Desarrollo, Table 1, p.398; ASIES, Mas de 100 Anos, 
p.357. 
205 ASIES, Mas de 100 Anos, p.357. It should be noted 
that the union members were all CONTRAGUA affiliates. 
206 In this regard, Miguel Angel Albizures has pointed 
to problems of participation and elitism in explaining the 
later demise of the FNS: Albizures, cited in ASIES, Mas ~e 
100 Anos, p.309. 
207 Miguel Angel Albizures, interview, Guatemala City, 
15.2.94. 
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legislation, it was clear that the hoped-for return to the 
favourable conditions experienced between 1944 and 1954 had 
not materialised. In the rural sector, almost all of the 
nat i ona 1 fi ncas rema i ned in the hands of the state, and 
budgetary deficits severely restricted other aspects of the 
government's agrarian transformation policies. 
While the problem of revenue remained a central obstacle, 
the inability of the government to push through tax reforms 
revealed a more fundamental problem which had serious 
implications for the democratisation process. This process 
had been severely circumscribed by the limited nature of 
the competition in the 1966 elections and the pact that 
Mendez Montenegro had signed with the military before 
taking power. It was further undermined by the continuing 
game of 'coup poker' played by the right in response to 
unwelcome government policies. The threat of a coup made 
the administration pull away from politically difficult 
measures and reinforced the position of the military as the 
ultimate arbiter in the political process. In the context 
of a guerrilla insurgency and increasing political 
polarisation, the central question remains as to the 
viability of any reformist project at this stage. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
'LA VIOLENCIA': GUERRILLA WAR AND COUNTERINSURGENCY 
A la pregunta, que pasa en Guatemala? .. cabe 
responder: la quiebra del derecho. La 
inseguridad es la t6nica angustiosa del pais. 
Ante la acci6n de las corrientes delictivas, se 
ha marcado una total ineficacia para frenarlas. 1 
Una fracci6n de la guerrilla intent6 apoyarlo e 
iniciar negociaciones en la direcci6n [de la 
revoluci6n de 1944-54] ... pero eso no cuaj6. Ya 
era muy tarde. La guerrilla tenia cuatro anos de 
existir y el ejercito se habia endurecido en 
linea obediente a los mandatos de la estrategia 
anticomunista r contrarevolucionaria de los 
Estados Unidos. 
Introduction 
The political and military effectiveness of the first 
generation of Guatemalan guerrillas was at its height when 
Mendez Montenegro took office on 1 July 1966. A leading 
issue in the electoral campaign had been the question of 
how to bring an end to the insurgency. In contrast to the 
hardline stance of Ponciano and the MLN, the PR's electoral 
platform had remained sufficiently vague as to suggest the 
possibility of a negotiated settlement with the guerrillas. 
Indeed, there is some indication that discussions to this 
end did take place between certain elements within each 
group. Given the narrow base of support for such 
Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro, 'Mensaje de Lucha: 
Discurso pronunciado por el Licenciado Julio Cesar Mendez 
Montenegro al ser proclamado candidato a la Presidencia de 
la Republica por el Partido Revolucionario, Guatemala. 
14.11.65'. pamphlet. (Guatemala, n.p., n.d.). 
2 Marco Antonio Villamar Contreras, interview. 
Guatemala City, 14.11.94. 
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negotiations even within these two sectors, and the highly 
polarised political situation within the country at large, 
the prospects for a satisfactory outcome along these lines 
were at best slim. Within months of his inauguration, 
Mendez Montenegro had launched a counterinsurgency 
campaign. 
The Guerrilla Challenge: Origins and Development 
In 
la revuelta armada que estalla [el 13 de 
noviembre de 1960] ... se proponia ... sustituir al 
gobi erno corrupto del genera 1 Mi guel Idi goras 
Fuentes por una junta mi 1 i tar ... y ... 'componer' a 1 
ejercito nacional. Como puede verse, esta 
revuel ta de haber tri unfado, no hubi era en 1 a 
practica solucionado ninguno de los ingentes 
problemas de las masas guatemaltecas y 
seguramente hubiera pasado a la historia como un 
cuartelazo mas muy parecido al dado meses ma~ 
tarde por el coronel Enrique Peralta Azurdia ... 
July 1966, there were two distinct guerrilla 
organisations in existence - the Movimiento Revolucionario 
13 de Noviembre (MR-13) and the Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes, 
the former led by Marco Antonio Yon Sosa and the latter by 
Luis Turcios Lima. Based mai nly in the north-eastern 
departments of Zacapa and Izabal, but with varying 
influence in several other regions,4 their combined numbers 
3 
'Breves Apuntes Hi stari cos del 
Revolucionario 13 de Noviembre', reproduced 
Movimientos Revolucionarios en Latinoamerica 
'Breves Apuntes Histaricos] pp.104-107, p.104. 
Movimiento 
in I NDAL, 
[hereafter 
4 Cesar Montes, interview, San Salvador, 6.9.94, has 
claimed that the guerrillas were also active in the eastern 
departments of El Progreso, Chi qui mula and parts of Jalapa 
as well as in the capital, and that they had some influence 
in Santa Rosa, Escuintla and Suchitepequez. Retalhuleu, San 
Marcos and Quezaltenango with a strong contingent in Baja 
Verapaz. An anonymous document, probab 1 y MLN, ' La 
guerrilla y anti-guerrilla en Guatemala (Guatemala, May 
1967) mimeo, reproduced in CIDOC, GuatemaJa. La Violencia, 
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were estimated at around 500 in the field at anyone time, 
with a reserve force of up to 5,000. 5 The FAR was the more 
significant in terms of numbers and actions and was viewed 
as the greatest political and military threat. 6 Its 
intimate if difficult relationship with the PGT, together 
with Castro's outspoken rejection of the MR-13 in its 
favour at the 1966 Tricontinental in Havana, attracted the 
particular attention of the Guatemalan security forces and 
United States officials. 7 Yon Sosa's MR-13 was viewed as 
a secondary target. 8 Both organisations owed their origins 
to the failed military uprising of November 1960, some 
participants of which had returned to Guatemala from exile 
in early 1961 and regrouped in the first MR-13. 9 Lacking 
any clear po 1 it i ca 1 di rect i on at that stage and seek i ng 
primari ly to reinact the original revolt to overthrow 
Ydigoras Fuentes - 'without making the same mistakes,10 -
Dossier No.21, pp.4/2-4/19, p.4/3, adds Jutiapa to this 
list; see also, Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution, 
pp.104-6, for a more modest assessment of guerrilla 
activity outside Izabal and Zacapa. 
5 DDRS CIA 003061, Intelligence Memorandum, 8.10.66. 
While the latter figure is roughly in line with Debray and 
Ramirez's breakdown, their estimated 'kernel' of full-time 
cadres was some 300, with potential fighters on the 
periphery who could not be mobilised due to lack of weapons 
and training facilities: Debray, The Revolution on Trial, 
p. 307 . Debray' s sect i on on Guatema 1 a was co-authored by 
Ricardo Ramirez alias Rolando Moran, current leader of the 
Ejercito Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP) section of the 
Union Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG). 
6 Debray, The Revolution on Trial, p.320; 'Three 
Reports on the Guatemalan Guerrillas', Monthly Review, 
(February 1967), pp.24-38. 
7 A United States official commented on the split 
between Turcios Lima and Yon Sosa that the latter had not 
'sold out to the Communists; he's his own boy': New York 
Times, 26.6.66. 
8 Debray, The Revolution on Trial, p.320. 
9 
'Breves Apuntes Historicos', pp.104-7. 
10 lb i~., p. 105. 
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discussions had been initiated with various political 
groupings, including the MLN and the PR, 'to find out what 
they stood for' .11 In the event only the PGT proved 
receptive, although the alliance between the latter and MR-
13 was not formalised until December 1962. 
Coi nci di ng wi th thei r return from Havana where the 
experience of direct contact with the Cuban Revolution had 
been critical in producing 'an evident change' in the 
'treci stas' 12 Yon Sosa, Turcios Lima and Luis Trejo 
Esqui vel presented the PGT wi th a concrete proposal for 
combined military action under joint command. 13 As a 
result, the PGT and MR-13 agreed to establish the Fuerzas 
Armadas Rebeldes 
which the PGT 
a politico-military 
would retain control 
organisation in 
of political 
organisation, while MR-13 would take charge of the military 
operat ions. The po 1 it i ca 1 nub of the FAR was to be the 
Frente Unido de Resistencia (FUR), organised by the PGT and 
other oppos it i on groups. Wi thout represent at ion in the 
FUR, the guerrilla leadership was effectively excluded from 
political decision-making. 14 While the logic of this 
11 Turcios Lima, cited by Gott, Rural Guerrillas in 
Latin America, p.75; 'Breves Apuntes Hist6ricos', pp.104-
107; Cesar Montes, interview, San Salvador, 6.9.94. 
12 'Breves Apuntes Hist6ricos', p.106. It was during 
this visit that Cesar Montes - then a student in Havana -
first came into contact with the MR-13 leaders: Cesar 
Montes, interview, San Salvador, 6.9.94. 
13 Crain, 'Guatemalan Revolutionaries', p.181. Both 
the PGT and the MR-13 had attempted unsuccessful 1 y to 
estab 1 ish separate focos in in February and March 1962: 
Debray, The Revo 1 ut i on on Tr i a 1, pp. 280-1; 'Breves Apuntes 
Hist6ricos', pp.104-6. 
14 The URD became an occasional participant in the 
FUR: DDRS CIA 002411, Special Report, 'Guatemalan 
Communists Take Hard Line as Insurgency Continues', 6.8.65; 
Gilly, 'The Guerrilla Movement in Guatemala' Monthly Review 
(May, 1965) p.18; see also Crain, 'Guatemalan 
Revolutionaries', p.181; Gott, Rural Guerrillas, p.82; 
Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus, p.454. 
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arrangement stemmed in part from the primary concern of the 
trecistas with military operations J it was principally 
structured to allow the PGT to incorporate armed struggle 
as a tactic within an overall strategy seeking a return to 
political legality and the peaceful road to socialism. 
5i nce 1959 the PGT had come under i ncreasi ng pressure 
from its younger cadres to follow the Cuban example. 15 The 
Cuban Revolution had served to sharpen criticism of the 
policy of 'national conciliation' adopted by the party 
towards the Ydigoras Fuentes administration and had revived 
memories of the party's inability to defend the gains of 
the 1944 Revolution during and after Arbenz's overthrow in 
1954. 16 In response J at its Third Party Congress in May 
1960 the PGT recognised the validity of the armed struggle 
alongside other forms of struggle in the quest for a 
'democratic J revolutionary and patriotic government' of the 
working class J campesinos J petty and national bourgeoisie -
the 'indispensable condition' for the democratic revolution 
15 Crain J 'Guatemalan Revolutionaries' J pp.178-9. 
Crain notes Eduardo Galeano's observation that young PGT 
radicals had a great deal more influence on party policy 
than was generally the case in most Latin American 
Communist parties: Eduardo Galeano J Guatemala. Clave de 
Latinoamerica (Montevideo J 1967)J p.27 J n.2. 
16 The per c e i v ed' pet t y b 0 u r g e 0 is' fa i 1 i n g s 0 f the PG T 
in this earlier period were once again thrown into sharp 
relief in January 1968 when the FAR announced its 
definitive separation from the PGT: 'Declaraci6n de las FAR 
de Guatemala: el PGT Ha Capitulado J Las FAR Rompen con una 
Corriente Politica Oportunista'J reproduced in INDALJ 
Movimientos Revolucionarios de Latino America J pp.78-82; 
see also the 'self criticism' by the PGT's Comisi6n 
Politica J 'La Intervenci6n norte-americano en Guatemala y 
e 1 Derrocami ento de 1 regi men democrat i co' J reproduced in 
Michael LowYJ Le Marxisme en Amerique Latine: anthologie 
(Paris J 1980) pp.200-11J in which the PGT recognised a 
number of errors committed by the party between 1949 and 
1954 and in particular in its relationship with the 
'national bourgoisie'. 
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which would open the road towards socia1ism. 17 A May 1961 
document went further by defi ni ng armed strugg1 e as the 
principal revolutionary tactic and the party sponsored its 
own short-1 i ved foco in March 1962. 18 
While Debray has suggested that this move identified PGT 
militants as the first foquistas in Guatemala, in many ways 
the party remained an orthodox, urban Communist party whose 
accommodat i on of the armed st ruggl e was far from tota 1 
commitment. At the same time, however, it is important to 
note that even this partial accommodation signalled a 
departure from 
organisation in 
traditional forms 
Latin America. 
of Communist party 
Nevertheless, the 
propensity of the leadership to switch from armed struggle 
to politiqueria became an increasing source of tension 
internally and between the party and the guerrillas and was 
central to the acrimonious break with the latter in 1968. 
By 1964, two guerrilla focos had been established in the 
north-east of the country: the Frente Guerri 11 ero 
'Alejandro de Leon' (also known as MR-13) commanded by Yon 
Sosa in Izabal and the Frente Guerri 11 ero Edgar Ibarra 
(FGEI) under Turcios Lima in the Sierra de las Minas in 
Zacapa. This was an area predominantly inhabited by poor 
ladino peasant farmers and the failure to incorporate the 
Indian population into the struggle was subsequently 
identified as a central flaw in the early revolutionary 
movement. 191 An early example of this type of criticism 
was the FAR's January 1968 attack on the PGT's 'false 
17 PGT, 'Plataforma Politica Aprobado por el III 
Congreso de 1 PGT', May 1960, mi meo, p. 14; Vi ctor Manue 1 
Gutierrez, 'Las elecciones deben realizarse', La Hora, 
3. 1 .66. 
18 Crain, 'Guatemalan Revolutionaries', p.180; Debray, 
The Revolution on Trial, p.280. 
19 Mario Roberto Morales, interview, Guatemala City, 
12.7.94; Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus, p.4S3; Jonas, The 
Battle for Guatemala, pp.68-9. 
225 
thesis' that indigenous campesinos were 'reserves of 
reaction', and Turcios Lima had hinted at this problem two 
years earlier in his speech at the Tricontinenta1 meeting 
in Havana: 20 
E1 campesinado guatemalteco est a formado en su 
enorme mayoria por las masas indigenas ... Por 
largo tiempo se considero a los indios como seres 
inferiores, como pueblos atrasados incapaces de 
as i mi 1 ar e 1 progreso y 1 a tecn i ca. No pocos 
revo1ucionarios en e1 pasado fueron presa de esta 
ideo10gia y consideraron a las masas indigenas 
como peso muerto para 1a revo1ucion. La 
experiencia de 1a 1ucha guerri11era ha demostrado 
que e1 campesino indigena 1ejos de ser un 
obstacu10 para la revolucion, es su fuerza 
decisiva. 21 
It is indicative that there had been several unsuccessful 
attempts during 
Indian-populated 
1962 to establish guerrilla fronts in 
areas, the earliest example of which was 
the PGT-sponsored foco in the mountains of Concua in Baja 
Verapaz. 22 Details are scarce, but a principal problem 
appears to have been the insurgents' lack of linguistic 
20 'Comunicacion de Caracter Nacional e Internacional 
de las Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR) de Guatemala', 
10.1.68, reproduced in INDAL, Movimientos Revolucionarios 
en Lat i noameri ca p. 85; Turci os Lima, 'Di scurso en 1 a 
Conferencia Tricontinental " reproduced in ibid.; see also 
Ricardo Ramirez, Lettres du Fronte Guatemalteque (Paris, 
1970), p.186. 
21 Turcios Lima, 'Oiscurso en la 
Tricontinental " reproduced in INDAL, 
Revolucionarios de America Latina, p.55. 
Conferencia 
Movimientos 
22 In November 1962, another guerrilla foco in San 
Mateo Ixtatan, Huehtenango, was quickly defeated, while 
Turcios Lima abandoned his attempts to establish a front in 
San Marcos and moved operations to the Sierra de las Minas: 
Debray, The Revolution on Trial, pp.280-2; interview with 
Turcios Lima in Le Monde, 7.2.66, cited in Gott, Rur_al 
Guerrillas, pp.81-2; 'Breves Apuntes Historicos', p.106. 
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ability and local suspicion of outsiders. 23 Yet, at least 
while Turcios Lima was alive, the guerrilla was not pursued 
in total isolation from the Indian population. Of 
particular salience is the FGEI's occupation of the river 
port of Panz6s in Alta Verapaz in October 1964, given that 
the Panz6s massacre in 1978 is generally accepted as 
marking the beginning of the Indian uprising of the late 
1970s. 24 Finally, it appears that there was a significant 
level of guerrilla contact with indigenous peasants in 
Rabinal, Baja Verapaz, where the Cakchiquel leader Emilio 
Roman L6pez (Comandante Pascual) operated until his death 
in October 1966. 25 
At the same time however, it is easy to underestimate the 
political potential of the ladino north-east, an area in 
which a poor peasantry was coming under increasing pressure 
from cattle ranching and where foreign companies did have 
a significant presence. These factors, and particularly 
the return of expropriated land to UFCo following the 1954 
liberaci6n, lend some weight to the thesis of the peasant 
'moral economy' in defining local support for the 
23 This was not a problem unique to the Guatemalan 
guerrillas as the cases of Peru and Bolivia demonstrate. 
On the slow process of rebuilding the Guatemalan guerrilla 
movement amongst the Indian population in the early 1970s, 
see Mario Payeras, Los dias de la selva, 8th edition 
(Mexico, 1989). 
24 Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus, p.453; see also, 
Cesar Montes, interview, San Salvador, 6.9.94; Wickham-
Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution. 
25 Cesar Montes, i ntervi ew, San Sa 1 vador, 6.9.94, 
argues that this amounted to an indigenous foco; see also, 
Mario Roberto Morales, interview, Guatemala City, 12.7.94; 
Orlando Fernandez, Turcios Lima (Havana, 1970); Galeano, 
Clave de Latinoamerica (Montevideo, 1967), p.36; Mario 
Roberto Morales, La Ideologia y la Lirica de la Lucha 
~rmada (Guatema 1 a, 1994), pp. 173-4. 'Pascua l' was shot 
dead in Guatemala City on 23 October 1966 just weeks after 
Turcios Lima's death in a car crash. 
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guerrillas. 26 Wickham-Crowley has also argued that the 
relatively high percentage of farm tenancy and 
sharecropping in the core area of guerrilla activity 
supports Jeffery Paige's structural theory of peasant 
revolution. 27 FAR commander Cesar Montes' observed at the 
time that thei r peasant supporters in Zacapa and I zaba 1 
were medi eros (sharecroppers), rather than seasonal 
labourers - won over 
, armed propaganda'. 28 
to the revolutionary cause through 
Yet, even in Zacapa, on 1 y 19.8 per 
cent of the 7,216 farm un its were rented J and the rapi d 
loss of this peasant base once the counterinsurgency 
campaign began has been attributed to a local population of 
'small landowners' who lacked 'political consciousness' and 
who switched sides when the guerrilla forces appeared to be 
losing the battle. 29 
The area did have a recent history of radicalism, 
however. Peasant/worker mi 1 it i as in Zacapa and Puerto 
Barrios had fought to defend the revolution against 
26 Some 40 per cent of farmland was expropriated in 
Izabal under Arbenz's Agrarian Reform Law: Wickham-Crowley, 
Guerrillas and Revolution, pp.121-3; on the peasant moral 
economy see esp. James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the 
Peasant (New Haven, 1976); and Eric Wolf, Peasant Wars of 
the Twentieth Century (New York, 1969); for an overview of 
theories of peasant rebellion see Ian Roxborough, Theories 
of Underdevelopment (Basingstoke and London, 1979), pp.91-
106; Theda Skocpol, 'What Makes Peasants Revolutionary?', 
Comparative Pol itics, 14 (Apri 1 1982). 
27 Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution, pp.103-
6, esp. Table 6.6, p.104; Jeffery M. Paige, Agrarian 
Revolution (New York, 1975); on the different systems of 
agriculture in the eastern highlands as opposed to the 
'Indian' altiplano, see Whetten, Guatemala, pp.150-1. 
28 Cesar Montes quoted in Ga 1 eano, Clave de 
Centroamerica, p.22. 
29 Gabriel Aguilera Peralta, interview, Guatemala 
City, 16.11.93; Mario Roberto Morales,. interview, Guate~ala 
City, 12.7.94; Wickham-Crowley, Guerrlllas and Revolutlon, 
p.105, Table 6.7. 
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liberacion forces in June 1954. 30 In Novembe r 1960, 800 
peasants reportedly arrived at the Zacapa barracks to offer 
thei r support to the rebel sin the wake of the mi 1 i tary 
uprising. 31 The PGT's organisational links with the 
workers on the Izabal banana plantations are also said to 
have provi ded an important base for the guerri 11 as. 32 
Strategically, the region was crucial, traversed by the 
Transatlantic Highway and the railway link between 
Guatemala City and the key Caribbean port of Puerto 
Barrios. As the centre of UFCo operations the port was the 
symbolic heart of US imperialism. However, the economic 
importance of the area and its relatively efficient 
communications network - differentiated the region from the 
Cuban Sierra Maestra and rendered the guerrillas 
particularly vulnerable to military attack. 33 
The main ideological differences between MR-13 and the 
FGEI/FAR developed out of the PGT' s rel uctance to full y 
embrace armed struggle. Yon Sosa's frustration with the 
PGT's politiqueria led him first to negotiate 
unsuccessfully with Villagran Kramer's URD, and then into 
30 Worker/peasant militias had also fought in 
Chiquimula, Santa Rosa and Escuintla: see Cardoza y Aragon, 
La Revolucion Guatemalteca, p.176. In an effort to explain 
parami 1 i tari sm in the eastern departments of Zacapa and 
Chiquimula, Caesar D. Sereseres, 'Guatemalan Paramilitary 
Forces, Internal Security, and Politics', unpublished 
paper, University of California, Irvine, pp.19-25, has 
asserted a distinctive political culture in this region 
based on clans and clientilist structures; see also, 
Gabriel Aguilera Peralta, 'Terror and Violence as Weapons 
of Counterinsurgency in Guatemala', Latin American 
Perspectives, 25/26 (Spring and Summer 1980), p.97. 
31 Gi 11 y, 
Monthly Review 
Guerrillas, p.71. 
'The Guerrilla 
(June 1965), 
Movement 
cited in 
in Guatemala', 
Gott, Rural 
32 FAR commander Pab 10 Monsanto cited in Wi ckham-
Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution, p.147. 
33 Cesar Montes, cited in Galeano, Guatemala. clave, 
p.17. 
229 
a temporary association with Mexican Trotskyism. The 
extent of Trotskyist infiltration within MR-13 became clear 
with the first publication of Revolucion Socialista in July 
1964, in which MR-13 advocated a socialist revolution to be 
achieved through a generalised mass uprising of politically 
conscious peasants supported in the cities by organised 
workers and students. 34 
The FGEI both rejected Trotskyism and was critical of the 
PGT's vacillation on the issue of the armed struggle. 35 In 
October 1964, the organisation delivered a letter to the 
PGT and the MR-13 outlining its position and calling for 
the reorganisation of the FAR. 36 Shortly afterwards in 
December, Turcios Lima met with Yon Sosa over several days 
as part of MR-13's 'National Directorate', at 'Las 
Orquideas' - a guerrilla encampment in the Sierra de Las 
Minas. According to Debray, Turcios Lima was persuaded by 
Trotskyi sts Amado Granados and Ado 1 fo Gi 11 y to agree in 
principle to a common declaration of goals more radical 
than those outlined in the earlier FGEI letter, but did not 
sign the document. 37 The fact that its subsequent 
publication bore his name precipitated Turcios Lima's 
resignation from MR-13 in March 1965. 38 
34 Crain, 'Guatemalan Revolutionaries', p.182-4; 
Debray, The Revolution on Trial, p.288-90; Gilly, 'The 
Guerrilla Movement in Guatemala' (May, 1965), pp.19-20; 
Gott, Rural Guerrillas, pp.88-102. 
35 Crain, 'Guatemalan Revolutionaries', p.184. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Debray, 'The Revolution on Trial', p.291. 
38 Ibid.; 'Primera Declaracion de la Sierra de las 
Minas, 20.12.64', Revolucion Socialista (January 1965). 
reproduced in Edi ci on del Comi te Bancari 0 de Lu<?ha 
Antiimperialista (Uruguay, 1965), pp.15.46; 'TurClOS 
Renuncia del 13; Carta Abierta a la Direccion Nacional del 
Movimiento 13 de Noviembre', 6.3.65, reproduced in INDAL, 
Movimientos Revolucionarios en Latinoamerica, pp.48-53; 
Gott, Rural Guerrillas, p.93. 
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The 'Fi rst Dec 1 arat i on of the Si erra de 1 as Mi nas' 
published in Revoluci6n Socialista in January 1965 - called 
for worldwide socialist revolution of the masses against 
capitalism and imperialism, rejecting both the 'peaceful 
road' to socialism and 'peaceful coexistence' with 
imperialism. 39 It was also a damning indictment of the PGT 
and the latter's defence of the 'national democratic 
revolution [which] means putting the guerrillas at the 
service of a bourgeois objective' :40 
... 1 as FAR ... han expresado que 1 uchan por 1 a 
revoluci6n democratica nacional, para instaurar 
un gobierno de las cuatro clases, en que estan 
representados los obreros, los campes i nos, 1 a 
pequena burguesia y la burguesia nacional. 
Nosotros, por el contrario, no queremos nada con 
la burguesia, sea cual sea. 41 
The effect of this split was to push the FGEI back into 
the arms of the PGT, and Crai n has suggested that the 
spectre of Trotskyism actually prevented the total 
breakdown of the FAR-PGT alliance at this stage. 42 At the 
same time, recognising the danger of a pro-Cuban secession, 
the PGT went some way to meeting the demands laid out in 
the FGEI's letter. 43 In January 1965, the Centro 
Provisional de Direcci6n Revolucionaria (CPDR) was 
established as a single politico-military command. Its 
founding document rejected electoral ism and legalism as 
ploys of the military dictatorship which were bound to fail 
and made clear its orientation towards a prolonged people's 
39 'Primera Declaraci6n de la Sierra de las Minas', 
pp.15-17. 
40 Ibid., pp.27-30. 
41 Yon Sosa, interview in Prensa Libre, 19.7.66. 
42 Crain, 'Guatemalan Revolutionaries'. p.184. 
43 Ibid., pp.184-5. 
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revolutionary war. 44 The FAR was subsequently 
reconstituted without Yon Sosa and MR-13 in March 1965. 
The PGT's trend towards a more substantial commitment to 
the armed struggle appeared to be confirmed in its 'Ten 
Theses of Organisation' .45 Ratified by the Central 
Committee in May 1965, this document effectively integrated 
the PGT structure into the armed movement. However, with 
the approach of the March 1966 elections and the renewed 
possibility of winning back the gains of the reformist 
decade, the PGT began to apply pressure within the FAR to 
support the Mendez Montenegro candidacy. 
The ideological differences between the two guerrilla 
organisations had operational implications. In particular, 
the FGEI/FAR was critical MR-13's subordination of military 
action to social organisation and in their different 
application of 'armed propaganda'. While the FGEI/FAR 
emphasised clandestinity - 'a fundamental component of the 
Popular War' in the organisation of local cells of 
resistance in the villages it worked with, MR-13's practice 
of publicly appointing 'peasant committees' in addition to 
clandestine cells was criticised for creating easy targets 
for repression. 46 In his rejection of the 'First 
Declaration of the Sierra de las Minas', Turcios Lima made 
similar criticisms of the call to the Association of 
University Students (AEU) and other student bodies to be 
44 
45 
CIDOC, 
4/250; 
Ibid. 
, Di ez tes is sobre organ i zac ion', reproduced in 
Guatemala La Violencia, Dossier No.21, pp.4/228-
Crain, 'Guatemalan Revolutionaries', pp.184-5. 
46 'Turcios Renuncia del 13', pp.48-53; Cesar Montes, 
interview, San Salvador, 6.9.94; Galeano, Guatemala, pp.21-
2; Gi 11 y, 'The Guerri 11 a Movement in Guatema 1 a', Month 1 y 
Review (May, 1965), pp.20-6; Gott, Rural Guerrillas, pp.95-
103. 
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the 'expression of the guerrilla movement,.47 With regard 
to this debate, it is worth noting Havana's reservations on 
the whole question of armed propaganda. While Debray's 
Revolution in the Revolution? had warned of the multiple 
dangers associated with this practice if parallel military 
action was not also underway, Castro also reportedly 
questioned its value: 48 
en alguna oportunidad el dijo: 'que era eso de 
andar dando discursitos parado en un banquito con 
las armas?' Incluso usaba una cita del Che que 
decia que la propaganda armada de los combates, 
no 1 a propaganda armada de di scursos ... se 
triunfa ... Nosotros partiamos mas bien de una 
asimilaci6n de la experiencia vietnamita que 
habia logrado un gran apoyol' .sobre la base de 
campanas de propanda armada. q9 
Despite their ideological and operational divergences, 
relations between the FGEI/FAR and MR-13 were more fluid 
than some of the invective implied. Indeed, Cesar Montes 
has claimed that the latter continued to receive financial 
support from the proceeds of FAR operations. SO By the time 
of Mendez Montenegro's inauguration, Yon Sosa was 
dissociating MR-13 from Trotskyist influence and relations 
47 'Turcios Renuncia del 13', pp.48-53. 
48 Cesar Montes, interview, San Salvador, 6.9.94; see 
also Debray, Revolution in the Revolution? (Harmondsworth, 
1967), pp. 46-58; and Cesar Montes' response to Ga 1 eano, 
Guatemala, pp.29-30, cited in Gott, Rural Guerrillas, p.99-
100. 
49 Cesar Montes, interview, San Salvador, 6.9.94, 
cites this as proof that the Guatemalan guerrillas were 
less influenced by the Cuban Revolution than by the 
struggle taking place in Vietnam. He also suggests that 
Debray's analysis of the Guatemalan situation was incorrect 
and based on information from companeros - 'like Rolando 
Moran and others', who had been absent from Guatema 1 an 
struggle for some time. 
50 Ibid.; see also John and Barbara Ehrenreich, 'A 
Favorable-View of the FAR', Monthly Review (February, 1967) 
pp.24-32. 
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with the FAR began to improve. 51 Turcios Lima's death in 
a car accident in October 1966 temporarily stalled moves 
towards an official reconciliation between the two 
organisations while his second-in-command and successor 
Cesar Montes strugg1 ed to impose hi s authori ty over the 
disparate groups within the FGEI/FAR. The formal 
unification between them did not take place until early 
1968 and was in any case short1ived, with Yon Sosa 
withdrawing a few months later. He was finally killed by 
Mexican forces in June 1970 having apparently strayed 
across the Guatemalan-Mexican border. 52 
Amnesties and Ultimatums 
En 10 tocante a los grupos descontentos que 
expresan vio1entamente su inconformidad y traten 
de hacerse justicia por su propia cuenta, desde 
este est ado civil y en este instante memorable, 
1 es hacemos un 11 amami ento a 1 a paz y a 1 a 
concordi a; si este gesto franco, empero, hecho 
por un guatema1teco que hab1a a sus 
conciudadanos, por un presidente que dia10ga con 
el pueblo; si est a actitud abierto y espontaneo, 
se interpretara como debilidad y se respondiera 
con arrogancia, la mano cordi~J que hoy se tiende 
se cerraria en puno fuerte ... 
Together with the lifting of the state of siege - in place 
since May 1966 - Mendez Montenegro's inaugural offer of 
reconciliation with the guerrillas appeared as tangible 
evidence that a political transition was indeed taking 
place. This impression was reinforced by the public debate 
51 Prensa Libre, 29.7.66; Gott, Rural Guerrillas, 
p,107; Debray, The Revolution on Trial, pp.322-3. 
52 The exact circumstances of Yon Sosa's death remain 
unclear: see Debray, The Revolution on Trial, p.342-3. 
53 Mendez Montenegro, inaugural speech, El Imparcia1. 
1 .7.66. 
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that developed around the question of a political amnesty 
for the guerrillas, and by the repeal of Decree Law 10 that 
followed on 5 August. 54 Repeated promises of press freedom 
were accompanied by criticisms of the Peralta regime and 
its excesses - although it is notable that the police were 
the focus of this attention rather than the mi1itary.55 
Although the left criticised the new government's lack of 
action on the case of the 28 missing revo1utionaries,56 it 
appears that some moves were made in this direction, as a 
CIA document somewhat disparagingly confirmed: 
The police forces have been disrupted by 
investigations dealing with charges of murdering 
Communists; police officials have been removed 
and rep 1 aced by even 1 ess competent, if more 
humane, individuals ... 57 
Yet even at this stage, the true limits to civilian 
authority vis a vis the military had been publicly 
established. In a forthright response to the Interior 
Minister's promise to incinerate lists of 'subversives' 
compiled under Peralta's Decree Law 9, Defence Minister 
Arriaga Bosque flatly refused to follow suit: 
Las 1istas que e1 decreto ley ... manda que esten 
en poder del ministerio de 1a defensa, no seran 
incineradas. Esto es 10 que tengo que decir, en 
cuanto a las 1istas que e1 ministerio de 
54 I ssued by Pera 1 ta on 10 Apri 1 1963, Decree Law 10 
had established excessive sentences for common crimes which 
were adjudicated by military courts: Prensa Libre, 3.8.66, 
6.8.66. 
55 See for example, statement by Interior Minister 
Mansi11a Pinto, E1 Imparcia1, 22.7.66. 
56 Jose Manuel Fortuny, 'Guatemala: the Political 
Situation and Revolutionary Tactics, World Marxist Review 
(10, 1967) p.31. 
57 DDRS CIA 003059, 
Special Memorandum, 'The 
Guatemala', 28.9.66. 
Office of 
Danger of 
National Estimates, 
a Military Coup in 
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gobernacion tiene en su poder [ ] 
58 . .. que sobre ellas. decida 
On 26 July 1966, Congress passed an amnesty for political 
. 59 h 
crlmes. T e support of the revolutionary left for the PR 
had been premised on the expectation of precisely this kind 
of conciliatory gesture, yet the terms of the amnesty were 
considered totally unacceptable. Covering the period from 
1 November 1960 but specifically excluding anyone 
implicated in the death of Mario Mendez Montenegro - all 
illicit weapons were to be surrendered within an eight-day 
period. 60 A further stipulation was the immediate release 
of FGEI/FAR hostages Baltazar Morales de la Cruz and 
Augusto de Leon held since March. 61 Both conditions were 
categorically rejected by Turcios Lima as a 'ridiculous 
ultimatum', while Yon Sosa had repudiated the whole concept 
in similar terms, even before the amnesty had been 
proffered: 
58 
20.7.66. 
Prensa Libre, 14.7.66; see also, ibid., 16.7.66, 
59 Congressional Decree 1605, 'concede AMNISTIA por 
delitos politicos y comunes conexos, cometidos desde el 10 
de noviembre de 1960, hasta el 26 de julio de 1966', 
26.7.66. Recopilacion de Leyes, Vol.86, p.10; El 
Imparcial, 27.7.66. 
60 A separate Presidential acuerdo described how the 
weapons should be deposited: 'en cualquiera de las 
Alcaldias Municipales de las cabeceras departmentales donde 
se le vantara una acta simple para acreditar la entrega, 
sin llevar formalidades de ninguna clase ... las autoridades 
no haran investigacion alguna sobre su procedencia 0 
adquisicion ... '. The weapons would be immediately 
transferred to the nearest millitary base: El Imparcial, 
28.7.66. 
61 Respectively the Secretary for Information and the 
President of the Supreme Court under Peralta Azurdia, the 
two had been kidnapped to pressure for information as to 
the fate of the 28 missing PGT and labour activists. Both 
were released in early September in exchange for FAR member 
Ortiz Vides: New York Times, 2.9.66. 
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nosotros no aceptamos que nadie nos 
mande ... Nuestra meta es conqui star e1 poder y 
formar un gobierno naciona1, que estaria formado 
por los obreros, los campesinos y tambien por e1 
propio pueblo ... Es notorio en rea1idad 1a presion 
que ejerce e1 ejercito con e1 gobierno del 
1icenciado Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro ... De 1a 
noch~ a 621 a manana, e1 ejercito no puede nunca 
camblar. 
Dejemos bien claro que a nosotros no nos 
interesa, en ningun momento, amnistia, indu1to, 
n i promesas, n i componendas, n i nada por e 1 
esti10. De aceptar1as seria una traicion a las 
masas exp1Qtadas ... nuestro objectivo es 1a toma 
del poder. 63 
As we have seen, the terms of the agreement si gned 
between Mendez Montenegro and the mi 1 i tary hi gh command 
effectively ruled out any possibility of a peaceful 
resolution to the guerrilla challenge, except under 
conditions of total surrender. Given these limitations, it 
would be easy to dismiss Mendez Montenegro's amnesty as no 
more than a disingenuous manouevre, designed both to 
placate those calling for negotiation and to isolate the 
guerrillas in the public eye as intransigent. 64 Yet it is 
worth noting that Congress had been 'bombarded' with 
several different amnesty bills and that the bill 
selected had suffered a number of amendments before being 
finally passed. 65 According to Fortuny - a founding member 
of the PGT - right-wing congresistas, including those from 
'the more reactionary wing' of the PR, had blocked the 
62 Turcios Lima, press conference, Prensa Libre, 
29.7.66. 
63 Yon Sosa, press conference, Prensa Libre, 19.7.66, 
cited by journalist Rafael Escobar Arge110 as evidence of 
the guerrillas' bad faith: E1 Imparcia1, 21.7.66. 
64 See, for example, Debray, The Revolution on Trial, 
p.300. 
65 E1 Imparcia1, 26.7.66; Fortuny, 'Political 
Situation', p.32. 
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ori gi nal proposal submi tted by the government whi ch was 
'far more interested in an amnesty than the revolutionaries 
for whom it was intended'. 66 Moreover, it appears that 
Mendez Montenegro continued to resist pressure for an all-
out counterinsurgency campaign even after the amnesty had 
been rejected by the guerrillas. 67 
At the same time however, the public debate on the issue 
had the effect of weakening the position of the 
revolutionary movement as a whole. The media engagement 
with the guerrillas -interviews with Yon Sosa and Turcios 
Lima in their mountain hideouts and lengthy debates in 
print between newspaper columnists and members of the PGT 
Central Committee - served to strengthen the impression of 
to 1 erant and democrat i c government. 68 In addition, the 
publicity given to the guerrillas' radical demands in terms 
of their Marxist ideology and socialist goals may have 
alienated sympathisers, who had previously opposed the 
military regime but now believed in the possibility of 
reform under Mendez Montenegro. 69 
66 Ibid. 
67 DDRS CIA 003059, 
Special Memorandum, 'The 
Guatemala', 28.9.66. 
Office of 
Danger of 
National Estimates, 
a Military Coup in 
68 See especially the debate that took place between 
columnist Isidoro Zarco and PGT ideologue Gabrial Salazar 
over over several weeks in 15 articles in Prensa Libre, 
26.8.66-19.9.66; see also ibid., 19.7.66, 29.7.66; £1 
Imparcial, 5.7.66,20.7.66,27.7.66; Judy Hicks, 'FAR and 
MR-13 Compared', Monthly Review (February 1967), pp.30-31. 
69 In contrast, Wickham-Crowley. Guerrillas and 
Revolution, p.178, has pointed to the moderate media image 
that Fidel Castro sought to maintain throughout the Cuban 
guerrilla struggle; see also, Aguilera Peralta et al, 
Dialectica del Terror, p.113; Debray, The Revolution on 
Trial, p.296; Handy, Gift of the Devil, p.233; URD member 
Adolfo Mijangos, cited by Norman Lewis, 'Guatemala: Banana 
Republic on the Brink of Doomsday', in The Sunday Times 
Magaz i ne, 14.3. 71 . 
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Within the revolutionary movement itself the new 
situation produced confusion and disagreement. While 
Turcios Lima and the PGT's Jose Manuel Fortuny separately 
warned that the rhetoric of social justice was a demagogic 
manoeuvre to take 'the edge off the popular 
discontent ... alienating the peoples ... from the revolution', 
the PGT's commitment to the armed struggle continued to be 
qualified. 70 As Fortuny put it, the new situation demanded 
'the proper combination of political, armed, economic and 
social struggle' :71 
The Party sees its main task in all-round 
utilisation of the possibilities afforded by the 
present situation for improving the organisation 
of the revolutionary struggle in the three basic 
areas - the masses, the Rebel Armed Forces and 
the Party itself. But work in this direction and 
the steady development of revolutionary 
act ion ... in no way detracts from the Party's 
efforts to build alliances or to achieve unity of 
action with the remainder of the Left and with 
all groups and organisations having influence 
among the masses. In particular, the Party of 
Labour is determined not to allow the 
Revolutionary Party to capitalise on our 
sectari an mi stakes to wi n support among these 
groups and to isolate the Communists in the Rebel 
Armed Forces. 72 
The FAR offer to suspend military operations in September 
1966 should also be seen in this light. It was 
subsequently argued to have been a mistaken strategy which 
threw the organisation into considerable disarray.73 In 
70 Fortuny, 'Political Situation'; Turcios Lima, 
'Nuestras Tareas Fundamentales en la Actual Situacion 
Politica Y Nuestra Preparacion para su Inminente Cambio 
Futuro' (n.d.) reproduced in INDAL, Movimientos 
Revolucionarios de America Latina, pp.96-100. 
71 Fortuny, 'Political Situation, p.33, citing PGT 
Central Committee resolution of 10 June 1966. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Fernandez, Turcios Lima, pp.60-62; Debray. The 
Revolution on Trial, pp.294-301. 
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response to Mendez Montenegro's 7 September 'f i na 1 ca 11 ' 
for peace,74 Turcios Lima and PGT Central Committee member, 
Bernado Alvarado Monzon issued a joint statement which also 
highlighted concerns about MLN activities in the north-east 
and the recruitment of mercenaries for a liberacion-style 
invasion: 
Las FAR, concientes de su rol historico de 
vanguardia politica del pueblo, adopta en este 
momento la siguiente decision: Suspender acciones 
de tipo militar, condicionando esto a que el 
aparato represi vo del gobi erno no provoque 0 
persiga al pueblo; en la medida que el gobierno 
denuncie, reprima y extermine la conspiracion 
liberacionista y que el ejercito no opere en 
contra de la poblacion campesina y sectores 
democrat i cos. Las FAR agotar en est a forma sus 
recursos para dar lugar a que el gobierno 
demuest re siva a combat ira los enemi gos de 1 
pueblo, real ice reformas democraticas de fondo, 
rechace y denuncie la oresion de que es objeto 
por parte del ejercito. 75 
In a subsequent internal document, Turcios Lima argued 
that the military truce was necessary for the guerrillas to 
avoid retaliatory attacks during a period of planning and 
reorganisation. 76 Whether or not these plans would have 
been successful under his leadership is now a moot point, 
but critics of the PGT strategy have since argued that 
Turcios Lima was the victim of a 'tacit conspiracy' which 
kept him unnecessarily in the capital where he was killed 
ina car crash 1 ess than a month 1 ater. 77 The prob 1 ems 
74 
8.9.66. 
Mendez Montenegro, 'Ultima Llamada', Prensa Libre, 
75 Prensa Libre, 10.9.66. 
76 
p.97. 
Turcios Lima, 'Nuestros Tareas Fundamenta 1 es' , 
77 Fernandez, Turcios Lima, p.63; Prensa Libre, 
3.10.66. Mario Roberto Morales, interview, Guatemala City, 
12.7.94, has suggested that a bomb, 'probab 1 y set by some 
member of the Party [PGT] that was linked to the army or 
the police', was the cause of the accident, but accusations 
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encountered by Cesar Montes in applying Turcios Lima's plan 
of resistance to the disparate guerrilla forces were 
attributed by one participant to its strategic 
insufficiencies, which had overestimated the strength and 
unity of the FAR as a whole. 78 
From Liberalisation to Repression: 'A Counterinsurgency 
Running Wild' 
El III Gobierno de la Revolucion esta gobernando 
al pai s dentro del estri cto marco de 1 a 
Constitucion y la Ley. Aun en momentos dificiles 
en que la violencia ha oscurido el cielo patrio, 
ha mantenido con firmeza est a actitud democratica 
porque no qui ere, ni puede, ni debe violar la ley 
para combatir a quienes la transgresen. Esta 
conducta ... es el unico camino para consolidar la 
INSTITUCI~NALhDAD, sin la cual Guatemala nunca 
progresara ... 
Que no le estrano al Gobierno de la republica 
que, ante la incuria y tolerancia de las 
autor i dades, 1 a c i udadan i a se organ ice para su 
autodefensa 0 se haga justicia pro sus propias 
manos. 80 
of foul play are notably absent from most accounts of this 
event. Similarly, an announcement by the clandestine anti-
communist terror organisation MANO that it was responsible 
seems to have been widely disregarded: Prensa Libre, 
7.10.66. 
78 Fernandez [alias Ricardo Ramirez and Rolando Moran, 
current commander of the Ejercito Guatemalteco de los 
Pobres (EGP)], Turcios Lima, p.63, argues this was partly 
due to the 'exaggerated and fa 1 se i nformat ion' on the 
internal situation of the FAR given to Turcios Lima by the 
CPDR. 
79 Presidential public relations office, Prensa Libre, 
26.2.69. 
80 MLN leader, Mario Sandoval Alarcon, El Imparcial, 
27.8.66. 
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For most analysts of this period, the Mendez Montenegro 
regime provided a democratic veneer for a carefully 
conceived counterinsurgency 
scale military offensive 
terror. 81 Launched in 
campaign which combined a full-
with extensive clandestine 
November 1966, the counter-
insurgency campaign employed scorched earth tactics and 
involved the erradication of whole villages in the north-
east. 82 The campaign increasingly took on the character of 
a 'dirty war', which extended rapidly to other parts of the 
country and left up to 8,000 dead. 83 While the government 
81 Aguilera Peralta et al, Dialectica del Terror en 
Guatemala, pp.181-182; Jonas Bodenheimer, Guatemala: Plan 
Piloto, p.288; Gleijeses, 'Guatemala: Crisis and Response', 
in SAIS Report on Guatemala (Boulder and London, 1985) 
pp.51-74; McClintock, The American Connection, pp.79-98; 
see also, Carlos Rafael Soto, 'No le da verguenza 
expresidente?', El Grafico, 4.2.94; and Nineth Montenegro 
quoted in Nancy Arroyave, 'El juicio de la historia. Julio 
Cesar Mendez M. " Cr6nica, 10.5.96, p.55. 
82 Statement by Norman Diamond to Committee of 
Returned Volunteers/New York Latin America Committee, 
Guatemala Perspective (New York, 1968), p.5; see also 
'Exhortaci6n pastoral del Episcopado Guatemalteco', 
reproduced in CIDOC, Guatemala La Violencia, Dossier No.21, 
pp.5/75-5/83 and Prensa Libre, 10.5.67. Unusually, this 
latter document emphasises the violence taking place in the 
'north-west' of the country; DDRS DOS 003260, Airgram A193, 
, Fi rst 100 days Mendez Regi me assessment', 16.11.66, 
which notes that security activity was increased in 
October, 'following a period of internal planning'. 
83 Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, p.63. McClintock, 
The American Connection, p.85, gives this figure for the 
oriente region between November 1966 and March 1967, while 
in November 1968 the 'Comi te de Defensa de los Derechos 
Humanos', La Violencia en Guatemala. Dramatica y 
Documentada Denuncia sobre "El Tercer Gobierno de la 
Revoluci6n" (Mexico, 1969) p.181, claimed the violence had 
taken 6, 000 1 i ves since the campa i gn began. The Lat i n 
America Studies Association, Ad Hoc Committee on Guatemala 
Report, 15.4.73,. reported est i mates of deaths as a resul t 
of the violence ranged from 3,000 to 8,000 for the period 
1966-1968, and 7,000 for the period 1968-70. The US State 
Department, DDRS DOS 003236, 'Guatemala: A Counter-
Insurgency Running Wild?', Intelligence Note 843, 23.10.67, 
estimated 500-600 victims of counter-terrorism in the year 
since October 1966, acknowledging that the inclusion of 
'missing' persons could double the figure. 
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continued to affirm its democratic credentials largely on 
the basis of its constitutional status, such a claim was 
severely tested by the repeated suspension of individual 
guarantees and the imposition of media restrictions under 
various states of exception. 84 Reports of men and women 
being taken away by the ubiquitous 'groups of unknown armed 
men' appeared da i 1 yin the nat i ona 1 press, together wi th 
seemingly unrelated reports of tortured corpses found on 
roadsides. Public appeals for the exhibicion personal 
(habeus corpus) of missing persons were printed in 
newspapers alongside faded photographs. The Thi rd 
Government of the Revolution seemed patently incapable of 
upholding even the most basic rights of the individual 
enshrined in the Constitution. 85 
Mendez Montenegro insisted that his government was the 
innocent victim of extremismos to its left and its right, 
but for many the President was simply a hostage to military 
designs, if not thoroughly complicit in their unfolding. 
Central to this analysis is the question of the agreement 
reached with the military in March 1966 and the limits it 
set for the exercise of full civilian government. In 
84 Guatemala was under states of exception of varying 
grades of severity for some 17 months during Mendez 
Montnegro's government. While responsibility for civilian 
security forces devolved to the Ministry of Defence under 
a State of Siege, it remained in the remit of the Ministry 
of the Interior under the lesser State of Alarm and State 
of Prevention. 
State of Siege: 2.11.66-27.2.67; 18.3.68-
16.4.68; 28.8.68-26.10.68; 2.4.70-1.5.70. 
State of Alarm: 28.2.67-1.5.67; 16.1.68-
17.3.68; 17.4.68-16.6.68; 27.10.68-26.11.68. 
- State of Prevention: 17.12.69-13.2.70. 
85 In 1967, murders were being estimated at 100 per 
month, Prensa Libre, 5.4.67, cited in Melville and 
Melville, Another Vietnam?, p.269. The Supreme Court 
reported that in the period immediately preceding April 
1968 at least five writs for habeus corpus were presented 
each day: Prensa L i bre, 4.4.68; see al so 1 i st of recorded 
disappearances and murders between July 1966 and October 
1968 in La Violencia en Guatemala, pp.46-175. 
243 
addition, powerful elements within the armed forces had 
remained opposed to Peralta's solution to the electoral 
impasse in March. Mendez Montenegro's careful references 
to the military's constitutional role in his inaugural 
address - and in his regular Saturday visits to principal 
military bases in the following months - were an implicit 
recognition of the continuing fragility of this uneasy 
modus vivendi .86 
Yet there is also some evidence to suggest that Mendez 
Montenegro resi sted pressure 
right as well as the PR 
from the mi 1 i tary and the 
leadership to launch an 
offensive against the guerrillas in the early months of his 
presidency.87 Moreover, while the terms of the amnesty law 
can be seen to correspond to the military's condition of 
total surrender, the FAR's suspension of action against 
military targets closely followed the release of their 
hostages and suggests that - in some circles at least -a 
negotiated settlement was still believed possible. 
The sharp revival of the post-1954 emnities as a result 
of the PR's arrival in office can also be identified at 
this stage. The governi ng party's proposal in August to 
replace the liberaci6n motto 'Dios Patria Libertad' in the 
parliamentary chamber was accompanied by a bitter exchange 
with the MLN. The latter's response was to declare 
86 Mendez Montenegro, inaugural address, El Imparcial, 
1.7.66; ibid., 30.7.66; DDRS CIA 003057, National 
Intelligence Estimate, 24.6.66; DDRS CIA 003058, 
Intelligence Memorandum, 30.6.66; DDRS CIA 003059, Office 
of National Estimates, Special Memorandum, 'The Danger of 
a Military Coup in Guatemala', 28.9.66. 
87 DDRS CIA 003059, Special Memorandum, 'The Danger of 
a Military Coup in Guatemala', 28.9.66. If Irma Flaquer, 
'Facultades Al Ejercito para Combatir a las Guerrillas', La 
Hora, 30.8.66, is to be be 1 i eved, however, the Pres i dent 
succumbed to such pressure somewhat earl i er on. At a 
meeting on 23 August with the entire high command, Mendez 
Montenegro reportedly gave his approval for action to begin 
against the guerrillas. 
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'political war' on the PR 'in reply to the attacks and 
accusat ions that party has made aga i nst the MLN' and to 
revea 1 deta i 1 s of the 1960 pact between the PR, MLN and 
DCG. 88 However, this political theatre masked a deeper 
concern on the part of the liberacionistas. With only five 
deputies and exluded from Mendez Montenegro's 'government 
of national unity', the MLN's influence seemed decidedly on 
the wane. As a CIA document noted, 'I tis not lost on the 
MLN that the PR ... will be an unbeatable political 
organization by 1970 if it controls the government for a 
term. 89 
Far from the 'party of democratic opposition' promised by 
MLN leader Sandoval Alarc6n at the tomb of Castillo Armas 
in June 1966, the MLN pub 1 i c 1 y accused the government of 
being in league with the FAR and continued to press 
military sympathisers to stage a coup.90 At the same time, 
there was compelling evidence to suggest that the party was 
involved in the organisation of right-wing terrorist 
groups. In addition, the FAR claimed that the MLN was 
recruiting mercenaries in the north-east and planning to 
stage a new liberaci6n from Honduras. 91 
By September 1966, the CIA was reporting that many senior 
officers were 'approaching the point of no return with the 
88 PR deputies had accused the liberacionistas of the 
murder of Chiquimula peasants during the 1954 invasion: 
Prensa Libre, 13.8.66, 15.8.66, 19.8.66, 20.8.66. 
89 DDRS CIA 003061, Intelligence Memorandum, 
'Guatemala - A Current Appraisal', 8.10.66. 
90 Ibid.; Prensa Libre, 20.8.66. 
91 See, for example, Turcios Lima, 'Nuestras Tareas 
Fundamentales', p.97; Gabriel Salazar, 'Nueva carta de las 
FAR; a 1 ude a prob 1 emas y so 1 uc i ones y a 1 MLN', Prensa 
Libre. 15.9.66. 
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Mendez admi n i st rat ion' .92 The appointment of exiled 
Communist novelist and Nobel prize winner, Miguel Angel 
Asturias, to the post of Ambassador to France had fuelled 
suspicions of Mendez Montenegro and the PR, while prominent 
officer Colonel Enrique Daniel Cifuentes Mendez argued that 
former guerrillas were securing high-level positions in the 
government. 93 To some extent the threat of a coup 
reflected the level of dissatisfaction within the military 
institution itself. It has been suggested that Arriaga 
Bosque's appointment as Minister of Defence had not been 
universally popular within the military institution. 
According to General Gramajo 
Minister had been selected 
successor Colonel Carlos 
Morales, the new Defence 
over Peralta's preferred 
Vie 1 ma n . 94 Wh i 1 e t his 
interpretation implies that Mendez Montenegro had some 
choice in the matter - in contrast to the standard version 
of events95 - it seems that thi s appoi ntment had sparked 
resentment among other influential high-ranking officers 
who coveted the position. 96 In addition, Arriaga Bosque's 
92 DDRS CIA 003059, Special Memorandum, 'The Danger of 
a Military Coup in Guatemala', 28.9.66. Two officers and 
a colonel had been arrested for conspiracy against the 
government on 13 September: Gramajo Morales, De la Guerra, 
p.243. 
93 Elian Dario Acuna, Treasurer General of the Nation, 
was reportedly a member of the communist youth group, JPT. 
Carlos Toledo, Secretary General of the FASGUA-affiliated 
Guatemala City Bus Drivers' Union (SPAS), had been 
appoi nted alternate to the 1 abour represent at i ve on the 
Council of State: DDRS CIA 003061, Intelligence Memorandum, 
'Guatemala - A Current Appraisal " 8.10.66. 
94 Genera 1 Hector 
Guatemala City, 31.10.94. 
Gramajo Morales, interview, 
95 DDRS CIA 003061, 'Guatemal a - a Current Apprai sal' , 
Intelligence Memorandum, notes that 'Mendez mollified 
opponents by appointing Col. Arriaga, a h.ighly respe7ted 
officer ... '; see also, McClintock, The Amerlcan Connectlon, 
p.79. 
96 Including Colonels Callejas Soto and Sosa Avila. 
Vice- Minister of Defence and Second vice-Minister of 
Defence respectively, Callejas coordinated an abortive 
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subsequent personnel changes and hi s attempts to remai n 
wi thi n the mi 1 i tary budget had increased unease amongst 
younger military officers and contributed to a sense that 
their career prospects were no longer guaranteed.97 
In the context of an intensification of guerrilla attacks 
against liberacionista and military targets during August _ 
and urged on by MLN complotistas this 'young turk' 
element became increasingly frustrated with the lack of 
high command action against the insurgents. 9B Finally, the 
characteristically provocative writings of Marroquin Rojas 
in La Hora should also be considered. While the Vice-
President had alarmed right-wing elements in the run-up to 
the March elect ions by suggest i ng that there shou 1 d be 
negotiations with the guerrillas, he continued to berate 
the military for its failure to defeat the insurgency and 
implied a split between officers planning counterinsurgency 
operations in the capital and those actually involved in 
attempt to remove Mendez Montenegro in November 1966, while 
Sosa Avila had been strategically deprived of direct troop 
command wi th his 'promot ion' from Navy Commander in an 
effort to neutralise him. Ibid.; Captain Juan Fernando 
Cifuentes Herrera, interview, Guatemala City, 30.9.94; 
Gramajo Morales, De la Guerra, p.243. 
97 General Hector Gramajo Morales, interview, 
Guatemala City, 31.10.94; Gramajo Morales, De la Guerra, 
pp.242-244; DDRS CIA 003059, Office of National Estimates, 
Special Memorandum, 28.9.66. Measures included cutting 
allowances of officers and certain offices and units, 
including their operational funds. The latter document 
notes that the military budget 'had been depleted by use of 
half a million dollars for additional security forces in 
the tense pre-inaugural period'. Several officers were 
also forced into retirement as a result of Peralta 
Azurdia's measures to weed out remaining line officers: 
Decree Law 55, 'Ley de Jubilaciones, Pensiones y Montepios 
en el Ejercito', 26.6.63, Recopilaci6n de Leyes, p.65, 
Vol. 82. 
98 A nascent plan to have Arriaga Bosque removed from 
office led to the arrest of three officers in mid-September 
1966 and the dismissal of another three. DDRS CIA 0030661, 
I nte 11 i gence Memorandum, 'Guatema 1 a - A Cu r rent Appra i sa 1 ' , 
8.10.66; Gramajo Morales, De la Guerra, p.243. 
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the fi ght i ng in the mounta ins. 99 Pl ayi ng upon mi 1 i tary 
anxieties, Marroquin Rojas' references to the traditional 
cleavage between line and academy officers also revived an 
older but enduring military crisis of identity:l00 
Pero he aqui una confesi6n mia como 
Vicepresidente de la Republica: Confi~so que 
sospecho que el Ejercito de Guatemala no quiere 
pel ear; que no ha querido pelear desde hace tres 
anos. De 10 contrario, las FAR ya no 
existieran ... Yo, de gobernante, ya habria dado un 
plazo de tres meses al ejercito para que 
dilucidara la situaci6n: 0 hay paz en el pais con 
la victoria del Ejercito, 0 hay comunismo con la 
victoria de las FAR; pero no admitiria este gallo 
gallina en que vivimos ... Y aseguro que si el 
Ejercito actual, todo de escuela, no peleaba, 10 
disolveria y formaria uno nuevo con oficiales y 
soldados de caite, para ver si este realizaba 10 
que no se ha querido realizar ... 101 
The declaration of a State of Siege on 3 November 1966 
confirmed that if there had ever been a real possibility of 
a negotiated end to the guerrilla challenge, it had 
99 General Gramajo Morales, interview, Guatemala City, 
31.10.94, has argued that Marroquin Rojas was the ideologue 
behind the fictitious 'Oficiales de la Montana' who were in 
reality right-wing civilians attempting to discredit the 
new government: see also, Gramajo Morales, De la Guerra, 
p.244. 
100 The confrontat i on between Arbenz and Franci sco 
Arana has been characteri sed as deri vi ng from tensi ons 
between academy and line officers. In August 1954, the 
uprising of Escuela Politecnica cadets resulted in the 
temporary closure of that institution by Castillo Armas. 
Following the November 1960 military rebellion, Ydigoras 
Fuentes was said to distrust academy officers to such an 
extent that he sent line officers in command of senior 
politecnica graduates in actions against the early 
guerrilla focos: Captain Juan Fernando Cifuentes Herrera, 
interview, Guatemala City, 30.9.94. 
101 Marroqu in Roj as, 'Es i nexp 1 i cab 1 eel proceso de 
nuestra politica', La Hora, 14.9.66; see also Marroquin 
Rojas, I La Falta de Armonia entre Dos Funcionarios!'. La 
Hora, 10.12.73. 
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on passed.
102 Apparently a response to the FAR's attack 
the United States-owned electriCity plant at Amatitlan, it 
was also directed at right-wing terrorists responsible for 
a wave of bombings in the capital during the previous six 
weeks. 103 In addition to the seizure of the printing press 
of the left-wing publication El Estudiante, 
promi nent members of the MLN were arrested. 104 
several 
The foll owi ng months saw a fi erce counter-i nsurgency 
campaign in the north-east of the country in which the 
commander of the Zacapa military base, Colonel Carlos Arana 
Osorio, played a crucial part. 10S Local campesinos were 
corralled into anti-guerrilla demonstrations and bore the 
brunt of army manoeuvres and death squad ope rat ions. 106 A 
targeted programme of military civic action in tandem with 
the much-heralded 'Pilot plan for the socio-economic 
development of the north-east' drilled wells and fed 
schoolchildren. Peasant support for the insurgents fell 
away. By the end of 1967, the guerrillas had been all but 
102 
Congreso 
3. 11 .66. 
Decree 
1621 , 
621, Prensa Libre, 4.11.66; Decreto del 
Recopilacion de Leyes, Vol.86, p.31, 
103 New York Times, 4.11.66; PrensaLibre, 3.11.66: MLN 
deputies had failed in their attempt to amend the wording 
of the decree ratifying the state of siege to specify 
seditious groups 'of communist tendency': ibid., 4.11.66. 
104 Most were re 1 eased a month 1 ater after ta 1 ks wi th 
the President: Mario Sandoval Alarcon, interview, Guatemala 
City, 31.8.94; Prensa Libre, 4.11.66; New York Times, 
4.11.66; Fortuny, 'Political Situation', p.32. 
lOS Colonel Arana stood for president on the joint MLN-
PID ticket in 1970 and won a plurality. 
106 A series of these 'demonstrations' in support of 
the government and the military and repudiating 'subversive 
elements' took place in the north-east and in parts of the 
'Indian' highlands between the end of 1966 and early 1967. 
Mario Fuentes Pierrucini, interview, Guatemala City, 
2.2.94, argued that they were a means to reassure the 
military that the government had popular support; see also, 
Prensa Libre, 24.11.66, 25.11.66, 20.12.66, 24.1.67; U 
Grafico, 20.12.66, 16.2.67. 
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destroyed at their rural base: 
[T]he success of President MM in dealing with 
rural and urban insurgency in Guatemala during 
the past 8 months ... shows what a democrat i c, 
popular government can do when it is determined 
tot a kef i r mac t ion . . . the at tit u d e 0 f MM has 
facilitated our providing equipment, training 
[blank] to the military and police which has 
helped the~ ferret out the guerrillas and 
terrori sts. 1 7 
Michael McClintock has argued that United States security 
assistance 
insurgency 
was central ; n 
in Guatemala. 10a 
shaping 
Bearing 
the 
the 
war agai nst 
hallmarks of 
similar US-directed projects, claims that United States 
personnel were directly involved in counterinsurgency were 
commonplace. Most frequently cited is the assertion that 
up to 1,000 Green Berets were ope rat i ng on Guatema 1 an 
territory during this period,109 together with claims by 
Marroquin Rojas that United States pilots flew on round-
trips from the Panama Canal Zone to drop napalm on 
suspected guerri 11 a encampments .110 Both the US Embassy 
107 
11.7.67. 
LBJL WH, Memorandum to President from W Rostow, 
loa McClintock, The American Connection, pp.102-109. 
Prensa Libre, 10.11.67, gives an indication of the kind of 
aid the Guatemalan military was receiving openly via the US 
Mil ita r y Aid Pro g ram ( MA P): 3 U H - I H he 1 i cop t e r s , 5 M 1 1 3 
armoured cars, 4 jeeps, 2 troop carriers; see also Revista 
Militar, Oct.-Dic., Vol.58, p.77-80; Gabriel Aguilera 
Pera 1 ta, 'Terror and Vi 01 ence as Weapons of 
Counterinsurgency in Guatemala', Latin American 
Perspectives, 25/26 (Spring and Summer 1980), p.98. 
109 This figure appears to originate in an article by 
Georgie Ann Geyer in the Chicago Daily News, 12.1.66, and 
is regularly quoted in the literature: see also, Prensa 
Libre, 14.12.66; Galeano, Guatemala, pp.82-93. In October 
1968, bombs were dismantled in two cinemas showing the film 
'Green Berets' starring John Wayne: Prensa Libre, 31.10.68. 
110 Galeano, Guatemala: Clave. p.81; see also, 
testimony by guerrilla Leonidas Reyes, in Caceres, 
Aoroximacion a Guatemala, p.168; editorial, 'Ante la mas 
Negra Encrucijada', No Nos Tientes (1969), reproduced in 
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and the Guatemalan government were quick to deny the former 
allegation, with the Interior Minister adding that the 
government would never accept such foreign intervention in 
national issues and the Defence Minister arguing that the 
Guatemalan military was perfectly capable of fighting 
subversi on wi thout external ai d .111 
The involvement and exact numbers of United States 
personnel in direct combat remain difficult to verify - and 
have always been officially denied. 112 However, mobile 
training teams were sent to Guatemala for counterinsurgency 
pu rposes - advi sory or otherwi se - and the US Mi 1 i tary 
Mission in Guatemala is known to have comprised more than 
30 members .113 The' hearts and mi nds' -styl e strategy of 
infrastructural and socio-economic programmes in the core 
area of guerrilla activity which accompanied the military 
offensi ve has been seen as further evi dence of Uni ted 
States i nvol vement. 114 The ori gi ns of the death squads 
Documentos de Actualidad AEU, mimeo (May 1969) pp.16-17. 
111 The US Embassy issued an official denial regarding 
the allegations in the Chicago Daily News, 14.12.66: Prensa 
Libre, 14.12.66. Mario Fuentes Pieruccini, interview, 
Guatemala City, 2.2.94, also denies this aspect of US aid; 
equally predictably ex-guerrilla leader Cesar Montes, 
interview, San Salvador, insists on the veracity of the 
story. Mendez Montenegro, written response, Guatemala 
City, 31.1.94, refused to comment apart from to say that 
his government had recei ved no spec i a 1 aid from the US 
government itself. 
112 McClintock, The American Connection, pp.102-106. 
113 Uni ted States Ai r Force Operat ions Advi sor Maj or 
Bernard Westfall died when he crashed the Guatemalan Air 
Force T-33 jet he was piloting on a 'trial flight' to 
Escuintla - one of 28 deaths of North American officials in 
Guatemala between 1966 and 1972: ibid.; New York Times, 
16.6.68; Prensa Libre, 27.9.67. 
114 LASA, Ad Hoc Committee on Guatemala Report, 
15.4.73, p.7; Jonas and Tobis, Guatemala, p.118. Mendez 
Montenegro's announcement of the 'pilot plan for the socio-
economic development of the north-east' in December 1966 
was followed by USAID's counterpart loan to finance the 
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that appeared during this period have similarly attributed 
to Uni ted States gui dance and support, 115 and the January 
1968 assass i nat i on of two members of the US Mi 1 i tary 
Mission was justified by the FAR on these grounds.116 
Habia ... una misi6n norteamericana, un grupo 
mi 1 i tar muy fuerte, muy poderoso aqu i en 
Guatemala y algunas de las politicas 
contrainsurgentes que se llevaron a cabo estaban 
i~s~iradas 0 estimuladas por este grupo 
mllltar ... de operaciones, de logistica, de 10 que 
despues fue asuntos civiles que en ese entonces 
era acci6n civica, los norteamericanos nos dieron 
los indicativos, c6mo actuar ... la Constituci6n 
prohibia la existencia de grupos armados que no 
fueran del ejercito. Entonces creo yo que estos 
grupos fueron, P?r 10 menos, estimulados por los 
norteamericanos. 17 
Clandestine counterinsurgency operations during the 
Mendez MOn~egro regime were both urban and rural and 
involved a complex coalition of military and civilian 
project: Prensa Libre, 16.12.66, 7.4.67. The Plan Piloto 
involved the participation of several state ministries and 
agencies under the coordination of the Military Public 
Relations Chief and the Commander of the Zacapa military 
base, Colonel Carlos Arana Osorio. The Guatemalan 
Government was to provide Q257,400; USAID, Q280,OOO: ibid. 
115 Agui lera Peralta et al, Dialectica del Terror en 
Guatema 1 a, p. 115; 'Comi te de Defensa de los Derechos 
Humanos', La Violencia en Guatemala, p.33; Debray, The 
Revolution on Trial, p.311; Jonas Bodenheimer, Plan Piloto, 
p.348; McClintock, The American Connection, p.86. 
116 Co 1. John D. Webber Jr., Commander of the US 
Military Advisory Group, and Lt-Cmdr Ernest A. Munro, Head 
of U.S Naval Section, were assassinated on 16 January 1968, 
apparently in revenge for the death squad killing of ex-
beauty queen Rogelia Cruz Martinez. The former offical had 
reportedly claimed to have suggested the establishment of 
death squads as part of the counter-terror operat ions: 
Time, 26.1.68; Prensa Libre, 17.1.68; New York Times, 
17. 1 .68. 
117 Capta in Juan Fernando Ci fuentes Her rera, i nterv i ew, 
Guatemala City, 30.9.94. 
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e lements. '18 M f th any 0 e groups wh i ch announced thei r 
existence through the publication of death lists and 
'advice' to government policy makers were in fact phantom 
creations of the military, but this was not exclusively the 
case.
'19 In particular, the Movimiento anticomunista 
nacional organizado (MANO)'20 the first such group to 
appear -is generally agreed to have been formed by civilian 
extremists with close links to both the MLN and the 
military.121 During 1967, MANO leaders 'fell into 
[mi 1 i tary] di sfavor', after havi ng worked for a time in 
league with the army's 'Special Commando Unit' in the 
118 Mendez Montenegro, wri tten response, Guatema 1 a 
City, 31.1.94, claimed he did not believe that the 'armed 
groups' were linked to the military; Aguilera Peralta, 
'Terror and Violence', pp.98, 112-3, argues that at the 
height of the violence some 23 paramilitary organisations 
were operating, some of them linked to state security 
forces and others by the right. 
119 DDRS DOS 003262, I nte 11 i gence Note 843, 'Guatema 1 a: 
A Counterinsurgency Running Wild?', 23.10.67: this document 
identified NOA, CADEG, CRAG and RAYO, as examples of 'anti-
communist front organisations' for clandestine army 
counter-insurgency activities. MANO leader, Raul 
Lorenzana, c 1 aimed that together wi th MANO, Nueva 
Organizacion Communista (NOA) was a genuine organisation: 
El Grafico, 23.3.68; see also, Aguilera Peralta et al, 
Dialectica del Terror. pp.123-147; 'Comite de Defensa de 
los Derechos Humanos', La Violencia en Guatemala. 
120 Also known as Mano Blanca, the organisation's 
symbol was a white hand against a red circle outlined in 
black. 
121 PR Secretary General Alberto Mendez Martinez 
described MANO as a terrorist organisation in which 
liberacionista elements operated: Prensa Libre, 15.11.66. 
According to the CIA in October 1966, the MLN organised 
MANO as well as CRAG and the National Resistance Front. A 
later document stated MANO was 'taken over by the 
military': DDRS CIA 003061, Intelligence Memorandum, 
8.10.66; DDRS CIA 003023, Intelligence Memorandum, 8.11.68; 
see a 1 so, DDRS DOS 003262, I nte 11 i gence Note 843, 
'Guatemala: A Counterinsurgency Running Wild?' 23.10.67; 
Goulden 'Guatemala: Terror in Silence', The Nation, 
, 1 ' 22.3.71, p.366; Goulden, 'Guatemala: A Democracy Fa ters ; 
Jonas, Battle For Guatemala, p.62; McClintock, The American 
Connection, p.85. 
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capital. 122 A nAp r i 1 1 967 com m u n i que fro m MA N 0 i n d i cat e d 
competition between itself and the Nueva Organisacion 
Anticomunista (NOA).123 In addition, members of the Fourth 
Corps of the National Police were reportedly responsible 
for the murder of Jorge 'huevo loco' Cordova Molina, one of 
MA NO' s p r inc i pal 1 e a d e r san d ex - chi e f 0 f j u d i cia 1 pol ice 
under Ydigoras Fuentes. 124 MANO was also intimately 
involved in the kidnapping of Archbishop Casariego in March 
1968, a conspiracy which precipitated the removal from 
office of the Defense Minister and other high-ranking 
military officers. 
In addition to its links with the urban counter-terror 
network, the MLN was also deeply implicated in the 
organi sat i on of ci vi 1 i an armed groups in the north-east: 125 
122 DDRS DOS 003262, I nte 11 i gence Note 843, 'Guatema 1 a: 
A Counterinsurgency Running Wild?', 23.10.67. The 'Special 
Commando Unit' - the centre of the army's clandestine urban 
counter-terrorist apparatus - was headed by Colonel Maximo 
Zepeda, acting under orders from Defence Minister Arriaga 
Bosque. The unit also collaborated with the Fourth Corps of 
the National Police: ibid. According to the 'Comite de 
Defensa de Derechos Humanos', La Vi 01 enc i a en Guatema 1 a, 
pp.44-5, Colonel Zepeda headed NOA. 
123 MANO accused NOA of 'a 1 taneri a y bravuconeri a' in 
claiming responsibility for the killing of three 'bandidos 
guerrilleros': MANO bulletin, 2.4.67, reproduced in CIDOC, 
Guatemala La Vio1encia, Dossier No.21, p.4/282. 
124 DDRS DOS 003262, I nte 11 i gence Note 843, 'Guatema 1 a: 
A Counterinsurgency Running Wild?', 23.10.67. 
125 DDRS DOS 003262, I nte 11 i gence Note 843, 'Guatema 1 a: 
A Counter-insurgency Running Wild?', 23.10.67. Edelberto 
Torres Ri vas, 'Authori tari an Trans it i on to Democracy. in 
Central America', in Jan Flora and Ede1berto Torres R1vas 
(eds.) Sociology of 'Developing Societies: Central America (Londo~, 1989), p.197, argues that paramilitarism has 
historically had a peasant base in Central America 
beginning with the Nicaraguan jueces de mesta ~nd t~e 
Guatemalan military commissioner system both establ1shed 1n 
the late nineteenth century and continuing into the 1960s 
in E1 Salvador with the formation of the mass peasant 
organisation ORDEN under the auspices of the National 
Guard; see also, Jenny Pearce, Promised Land. Peasant 
Rebellion in Cha1atenango E1 Salvador (London, 1986) pp.89-
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E1 movimiento antiguerri11ero adopt a este 
sistema. La 1ucha armada en 1a zona nor-oriente 
del pais entra en una fase de suma vio1encia. Se 
empieza a combatir 1a vio1encia con vio1encia y 
e1 terror con terror. Ahora, ya que se sabe 
quienes son los co1aboradores de 1a guerrilla se 
los busca di rectamente y se los 1 i q~ ida 
imp 1 acab 1 emente. 126 
Initially believed to be preparations for a new 1iberacion-
style invasion, in September 1966 the FAR had denounced MLN 
activities in the region and accused the party of seeking 
logistical and financial support from Honduras, E1 Salvador 
and Nicaragua. 127 These groups became part of the rural 
counterinsurgency apparatus, armed and organised in large 
part by the Zacapa military commander, Arana Osorio. Its 
backbone was the local military commissioner network - most 
of whom belonged to the MLN and recruited amongst its 
supporters. 128 In 1967, the army c 1 aimed to have some 
1,800 armed civilians under its control, although the State 
Department observed that other groups were also known to 
operate 'semi-independently' in the region. 129 
91; and Michael McClintock, The American Connection Volume 
1. State Terror and Popu1 ar Resi stance in E1 Sal vador 
(London, 1985) p.207. 
126 'La guerrilla y anti-guerrilla en Guatemala', May 
1967, mimeo, reproduced in CIDOC, Guatemala La Vio1encia, 
pp.4/2-4/19, p.4/16. This document was said to be the work 
of the MLN: 'Comite Guatema1teco de Defensa de los Derechos 
Humanos', 'Terror en Guatemala!', 31.7.67, mimeo, 
reproduced in ibid., pp.5/2-5/27, p.5/23. 
127 This threat was apparently taken seriously by the 
government and there were diplomatic consultations on the 
matter with Presidents Rivera and Lopez Arellano: Prensa 
Libre, 26.8.66, 12.9.66; New York Times, 9.11.66, 13.11.66; 
see a 1 so, Gou 1 den, 'Guatema 1 a: a Democracy Fa 1 ters " p. 18. 
128 DDRS CIA 003023, Intelligence Memorandum 2051/68, 
8.11 .68; DDRS DOS 003262, I nte 11 i gence Note 843, 
'Guatemala: A Counter-insurgency Running Wild?', 23.10.67. 
129 DDRS DOS 003262, I nte 11 i gence Note 843, 'Guatema 1 a: 
A Counter-insurgency Running Wild?', 23.10.67. 
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Noting the success of 'a combination of overt and covert 
operations by the Guatemalan security forces and right-wing 
civilian associates and auxiliaries to stamp out the 
insurgents' in October 1967, the State Department also 
expressed its concern that 'the counter-insurgency machine 
is out of control '.130 Victims of the counter-terror 
during the previous twelve months were 'roughly' estimated 
at between 1,000 to 1,200: 131 
In addition to "known" communists and communist 
sympathisers, the clandestine counter-insurgency 
groups (both urban and rural) have threatened and 
acted against an alarmingly broad range of 
Guatemalans of all social sectors and political 
persuasions. Labor leaders, businessmen, 
students and intellectuals, government officials, 
and politicians have all been included at various 
times on the "target lists" of the clandestine 
"ant i-communi st organi sat ions". 132 
The vulnerability of PR militants to death squad 
activities underlined the partisan quality of the violence 
and complicated any easy characterisation of the 
phenomenon. As a result, the counterinsurgency question 
became an increasingly divisive issue within the governing 
party i tsel f. In January 1967, PR deputy Ed mundo Lopez 
Duran declared that military commissioners in his 
Chiquimula constituency were acting in collusion with MANO 
against members of the governing party under the protection 
of State of Siege regulations. 133 He was expelled from the 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid. 
132 DDRS DOS 003262, I nte 11 i gence Note 843, 'Guatema 1 a : 
A Counter-Insurgency Running Wild?' J 23.10.67. 
133 El Grafico, 3.2.67, 4.2.67, 7.2.67; La Hora, 
3.2.67. 
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party in April for 'indiscipline,.134 In March, ten 
members of the local PR organisation in Sanarate, El 
Progreso, were dragged from thei r homes at gunpoi nt. 135 PR 
deputy Marco Antoni 0 Soto Betata was assassi nated days 
after five PR deputies received death threats in May 1967, 
while the President of Congress privately admitted to US 
Embassy officials that all PR deputies had received 
threats. 136 
The debate intensified in August 1967, when the PR 
leadership revealed that it had secretly approved the 
arming of civilians in the counterinsurgency war - 'but 
only in the north-eastern zone of the country, where it was 
necessary to combat the guerri 11 as' .137 Wi th tortuous 
logic, Interior Minister Mansilla Pinto argued that this 
was not a question of arming individuals in their own right 
since they had been incorporated into the security forces -
thus they were not really civilians at all, but militares 
'dressed as civilians,.138 As Marroqu in Roj as observed J 
this was a disturbing admission with serious implications 
for the PR and the government: 
134 As a member of the Congressional Committee required 
to ratify a further extension to the State of Siege, Lopez 
Duran had refused to put hi s name to the decree: Prensa 
Libre, 6.4.67. 
135 Prensa Libre, 1.4.67. Interior Minister Mansilla 
Pinto confirmed that of eleven disappeared in Sansarate, 
four were PR activists and claimed that either MANO or NOA 
were responsible. MANO denied responsibility and accused 
the police: Prensa Libre, 4.4.67. 
136 Prensa Libre, 24.5.67, 31.5.67; DDRS DOS 003262, 
Hughes to The Secretary, 'Guatema 1 a: A Counter- insurgency 
Running Wild?', Intelligence Note 843, 23.10.67. 
137 Professor Rafael Pantoja, Director PR political 
training, Mansilla Pinto, Interior Minister, Prensa Libre, 
26.8.67. The latter had previously denied rumours of ~uch 
groups, as had the military's public relations offlce: 
Prensa Libre, 12.7.67. 
138 Prensa Libre, 26.8.67, 30.8.67. 
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Deci r esto, es aceptar que los muertos que han 
aparecido en los caminos, comidos de los perros 
y de los zopilotes, son obra de esos grupos ... la 
afirmaci6n es gravisima ... ya que no s6lo se acusa 
al Ejercito de esa practica, sino que se hace 
solidario de ella al PRJ precisamente J 9uando la 
mayor i a de los ca i dos son gente de 1 PR. 39 
The united front which had been tenuously achieved within 
the PR leadership around the question of armed civilians 
began to fragment in early March 1968. In terms almost 
identical to L6pez Duran's previous denuncia, PR Secretary-
General Alberto Mendez Martinez declared that clandestine 
groups were using the continuing State of Alarm to kidnap 
and murder elements of the PR. 140 The potential 
confrontation between the PR and the Executive was halted 
by the FAR's rocket attack on two security forces targets 
in Guatemala City,141 but may have contributed to Mendez 
Montenegro's move aga i nst members of the mi 1 i tary high 
command at the end of March. 
139 Clemente Marroquin Rojas, 'Las Declaraciones del 
PR', La Hora, 26.8.67. Ever eager to embarrass Mendez 
Montenegro and the government, it is also worth noting that 
the vi ce-Presi dent was rumoured to be a MANO supporter: 
see, for example La Hora, 29.11.67. 
140 Prensa Libre, 6.3.68; El Grafico, 6.3.68; New York 
Times, 9.3.68. Interestingly, MLN deputies also °hPPOS~d 
the extension of the State of Alarm, ~rguing t at ,t 
restricted political activities: Prensa Llbre, 18.3.68. 
141 Prensa Libre, 14.3.68. 
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The Civilian 'Golpe' of March 1968 
Whether dismayed by his poor public image or 
driven to political courage by the desperate 'need 
to end the bloodshed, or angered by some specific 
outrage such as, the kidnapping of the archbishop, 
Mendez acted Wl thout warni ng and 'exi 1 ed' those 
responsible for the c~unterterrorism by sending 
them to posts abroad. 1 2 
... hace un ano planteamos categoricamente 
que ... el ciudadano presidente de la 
republ i ca ... debi a romper 1 as cadenas y di sponerse 
a gobernar con sent i do exc 1 us i vo de ese mi smo 
pueblo que le habia elegido. Y ese aspecto 
dificil que requeria valor pragmatico, firme 
habilidad, integridad y consecuencia ... ha sido 
por fin cumplido ... decidio consolidar el regimen 
de Derecho emperante, y a fi anzar 1 a paz y 1 a 
institucionalidad del pais de conformidad con los 
fundamentos const i tuci ona 1 es ... 14 
In an unprecedented move with potentially explosive 
implications, on 28 March 1968 Mendez Montenegro dismissed 
his Defence Minister Colonel Rafael Arriaga Bosque, 
together with the Commander of the Zacapa military base, 
Colonel Carlos Arana Osorio and the Director of National 
Police, Colonel Manuel Sosa Avila. 144 Explained as routine 
142 DDRS CIA 003063, I nte 11 i gence Memorandum. 
'Guatemala after the Military Shakeup', 13.5.68. 
143 Jaime Monge Donis, Second Secretary of CONTRAGUA. 
El Grafico, 5.5.68. 
144 Mendez Montenegro's 1 ater accounts name 'Ch i ef' of 
Army General Staff Colonel Kjell Laugerud (in fact he was 
2nd-Chief of Army General Staff) - and not Sosa Avila - as 
the third key figure removed. According to the ex-
President, Laugerud's name does not appear in 
contemporaneous reports of the changes because he was moved 
a few days later: Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro. interview. 
Guatemala City, 18.11.94; Prensa Libre. 29.3.68; El 
Grafico, 29.3.68, 15.12.85; New York Times., 30.~.6~. 
Arriaga Bosque was designated Consul General ln Ml~ml. 
Arana Osorio, Ambassador to Nicaragua. and Sosa AVl la, 
military attache to the Guatemalan Embassy in Spai~. 
Laugerud was sent to Washington as military attache: 
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democratic practice, the immediate context for these 
military changes was the kidnapping of Archbishop Casariego 
on 16 March. 145 An abortive attempt by the extreme right 
to force Mendez Montenegro's res i gnat ion, the kidnappers 
threatened to kill the Archbishop if the President did not 
stand down. 146 
Any intention to present 
guerrillas was thwarted by 
and the FAR,147 while the 
failed to materialise. 148 
the outrage as the work of the 
rapid denials from both the PGT 
expected protests and unrest 
Speculation as to the extent of 
police and military involvement was heightened by a MANO 
communique giving details of the affair and appeared to be 
confirmed by subsequent events. 149 In addition, the deed 
unleashed a series of scandals. A warrant was issued for 
the arrest of ex-President Ydigoras Fuentes' crony, 
landowner Roberto Alejos Arzu, for his alleged involvement 
in the conspi racy, and there were a 1 so all egat ions about 
the role in the affair played by Vice-President Marroquin 
Prensa Libre, 4.4.68; El Grafico, 15.12.85; McClintock, 
The American Connection, p.95. 
145 Mendez Montnegro address to nat ion, Prensa L i bre, 
6.4.68; Prensa Libre, 8.4.68. 
146 This ultimatum was not made public at the time: 
Prensa Libre, 25.3.68; Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro, 
written response, 31.1.94. 
147 Handy, Gi ft of the Devi 1, p. 163; McCl i ntock. The 
American Connection, p.95. Prensa Libre. 18.3.68, reported 
receiving separate denials from the PGT and the FAR. 
148 La Hora, 22.3.68. 
149 El Grafico, 27.3.68. General Gramajo Morales, 
interview, Guatemala City. 31.10.94. has stated t~at the 
kidnapping was carried out by the extreme right wlth the 
consent of the military hierachy and the connivance of the 
Archbishop himself. 
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Rojas himself. 150 
It is possible that plans for a military overhaul were 
already underway before Casariego's abduction and that the 
action represented a preemptive strike. In particular. a 
document purporting to be the transcript of a conversation 
between the Archbishop and his principal kidnapper. MANO 
leader Raul Lorenzana. suggests that the prelate had been 
party to a scheme to remove Arriaga Bosque and Arana Osorio 
from office. 151 While McClintock has emphasised 
Casariego's 'extremely conservative views'. it is worth 
not i ng that the Archbi shop had i nfuri ated ul tramontane 
elements with his calls for a civic dialogue to end the 
violence and his clear condemnation of death squad 
activity.152 
150 Formally censured by PR deputies in Congress for 
his 'reprehensible behaviour' during the affair the 
question of his actual involvement was avoided - the Vice-
President washed his hands of the PR and went on to promote 
MLN presidential candidate Colonel Arana Osorio for the 
1970 elections: Prensa Libre. 27.3.68; El Grafico. 28.3.68; 
Mario Fuentes Pierrucini. interview. Guatemala City. 
2.2.94; Isidoro Zarco. Prensa Libre. 26.3.68; Marroquin 
Rojas, La Hora, 26.3.68. Mendez Montenegro refused to 
discuss any aspect of his uncomfortable relationship with 
Marroquin Rojas: Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro. written 
response. 31.1.94; interview. Guatemala City, 18.11.94. 
151 Comi te de Defensa de los Derechos Humanos, La 
Violencia en Guatemala, pp.187-194. This account 
contradicts suggestions that Casariego conspired in his own 
abduct ion. it is interest i ng to note the pub 1 i cat ion in 
Prensa Libre. 22.3.68, of a photograph in which the 
Archbishop appears in friendly conversation with one 
Roberto Alejos Arzu at the time supposedly facing a 
warrant for arrest for his involvement in the conspiracy. 
The photographer responsible was dismissed from the 
Presidential Public Relations Office: Prensa Libre. 
29.3.68; General Hector Gramajo Morales. interview. 
Guatemala City. 31.10.94; Marroquin Rojas, La Hora, 
23.3.68; McClintock. The American Connection. p.95. 
152 Archbi shop Casari ego. Prensa L i bre. 10.5.67, 
20.2.68; Raul Lorenzana. interview. El Grafico. 13.5.67; 
ibid .• 23.3.68; Comite de Defensa de los Derechos Hum~nos. 
La Violencia en Guatemala. pp.187-194; New York Tlmes, 
22.3.68; McClintock. The American Connection. p.95. 
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Wi th regard to Uni ted States i nvo1 vement , n any such 
plan, documents show that there was considerable concern 
within the State Department about the levels of 
counterinsurgency violence in Guatemala at this stage and 
suggest that there would have been at least tacit support 
for Mendez Montenegro's act ions. 153 Whether or not plans 
had a 1 ready been 1 aid for the 
sequence of events moved very 
Archbishop's release on 20 March. 
mi 1 i tary reshuffl e, the 
swiftly following the 
The reappearance of some 
half a dozen missing students abducted from the 
University of San Carlos campus on 21 March - coincided 
with the announcement of the military changes and tended to 
confirm the impression that the President had finally 
decided to act to curb death squad activities. 154 
Given Mendez Montenegro's weakness in relation to the 
armed forces, his action appears particularly impressive. 
Moreover, he was directly challenging the terms of the 
'secret pact' of March 1966. 155 At the same time, however, 
CIA sources noted that the 'exiled' commanders had resisted 
pressure from their followers to retaliate - 'unwilling to 
risk an open split in the armed forces,156 - and it seems 
153 DDRS DOS 003262, 'Guatema 1 a: A Counter- insurgency 
Running Wild?', 23.10.67. The CIA remained uncertain as to 
what exact 1 y had prompted Mendez Montenegro's move: DDRS 
CIA 003023, Intelligence Memorandum, 'The Military and the 
Right in Guatemala', 8.11.66. 
154 Prensa Libre, 25.3.68, 26.3.68, 27.3.68, 29.3.68; 
E1 Grafico, 26.3.68, 27.3.68; La Hora, 29.3.68: Casariego 
subsequently refused to speak publicly about his ordeal 
apart from to say that he forgave his kidnappers. 
155 His later claims that this move definitively ended 
his compact wi th the mi 1 i tary have been. tempered more 
recently by his acknowledgement that executlve ~ontrol over 
the institution remained incomplete: 'Confeslones de un 
expresidente', E1 Grafico, 15.12.85; Ju1 io Ces.ar Me~dez 
Montenegro, written communication, 31.1.94; lntervlew. 
Guatemala City, 18.11.94. 
156 DDRS CIA 003063, I nte 11 i gence Memorandum. 
'Guatemala after the Military Shakeup', 13.5.68. 
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clear that the President required the considerable Support 
of other powerful seni or offi cers in order to remai n ; n 
office. According to respondents. these figures included 
Colonel Enrique Daniel Cifuentes Mendez -Commander of the 
important Mariscal Zavala army base in the capital and an 
erstwhile opponent of the Mendez Montenegro succession in 
March 1966 together wi th Ai r Force Commander Colonel 
Doroteo Monterroso Mi randa and Colonel Gui 11 ermo Mendez 
Montenegro. 1S7 The 'civilian golpe' therefore suggested 
less a shift in the military-civilian balance of forces 
than shifting alliances within the military establishment 
itself. 
Unravelling the internal workings of the Guatemalan 
military is a notoriously difficult task and the precise 
details of these events remain opaque. However, in 
considering possible motives for continued military support 
for the President at this stage. institutional concerns can 
be assumed to have played an important part. In the first 
place - as has already been noted - Arriaga Bosque was not 
a popular officer. According to General Gramajo Morales. 
his appointment as Defence Minister had generated tensions 
within the institu~on which had been suppressed rather than 
resolved. 1SS In addition. Arriaga Bosque. Arana Osorio and 
Sosa Avila had become clearly associated in the public 
consc i ousness wi th the c 1 andest i ne terror network. 159 
157 Genera 1 Hector Gramaj 0 Mora 1 es. i ntervi ew. 
Guatemala City. 31.10.94; Captain Juan Fernando Cifuentes 
Herrera, interview, Guatemala City, 30.9.94; Julio Cesar 
Mendez Montenegro, i ntervi ew, Guatema 1 a Ci ty, 18.11.94. 
General Cifuentes Mendez refused to confirm his role in the 
events. General Enrique Daniel Cifuentes Mendez, 
interview, 4.11.94. 
158 Genera 1 Hector Gramaj 0 Mora 1 es, interview, 
Guatemala City. 31.10.94. 
159 New Yo r k Time s, 30. 3 . 68; Mar r oq u i n Ro j as, La H_Q r a • 
3.8.68; DDRS DOS 003262, Intelligence Note 843, IGuat~m?la: 
A Counter-Insurgency Running Wild?', 23.10.67; Com,te de 
Defensa de los Derechos Humanos, La Violencia en Guatemala. 
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There is also some suggestion that the Defense Minister and 
the Zacapa commander were competing between themselves for 
control of the dirty war. 160 While this kind of conflict 
wo u 1 d h a v e g e n era ted a 1 arm s i g n a 1 s wit h i nth e mil ita r y 
. h establ1~ment, the attempt to unseat Mendez Montenegro with 
the abduction of Archbishop Casariego may have proved one 
outrage too many for the military 'institutionalists'. 
A further consideration was the military defeat of the 
guerrillas in the north-east and the perception that there 
was little inherent risk in moving against Arana at this 
stage. 
13 and 
In this respect, the public unification of the MR-
FAR 1n February 1968 signalled the movement's 
weakness rather than its strength and coincided with the 
separation of the latter from the PGT in a rupture which 
had been pending since 1964. 161 The separate declarations 
issued on behalf of the FAR by Pablo Monsanto and Camilo 
Sanchez on the one hand, and by Cesar Montes on the other, 
indicated the extent of disarray within the guerrilla 
leadership itself. 162 
p.206. 
160 
(PGT) , 
en 1 a 
CIDOC, 
4/271, 
Comite Central del Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo 
'Orientaciones para impulsar la lucha revolucionaria 
actual situacion politica', 2.7.67, reproduced in 
Guatemala: La Violencia, Dossier No.21, pp.4/266-
p.4/267. 
161 'Comuni cado de Uni fi caci on de 1 as FAR y del MR-13', 
reproduced in INDAL, Movimientos Revolucionarios de America 
Latina, pp.92-3; Yearbook on International Communist 
Affairs, (Stanford, 1969), p.398; Debray. The Re~olut~on on 
Trial, pp.325-6. The split precipitated the res1gnatlon of 
some 50 per cent of the PGT's Central Committee membership 
and 40 per cent of the party's Political Committee: 
Tricontinental Bulletin (October 1968), cited in Yearbook 
on International Communist Affairs. (1969), p.393. 
162 , Dec 1 arac i on de 1 as FAR de Guatema 1 a: E 1 PGT ha 
capitulado, las FAR rompen con una corriente politica 
oportunista'. 10.1.68, reproduced in INDAL, Movi~ien~<:>s 
Revolucionarios de America Latina, pp.78-82; 'Comunlcaclon 
de Caracter nacional e internacional. pp,83-7; 'Declaracion 
de Cesar Montes', 21.1.68, reproduced in ibid. J pp.88-91. 
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Finally, Mendez Montenegro's restoration of the military 
rank of General in September 1968 should also be noted. 
Unofficially discarded since the October 1944 as a punitive 
measure against senior officers who had supported Ubico, 
the rank of General was again bestowed on five colonels in 
a ceremony that also marked the new Ley Constitutiva del 
Ej erc i to de Guatema 1 a of 5 September 1968. 163 
Significantly, the beneficiaries of what the President 
termed 'an act of justice for the armed institution,164 
included the new Defence Minister Rolando Chinchilla 
Aguilar, together with Colonels Cifuentes Mendez and 
Monterroso Miranda central fi gures in uphol di ng the 
President's earlier actions against Arriaga Bosque, Arana 
Osorio and Sosa Avi la. 16S 
A period of relative calm followed the events of March 
1968, a 1 though the State of A 1 arm was not 1 i fted unt i 1 
June. Sources at the Supreme Court recorded a reduction in 
'subversive acts' immediately following the kidnapping of 
For an outline of the 'fractionalist intrigue' within the 
revolutionary movement which eventually led to the 
expul si on of Cesar Montes from the FAR see Debray, The 
Revolution on Trial, pp.320-36. 
163 A copy of whi ch was presented by the Presi dent to 
the newly-promoted Defence Minister, General Rolando 
Chinchilla Aguilar: Prensa Libre, 16.9.68; 'Ley 
Constitutiva del Ejercito de Guatemala', Congressional 
Decree 1782, 5.9.68. Recopilacion de Leyes, Vol.88, p.159. 
164 Mendez Montenegro cited in Prensa L i bre. 16.9.68. 
165 The other reci pi ents were Doroteo Reyes Santa Cruz 
_ who later became Minister of Defence - and Manuel Arturo 
Gi ron Natareno: Congress i ona 1 Decree 1789. 12.9.68. 
Recopilacion de Leyes. Vol.88. p.77; Prensa Libre. 16.9.68. 
17.9.68; Mendez Montenegro, wri tten response ... Guatema 1 a 
City. 31.1.94; Gramajo Morales. Liderazgo Mllltar yel 
Futuro del Ejercito de Guatemala. (Guatemala. 1990). pp.53-
54. 
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the Archbi shop. 166 Thi s respi te gave added wei ght to the 
already considerable evidence against the officers in 
question and their involvement in coordinating the counter-
terror, yet the longer-term benefits of their removal from 
office were limited. Colonel Sosa Avila returned to 
Guatemala in June 1969 to the post of Interior Minister, 
while Arana Osorio emerged as the winning candidate for the 
MLN/PID coalition in the March 1970 presidential 
elections. 167 Moreover, the right reportedly viewed new 
Defence Minister Chinchilla Aguilar with suspicion, 
interpreting his call to all Guatemalans to lay down their 
arms as 'an unwarranted 
accommodation of the 1 eft' .168 
perhaps 
By May 
traitorous 
1968, junior 
officers were expressing a similar lack of confidence in 
the revi sed mi 1 i tary command structure .169 
President Mendez' sudden dismissal of 3 key 
military officers ... has given the Guatemalan 
people a president in fact as well as in 
name ... Guatemalans of all political shades have 
interpreted Mendez' assertion of authority as the 
end of the armed forces' constriction on civilian 
r u 1 e . 170 
166 In contrast to the daily minimum of five writs of 
habeus corpus issued by those seeking missing relatives, 3 
April was the second consecutive day without a single writ 
being presented: Prensa Libre, 4.4.68. 
167 Colonel Kjell Laugerud became President in 1974 
after blatant fraud and military pressure stole the 
elections from the Christian Democrats and convinced their 
candidate, Colonel Efrain Rios Montt to accept the 
Guatemalan Ambassadorship to Spain. Significantly, Colonel 
Arriaga Bosque was not rehabilitated. He was assass~nated 
on 7 September 1977. Colonel Sosa Avila was assasslnated 
on 1 April 1985. 
168 DDRS CIA 003063, I nte 11 i gence Memorandum. 
'Guatemala after the Military Shakeup', 13.5.68; Chinchilla 
Aguilar, address to nation, Prensa Libre. 30.3.68. 
169 DDRS CIA 003063, Intelligence Memorandum. 
'Guatemala after the Military Shakeup', 13.5.68. 
170 I bid. 
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Expectations that Mendez Montenegro's assertion of 
civilian power would allow him to move forward on the 
socio-economic remained unfulfilled, while recrudescent 
vi 01 ence in the north-east in the second ha 1 f of 1968 
revived the unresolved issue of the civilian militias in 
this region. In the context of municipal elections in 
August, Alberto Mendez Martinez again claimed that PR 
sympathisers in particular were suffering harassment and 
death at the hands of paramilitary forces, and accused the 
mi 1 i tary of exert i ng pressure on voters in the regi on. 171 
A central factor underlying this pressure was the 
rea 1 i sat i on that the MLN' s power-base in the north-east 
represented a si gni fi cant threat to the chances of a PR 
victory in the 1970 elections: 172 
El PR demanda del gobierno la desaparicion de los 
grupos clandestinos que operan en el nororiente 
de la republica, pues se han convertido en bandas 
de asesinos ... Tomando en cuenta que el propio 
gobierno ha declarado que ya no existen 
guerrilleros en aquel sector del pais y que la 
constitucion de la republica prohibe el 
funcionamiento de milicias ajenas a la 
institucion armada, el PR demanda de los 
autoridades civiles y militares la desaparicion 
de tales grupos.173 
The assassination of United States Ambassador John Gordon 
171 Chinchilla Aguilar narrowly avoided being called 
to account by Congress on these issues: Prensa L i bre, 
19.8.68, 20.8.68, 21.8.68. The PR c 1 aimed a sweepi ng 
victory in the 11 August elections in 294 municipalities: 
ibid., 12.8.68, 13.8.68; New York Times, 13.8.68. 
172 The MLN was a 1 so est i mated to have the support of 
most of the 3,000-5,000 regional military commissioners, 
DDRS CIA 003023, Intelligence Memorandum, 8.11.68. 
173 Alberto Mendez Mart inez, Prensa L i bre, 17.8.68. 
The militias were quietly disbanded in October 1968, while 
a subsequent newspaper report noted that finqueros were n~w 
permitted to run their own private armies to protect thelr 
property: DDRS CIA 003023, Intelligence Memorandum, 'The 
Military and the Right in Guatemala', 8.11.68; La Hora, 
2.4.69. 
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Mein by FAR forces on 28 August 1968 effectively ended any 
remaining appearance of tranqui1ity.174 Decimated at their 
rural base and retreating to the relative safety of the 
displaced guerrillas demonstrated their 
capacity for spectacular assaults in the 
city, the 
continuing 
capita1. 175 However, Mein's assassination did not appear 
to be part of an overa 11 st rategy to rega in lost ground. 
Indeed, as the FAR subsequently admitted, the attack was an 
abort i ve kidnap attempt - an 
arrest of guerrilla leader 
pressure for his re1ease. 176 
executed. 
improvised response to the 
Cami10 Sanchez intended to 
In fact, he had already been 
Effectively in command of FAR operations since the end of 
1967, Cami10 Sanchez had been the prime instigator of the 
split with the PGT and the rejection of political 
negotiation for a purely military strategy: 
... unos pequenoburgueses ... nos han empuj ado a 
probar si 1 a 1 ucha revo1 uci onari a puede vencer, 
sin que e110s se quemen los dedos, abandonandonos 
a nuestra suerte bajo e1 fuego enemigo, bajo las 
bombas norteamericanas, bajo 1a guadana 
imperia1ista del exterminio, de 1a massacre, como 
10 hi ci eron en 1954 y como 10 hacen en e1 
presente cuando creen ver amenazada 1a 
supervivencia de su 11amado Partido Guatema1teco 
174 Prensa Libre, 29.8.68, 30.8.68, 31.8.68. CACIF 
offered a Q10,OOO reward for information leading the arrest 
of the assassins: La Hora, 6.9.68. Available US Government 
documents throw little light on the US response to the 
assassination, and comments are mainly confined to details 
available in the Guatemalan press. Mein was replaced as US 
Ambassador by Nathaniel Davis who was later US Ambassador 
to Chile at the time of the 1973 coup. 
175 These included the kidnap of the Foreign Minister, 
Alberto Fuentes Mohr, was kidnapped on the eve of the March 
1970 elections and the assassination of the German 
Ambassador, Count Von Spreti on 5 May 1970. 
176 New York Times, 29.8.68, 30.8.68, Oebray, The 
Revolution on Trial, p.327; Yearbook on International 
Communist Affairs (1969), p.398. 
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del Trabajo.l77 
At the time of his death, his plan to open a new rural 
front in Alta Verapaz was disintegrating and the repression 
which followed Ambassador Mein's murder dealt a further 
blow to the organisation. 178 A subsequent overhaul of the 
guerrilla leadership placed Pablo Monsanto at the head of 
the command structure, together with Androcles Hernandez, 
Rami ro Di az and Fe 1 i ciano Argueta. 179 I n September 1968 J 
it was announced that Cesar Montes had been demoted to the 
rank of 'private' for being an 'antirevolutionary 
opportunist', while Yon Sosa was reportedly removed from 
his position as Commander-in-Chief for 'treasonous and 
subversive' behaviour. 180 Yon Sosa's open letter to U 
Imparcial in January 1969 confirmed his resignation from 
the FAR command and declared the latter dissolved.1S1 
To all intents and purposes, the first attempt to 
establish a rural guerrilla in Guatemala had been 
decisively defeated by the end of 1967. Fort i fi ed by US 
security assistance, the severity of the counterinsurgency 
offensive in the north-east of the country had been central 
to this collapse. The role played by the military-
sponsored right-wing militias in the region had been 
particularly effective in this regard. Other factors must 
177 
'Declaraci6n 
Capitulado', p.78. 
de las FAR de Guatemala: el 
178 Debray, The Revolution on Trial, pp.332-4. 
PGT ha 
179 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 
(1969), p.398. Pablo Monsanto remains Commander of the FAR 
within the present URNG guerrilla alliance. 
180 Guerrillero. (supplement) September 1968 and 
November 1968. cited in Yearbook on International Communist 
Affairs (1970). p.425. 
181 Ell m par cia 1, 28. 1 . 69 • cit e din i b ,i cj • M R - 1 3 was 
resurrected and returned to the Izabal re~lon, led by Yon 
Sosa in alliance with Gabriel Salazar untll hlS death in 
June 1970: Debray, The Revolution on Trial. p.323. 
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also be taken into consideration in explaining the decline 
of the guerrillas at this stage. Not least of these was 
the palpable failure of the foquista assumption that a 
small and dedicated band of revolutionaries could create 
the conditions for revolut1'on w,'thout f' 
, rst engagi ng in 
extensive political work among the local population. 
Associated with th,'s bl pro em was the fact that, 
notwithstanding claims of widespread support, the 
guerrillas were unable to sustain or defend their popular 
base from the devast i ng effects of the combi ned 
counterinsurgency effort ranged against them from the end 
of 1966. 182 In addition, the revolutionary movement was 
constantly beset by ideological disputes, proved prone to 
infiltration and defections and continued to lack effective 
and coherent 1 eadersh i p. 183 
A final consideration in the defeat of this first 
generation of Guatemalan guerrillas must be the challenge 
presented by the transition from de facto military rule to 
constitutional civilian government in July 1966. The 
existence of popularly-elected regimes in many Latin 
182 Whi 1 e the FGEI/FAR had in fact begun to move away 
from a strict application of foquismo as early as 1965 and 
increasingly emphasised the Vietnamese model of prolonged 
popular war, the strategy was explicitly criticised by the 
second generation of Guatemalan revolutionaries which 
emerged in the 1970s. Nevertheless, guerrilla leader Mario 
Payeras i dent i fi ed an underl yi ng adhesi on to the foco 
theory as a continuing flaw which continued to undermine 
the guerrilla campaign of the 1980s: Mario Payeras, Los 
Fusiles de Octubre, pp.89-100; see also, Dunkerley, Power 
in the Isthmus, pp.452-3; 'Turcios Renuncia del 13', pp.49-
50; Cesar Montes, interview, San Salvador, 6.9.94. 
183 The most notori ous of these defectors were Sa 1 vador 
Orellana alias 'Gallo Giro' and Oliverio Casteneda, who 
later became an MLN deputy during the Arana government and 
was reportedly leader of the Ojo por Ojo death squad: 
Gabriel Aguilera Peralta, interview, Guatemala City, 
16.11.93; Debray, The Revolution on Trial" p.34.1; 'Un 
bosquejo historico: Leonidas Reyes' 1n Cacer~s, 
Aproximacion a Guatemala, pp.166-7; see also PR elect,on 
publicity, 'Pacto con las guerrillas! De Quien?', Prensa 
Libre, 14.8.69; ibid, 20.3.70. 
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American countries in the 1960s were an important factor in 
the failure of their rural guerrilla 
movements to sei ze 
power and contrasted sharply with the situation in Cuba in 
1959. 184 Wh·1 h 
, e t e Mendez Montenegro regime did not have 
the ki nd of mass support of the Betancourt and Leoni 
governments in Venezue 1 a, nor th even at of Be 1 aunde in 
Peru, there is no doubt that ,. thad a certain popular 
1 eg i t i macy i n its early stages. 18S By the time that the 
limits to reform had become clear, the guerrillas were no 
longer a viable military force. 
184 Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution, p.178, 
has also pointed to the radicalism of the guerrilla 
movements in Guatemala and Venezuela in comparison to 
Castro'S 'bourgeois-democratic' ideology and his emphasis 
on the illegality of the Batista dictatorship. 
185 It i s perhaps worth not i ng here Che Guevara's 1960 
'democratic corollary' to his theory of guerrilla warfare, 
in which he argued that armed struggle should not be 
undertaken aga i nst a government that has come to power 
through some form of popular vote and maintains 'at least 
the appearance of constitutional legality', even though by 
1963 this corollary had been discarded to incorporate 
Venezuela into the revolution: Ernesto Che Guevara, 
Guerrilla Warfare, (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1985) and 'Guerra de 
Guerrillas: Un Metodo, Cuba Socialista (Sept. 1963), both 
cited in Matt D. Childs enlightening article, 'An 
Historical Critique of the Emergence and Evolution of 
Ernesto Che Guevara's Foco Theory', Journal of Latin 
American Studies (27, 1995); see also, Wickham-Crowley, 
Guerrillas and Revolution, pp.166-70. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE ELECTIONS OF MARCH 1970 
La sucesi on presi denci al fue absol utamente 
norma 1, a 1 punto de que r 1 Corone 1 Arana fue a 
despedirme al aeropuerto. 
Introduction 
The debate on the legacy of the Mendez Montenegro 
government was recently rekindled by the death of the ex-
president on 28 April 1996. Thirty years after the 'Third 
Government of the Revolution' took office, the collective 
memory remains one of frustrated expectations and the 
'betrayal' embodied in the pact with the military.2 
Several factors combined to bring about the defeat of the 
Partido Revolucionario in the elections of 1 March 1970. 3 
In the fi rst pl ace, the party was faced wi th the new 
challenge of the Christian Democrats to its left, standing 
in coalition with the still unregistered Unidad 
Revo1ucionaria Democratica. While circumstances in 1966 
had coalesced to permit a broad centre-left constituency 
for the PR, in 1970 this window of opportunity remained 
decisively closed. The vi 01 ence wh i ch had accompan i ed 
Mendez Montenegro's term in office was 
importance. Moreover, the reformi st 
the DCG (Frente naciona1) after 
evidently of central 
platform offered by 
four years of PR 
administration, served to expose the empty rhetoric of the 
'Third Government of the Revolution'. 
Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro, written response. 
Guatemala City. 31.1.94. 
2 See, for example, Nancy Arroyave, 'El juicio de 1a 
historia. Julio Cesar Mendez M.', Cronica, 10.5.96. 
3 MLN-PID, 43.4 per cent; PR, 34.9 per cent; DCG 
(Frente nacional), 21.7 per cent: see Table 2, p.278. 
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Similarly, the PR was faced with a new situation to its 
right. In 1966, the MLN and the PID had been unable to 
form an alliance, largely because of differences over 
candidates and because the MLN had been reluctant to become 
part of a coalition in which peraltista elements would have 
predomi nated. The debate had al so refl ected di fferences 
wi thi n the mi 1 i tary establ i shment, between reformi st and 
hardline groupings, as well as the personal animosity 
between Peralta Azurdia and his erstwhile Chief of General 
Staff, Ponciano. While the events of March 1968 indicated 
that divisions remained, by 1970 there was little 
inclination to repeat the experience of 1966. 
For the MLN, with a small but substantial base, unity on 
the right represented the only access to political power 
through constitutional means. Indeed, the fact that this 
experiment in limited democracy between 1966 and 1970 ended 
with a constitutional transfer of government rather than a 
coup is significant. The MLN and the PID closed ranks in 
a coalition which further isolated the PR and its attempts 
at reelection. This final, short chapter outlines the 
campaign preceding these elections and presents a brief 
analysis of their results. 
The Election Campaign 
Mendez Montenegro's removal of key members of his military 
high command in March 1968 had appeared to signal a change 
in the military balance of forces and to offer the prospect 
of a more assertive civilian politics. As we have seen, 
however, this move provided only a momentary hiatus in a 
pattern of partisan and military violence with little 
evidence of the expected revival of the reformist project. 
The military group which had supported the President in his 
unprecedented action proved itself to be less democratic 
than institutional in motivation and unwilling to risk 
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military unity for a dramatic shift in orientation. 
The replacement of Defence Minister General Chinchilla 
Aguilar on 20 Feburary 1969 was interpreted by the weekly 
report Latin America as signalling the 'thorough ouster' of 
the military group which had acquired a dominant position 
just one year earlier. 4 Arana Osorio's feted return to 
Guatemala from Nicaragua in April to campaign for the 
presidency appeared to confirm this trendS - as did Sosa 
Avila's rehabilitation as Interior Minister in June. 6 
However, matters were not quite so clear cut. Chinchilla 
Agui 1 ar' s successor - General Doroteo Reyes Santa Cruz -
had been one of five colonels promoted by the President in 
September 1968, suggesting that he too had been an element 
of support in the civilian golpe of March 1968. 7 The 
simultaneous appointment of General Cifuentes Mendez to the 
powerful post of Army Chief of General Staff adds to the 
impression that these changes represented less a decisive 
settling of accounts within the military establishment than 
4 Latin America, 7.3.69. 
5 New York Times, 29.4.69. Nicaragua had given the 
colonel an ideal base from which to nurture his 
presidential ambitions with the friendly support of Somoza: 
El Grafico, 15.1.69; La Hora, 16.1.69; Rene de Leon 
Schlotter, interview, Guatemala City, 8.2.94. 
6 Prensa Libre, 14.6.69, 20.6.69; La Hora, 14.6.69; 
see a 1 so, A E U pro t est i n La H 0 r a , 1 7 . 6 .. 69 . So s a A v i 1 a's 
stint as Interior Minister lasted only SlX months. He was 
transferred in January 1970 to the Command of the Poptun 
military base, and from there to the Quiche military base 
in February 1970: Prensa Libre, 17.1.70, 20.2.70. 
7 That Ch inch i 11 a Agu i 1 ar and Reyes Santa Cruz were of 
the same promocion lends some weight to this thesi~, 
although it should also be noted that this m~litary bond 1S 
prone to disintegration higher up the ?r?mot10nal l~dder as 
officers begin to vie for top pOS1t10ns: Capta1n ~uan 
Fernando Cifuentes Herrera. interview. Guatemala C1ty, 
30.9.94. 
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another realignment of forces. 8 Moreover, Chinchilla 
Aguilar's own 'diplomatic exile' in Spain proved to be 
temporary and he returned in February 1970 to take up the 
post of Interior Minister. 9 
Chinchilla Aguilar's resignation should be viewed in the 
context of failed negotiations with the PR to establish his 
candidacy for the 1970 presidential elections. 10 Selection 
procedures for presidential candidates for the PR and the 
PIO sparked a series of intra-party conflicts and indicated 
the continuing tendency of party leaderships to act as 
exclusive cliques and without proper consultation of the 
base. As in 1965, nomi nated candi dates were presented to 
party conventions for ratification purposes only and 
di ssenters were ei ther ignored or i nt i mi dated. Yet the 
fact that both parties engaged in such public disputes over 
the selection of candidates also suggested a serious lack 
of internal cohesion at executive level. 
The debate wi thi n the PR had begun wi th the poi nted 
endorsement of the 'democratic and revolutionary-thinking' 
Foreign Minister, Fuentes Mohr, by Juventud Revolucionaria 
at its Third Congress in January 1969. 11 Given the 
implacable hostility of the right towards Fuentes Mohr -
matched by a definite ambivalence towards him from some 
members of hi s own party his bid for nomination was 
8 Prensa L i bre, 21.2.69. Ci fuentes Mendez was 
replaced by Colonel Efrain Rios Montt as Commander of the 
Guatemala City Mariscal Zavala Brigade: Prensa Libre. 
1 .3.69. 
9 La Hora, 6.2.70. 
10 Marroquin Rojas, La Hora. 7.1.69,10.2',69; 
L i bre, 20.2.69; open 1 etter from Sagastume Perez 
Secretary General Mendez Martinez (21.2.69). La 
12.3.69. 
Prensa 
to PR 
Hora, 
11 H 22 1 69 25 .1.69,' Prensa Libre, 24.1.69. La ora. .. , 
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hardly likely to prosper. 12 Instead. the prospect of Arana 
Osorio's candidacy for the MLN prompted elements of the PR 
leadership to seek a similar military candidate in 
Chinchilla Aguilar. Such a scheme ran counter to civilista 
traditions within the PR which reached back the reformist 
decade when the FPL had split on the question of support 
for Colonel Francisco Arana. although it appears that 
objections were fuelled more by personal ambition than 
ant i -mi 1 i tary sent i ment per se. 13 
Had the negotiations between Chinchilla Aguilar and the 
PR leadership been successful. it is possible that military 
divisions might have been more clearly defined along the 
lines of the Ponciano/Aguilar de Leon fractions of March 
1966. However. attempts by more caut i ous elements to 
impose a list of conditions on the prospective military 
candidate - in an interesting variation on the 1966 'secret 
pact' - and Chinchilla Aguilar's refusal to accept them, 
resulted in his resignation and a rapid posting to the 
Ambassadorship in Spain. 14 
Veteran PR leader Carlos Sagastume Perez was a main 
obj ector to the Defence Mi ni ster' s nomi nat ion on the 
grounds that the selection process was not taking place 
according to 'established democratic party principles' .15 
His own bid for the candidacy - which he believed settled 
12 Fuentes Mohr withdrew from the nomination race in 
early March: ibid., 3.3.69. 
13 Johnson, 'The 1966 and 1970 Elections', pp.39-40, 
has argued, somewhat implausibly, that the failure ,to 
nominate Chinchilla Aguilar seriously damaged the PR wlth 
many pro-military members abstaining in the 1970 poll. 
14 Danilo Roca Barrillas. interview. Guatemala City. 
17.10.94; Marroquin Rojas. 'La Tragedia del PR'. La Hora. 
10.2.69; Prensa Libre. 20.2.69. 
15 Sagastume Perez to Mendez Mart; nez (21.2.69). La 
Hora. 12.3.69; i bi d.. 13.3.69. 11.2.70; Prensa L i bre, 
20.3.69. 23.3.69, 28.3.69. 
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after a 'long meet i ng' wi th Mendez Montenegro - came to 
nothing, and is also suggestive of the tenuous links that 
the President maintained with the party which had brought 
him to office. 16 The Sixth Party Convention - called at 
the end of March 1969 to decide the nomination and attended 
by some 580 local PR affiliates - voted 'unanimously' for 
Treasury Minister Mario Fuentes Pieruccini :17 
So 1 amente, cuando e 1 represent ante de 1 a fi 1 i a 1 
de un municipio emitie su voto, se oye 
confusamente el nombre del licenciado Carlos 
Sagastume Perez; pero rectifice y los miembros de 
la directiva indicaron que el voto era por el 
licenciado Fuentes Pieruccini .18 
Similar divisions within the PIO had serious implications 
for the right and appeared to threaten the prospect of a 
single candidate considered imperative for a right-wing 
victory in 1970. It was widely understood that the failure 
to form an electoral alliance in 1966 had permitted the PR 
to take office, and it was a repeat of this outcome that 
the MLN in particular was determined to avoid. Winning 
almost 25 per cent of the poll in 1966, but with only five 
deputies, the MLN had seen itself marginalised in the 
political process and from the spoils of office. In this 
regard, it shoul d be remembered that the MLN had been 
exc 1 uded from the post-e 1 ectora 1 negot i at ions wh i ch not 
only resulted in the military pact, but also in a 
'gentleman's agreement' between the PR and the PIO which 
ensured that their deputies had sole control of 
16 Marroquin Rojas, 'Se me hace que sacrificaren a 
Fuentes Pieruccini', La Hora, 13.3.69; Oani 10 Roca 
Barrillas, interview, Guatemala City, 17.10.94. 
17 The PR' s Nat i ona 1 Execut i ve Counc i 1 had a 1 ready 
presented Fuentes Pieruccini to the press as the party's 
candidate on 10 March 1969: Prensa Libre, 11.3.69. 
18 Prensa L i bre, 28.3.69: The process 1 asted a 1 most 
three hours with each delegate being called upon by na~e to 
deliver his vote - so as to avoid charges of fraud [SlC]. 
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congressional committees. 
Given his close relationship with the MLN during his 
command of the Zacapa mi 1 i tary zone, it was evi dent that 
Colonel Arana Osorio would be that party's choice for 
presidential candidate: 
e~ clim~ de desorden, inmoralidad, anarquia y 
vlolencla ... hace volver la mirada del pueblo 
hacia la figura de un verdadero Caudillo ... 19 
However, the joint MLN-PIO candidacy offered him in the so-
called 'Pact of Managua' two days after the parties' formal 
alliance on 10 January 1969, was challenged by a faction 
within the PIO which backed Roberto Alejos Arzu. 20 Led by 
founding PIO member, Mauro Monterroso, the dissenters 
argued that Arana's candidacy had not been approved by the 
PIO's General Assembly and that other possible candidates 
for the nomination existed, including Alejos Arzu. 21 The 
debate split the PIO with the dissident faction eventually 
emerging as the stronger. Monterroso survived a suspicious 
car accident and an expulsion attempt to become the new 
Oi rector Genera 1 of the PIO in May 1969. 22 At the same 
19 Open 1 etter from MLN Oi rector General 
Alarcon to Colonel Arana Osorio, offering him 
presidential nomination, La Hora, 24.1.69. 
Sandoval 
the MLN 
20 Alejos Arzu had previously lost to Arana Osorio in 
a vote taken at executive level within each of the parties: 
Prensa Libre, 29.11.68, 11.1.69; Politica y Sociedad, ~--=-:...:.==---=:...;....::::....:..--= 
numero extraordinario (April 1978), p.51. 
21 Latin America, 14.3.69, p.88. Mauro Monterroso was 
a member of the electrical workers' union Luz y Fuerza and 
long-time Secretary General of the Confederaci6n Sindical 
de Guatemala (CSG). Coopted by the Peralta government and 
el ected to the 1964 Const i tuent Assembl y -together wi th 
three other labour representatives - he was elected as a 
deputy for the PIO in the 1966-70 Congress: Levenson-
Estrada. Trade Unionists against Terror, p.32; see also. 
ASIES, Mas de 100 Anos, pp.254-5, 275-280. 
22 Prensa L i bre, 15.1.69, 24.1.69, 22.2.69, 24.2.69, 
10.4.69; Latin America. 28.3.69, p.99. 
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time, however, it was evident that a compromise had been 
reached. Arana was nominated PID presidential candidate at 
the party Convention in June, after Alejos Arzu stood down 
in his favour. 23 
In many ways, the election campaign resembled that of 
1966, with an equal number of candidates and the choice for 
president remaining that between two military officers and 
one civilian. It should be noted, however, that the DCG 
candidate, Major Lucas Caballeros, stood clearly to the 
left of his PR civilian counterpart. The level of campaign 
invective was heated and characterised by familiar 
accusations and counter-accusations of communism, electoral 
fraud and pacts with the guerrillas. 24 While this 
political animosity had been largely confined to agressive 
rhetoric in 1966, the 1970 campaign was accompanied by 
intensified levels of violence, much of it of a directly 
partisan nature. 
Partisan violence centred on clashes between youth groups 
belonging to the MLN and the PR. 25 Known as 'los 
Centuriones', elements of the PR's youth wing were accused 
of being 'shock troops' for the official 
acts of intimidation and violence 
opponents. 26 While 'los Centuriones' 
party, engaging in 
against political 
were officially 
23 Prensa Libre, 17.4.69, 21.4.69, 3.5.69, 30.6.69; 
Latin America, 25.7.69, p.240. 
24 On the question of fraud by the PR and the MLN-PID 
in the 1970 elections see Josef Thesing, 'Elecciones y 
Cambio Politico en Guatemala', Politica Y Sociedad, 2 
(July-December 1976), pp.20-2. 
25 One of the most serious incidents took p1a~e in 
Barba rena, Santa Rosa, in Apr; 1 1969 : Prensa L 1 bre, 
18.4.69, 21.4.69, 22.4.69; La Hora, 18.4.69, 23.4.69. 
26 Prensa Libre, 5.2.70; Miguel Angel Albizures, 
94 . d 'De los interview, Guatemala City, 15.2. ; 1 em." 
centuriones a los campesinos justicieros y de estos a los 
acarreados', Sig10 Veintiuno. 23.11.93; Colonel Juan 
Fernando Cifuentes Herrera. interview, Guatemala City, 
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disbanded by the party in October 1969, complaints about 
their activities continued into 1970,27 and Miguel Angel 
Albizures has further argued that the group - led by PR 
youth leader Danilo Roca Barrillas - press-ganged peasants 
into voting for the party in the 1970 elections. 28 Press 
reports of robbery, murder and cattle rustling in the 
eastern provinces during 1969 and 1970, added to the 
hei ghtened tensi ons, and there are i ndi cat ions that the 
gangs operating in this area had extreme right-wing 
connections. 29 Of particular salience in this regard, was 
the recent move by the government to disband the 
controversial armed militias based around Zacapa. 30 
As in 1965-6, guerrilla activity was a central point of 
reference for the extreme right and an important factor in 
the electoral campaign as a whole. Although considerably 
weakened, the FAR rema i ned abl e to carry out sporadi c 
actions in Guatemala City, and in September 1969 the 
military crushed an attempt to establish a new guerrilla 
front in Alta Verapaz. 31 The assassination of leading 
30.9.94. 
27 Lucas Caba 11 eros, Prensa L i bre, 5.2.70; Frente 
Juvenil Aranista, ibid., 26.2.70; Central Aranista 
Feminista, ibid., 27.2.70. 
28 Needless to say the Roca Barrillas denies these 
allegations: Danilo Roca Barrillas, interview, Guatemala 
City, 17.10.94; Miguel Angel Albizures, interview, 
Guatemala City, 15.2.94. Colonel Cifuentes, interview, 
Guatemala City, 30.9.94, suggested that the group was led 
by the sons of Julio and Mendez Montenegro; see also. 
Prensa L i bre, 5.2.70 and 23.2.70 on i nvol vement of PR 
leader and propagandist, Rafael Pantoja. 
29 Prensa L i bre, 5.5.69, 11.12.69, 12.12.69. 6.1.70; 
Marroquin Rojas, La Hora, 27.11.69. 
30 DDRS CIA 003023. Intelligence Memorandum, 'The 
Military and the Right in Guatemala' J 8.11.68; Arana Osorio 
in El Grafico, 15.1.69; and La Hora, 27.1.69. 
31 Prensa L i bre, 18.10.69. 
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1iberacionistas during 1969 - including MLN leader. Mario 
Lopez Vi 11 atoro. and the party's candi date for Guatema 1 a 
Ci ty Mayor, Dr Davi d Guerra Guzman - added to ri ght-wi ng 
percept ions of the cont i nu i ng subvers i ve th reat ,32 
Following Guzman's murder, the government declared a 'State 
of Prevent ion' in order to counter what was termed 'a 
resurgence of extreme left-wing subversion' ,33 
Immedi ate1 y before and after the March 1970 el ect ions. 
the FAR engaged in a series of kidnappings reminiscent of 
its campaign four years earlier. The objective this time, 
however, was the release of guerrilla suspects from prison 
in exchange for the hi gh-ranki ng government and forei gn 
officials held hostage. While the release of Foreign 
Minister Fuentes Mohr and US Embassy official Sean Holly 
were successfully negotiated in this manner, the failure of 
the Guatemalan government to agree to free 17 political 
prisoners in exchange for the German Ambassador Count Von 
Spreti culmi"ated with his murder on 5 April 1970. 34 
A 
The legal participation of the Christian Democrats 
represented a new phenomenon in the political process, and 
one which split the centre-left vote. The absence of a 
party to its 1 eft in 1966 had been central to the PR' s 
ability to garner the bulk of that constituency. and the 
DCG's continuing problems in gaining registration after 
32 Prensa L i bre, 2.6.69, 12.6.69, 18.12. 6~; ,I ~pacto, 
4.8.69 reported that the FAR had claimed ~esponslbll'ty( f~r 
Lopez Vil1atoro's assassination in Gue~rl~lero. No.9 Ju y 
1969) and for the murder of 1 i beracl on 1 sta. Hugo Byron 
Sagastume Calderon on 30 May 1969. 
33 Prensa L i bre, 18.12.69. 
34 Prensa Libre, 28.2.70; La Hora, 3.3.70. 7.3.70; New 
York Times, 28.2.70, 7.3.70, 1.4.70, 6.4.70; see also, 
Fuentes Mohr, Secuestro y Prision. 
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July 1966 should be understood in this light.35 In 1970, 
the DCG headed a 'National 
which incorporated the 
front' of the democratic left 
still illegal URD, whose 
representative, ex-PR deputy Edmundo Lopez Duran, stood as 
the coalition's vice-presidential 
stage, according to Villagran 
candidate. 
Kramer, the 
By 
URD 
this 
was 
experiencing an internal debate between its younger cadres 
who were leaning towards support for the armed struggle and 
those who still favoured a reformist solution. 36 In 
contrast to 1966, however, there was no evidence of a tacit 
alliance between the reformist coalition and the 
revolutionary movement, while the PGT called for a boycott 
of the electoral proceedings. 
Claiming to be 'the candidate with clean hands', Lucas 
Caballeros outlined a four-point plan of government 
promising structural reforms in administration, 
agriculture, education and fiscal policy. 37 Decisively 
reformist in tone and far more radical than the PR's 
platform in 1966, it is also interesting to note the 
coincidence with the right on the matter of foreign loans -
viewed by government critics on both sides to be 
'mortgaging the country' 
States. 38 
principally to the United 
35 The DCG finally achieved registration in August 
1968: Prensa Libre, 26.6.68; 'Documento Constitutivo del 
Frente Nacional', ibid., 2.8.69; Impacto, 2.8.69; see also, 
Comision del Colegio de abogados de Guatemala, denunciation 
of the El ectoral Regi ster' s refusal to grant DCG 
recognition in December 1967: Prensa Libre, 23.12.67. 
36 Francisco Villagran Kramer, 
City, 22.10.93. 
37 Prensa L i bre, 11.2.70. 
interview, Guatemala 
38 MLN press conference, Prensa L i bre, 29. 11 .68; Lucas 
Caballeros, ibid, 11.2.70; Finance Mini~ter Fu~ntes 
Pieruccini, ibid, 25.2.69 argued that the 20 lnternatlonal 
loans contracted by the government since 1 July 196~ and 
amounting to $84,712,000 were essential for natlonal 
development. He emphasised the multi-lateral nature of the 
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While the DCG candidate was a retired military officer, 
his radicalism, and the perceived anti-militarism of the 
DCG, added 
institution 
to speculation that the military 
backed Arana Osorio's candidacy.39 
as an 
In an 
effort to counter this assumption and reassure the nation 
of its firm intention to remain impartial and respect the 
popular will, the entire military high command made an 
unprecedented tel evi si on appearance in February. 40 Yet the 
question of military preference remained an issue, and the 
PR's losing candidate has since argued somewhat 
implausibly - that it was the military's superior resources 
in terms of communications and transport which ensured 
Arana Osorio his victory.41 
Underlining its own pro-military stance, the MLN sought 
to expose the PR as anti-military and accused it of 
ingratitude towards the armed institution 'wh i ch has kept 
Lopez Villatoro MLN leader Mario it in government'. 42 
forcefully condemned Fuentes Pierrucini's 'extremist 
civilianism' and his failure to pay adequate attention to 
the role of the armed forces during his campaigning: 
funding. See also, Bauer Paiz, 'The "Third Government of 
the Revolution"; Jonas, Plan Piloto, p.30S. 
39 For a definitive statement on DCG's traditional 
position towards the military and its decision to alter 
this and support Colonel Rios Montt in the 1974 elections 
see, Danilo Barillas, 'La Democracia Cristiana y su 
Posicion ante el Ejercito Hoy en Guatemala (llamado a un 
compromiso historico)', mimeo. (Guatemala. n.d.). 
40 Prensa Libre. 14.2.70; see also, Lucas Caballeros' 
response. ibid., 26.2.70. 
41 Mario Fuentes Pieruccini, interview, Guatemala 
City, 2.2.94. 
42 
2.6.69; 
19.2.70. 
Lopez 
ibid., 
Villatoro, 
11.2.70; 
post-humous article, La Hora, 
MLN publicity, P[ensa Libre, 
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La forma abultada como Fuentes Pieruccini 
sil~ncio ~l Ejercito y su obra no es producto del 
olvldo nl de l,a ligereza. Es producto de 
profundas reflexl~neS,y ,de la discusion colgiada 
del PR, que ~~ev~ lmpllclta una posicion politica 
f~e~t~ al E]erclto. Es la manifestacion de un 
Cl,~ll~smo a ultr~nza? Es la marginacion del 
E]erCl~O d~ la vlda nacional y las principales 
determlnaclones de la politica? .. 43 
For its part, the PR poi nted to the exi stence of ex-
guerrillas in the ranks of the MLN and referred to Sandoval 
Alarcon's notorious 1956 declaration that the MLN was 'the 
party of organised violence' .44 
While this kind of rhetoric was to be expected, the 
hostility between the DCG and the PR was especially 
st r i king. The i nvect i ve reached its apogee in Lucas 
Caballeros' televised declaration that the PR and MLN were 
equally responsible for the 'genocide' in which more than 
6,000 guatemalans had died in two years: 45 
Desde hace muchos anos se han venido 
i dent i fi cando esos part i dos, representando de 1 as 
pequenas minorias ... Es asi como se implanto en el 
pais una nueva modalidad de gobierno: el gobernar 
con el apoyo de fuerzas de bandoleros promovidas, 
apadrinadas y encubiertas por el poder 
oficial ... En los ultimos cuatro anos de 
gobierno ... el Partido Oficial, haciendose llamar 
todavia revolucionario, ha hecho un gobierno de 
43 Post-humous publication of article by MLN leader, 
Mario Lopez Villatoro, La Hora, 2.6.69. 
44 MLN militants Salvador Orellana ('Gallo Giro') and 
01 i vi ero Casteneda had defected from the ranks of the 
guerrillas to the extreme-right: PR publicity, 'Pacto con 
las guerrillas! De Quien?', Prensa Libre, 14.8.69; see 
also, Aguilera Peralta, interview, Guatemala City, 
30.11.93; Prensa Libre, 20.3.70; Debray, The Revolution on 
Trial, p.341, 345. 
45 'Mensaj e Pronunc i ado Por ElL i cenc i ado Lucas 
Caba 11 eros A 1 Pueb lode Guatema 1 a, e 1 17 de febrero de 
1970', Prensa Libre, 18.2.70; see also, ibid., 6.12.69, 
1 7 . 1 . 70 , 1 9 . 1 . 70 , 1 7 . 2 . 70 , 26 . 2 . 70 ; =L.=a _H_o_r_a , 1 3 . 1 1 . 69 ; 
Politica y Sociedad (April 1978) p.51. 
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1 - t d h 46 a mas ex rema erec a ... 
Unsurprisingly, and reflecting Ponciano's campaign four 
years earlier, Arana Osorio focused on the paramount 
question of security and emphasised his previous successes 
in Zacapa against 
impose order on 
'subversion' .47 
Guatema 1 a, 'at 
Stating his intention to 
the cost of whatever 
sacrifice and surmounting whatever obstacle', the MLN 
candidate accused the Mendez Montenegro government of 
stopping short of pacification at a national level and the 
PR for backtracking on its previous support for the 
civilian militias in the north-east. 48 Nevertheless, while 
hi s programme stressed securi ty and order, he al so made 
the, by now, obligatory promises of 'social development' to 
be brought about 'with decisiveness and firmness without 
demagogy' and even ut i 1 i sed the po 1 it i ca 11 y-charged term 
'the realisation of justice' .49 
In contrast to the tough-talking caudillo style of Arana 
Osorio, and the reformism of Lucas Caballeros, Mario 
Fuentes Pieruccini 's campaign appeared lacklustre. The PR 
candidate and his running-mate the ex-Minister of 
Communications, Oscar Casteneda Fernandez - promised more 
infrastructural development and 'peace', but 'without the 
use of terror, persecut i on and the submach i ne gun'. 50 
Legal measures would be taken to secure the lives and 
property of Guatemalans - and to make private ownership of 
handguns i 11 ega 1 . In a belated effort to enhance the 
party's appeal to the indigenous population, Fuentes 
46 Ibid. 
47 Co lone 1 Arana Osori 0, campa i gn speech in Zacapa, 
Prensa Libre, 23.2.70. 
48 El Grafico, 15.1.69; La Hora, 27.1.69. 
49 Prensa Libre, 7.11.69. 
50 Mari 0 Fuentes Pi erucci ni, campai gn speech in 
Zacapa, Prensa Libre. 1.12.69. 
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Pieruccini pledged to establish an Office of Indian Affairs 
and to abolish use of the mecapal th h 
_ - e arness worn by 
campes i nos around the forehead to carry heavy loads. 51 
These promises, together with others of shoes instead of 
sandals and free schoolbooks, were the focus of particular 
derision from his Christian Democrat rival. 52 
The 1970 Elections 
Arana Osorio won a plurality in the elections of 1 March 
1970 and was declared victor by the Guatemalan Congress on 
6 March after Fuentes Pieruccini declined to fight a 
second-round election. The effect was almost immediate, 
leaving Mendez Montenegro unable to negotiate the release 
of the German Ambassador in Apri 1 . Von Spret i 's murder 
sparked a diplomatic incident and was followed by the 
imposition of a particularly harsh State of Siege. 
However, far from the deci si ve vi ctory for mi 1 i tari sm 
that Johnson has claimed the election represented, careful 
scrutiny of the results reveals a more complex picture. 53 
There is little evidence that 'Guatemala's voters had 
shifted on the issue of guerrilla violence from soft-line 
tolerance and pacification to hard-line extermination', 
even if this was the character of the regime that Arana 
Osorio eventually headed. 54 Indeed, had a political 
alliance of the centre-left forces been possible at this 
stage, the indications are that it would have defeated the 
right-wing coalition. 
51 Prensa Libre, 14.2.70; Politica y Sociedad, numero 
extraordinario (April 1970), p.51. 
52 Ibid; Prensa Libre, 14.2.70. 
53 Johnson, 'The 1966 and 1970 Elections', p.41. 
54 I bi d . 
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What is particularly striking about these results is that 
in most cases, support for the MLN-PID coalition was 
substant i all y lower than that suggested by the combi ned 
tota 1 s of thei r votes in 1966. In only one province _ 
alliance improve on its Jalapa did the right-wing 
aggregate vote of four years earlier. These losses can be 
explained i n a 
fraud was more 
1966 and 1970 
number 
widely 
than 
of ways and one implication is that 
practiced by the official parties in 
recognised. In 
regard, Thesing has 
is generally 
claimed that almost 60,000 
this 
false 
identity cards were issued by the PR for the 1970 
local officials frequently tampered 
with votes to increase the showing for the official 
party.55 While it is likely that the PID vote in 1966 was 
similarly artificially inflated, it is also possible that 
many PID voters objected to Arana Osorio and either 
switched parties or abstained altogether. 
elections, and that 
An additional factor was the participation of the DCG in 
the 1970 elections. Although it seems less plausible that 
the right-wing supporters would cross the political 
spectrum to vote for what was an overtly reformist party, 
in several cases it appears that the Christian Democrats 
picked up votes from the right as well as from the PRo 
Such an assertion must remain largely impressionistic since 
it is not possible to verify to what extent the 
configuration of the electorate had changed between the two 
polls. This caveat is all the more important given the 
fact that only 26.7 per cent of the electorally-qualified 
population registered to vote in 1970, actually did so.56 
55 Thesing, 'Elecciones y Cambio Politico', p.21. 
56 49.6 per cent of the electorally-qualif~ed 
population were registered to vote in 197~ as compared wlth 
44.9 per cent in 1966, when the abs~entlo~ :at~ was 25.3 
per cent: Thesing, 'Elecciones y Camblo,Polltlco , Tabl~ 2, 
p.31. Thesing, ibid., gives the flgures for spolled 
ballots in the 1966 and 1970 elections as 12.4 per cent and 
9.6 per cent respectively. 
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Table 2 
Presidential Election Results: 1 March 1970 
Department MLN-PID % PR % DCG % 
(Frente 
nacional) 
Guatemala 63,076 42.1 32,573 21 .7 54,272 36.2 
Escuintla 7,251 25.7 10,704 37.8 10,305 36.5 
Sacatepequez 7,329 57.0 3,461 27.0 2,060 16.0 
Chimaltenango 9,616 44.8 6,991 32.6 4,856 22.6 
Quezaltenango 19,107 47.0 16,540 40.7 5,008 12.3 
SoloL3 6,630 49.8 4,650 35.0 2,018 15.2 
Totonicapan 9,363 53.9 4,664 26.8 3,360 19.3 
San Marcos 15,591 36.1 22,362 51 .7 5,288 12.2 
Retalhuleu 4,940 32.2 6,387 41 .7 3,999 26.1 
Suchitepequez 11,151 37.6 10,654 35.9 7,879 26.5 
Santa Rosa 9,120 44.8 7,686 37.8 3,532 17.4 
Jutiapa 14,095 49.1 12,282 42.8 2,320 8.1 
Jalapa 5,834 59.5 2,901 29.6 1 ,070 10.9 
El Progreso 5,013 52.0 2,583 26.8 2,047 21.2 
Zacapa 7,639 54.1 4,954 35. 1 1 ,525 10.8 
Chi qui mula 10,233 51 .7 7,596 38.4 1 ,968 9.9 
Izabal 5,346 39.8 6,321 47.0 1,770 13.2 
Alta Verapaz 6,874 32.6 11 ,860 56.3 2,350 1 1 . 1 
Baja Verapaz 5,630 50.5 4,238 38.0 1,284 11 .5 
Quiche 9,178 46.2 4,921 24.8 5,745 29.0 
Huehuetenango 15,643 46.1 15,532 45.8 2,750 8.1 
Peten 2,206 40.2 2,471 45.0 812 14.8 
TOTALS: 251,675 43.4 202,331 34.9 126,218 21.7 
Source: Diario de Centroamerica, 19.3.70 
The PR registered an overall reduction of just under ten 
per cent in its national vote and generally did better in 
areas where its support had been weakest in 1966. This was 
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particularly true of the 'Indian' highlands where the party 
managed to win a clear majority in Alta Verapaz the 
department where five national fincas had been distributed 
to peasants a year earl i er. The party's most ser i ous 
losses were in four of the five provinces where it had won 
an overall majority in the 1966 election. In the 
department of Guatemala, its vote was more than halved to 
just under 22 per cent, with slightly less dramatic 
reductions in Escuintla, Retalhuleu and Suchitepequez. In 
each case the Christian Democrats were the clear 
beneficiaries, and this trend confirms the tendency of 
these departments to vote for more radi ca 1 a 1 ternat i ves. 
At the same time, it indicated a repudiation of the PR and 
its performance in government during the preceding four 
years. San Marcos was the signal exception to this rule, 
with the PR retaining its overall majority, and Amaro has 
suggested that the region's anti-clerical tradition made it 
less permeable to Christian Democratic reformism. 57 
The DCG's increasing political importance was to be 
confirmed in 1974 when, backing the candidacy of Colonel 
Ri os Montt, the party's evi dent majori ty was averted by 
massive electoral fraud. In 1970, the political balance of 
forces did not require such a tactic. The irony of the 
reversion to authoritarian rule was that it took place 
under constitutional conditions in which the scope for 
e 1 ectora 1 compet it i on had actua 11 y been expanded since 
1966. 
57 Amaro, 
pp.269-70. 
'Factores Influyentes de la votacion', 
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GUATEMALA 1963 - 1970: THE LIMITS TO DEMOCRATISATION 
CONCLUSIONS 
In their introduction to Tentative Conclusions about 
Uncertain Democracies, Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe 
Schmitter emphasise the uncertainty of the transition 
process in terms of its end resu 1 t. 1 The outcome of a 
transition from a 'certain' authoritarian regime can be the 
inauguration of political democracy. Alternatively, the 
process may cu 1 mi nate in the restorat i on of a new and 
perhaps more severe form of authoritarian rule, or simply 
a confusing sequence of governments which prove incapable 
of providing a lasting resolution to the problem of 
institutional ising political power. It is unarguably the 
case that in Guatemala, the transition which began under 
the military regime of Peralta Azurdia in 1964 and which 
led to the restoration of constitutional civilian rule 
between 1966 and 1970 di d not resu 1 tin estab 1 i shment of 
political democracy in that country. Indeed, the irony of 
the ostensibly free and fair elections of March 1970 was 
that they confirmed the transition to a distinct form of 
authoritarian government in which the trappings of liberal 
democracy were routinely ignored. 
While the Guatemalan experiment of the 1960s quite 
clearly did not produce political democracy, its failure 
can be examined in the light of later theoretical debates 
on transition from authoritarian rule in Latin America. It 
has a 1 ready been observed of the Pera 1 ta Azurdi a regi me 
that it did not achieve the level of institutionalisation 
of its South Americari counterparts, and this was clearly an 
important factor in its relatively short period of absolute 
control. Yet the regime was Guatemala's first experience 
O'Donnell and Schmitter, Tentative Conclusions, p.3. 
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of prolonged military rule in which the armed forces 
governed as an institution and made considerable efforts to 
restructure the parameters of political competition. 
As the contemporary transitions literature suggests is 
usually the case, the impetus for liberalisation came from 
within the regime itself. The decision to return to 
const i tut i ona 1 government was i nfl uenced by a number of 
factors including internal and external political pressure 
and concerns about legitimacy and institutional unity. 
With regard to this last point, there are clear indications 
that tensions existed between so-called 'hard-line' and 
'soft-line' elements within the regime on questions of 
policy, tensions which increased with the struggle over the 
candidacy for the official party. Similarly, there was a 
growing sense of dissatis faction amongst civilian groups 
which had supported the coup. 
The US government constituted an additional source of 
pressure, and external factors must be given greater weight 
in this case than the transitions literature generally 
allows. The support of US State Department and Embassy 
officials was critical in enabling Peralta Azurdia to 
withstand ultramontane opposition to the transfer of 
government. Overall however, the wider international 
environment in the mid-1960s was far less favourable to 
democratisation than that of the mid-1980s. 
There was 
mobilisation 
little 
which 
evi dence of 
is often 
the upsurge in 
assoc i ated wi th 
popular 
regime 
liberalisation. This absence can be largely explained by 
the tightly-controlled nature of the liberalisation itself. 
and might also be viewed in the context of the failure of 
just such an upsurge in March and April 1962. 
Significantly, it was this earlier movement which brought 
the military into the Cabinet - prior to its full takeover 
of power a year later - and signalled the end of what can 
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be interpreted as an earlier attempt at limited democracy. 
Between 1964 and 1966, the authoritarian regime was able 
to negotiate the terms 
considerable strength. 
liberalisation process 
little inherent risk. 
of the transition from a position of 
The evident perception was that the 
coul d be controll ed and i nvol ved 
It is at this point that the notion 
of uncertainty is important, since, even in such 
carefully circumscribed contest as the 1966 elections, 
a 
it 
seems clear that the expected result was a plurality for 
the officially-sponsored party. The paradoxical outcome of 
the limits to political competition imposed by the regime 
was the temporary coalescence of excluded interests around 
an opposition party which claimed its roots in the 
reformist decade. 
Contemporary theories of democracy stress the need for 
party elites and professional politicians to reach a 
'democratic bargain' in which the rules of the political 
game are agreed and underpi nned by cont i ngent consent. 
There is evidence that a series of implicit and explicit 
agreements were reached to ensure the Guatemalan transition 
in 1966 - between political elites, socio-economic elites, 
and the military establishment. However, these were 
exclusionary in the extreme and highly conditional, and 
were far from the kind of 'foundational pact' which marks 
instances of 'elite democratic convergence'. 
Of particular salience is the secret pact signed between 
the military high command and the elected representatives 
of the PR, to which the weakness of the Mendez Montenegro 
regime vis a vis the military is usually traced. In its 
readiness to engage in such an agreement, the PR might be 
seen as an example of O'Donnell's 'opportunistic 
opposition', prepared to reach power at any cost. 2 At the 
2 0' Donne 11, 'Trans it ions to Democracy', pp. 64-5. 
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same time, however, it seems cl ear that wi thout the pact 
there could have been no tranSition. 
The pact was not except i ona 1 in terms of its guarantees 
of institutional autonomy and freedom from prosecution for 
'acts carried out in the line of duty'. The condition 
regarding counterinsurgency was more problematic. It 
subordinated civilian rule to military decision-making in 
this area and implied considerable military oversight of 
government affairs. More generally, the pact represented 
a further constrai nt on the ci vi 1 i an government al ready 
bound by a mi 1 i tary-enacted const i tut ion. The mi 1 i tary 
retention of tutelary powers and reserved domains gave rise 
to the kind of perverse institutions that J. Samuel 
Valenzuela has described in respect of Chile. 3 The effect 
was one of a hybrid dictablanda/democradura in which 
limited democ racy coexi sted with i nc re as i n g 
militarisation. 4 
A central problem remained the lack of a normative 
commitment to democracy on the part of key political 
actors. In particular, the MLN's proclivity towards 'other 
ways of doing politics' on behalf of the reactionary elites 
1 ed to a game of 'coup poker', in wh i ch the threat of a 
coup was as effect i ve as a coup i tse 1 fin obst ruct i ng 
socio-economic reform. In this situation, democratisation 
'on the installment plan' could not take place. Attempts 
at the kind of precedent-setting political confrontations 
on such questions as tax reform - proposed by Valenzuela as 
a means to undermi ne the power of economi c eli tes and 
ultimately the military - was dissipated in the face of 
concerted opposition and overt threats of political 
3 J. Samuel Valenzuela, 'Democratic Consolidation in 
Post-Transitional Settings', pp.S8-70. 
4 On dictablandas and democraduras see O'Donnell and 
Schmitter, Tentative Conclusions, pp.40-S. 
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violence. S 
In this sense, it is worth taking up the criticisms that 
some schol ars have made of the emphasi sin much of the 
recent literature on the contingent nature of the 
transition process and the autonomy of political factors.6 
As Terry Lynn Karl in particular has argued, the nature of 
the agrarian structure in such countries as Guatemala has 
been crucial to the absence of an elite democratic 
political culture. Politics has been traditionally viewed 
by the Guatemalan elites as a zero sum game in which the 
'least concession is tantamount to defeat,.7 
The 1944-54 reformist decade was clearly a formative 
political experience in terms of this elite intransigence. 
Indeed, it represented a Rubicon in the political memory of 
the left as well as the right. The defeat of the 
revolution in 1954 set the tone for the political 
polarisation which became the overriding feature of 
Guatemalan politics. As the domi nant ideo logy of the 
counter-revolution, anticomunismo provided the prism for 
interpreting even the most modest reforms. Yet 
anticomunismo provided a poor substitute for a hegemonic 
proj ect and the decade after 1954 was characteri sed by 
acute political instability within the dominant bloc. 
The question of institutionalised military oversight of 
the Guatemalan political process can also be traced back to 
the 1944-54 period. While this experiment remains the 
yardstick by which Guatemalan efforts at democratisation 
5 Ibid., p.63. 
6 Karl, 'Dilemmas', p.6; Remmer, 'The Study of Latin 
American Democracy, pp.483-S; Smith, 'On Democracy', 
pp.304-S. 
7 
p.72. 
Torres Rivas, Crisis del Poder en Centroamerica, 
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continue to be measured, the 1945 . constltutional provisions 
with regard to the role of the armed forces signalled what 
was to become an enduring military influence in the 
political system. 
The military coup of 1963 marked the end of a period of 
erratic political opening initially sponsored by the 
military establishment itself. The proximate cause of the 
coup was the return of ex-President Arevalo and the 
prospect of his reelection with all that implied for a 
resurgence of the radical forces so decisively suppressed 
a decade before. Supported by the estab 1 i shed po 1 it i ca 1 
parties, and in the context of an incipient guerrilla 
challenge, the military government strengthened the rural 
security apparatus and redefined the parameters for 
political competition. 
A central point of debate in the 1966 election campaign 
was how to deal with the insurgency. Mendez Montenegro's 
reformist credentials contrasted with Ponciano's hardline 
posture and appeared to suggest the possi bi 1 i ty of a 
negotiated solution to the guerrilla conflict. Support for 
the PR candidacy from the revolutionary movement was 
premised on this notion. Equally, popular expectations of 
the PRes reformist rhetoric were important in the party's 
ability to win in certain key areas. 
Fears of an entente between the PR and the guerrillas, 
and of a return to the radi ca 1 ism of 1944-54, spurred 
right-wing and military resistance to recognition of the 
election results. Underlining the anti-democratic 
character of these forces, the threatened coup was only 
contained with US support and the pact between the Mendez 
Montenegro and the military high command. This early 
capitulation to hardline interests had far-reaching 
consequences and ensured that the military remained outside 
civilian control. 
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The failure of the 'Th,"rd G overnment of the Revolution' 
to put its reformist 
considerable disillusion. 
rhetoric into practice 
Popular disenchantment 
caused 
was an 
important factor in the PR's poor 1970 electoral 
performance in areas where it had done well in 1966. A 
lack of political will was compounded by fiscal problems 
and, most importantly, a serious campaign to destabilise 
the government. The i nabi 1 i ty of the regi me to push 
through new legislation on taxation signalled the limits to 
this democratic experiment. 
Extensive political violence became the leitmotif of the 
Mendez Montenegro administration. Ostensibly a clash 
between extremist elements, the violence was clearly 
associated with the counterinsurgency campaign and as such 
implicated not only the security forces, but also the US 
military mission and the government itself. The regime's 
failure to protect the basic rights of the individual 
severely tested its democratic credentials, as did the 
frequent suspension of constitutional guarantees. At the 
same time, activists within the official party and 
reformi st el ements in general al so became targets of the 
counter-terror and suggested an extreme right-wing strategy 
to undermine the government and eliminate the opposition. 
The transition to civilian government caused confusion 
within the revolutionary movement, and exacerbated existing 
tensions over strategy and tactics. These disagreements 
eventually led to an acrimonious split in 1968. Confronted 
by concerted military action and clandestine terror, the 
guerrillas proved unable to sustain their rural base in the 
ladino north-east. 
The defeat of the rural guerrilla and unease with the 
excesses of the counterinsurgency campaign provided Mendez 
Montenegro with significant military and US support in his 
impressive move against key members of his high command. 
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The suggestion of a more assertive civilian politics proved 
to be shortlived. Its overall effect was less a 
demilitarisation of politics than a realignment of military 
forces. The possibility of an open military split in the 
1970 elections was forestalled with Chinchilla Aguilar's 
refusal to be bound by PR conditions on his candidacy. 
The assassination of the US Ambassador by urban guerrilla 
elements termi nated the fragi 1 e ba 1 ance of forces and 
facilitated the rehabilitation of those deposed by the 1968 
civilian 'coup'. As in 1966, security became the dominant 
issue in the 1970 election campaign which was accompanied 
by heightened levels of political violence of a 
particularly partisan quality. Yet the victory of the 
extreme right-wing candidate did not indicate the desire of 
the Guatemalan electorate for a 'final solution'. Indeed, 
the reduced number of votes for the combined MLN-PID slate 
since 1966 suggested an evident distaste for such hardline 
tactics. 
The results of the 1970 elections were a function of a 
breakdown of the tactical alliance which had brought the PR 
to office in 1966, together with right-wing determination 
to avoid a reformist victory in 1970. Party-political 
antagonisms on the centre/left, combined with popular 
disillusion with the PR's performance in office were 
central to the victory of Arana Osorio. The significance 
of his plurality was the constitutional reversion to 
authoritarian rule under a hardline military officer who 
governed in league with extreme right-wing elements. 
Expectations of the PR's ability to return Guatemala to 
the democrat i c achi evements of the 1944-54 decade were 
always misplaced and bound to bring disenchantment. 
Indeed, the party's participation in the elections of 1966 
was premised on its rejection of the radicalism of that 
period. Yet. it was less the conservative character of the 
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government per se, than the refusal of the extreme right to 
accept even the most moderate of reformist solutions which 
ensured the failure of this experiment. The readiness to 
resort to extra-legal options signalled the continuing 
absence of a liberal democratic consensus. Moreover, the 
tightly-controlled transition process did not bring about 
military subordination to civilian rule. On the contrary, 
the government was dependent throughout on the goodwill of 
the military establishment to remain in office. In the 
context of a guerrilla war, this question was particularly 
acute and encouraged further militarisation. 
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APPENDIX 
Guatemala - Select Chronology 1960-1970 
1960 
May PGT.T~ird Party Congress recognises the 
valldlty of all forms of struggle in 
the quest for a democrat i c and 
representative government. 
November Military revolt at barracks in 
Guatema 1 a Ci ty, Zacapa and Puerto 
Barrios involving some 120 officers on 
13 November. Rebel s wi thdraw to 
Puerto Barrios. Defeated within three 
days. 
1961 
March 
April 
1962 
Clandestine return from Honduras of 23 
of the military rebels including Lts. 
Marco Antonio Yon Sosa and Alejandro de 
Leon Aragon and 2nd Lts. Luis Turcios 
Lima and Luis Trejo Esquivel. 
Operate as first MR-13. 
First gun battle between MR-13 elements 
and judicial police in the capital. 
MR-13 makes contact with PGT and with 
peasants in Morales, Izabal. 
February MR-13 el ements attack mi 1 i tary posts at 
Mari scos and Bananera in Izabal and 
police stations in Morales, Izabal. 
Simultaneous clashes with military 
patrols in Entre Rios and Km 80 on the 
Transatlantic Highway. 
March Anti-government protests in Guatemala 
City. Formation of PGT-sponsored 
guerri 11 a front Movi mi en to 20 de 
Octubre 1 ed by ex-arbenci sta offi cer 
Lt-Col. Carlos Paz Tejada. Ydigoras 
Fuentes appoints military cabinet. 
September MR-13 delegation goes to Havana. 
Contact wi th ex-Guatema 1 an pres i dent 
Colonel Arbenz. 
November El ect ions for Guatema 1 a Ci ty Mayor. 
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Montenegro Sierra wins, Closely 
followed by Villagran Kramer. PGT 
supports Jorge Toriello who comes last 
Arevalo declares his candidacy for pre~ident from Mexico. 
Decree 1559 imposes first income tax. 
Guatemalan Air Force rebels. 
December Pol i ti co-mi 1 i tary front Fuerzas Armadas 
Rebeldes (FAR) established. 
1963 
March 
1964 
February 
May 
June 
July 
Incorporates MR-13, PGT, 
student-based Movi mi ento 12 de Abri 1 
and rema ins of Movi mi ento 20 de 
Octubre. Guerrilla excluded from 
po 1 it i ca 1 command over wh i ch PGT 
retains control. 
Arevalo returns to Guatemala. Ydigoras 
Fuentes removed in military coup three 
days later. Col. Peralta Azurdia 
installed as Chief of State. 
New electoral 
50,000 members 
registration of 
be literate. 
law imposes minimum 
for political party 
whom 20 per cent must 
Controlled elections for Constituent 
Assembly. 
Yon Sosa breaks off negotiations with 
Villagran Kramer's URD. 
New income tax law 
Two distinct guerrilla fronts emerge in 
north-east: Frente A 1 ej andro de Leon 
MR-13 led by Yon Sosa based in Izabal, 
and Frente Guerrillero Edgar Ibarra 
(FGEI) based in Zacapa and led by 
Turcios Lima. 
Publication of MR-13's Revolucion 
Socialista reveals Trotskyist influence 
on Yon Sosa. 
September Frente Guerrillero Edgar Ibarra (FGEI) 
occupi es ri ver port of Panzos, Alta 
Verapaz, and town of Rio Hondo, Zacapa. 
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October L~tter from FGEI signals political 
dlfferences with both MR-13 and PGT. 
December MR-13 makes public its 'First 
Declaration of the Sierra de las Minas' 
h a v i n gap par e n t 1 y for g edT u rc i 0 s Lim a's 
signature. 
1965 
March 
Apri 1 
Turcios Lima resigns from MR-13 in open 
1 etter. New FAR const i tuted out of 
FGEI and PGT and without MR-13. 
PR leaves Constituent Assembly 
question of eligibility of 
participants for presidential 
election. 
on 
coup 
September New constitution promulgated but 
suspended until May 1966. 
October 
1966 
January 
March 
April 
May 
PR leader Mario Mendez Montenegro found 
shot dead. Julio Cesar Mendez 
Montenegro assumes candidacy. 
Turcios Lima rejects support for PR in 
forth-coming elections at 
Tricontinental Conference in Havana. 
Fidel Castro condemns Trotskyism. 
PGT endorse 
Montenegro. 
position. 
itself from 
support for PR and Mendez 
Turcios Limas accepts this 
MR-13 begins to distance 
Trotskyism. 
PR and Mendez Montenegro win plurality 
in elections 6 March. Results not 
recognised for several days. 
Fi rst rumours begi n to emerge about 
di sappearance and murder of 28 uni on 
and PGT activists including veteran 
labour leaders Victor Manuel Gutierrez 
and Leonardo Castillo Flores. 
Constitutional Assembly passes amnesty 
for security forces for actions in the 
line of duty between 3 July 1954 and 28 
Apri 1 1966. 
Secret agreement between Mendez 
Montenegro and mi 1 i tary high command 
grants armed forces autonomy and free 
June 
July 
September 
October 
301 
reign with counterinsurgency in 
exchange for mi 1 i tary guarantees for 
civilian government. 
Legislature installed. PR has 30 of 55 
s:ats. 1965 Constitution takes effect. 
Mendez Montenegro and Marroquin Rojas 
declared president-elect and vice-
president-elect. 
FAR kidnap government officials 
Baltazar Morales de la Cruz and Romeo 
Augusto de Leon in response to 
abduction by security forces of '28'. 
Zunzapote ambush changes pace of 
counterinsurgency operations. 
Congress ratifies State of Siege. 
Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro 
inaugurated. Makes call for national 
reconciliation. Lifts State of Siege. 
Leaflets calling for peace dropped by 
government in north-east. 
Congress passes amnesty for political 
cri mes commi ted between 1 November 1970 
and 26 July 1966. Turcios Lima and Yon 
Sosa reject amnesty. 
MANO makes its appearance wi th a 5-
point manifesto. 
MLN declares 'political war' on PR and 
warns of the impending organisation of 
vigilante groups. Reveals details of 
1961 'tripartite pact'. 
Labour Code reforms withdrawn after 
pressure from CACIF. 
Morales de la Cruz and De Leon released 
in exchange for guerrilla Ortiz Vides. 
Mendez Montenegro makes last call for 
harmony. FAR offer to suspend actions 
against military targets. 
Army colonel and 2 officers dismissed 
for plotting against Defence Minister 
Arriaga Bosque. 
Turcios Lima killed in car 
Funeral attended by several 
mourners. Second-in-command, 
crash. 
hundred 
Cesar 
Montes struggles to impose his 
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authority over FAR regional groups. 
I ncome Tax 
Congress. 
campaign. 
reforms 
CACIF 
presented to 
starts protest 
November Series of right-wing and left-wing 
terrorist attacks. State of Siege 
declared. MLN activists arrested. 
Left-wing paper El Estudiante is closed 
down. URD declared illegal. 
Counterinsurgency offensive begins in 
north-east under command of Col. Arana 
Osorio. 
Guarantees received from Honduras and 
El Salvador that MLN will receive no 
help in organising mercenary force. 
Coup attempt by Vi ce-Mi ni ster of 
Defence Callejas Soto thwarted. 
State of siege extended 30 days. 
December Modified Tax Reform Law passed. Mendez 
Montenegro announces 'Plan piloto' for 
the socio-economic development of the 
north-east. Campesinos in north-east 
participate in series of demonstrations 
in support of PR and military. 
1967 
Presidential acuerdo exempts finqueros 
and their administrators from general 
prohibition on weapon possession. 
State of Siege extended 30 days. 
January State of Siege extended 30 days. 
February State of Alarm replaces State of Siege. 
March 
April 
May 
Lopez Duran denounces 
military commissioners in 
Refuses to sign extension 
Alarm. NOA announces its 
act ions of 
Chi qui mula. 
to State of 
existence. 
PR officials abducted in Sanarate. 
Second Vice-Minister of Defence, Col. 
Sosa Avila appointed head of National 
Police. State of Alarm extended 30 
days. 
Lopez Duran expelled from PRo 
Guatemalan bishops issue pastoral 
October 
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letter condemning violence - offer to 
play mediating role. 
PR Cong ressman 
assassinated. Soto Be tat a 
Yon Sosa [MR13] and Cesar Montes [FAR] 
sign joint communique announcing 
unification. Yon Sosa becomes FAR 
Commander-in-Chief and Cesar Montes, 
Second-in-Command. Camilo Sanchez 
remains chief strategist. Rejects all 
political manoeuvres for purely 
military strategy. 
December Congress passes sales tax. 
protest against measure. 
CACIF 
1968 
January 
Mendez Montenegro declares in his 
Chri stmas message to the nation that 
the north-east is completely pacified. 
Government withdraws sales tax. 
FAR split from PGT. Cesar Montes 
issues declaration confirming move ten 
days after Pab 10 Monsanto and Cami 10 
Sanchez revealing tensions within FAR 
leadership. 
Beauty queen Rogelia Cruz Martinez 
assassinated. FAR guerrilla Castillo 
Johnson responds wi th shoot i ng of US 
offi ci al s Webber and Munro and fi nquero 
Alfonso Alejos. Castillo Johnson 
killed in attack on Police Chief Sosa 
Avila's residence. State of Alarm. 
February State of Alarm extended 30 days. 
March 
FAR and MR-13 unification made public. 
Archbishop Casariego's pastoral exhortation 
condemns violence from left and right. 
Fuentes Moh r rep 1 aced as Fi nance 
Minister by Fuentes Pieruccini in 
cabinet reshuffle. 
State of Alarm extended 30 days. 
PR Secretary General claims clandestine 
groups persecuting PR sympathisers 
under protection of State of Alarm. 
Archbishop 
Released four 
Casariego kidnapped. 
days later. State of 
April 
May 
August 
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Siege declared. Congress censures 
Marroquin Rojas for remarks about 
Casariego - only PR deputies present. 
Mendez Montenegro reshuffles military 
high command. Cols. Arriaga Bosque, 
Arana Osorio and Sosa Avila sent into 
diplomatic exile. Col. Chinchilla 
Aguilar appointed Defence Minister. 
State of A 1 arm rep 1 aces State of Si ege. 
MANO activist and principal Casariego 
kidnapper Raul Lorenzana assassinated. 
State of Alarm extended 30 days. 
Municipal elections. PR claims 
overwhelming victory. PRs demand 
dismantling civilian militias in north-
east and accuse military of putting 
pressure on voters in this region. 
FAR kill US Ambassador Mein in abortive 
ki dnap attempt 28 August. State of 
Siege declared. 
FAR Commander Camilo Sanchez executed. 
Replaced by Pablo Monsanto. 
September Mendez Montenegro promotes five 
officers to rank of General. New Army 
October 
1969 
January 
February 
Constitution. 
FAR Command demotes Cesar Montes to 
rank of Private. Yon Sosa removed as 
FAR 'Commander-in-Chief. 
State of Siege extended 30 days. 
State of Si ege rep 1 aced by State of 
Alarm. 
Ex-President Arevalo appoi nted 
Ambassador to Chile. 
Yon Sosa resigns FAR Command and 
'dissolves' Command Headquarters. 
MLN invite Coronel Arana Osorio to be 
presidential candidate. 
Chi nchi 11 a Agui 1 ar resi gns from Defence 
Ministry and becomes Ambassador to 
Spain. 
March 
April 
June 
October 
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PR VI Party Convention. Fuentes 
Pieruccini nominated PR presidential 
candidate. 
Arana Osorio returns to Guatemala from 
Nicaragua to lead MLN campaign as 
presidential candidate. 
Foreign Minister Arenales Catalan dies. 
Replaced by Fuentes Mohr. 
Key MLN militant 
assassinated. 
Mario Lopez Villatoro 
FAR claim 
responsibility. PGT 1 eader Huberto 
released after 
and domestic 
A 1 verado captured and 
intense international 
pressure. 
Sosa Avila returns to Guatemala from 
Spain and is appointed Interior 
Minister. AEU protests. 
Appearance of 
Tortugas' mining 
confirms rumours 
Coban. 
guerri 11 as at 'Las 
camp in Alta Verapaz 
of new FAR front in 
PR declares dissolution of youth group 
'Los Centuriones'. 
December MLN 1 eader Davi d Guerra Guzman shot 
dead. 
1970 
January 
February 
State of Prevention 15 days. Renewed. 
Casteneda Morgan rep 1 aces Co 1. Sosa 
Avila as Interior Minister. 
Journalist Isidoro Zarco assassinated 
by FAR. 
State of Prevention 15 days. 
Chinchilla Aguilar returns from Spain 
and appointed Interior Minister. 
Mi 1 i tary hi erachy make unprecedented 
appearance on national television to 
guarantee no political interference in 
elections. 
President of the Electoral Tribunal is 
shot and wounded. PR Congress i ona 1 
candidate shot dead with two 
March 
June 
July 
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supporters. 
Foreign Minister Fuentes Mohr is 
kidnapped by FAR and released one day 
later in exchange for student and 
guerrilla suspect Giron Calvillo. 
El ecti ons 1 March. Arana and MLN/PID 
win plurality. Congress declares Arana 
president-elect on 21 March. 
us official Sean Holly kidnapped by 
FAR. Released two days later in 
exchange for three pri soners. German 
Ambassador Von Spreti , kidnapped at end 
of month and killed 5 April when 
government refuses FAR demand for 
release of 17 prisoners. 
Yon Sosa kill ed by Mex i can Forces on 
border. 
Col. Arana Osor; 0 ; naugurated as 
Pres i dent. Mendez Montenegro 1 eaves 
Guatemala for Spain. 
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